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As the final gavel came down at 5.30am on Sunday morning, the COP29 UN climate change conference in Baku closed with many unsettled grievances and some ruffled feathers.

From the controversial new climate finance goal, to the adoption of rules for a global carbon market and stalled efforts on cutting planet-heating emissions, the summit’s outcomes were contested and widely seen as inadequate to tackle the urgency of the climate crisis.

The finance deal was hailed as “the start of a new era on climate finance” by the EU’s climate commissioner, but condemned as a “joke” by Nigeria – and India rejected it fiercely as being “too little, too late”.

Climate Home News unpacks COP29’s successes and failures, most of which require further work next year on the path to COP30 in Brazil.

New climate finance goal

Tagged the “Finance COP”, all eyes in Baku were on negotiations towards a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) for climate finance to kick in from 2026. The final deal for wealthy governments to channel at least $300 billion a year by 2035 to developing countries replaced the previous $100-billion annual target set in 2009 for the 2020-2025 period.

From the very beginning, developed countries were strategically silent, as they avoided revealing the amount of finance – or “quantum” – they would be prepared to offer for the new target. Developing-country asks ranged from $440 billion, $600 billion and $900 billion of government finance per year. They proposed an overall target of $1.3 trillion which would include private finance mobilised by governments, but not market-rate loans, export credits or private investment in general.

As negotiations moved into the second week and towards the final days, developing countries became impatient with the lack of clarity. As whispers of a number ranging from $200bn-$300bn spread through the conference, Bolivian negotiator Diego Pacheco labelled the $200bn figure “a joke” during a press conference in the sidelines of COP29.

On Friday, the last official day of the conference, a number was finally put on the table by the COP29 presidency, suggesting $250bn a year – to the disappointment of developing countries. The African Group’s lead negotiator Ali Mohamed said this was “totally unacceptable”.

The talks took a further dramatic turn on Saturday when governments received a draft text containing a slightly higher offer of $300bn a year for  the core government-led finance goal. This and other issues infuriated the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), who stormed out of the negotiations in protest just hours before the closing plenary.

Namibia uses COP29 climate summit to push for oil and gas investments

After LDCs and SIDs won some concessions – but not on the size of the goal – the presidency gavelled through the deal pledging at least $300 billion a year by 2035, with developed countries “taking the lead” on providing it. The text says the money will come “from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources”.

The existing $100bn goal includes direct government finance, a proportion of the public funding that flows through multilateral development banks (MDBs) and private finance “mobilised” by government money and export credits. It is unclear if the $300bn covers the same elements or more, experts said.

Under the $100bn goal, only 70% of MDB climate finance is counted, which excludes the share contributed by large emerging economies like China, India and Brazil.

But to the anger of some developing countries – especially India – the new goal recognises “the voluntary intention” of governments “to count all climate-related outflows from and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks towards achievement of the goal”.

UN climate chief Simon Stiell hugging COP29 president Mukhtar Babayev in the closing plenary of negotiations in Baku, Azerbaijan.

UN climate chief Simon Stiell hugs COP29 president Mukhtar Babayev at the closing plenary in Baku, Azerbaijan. (Photo: UNFCCC)

SIDS finance negotiator Michai Robertson told Climate Home that how MDB finance is counted and which private sources would be included in the $300bn will only be decided by the UNFCCC’s Standing Committe on Finance when countries report the first post-2025 figures, which will not be until 2028.

Fractious COP29 lands $300bn climate finance goal, dashing hopes of the poorest

A larger target of $1.3 trillion a year by 2035 was also set in Baku to scale up all sources of spending to combat climate change, including private investments in the Global South that are not linked to governments. How this broader target will be reached is uncertain, and will be discussed in the coming year under a “Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T”.

The roadmap will look into “grants, concessional and non debt-creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space” and produce a report by COP30 next year in Belem. It was first announced at a press conference in Baku by ministers from Colombia, Kenya, Barbados, Honduras and Panama. Barbados’ minister said it would consider measures such as redirecting fossil fuel subsidies in rich countries to climate action in the Global South.

SIDS negotiator Robertson criticised the roadmap as “a lot of smoke and mirrors”, adding that it was unclear how it would work.

