UK chancellor Rachel Reeves has announced new measures to cut energy bills alongside a “pay-per-mile” electric-vehicle levy as part of Labour’s second budget.
The policy changes are expected to cut typical household bills by around £134 per year, amid intense political scrutiny of energy prices and a government pledge to reduce them.
This cut is achieved through a combination of moving a portion of renewable-energy subsidies from bills to general taxation and ending a support scheme for energy-efficiency measures.
Reeves has also retained a long-standing freeze on fuel-duty rates on petrol and diesel, albeit with a plan to “gradually” reverse the extra cuts introduced under the previous government.
With fuel-duty receipts set to fall as people opt for electric vehicles, the government has also laid out its plan for an “electric vehicle excise duty” from 2028, to replace lost revenue.
The government has also announced new “transitional energy certificates” to allow new oil and gas production at or nearby to existing sites, as part of its plan for the future of the North Sea.
Below, Carbon Brief runs through the key climate- and energy-focused announcements from the budget.
- Energy bills
- Electric vehicles
- Fuel duty
- North Sea oil and gas
- Nuclear, ‘green finance’, critical minerals and rail
Energy bills
The chancellor used her budget speech to announce two major changes that will cut dual-fuel energy bills for the average household by £134 per year from April 2026.
The first is to bring the “energy company obligation” (ECO) to an end, once its current programme of work wraps up at the end of the financial year. This will cut bills by £63 per year, according to Carbon Brief analysis of the forthcoming energy price cap, which will apply from 1 January 2026.
The second is for the Treasury to cover three-quarters of the cost of the “renewables obligation” (RO) for households, for three years from April 2026. This will cut bills by £70 per year.
The total impact for typical households – those using gas and electricity – will be to cut bills by an average of £134 per year over the three-year period to April 2029.
(As explained in footnote 77 of the budget “red book”, this rises to an average of £154 per year, when including households that use electric heating and are not connected to the gas grid. This figure is then rounded to £150 per year in government communications around the budget.)
Notably, given the political attention on energy prices, this three-year period of discounted bills runs through to just before the next general election, which must be held by August 2029.
There has been furious debate over the past year over the causes and the most effective solutions to the UK’s high energy bills. A Carbon Brief factcheck published earlier this year showed that it was high gas prices, rather than net-zero policies, which has been keeping bills high.
Nevertheless, a politicised debate has continued and there has also been increasing attention on the factors that will put pressure on bills in the near future, such as efforts to strengthen the electricity grid.
At the same time, the advisory Climate Change Committee (CCC) has repeatedly advised the government that it should make electricity cheaper, as so much of the UK’s climate strategy depends on getting homes and businesses to use electricity for heat and transport.
The changes in the budget will go some way to addressing this.
Carbon Brief calculations show that they would cut unit prices for domestic electricity users by around 4p per kilowatt hour (kWh) – roughly 16% – from 28p/kWh under the next price-cap period from the start of 2026, down to around 23p/kWh.
However, the red book says the government wants to further “improve” the price of electricity relative to gas, often referred to as “rebalancing”. It explains:
“The government is committed to doing more to reduce electricity costs for all households and improve the price of electricity relative to gas…The government will set out how it intends to deliver this through the ‘warm homes plan’.”
Under ECO, which has been in place since 2013, utility firms must install energy efficiency measures in fuel-poor homes, funded by a levy on energy bills.
It replaced two earlier schemes, known as CERT and CESP, with reduced funding after then-prime minister David Cameron reportedly told ministers to “get rid of the green crap”. This shift coincided with a precipitous decline in the number of homes being treated with new efficiency measures.
The ECO scheme has been hit by a series of scandals, with a recent National Audit Office report citing “clear failures” in its design, resulting in “widespread issues with the quality of installations”.
Pre-budget media reports had speculated that the government would pay for ongoing energy efficiency initiatives after scrapping ECO, using funding from the forthcoming “warm homes plan”. This speculation had suggested that subsidies for heat pumps would be cut as a result.
Instead, the budget includes an extra £1.5bn of funding for the warm homes plan, to cover the additional cost of taking over from ECO. (The total cost of ECO was around £1.7bn.)
Adam Bell, head of policy at the consultancy group Stonehaven and the government’s former head of energy policy, tells Carbon Brief that, while this £1.5bn is not the total cost of ECO, the scheme had been “terribly inefficient”. He adds that a government-run alternative that tackles home upgrades on an area-by-area basis was “likely to be cheaper”.
Contrary to much pre-budget speculation in the media, the chancellor did not reduce the already-discounted 5% rate of VAT on energy bills. Nor did she scrap the “carbon price support”, a top-up carbon tax on electricity generators.
Finally, the budget red book says that the government “recently confirmed” an increase in the level of relief for certain industrial users, from electricity network charges.
It says that, in total from 2027, the “British industrial competitiveness scheme” will cut electricity costs for affected businesses by £35-40 per megawatt hour.
Electric vehicles
The budget confirmed the introduction of a new “pay-per-mile” charge for electric vehicles, to raise more than £1bn in additional tax revenue by the end of this decade.
It has long been expected that fuel-duty receipts will begin to fall as electric vehicles start making up a rising share of cars on the road.
In its report accompanying the budget, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) forecasts a decline to around half of current levels in the 2030s in real terms, before falling to near-zero by 2050.
