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uranium outlook

Top research agencies and industrialists are expecting a steady uranium production in 2025. They believe demand will be driven by rising global demand for nuclear energy as a zero-carbon power source.

In 2024, the market saw an activity uptick, with producers reopening mines and planning expansions to meet the needs of nations like the US, Canada, and the EU. Additionally, adoption and investment in small modular reactors significantly increased uranium demand.

So, what’s in store for uranium in 2025? Can supply keep pace with soaring demand, or will it crumble under the pressure? And what’s the price forecast looking like? Let’s study the report to find out the answers…

2024’s Most Significant Uranium Deals

The demand for nuclear energy has risen leaps and bounds as countries seek low-carbon power to meet their energy demands. Electrification, big data centers, and artificial intelligence (AI) are fueling the push for more reliable and clean energy sources.

uranium production

We have seen many retired power plants being reactivated, and new nuclear construction projects are happening worldwide. This is because, in this new dawn, governments and companies are prioritizing nuclear power as the pillar of energy transition. And this scenario directly connects with the global uranium supply chain.

Significantly, the global uranium market is responding to this increased demand for nuclear energy. Uranium mining stocks surged in 2024 after top tech companies like Meta, Google, Microsoft, and Oracle, announced their entry into nuclear to satiate the energy demand of their data centers. This further shows demand for uranium is going to rise.

One of the most notable deals of last year was Paladin Energy’s acquisition of Canadian company Fission Uranium for CA$1.14 billion. However, this deal has been delayed as the Canadian government raised national security concerns.

Apart from this, several other uranium deals progressed smoothly:

  • Uranium Energy Corp. resumed operations at Willow Creek in Wyoming, marking a key milestone in the company’s production efforts.
  • Paladin Energy Ltd. successfully restarted its Langer Heinrich mine in Namibia, achieving commercial production.
  • Boss Energy began its first drum of uranium produced at its Honeymoon project in Australia in April 2024.
  • IsoEnergy’s acquisition of Anfield Energy expanded its uranium resources significantly. The company’s measured and indicated uranium resources increased to 17 million pounds, with inferred resources now at 10.6 million pounds. This positions IsoEnergy as a potential key player in the U.S. uranium market.

More Power per Punch: Nuclear Energy Outshines Fossil Fuels

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Global Rise in Uranium Activity

Russia’s state-owned Rosatom has been offloading its stakes in Kazakhstan’s uranium mines, with Chinese companies stepping in as key buyers. Notable deals include selling 49.979% of Rosatom’s share in the Zarechnoye mine and transferring a 30% stake in the Khorasan-U joint venture to Chinese firms. These moves reflect a shift toward regional and China’s emergence in the uranium market.

Moving on, in Canada, Cameco Corp. has ambitious plans to increase annual output at its McArthur River mine from 18 million to 25 million pounds, alongside extending the operational life of its Cigar Lake mine. Recently, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also approved Urenco USA’s request to amend its license, allowing for uranium enrichment levels of up to 10% at its New Mexico facility.

France has injected €300m ($330m) into uranium major Orano to revamp the country’s uranium industry. Additionally, Brazil is partnering with mining firms to revive uranium production which is stagnant since Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil SA began operating its sole mine in 1982.

Thus, globally, several countries and companies are stepping up initiatives to expand uranium production.

Uranium Supply and Demand Estimates (2008-2040E)uranium mining

Source: Sprott (UxC and Cameco Corp. Data as of 9/30/2024)

Tax and Trade Tensions: Can Uranium Rise Above the Challenges?

S&P Global has highlighted several challenges for uranium production ranging from timeline to geopolitical tensions, tax policies, and technical challenges faced by some uranium mining giants. We have explained these challenges below:  

To begin with the U.S., Trump’s statement about imposing a 25% tariff on all products from Mexico and Canada has given rise to some serious concerns. In 2023 Canada supplied 27% of uranium to U.S. nuclear plants, making it the largest supplier.

However, the U.S. faces challenges in boosting domestic production. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the U.S. purchased 40.5 million pounds of U3O8 in 2022.

Industry experts predict that utilities will push to ensure uranium imports from Canada remain unaffected by potential tariffs, as Canada is a critical and reliable partner.

Geopolitical tensions have further complicated the uranium trade. In May, the U.S. banned imports of Russian uranium, which accounted for 11.8% of its 2022 uranium supply. In response, Russia restricted enriched uranium exports to the U.S. which escalated trade tensions.

Even leading uranium producers faced substantial setbacks. Kazakhstan’s NAC Kazatomprom, the world’s largest producer, reduced its 2025 output target due to difficulties in securing sulfuric acid, a key material for extraction. Similarly, Orano suspended mining activities at its Somair project as it faced financial strains and permit issues.

Uranium’s Future: Predictions for 2025

Uranium prices had a rollercoaster year in 2024. S&P Global reported that the Platts-assessed spot price of U3O8 peaked at $106.75 per pound in February.

In November 2024, Uranium spot price retraced to $77.08, according to the Sprott Uranium Report. Despite the dip, prices remain higher compared to historical levels, with the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust helping to stabilize around $80.

Image: Uranium Miners vs. Spot Uranium (2014-2024)

uranium priceSource: Sprott (Bloomberg and TradeTech LLC. Data from 9/30/2014 to 9/30/2024)

Looking ahead, several factors are driving optimism for uranium’s 2025 future. A persistent supply crunch, growing focus on nuclear energy, global energy policies, and geopolitical shifts will drive demand in the future.

  • While short-term volatility may persist, experts predict uranium prices will rebound to $90–$100 per pound by mid-2025.

However, significant investments in new mines, conversion plants, and enrichment facilities will be needed to ramp up uranium production. Moreover, overcoming the challenges we have explained before would also play a significant role in uranium’s bright future. 

The post 2025 Uranium Outlook: Will this Critical Commodity Endure its Golden Glow? appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide

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Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.

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Carbon Footprint

Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions

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Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?

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