Meanwhile the new finance goal also “encourages” developing countries to make contributions to climate finance “on a voluntary basis”, which they were not requested to do for the existing $100bn goal. While no countries are specified, the rich donor governments that pushed for this have said they want wealthier developing countries like China, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to chip in.

Cutting greenhouse gas emissions

Last year at COP28 in the UAE, countries completed the first global review of climate policies under the 2015 Paris Agreement – a process known as the global stocktake (GST). Among other things, last year’s deal saw countries commit to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030 and “transition away” from fossil fuels in energy systems in a fair manner to achieve the goals of the Paris pact, including limiting global warming to “well below” 2C and ideally to 1.5C.

In Baku, countries were meant to launch the “UAE Dialogue” to work out how to implement the recommendations from the GST and inform the upcoming round of new and stronger national climate plans – known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – due in 2025.

However, at COP29 countries did not reach consensus on advancing the UAE Dialogue, after Saudi Arabia blocked any references to fossil fuels in the text, in what observers described as “destructive” opposition.

Governments were also split on whether the UAE Dialogue should address issues beyond financing the commitments made at COP28, which Saudi negotiators claimed was the main scope of the dialogue. They used this as an excuse to avoid discussions on the energy transition.

Negotiators in the hallways of COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan.

Negotiators in the hallways of COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan. (Photo: UNFCCC)

A watered-down draft text proposed to “reaffirm” last year’s pledge without calling out fossil fuels by name, and also emphasised the role of “transitional fuels” – which could be interpreted to mean fossil gas.

Latin American countries, developed countries and small islands opposed this text, meaning that the talks on the dialogue had to be pushed to June 2025, aiming for a new outcome at COP30 next November.

Without a deal in Baku, countries missed the chance to adopt two new targets viewed as key for the energy transition: one aiming to increase energy storage capacity to 1,500 gigawatts by 2030 and another pledging to add 25 million kilometres of power grids by 2030.

In a different strand of the talks – a “non-prescriptive” effort to enhance emissions reductions known as the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) – countries approved a weak text after Saudi negotiators almost managed to collapse talks on it earlier in the summit, causing the COP29 presidency to step in and revive them.

All mentions of fossil fuels were removed from the MWP, as well as any mention of COP28’s pledges to reverse deforestation by 2030, phase out fossil fuel subsidies and triple renewables by 2030.

The outcome frustrated developed countries which said the text failed to send strong signals for ambitious NDCs next year. Germany’s climate envoy Jennifer Morgan called the MWP decision a “big step back”.

Just transition

Countries also failed to reach an agreement on the just transition work programme (JTWP) at COP29 – a deal meant to support workers and communities affected by the transition away from fossil fuels towards cleaner energy.

Governments were divided on issues of human and labour rights, measures seen as restricting free trade, adaptation and emissions reductions. A major bone of contention was whether to designate finance to support plans for a just transition.

Fatuma Hussein, Africa’s lead negotiator on just transition, told Climate Home that developed countries wanted to keep discussions focused on “national dimensions” rather than what needs to be done internationally to enable just transition on a global scale. She added that the lack of finance was “the biggest departure point” causing developing countries to reject the draft text.

COP29 host Azerbaijan shelves fossil-fuelled climate fund

Negotiations on this issue fell down the COP29 presidency’s list of priorities as the finance talks became heated. It set up a last-minute contact group and presented a final draft to save the JTWP, but no agreement was reached. Talks will continue in June next year, with international trade unions expressing their concern over the lack of a decision on next steps in Baku.

Activists calling for "trillions" in climate finance at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan.

Activists calling for “trillions” in climate finance at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan. (Photo: UNFCCC)

Global goal on adaptation

Work on the global goal on adaptation (GGA) – which is enshrined in the Paris Agreement but has yet to be implemented – made little progress during most of COP29, due to a lack of consensus on the means of implementation, generally understood to mean finance. In the end, a procedure to move the goal forward was agreed, called the Baku Adaptation Road Map.

Unwillingness from developed countries to put money on the table, as well as the difficulty of selecting indicators to measure progress, held back the talks at COP29, experts told Climate Home.

The GGA was adopted in 2015 with a view to enhancing resilience to climate change impacts, but countries defined a set of guidelines for it only last year, known as the UAE Framework. In Baku, countries were meant to advance on identifying indicators to measure progress, under a process known as the UAE-Belém Work Programme, which is due to be finalised next year at COP30.

However, in addition to the contention around finance, the role of transformational adaptation – meaning deep, long-term societal changes that influence sustainable development – was another obstacle to progress, as some developing countries like Senegal kicked back against it, saying it could throw up new barriers in accessing finance.

In the second week of COP29, countries agreed to defer a review of the GGA framework until after the second global stocktake in 2028. But the Baku Adaptation Road Map was launched to enable talks to continue in 2025.

Richard Klein, a senior researcher on adaptation at the Stockholm Environment Institute, told Climate Home that the GGA did not take substantive steps forward at COP29, further delaying implementation. Meanwhile, he said, “the gap between the adaptation action needed and what is being implemented continues to widen.”

India fires warning shot with rejection of finance deal at COP29

Gender work programme

This year, the main focus of the gender negotiations at the UN climate summit was the renewal of the Lima Work Programme (LWP), under which a Gender Action Plan is produced every five years – both of which establish guidelines for gender-responsive climate policies.

Some conservative countries, including the Vatican, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, successfully lobbied to remove some human rights-related language from the decision text on issues including diversity and intersectionality that had been being championed mainly by Latin American nations and the EU.

In the end, an agreement was reached, renewing the Lima Work Programme for another 10 years, with a review scheduled in five years, and a new gender action plan due to be drawn up in 2025.

Another topic of discussion was whether to house the LWP under the Paris Agreement or the UN climate convention. Some parties wanted it to be addressed in talks on both, but others argued that that would double the work. Countries decided to keep it just under the convention.

They also agreed to work on data that will be broken down by gender and age, gender-responsive implementation of just transitions, creating quality jobs for women that are aligned with national climate plans, and simplifying access to finance for grassroots women’s groups and Indigenous women.

Feminists call for climate justice at the COP29 negotiations in Baku, Azerbaijan. (Photo: Mariel Lozada)

Carbon markets

At COP29, talks on setting up a new global carbon market made a significant breakthrough after nearly a decade of discussions, as countries agreed on a package of rules under the Paris Agreement’s “Article 6”.

On the first day of the Baku summit, the COP29 presidency scored an early win as countries approved guidelines laying the foundations for  a regime to develop and trade carbon credits. This agreement was hailed by COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev as a “breakthrough” that “achieves full operationalisation of Article 6” – but experts criticised the procedure that was followed.

After failing to secure agreement in previous years, the rules were eventually crafted by a technical committee and then presented to governments at COP29.

With approval of the rules on Article 6.2, which regulates bilateral emissions trading between countries, and 6.4, which sets up an international carbon market, countries will now finalise technical details and could kick off the new markets from 2025.

But campaigners expressed concerns over the quality of the credits and how to deal with any problems. According to Carbon Market Watch, the rules agreed for Article 6.2 may not be strong enough to ensure real emissions reductions, as trades require less immediate transparency. Key technical information is not required to be disclosed until after trades have already happened, which could take years, the NGO warned.

The first batch of credits to be traded under the new Paris market is likely to consist of old offsets originally developed under the Kyoto Protocol-era’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), many of which were regarded as delivering little concrete benefit for the climate.

(Reporting by Vivian Chime, Mariel Lozada and Joe Lo; editing by Sebastian Rodriguez, Joe Lo and Megan Rowling)

The post What was decided at the COP29 climate summit in Baku? appeared first on Climate Home News.

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Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change

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A federal election is taking place in Germany on 23 February, following the collapse of the coalition government at the end of last year.

Germans will vote to elect 630 members of the nation’s parliament.

Polling suggests there will be a political shift to the right, with the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the lead and far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) set to make significant gains.

A “traffic light” coalition of parties has ruled since 2021, led by the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), alongside the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).

However, successive crises led to its breakup at the end of 2024, when the liberal, free market-oriented FDP split from the rest.

This prompted a vote of no confidence by the German parliament, which, in turn, triggered a snap election several months earlier than previously scheduled.

The coalition government has been plagued by ideological differences, particularly between the FDP and its two centre-left partners.

Climate policies were at the heart of many of the disputes. 

The centre-left SPD and Greens have broadly favoured more public spending on climate issues, while the FDP is opposed to state intervention of any sort.

In the interactive grid below, Carbon Brief tracks the commitments made by each of the main parties in their election manifestos, across a range of issues related to climate and energy.

The parties covered are:

  • Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU): The centre-right CDU and its regional Bavarian “sister party”, CSU, has been the dominant political force in modern Germany and is currently polling highest ahead of the election.
  • Social Democratic Party (SPD): The centre-left SPD has led the ruling coalition in Germany since the last election in 2021 and has traditionally been the other dominant party in the nation’s politics.
  • Green Party: The centre-left and environmentalist Greens have been part of the coalition government since 2021.
  • Free Democratic Party (FDP): The FDP is an economically liberal party that prioritises free markets and privatisation. It was part of the coalition government, but its departure at the end of 2024 ultimately triggered the federal election.
  • Left Party: In recent years, this left-wing, democratic-socialist party has lost much of its support base in the east of the country.
  • Alternative for Germany (AfD): The far-right party has become a major force in the country’s politics over the past decade, particularly in eastern Germany.
  • Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW): The party was only founded last year, as an offshoot of the Left Party, but it has rapidly risen in popularity with a left-wing economic message and a conservative approach to some social and cultural issues.

Each entry in the grid represents a direct quote from a manifesto document.

Net-zero and climate framing

Climate action has become a divisive topic in German politics.

This is evident in the major parties’ manifestos, which range from supporting more ambitious net-zero goals to outright climate scepticism.

Germany is currently aiming to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045, with interim targets including a 65% cut by 2030.

Government climate advisors on the Council of Experts on Climate Change have stated that the nation is on track to miss the 2030 target.

Despite starting out with ambitious aims, the coalition’s climate progress has faltered, with the FDP successfully pushing for weaker climate policies. Moreover, a major court ruling curtailed the government’s climate spending by enforcing Germany’s limit on debt. 

Amid these wider tensions, Germany’s two traditionally dominant parties still want to retain the nation’s headline climate target. The CDU, which is leading the polls in the run-up to election day, commits to meeting the Paris Agreement goals in its manifesto, saying its sights are “firmly set” on net-zero by 2045.

The SPD, which is currently third in the polls and likely to end up in coalition with the CDU, also supports the 2045 net-zero target, as well as the interim goals.

However, the two parties differ substantially in their approach to meeting the 2045 target. The CDU prioritises carbon pricing and rejects the tougher policies to decarbonise heating and transport favoured by the SPD. (See: Heating dispute and Combustion engine phaseout.)

Meanwhile, the AfD manifesto repeatedly questions the “supposed scientific consensus” on “man-made climate change”. The party, which is currently second in the polls, “therefore rejects every policy and every tax that is related to alleged climate protection”.

Mainstream German parties across the spectrum have long agreed to a “firewall” against far-right groups, meaning they will not form coalitions with the AfD. However, the CDU recently sparked controversy when it backed an anti-immigration policy with the AfD.

The Green Party also supports the 2045 net-zero target in its manifesto, emphasising Germany’s status as the EU member state with the highest emissions. The Left Party goes further, calling for a 2040 net-zero goal.

As for the FDP, its manifesto argues for the 2045 net-zero goal to be pushed back to 2050, stating that this would align Germany with the EU target. Prior to exiting the coalition government last year, the party had demanded this policy change, claiming that it would be a way to boost the German economy.

(Germany already revised its net-zero target, bringing it forward by five years, following a supreme court ruling in 2021 that its 2050 goal was insufficient. Moreover, even with a later goal, Germany would still need to align with wider EU targets, meaning its climate policies may not change much due to its “effort sharing” obligations.)

Finally, the BSW is not specific about when the net-zero goal should be achieved, but pushes for a “departure from the wishful thinking of quickly achieving complete climate neutrality”.

It does not reject climate policies outright, stating that climate change should be “taken seriously”. However, it frames many climate policies as being “extremely expensive and often unrealistic”.

Heating dispute

Home heating has become a major political issue in Germany. Along with transport, buildings make up one of the key German sectors that have repeatedly missed their decarbonisation goals, prompting the coalition government to take action.

Towards the end of 2023, the German parliament passed an amendment to the Building Energy Act, meaning that newly installed heating systems had to be powered by at least 65% renewable energy. 

This covered heat pumps, “hydrogen-ready” gas boilers and other low-carbon systems. There are caveats to ensure the law is phased in gradually in different areas and types of homes, starting with new builds.

The amendment had been watered down compared to the coalition’s initial proposal, with allowances for people to keep gas boilers for longer. This followed relentless campaigning by the AfD and the right-leaning tabloid newspaper Bild, which dubbed the policy the “heizhammer” – or “heating hammer”.

There were also attacks from within the coalition, with the FDP criticising the law proposed by its partners in the Greens and SDP. Opponents framed the policy as an excessive burden on consumers.

These disputes are reflected in the election manifestos, with many parties outright rejecting the amended law. The CDU, FDP and AfD all say they would abolish it, as does the populist left BSW.

Meanwhile, the Green Party pledges to provide more government support for the installation of new heating systems by covering up to 70% of the price. The Left Party commits to covering 100% of the cost for low-income households.

(The current law covers 30% of the cost as a starting subsidy, with more available for low-income households and people who replace their boilers before 2028.)

Combustion engine phaseout

Several German political parties are pushing back against the EU-wide ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars, which is set to come into effect in 2035.

The CDU says the “ban on combustion engines must be reversed”, while the AfD says the “one-sided preference for electromobility must be stopped immediately”.

(EVs are “likely crucial” for tackling transport emissions, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC].)

The FDP and the BSW also argue that the 2035 phaseout date should be dropped, with less focus on the transition to electric cars. (This is in spite of Germany being the second-biggest manufacturer of electric cars in the world.)

These parties also favour getting rid of supposed “anti-car” policies. For example, they oppose speed limits on the German “autobahns” and support funding for alternative fuels, such as synthetic fuels.

The issue with ending the 2035 ban on new combustion-engine cars is that this policy is set at the EU level. Far-right and centre-right coalitions within the EU, including German parties, have been pushing hard to weaken the ban across the bloc. 

However, the centre-left parties that may end up forming a coalition with the CDU, notably the SPD, stand by the 2035 phaseout date.

There is growing pressure on Germany’s car industry, linked to global competition and slow economic growth. Some German industry figures have stressed the need for consistent policy signals from the government, regarding the transition to electric vehicles.

Clean energy and fossil fuels

Broadly speaking, German parties on the left tend to be more supportive of renewables, while strongly opposing nuclear power. Those on the right are generally more open to nuclear and in some cases coal power.

Germany, which uses more coal than any other EU member state, has a coal power phaseout date of 2038. This is supported by the CDU and the FDP, but the Greens and the Left Party want a quicker phaseout by 2030.

(When the coalition government formed in 2021, the parties agreed to “ideally” move the coal phaseout date to 2030, but this has not happened formally. The SPD manifesto does not include any mention of coal power,)

Only the AfD advocates for the construction of new coal power plants, framing them as filling a gap until new nuclear plants are built.

Last year, Germany closed down its final nuclear reactors, bringing an end to a long-term plan to phase out the power source. However, nuclear power continues to be a politicised topic, with some arguing that its continued use is necessary to ensure the nation’s energy security.

Notably, the CDU suggests in its manifesto that it is open to reviving nuclear power in the future. It proposes an “expert review” around restarting closed plants and advocates for research on advanced nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors.

Despite this wording, CDU leader Friedrich Merz has conceded that it is unlikely any old reactors will be restarted. This echoes views expressed by German utility companies and energy experts.

Both the CDU and the SPD support the expansion of renewables in their manifestos. The Greens include a specific target to achieve a net-zero electricity grid by 2035. By contrast, the AfD calls for an end to wind power expansion, in favour of other technologies.

Finally, both the far-right AfD and the BSW say the German government should repair the damaged Nord Stream pipelines in order to import what the BSW refers to as “cheap” gas from Russia. (The Baltic Sea pipelines were blown up in 2022 under mysterious circumstances.)

Germany has tried to wean itself off Russian gas since the country’s invasion of Ukraine, with considerable success. However, both the AfD and the BSW are more open to cooperating with Russia, and less supportive of Ukraine, than mainstream German parties.

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Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica 

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“Atmospheric rivers” are bringing rain to the frozen slopes of the West Antarctic ice sheet, hitting the ice shelves that play a major role in holding back rapidly retreating glaciers.

In a new study, my colleagues and I show how rain is occurring in sub-zero temperatures due to these “rivers in the sky” – long, narrow plumes of air which transport heat and moisture from the tropics to the mid-latitudes and poles.

Rain in Antarctica is significant, not only because it is a stark indicator of climate change, but because it remains an under-studied phenomenon which could impact ice shelves.

Ice shelves in Antarctica are important gatekeepers of sea level rise.

They act as a buffer for glaciers that flow off the vast ice sheet, slowing the rate at which ice is released into the ocean.

In the study, we explore the causes of rain falling on ice shelves in the Amundsen Sea embayment region, which stand in front of the critically important Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers.

Researchers have warned the collapse of ice shelves in this region could trigger the loss of the entire West Antarctic ice sheet over several centuries.

Rivers in the sky

Atmospheric rivers are typically associated with bringing extreme rainfall to the mid-latitudes, but, in the frigid Antarctic, they can deliver metres of snow in just a few days. 

In West Antarctica, atmospheric rivers deliver a disproportionate quantity of the year’s snowfall. Research shows they account for around 13% of annual snowfall totals, despite occurring on just a few days per year.

But what makes atmospheric rivers in Antarctica so interesting is that snow is only part of the story. In extreme cases, they can also bring rain.

To explore how extreme precipitation affects the Amundsen Sea embayment region, we focused on two events associated with atmospheric rivers in 2020. The summer case took place over a week in February and the winter case over six days in June.

We used three regional climate models to simulate the two extreme weather events around the Thwaites and Pine Island ice shelves, then compared the results with snowfall observations.

During both the winter and summer cases, we find that atmospheric rivers dumped tens of metres of snow over the course of a week or so.

Meanwhile, the quantities of rain driven by these events were not insignificant. We observed up to 30mm of rain on parts of the Thwaites ice shelf in summer and up to 9mm in winter.

Amundsen sea, map.
A map of the Amundsen Sea embayment region in West Antarctica. Source: Produced by the British Antarctic Survey’s Mapping and Geographic Information Centre, 2025.

A mountain to climb

Antarctica’s cold climate and steep, icy topography make it unique. It also makes the region prone to rain in sub-zero temperatures.

The first reason for this is the foehn effect, which is when air forced over a mountain range warms as it descends on the downward slope.

Commonly observed across Antarctica, it is an important cause of melting over ice shelves on the Antarctic peninsula, the northernmost point of the continent. 

When air passes over the mountainous terrain of the West Antarctic ice sheet during atmospheric river events, temperatures near the surface of the ice shelves can climb above the melting point of 0C.

This can accentuate the formation of rain and drizzle that stays liquid below 0C – also known as “supercooled drizzle”.

Another factor which leads to liquid drizzle, rather than snow, in sub-zero conditions is a lack of dust and dirt – particles which are usually needed to trigger the formation of ice crystals in clouds.

In the pristine Antarctic, these particles – which act as “ice nuclei” – are few and far between. That means that pure liquid water can exist even when temperatures are below 0C.

The origins of rain over ice shelves

It is easy to assume that rain that reaches the surface in Antarctica is just snow that has melted after falling through a warm layer of air caused by the foehn effect. Indeed, this is what we initially supposed.

But our research shows that more rain reaches the surface of Antarctica when the air near the ground is within a few degrees of freezing.

At times when the foehn effect is strongest, there is often little or no rainfall, because it evaporates before it gets a chance to reach the surface.

However, we saw rain falling well above the warm layer of air near the surface, where temperatures were universally below 0C – and, in some cases, as low as -11C.

Rare rain

Rain in Antarctica is a rare occurrence. The region’s normally frigid temperatures mean that most precipitation over the continent falls as snow.

However, exactly how rare rain is in the region remains relatively unknown, because there are virtually zero measurements of rainfall in Antarctica.

There are a number of reasons for this – rain falls infrequently, and it is very difficult to measure in the hostile Antarctic environment.

Our results show that extreme events such as atmospheric rivers can bring rain. And it is likely that rain will become a more common occurrence in the future as temperatures rise and extreme weather events occur more frequently.

However, until rain starts being measured in Antarctica, scientists will have to rely entirely on models to predict rain, as we did in this research.

It is also not yet known exactly how rain could impact ice in Antarctica.

We do know that rain falling on snow darkens the surface, which can enhance melting, leading to greater ice losses. Meanwhile, rain that refreezes in the snowpack or trickles to the base of the ice can change the way that glaciers flow, impacting the resilience of ice shelves to fracture.

So, if we want to understand the future of the frozen continent, we need to start thinking about rain too. Because while rain may be rare now, it may not be for long.

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Colombia’s COP16 presidency in suspense as minister resigns

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Susana Muhamad, Colombia’s minister of environment since 2022 and president of the COP16 UN biodiversity negotiations, has announced she will step down from government, but has asked President Gustavo Petro to let her stay in her post to conclude the UN nature talks later in February.

In her resignation letter, addressed to the president and dated February 8, Muhamad said she was quitting as a minister but urged him to consider “the need to conclude COP16” – the summit left unfinished in Colombia last year and now scheduled to resume from February 25 to 27 in Rome.

“I’ve led the complex negotiations in progress and I exercise the role of president (of the COP). Therefore, if you so decide, this resignation could be made effective from March 3,” the letter reads.

Muhamad has been one of the most vocal opponents of the recent appointment of former senator Armando Benedetti as Petro’s chief of staff. Benedetti has faced allegations of domestic abuse and corruption, and was previously fired as ambassador to Venezuela by Petro himself.

In a televised session of the council of ministers held last week, Muhamad heavily opposed Benedetti’s appointment and threatened to resign if he remained in the cabinet. “As a feminist and as a woman, I cannot sit at this table of our progressive project with Armando Benedetti,” she told Petro.

According to Oscar Soria, veteran biodiversity campaigner and CEO of think-tank The Common Initiative, the Colombian government is likely to keep Muhamad as COP president, but her resignation could have a negative impact on the talks.

“To have a good result in Rome, proactive and energetic diplomatic work by the presidency was needed in the last months. However, some key issues have not been discussed recently. The internal political crisis (in Colombia) has likely been a great distraction,” Soria told Climate Home.

Since Muhamad’s announcement, several other ministers have also resigned, leading Petro to place all of his cabinet on hold and asking for “protocolary resignations” from every member.

“It’s not clear how much support from the president and ministers (Muhamad) can count on when her counterparts from other countries need to be approached by the Colombian foreign service,” Soria added.

Upcoming nature talks

The COP16 biodiversity negotiations are set to resume later this month, with important decisions coming up on finance for nature and a monitoring framework to track progress on nature restoration. These decisions were left pending after negotiators ran out of time in Cali, Colombia, last year.

One of the most pressing issues is the future of the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF), which currently sits under the Global Environment Facility (GEF) until 2030. Some developing countries have called for the creation of a new fund, citing barriers at the GEF to access the funds.

Observers said COP16 could play an important role in the future of biodiversity finance, especially as the new US president, Donald Trump, cuts development funding for climate and nature projects.

“In Rome, countries must give a firm response to the measures and visions promoted by the Trump administration, reaffirming [their] commitment to protecting biodiversity,” said Karla Maas, campaigner at Climate Action Network (CAN) Latin America.

“This implies guaranteeing public resources for conservation instead of depending on the will of private actors or philanthropy,” Maas added.

(Reporting by Sebastian Rodriguez; editing by Megan Rowling)

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