As such, the new charge on EVs will help maintain road infrastructure, the budget states. The “red book” notes that the new tax will see EV drivers paying a “fair share”. It adds:
“All vehicles contribute to congestion and wear and tear on the roads, but drivers of petrol and diesel vehicles pay fuel duty at the pump to contribute their fair share, whereas drivers of electric vehicles do not currently pay an equivalent.”
The electric vehicle excise duty (eVED) will come into effect in April 2028 at a rate of 3p per mile for battery electric vehicles and 1.5p per mile for plug-in hybrid cars, according to the OBR report.
The budget red book says this will mean the average driver of a battery electric vehicle paying “around £240 per year”. This is roughly half of the rate of fuel duty paid per mile by petrol and diesel car owners. (See: Fuel duty.)
(EVs will remain significantly cheaper to run than their combustion-engine equivalents. According to the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit thinktank, EVs would still be £1,000 cheaper to run per year than petrol equivalents, even after the new eVED charge.)
Currently, there is no equivalent to fuel duty for electric vehicles. Excise duty was brought in for EVs for the first time in April 2025, costing £10 for the first year and then rising to a standard rate of £195 per year – an increase announced in last year’s budget.
The introduction of the eVED is expected to raise £1.1bn in 2028-29 and £1.9bn in 2030-31, dependent on electric-vehicle uptake in the coming years.
The revenue generated by the eVED will “support investment in maintaining and improving the condition of roads”, the budget adds, with the government committing to £2bn in annual investment by 2029-30 for local authorities to repair and renew roads.
A consultation will be published seeking views on the implementation of eVED, the budget notes. It adds that there will be no requirement to report where or when the miles are driven, or to install trackers in cars.
The OBR report states that the additional charge of the eVED “is likely” to reduce demand for electric cars, due to increasing their lifetime costs.
Overall, it estimates that there will be around 440,000 fewer electric car sales across the forecast period relative to its previous forecast.
New support for EV buyers and manufacturers also announced in the budget could help offset 130,000 of this impact, the report notes.
This includes a boost to the electric car grant, which was launched in July and currently offers up to £3,750 off eligible vehicles.
The budget announces an increase of £1.3bn in funding for the programme, as well as an extension out to 2029-30.
Additional measures include an increase in the threshold at which EV owners have to pay the “expensive car supplement” from £40,000 to £50,000 from April 2026. This is expected to cost the government £0.5bn in 2030-31, the OBR notes.
The government will delay changes to “benefit-in-kind” (BIK) rules for employee car-ownership schemes until April 2030. This is a continuation of a policy announced in Reeve’s first budget as chancellor in 2024, which delayed the previously planned increase in BIK rates to 9% per year for electric vehicles by 2029, instead increasing them to just 2% per year out to 2029-30.
EV manufacturers will see the research and innovation Drive35 programme extended, with a further £1.5bn allocated to the project to 2035. This takes total funding for the project to £4bn over the next 10 years, according to the government.
Beyond the vehicles, the budget includes investment for EV charging infrastructure – also partly funded through the eVED revenues, it notes – with an additional £100m allocated. This builds on the £400m announced in the spending review in June.
Additionally, funding will be allocated to local authorities to support the rollout of public chargepoints, a consultation will be launched on permitting rights for cross-pavement EV charging and a 10-year 100% business-rates relief for eligible EV chargepoints will be introduced.
Fuel duty
Former Conservative governments repeatedly cancelled inflation-linked increases in fuel duty – a tax paid on petrol and diesel – every year since 2010.
Fuel duty was cut by an additional 5p per litre in 2022 by then-Conservative chancellor Rishi Sunak in response to the energy crisis.
Successive freezes in fuel duty have substantially increased the UK’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by lowering the cost of driving and, therefore, encouraging people to use their cars more and low-carbon transport options less.
Last year, Reeves opted to maintain the existing freezes and cuts introduced by her predecessors.
In the new autumn budget, she has once again announced a freeze on fuel-duty rates for an additional five months from April until September 2026.
Beyond that, the government says the 5p additional cut introduced in 2022 will be reversed – “gradually returning to March 2022 levels by March 2027”. However, the planned increase in fuel-duty rates in line with inflation for 2026-27 will be cancelled.
Then, from April 2027 onwards, the government says that fuel-duty rates will increase annually to reflect inflation.
In total, the 16 years of delays to expected increases in fuel duty rates – plus the “temporary” 5p cut – will have cost the Treasury £120bn by 2026-27, compared to the expected rise in line with inflation from 2010 onwards, according to the OBR.
Increasing fuel duty is very unpopular. However, research by the Social Market Foundation thinktank suggests persistent freezes have “done little for average Brits”, with the wealthiest in the country disproportionately benefiting.
Meanwhile, the government is also responding to the long-term decline in fuel-duty receipts “as more people choose to switch to cleaner, greener electric cars” by introducing a new per-mile charge on electric-vehicle use from 2028. (See: Electric vehicles.)
North Sea oil and gas
Much of the environmentally focused coverage previewing the budget centred on government plans to allow for new oil and gas production on or near existing field sites in the North Sea.
This was formally announced in the North Sea future plan, a 127-page document outlining the government’s approach to put the region “at the heart of Britain’s clean energy and industrial future” and “deliver the next generation of good, new jobs”.
(The plan was published in response to a consultation held earlier this year on the North Sea’s future, involving nearly 1,000 responses from stakeholders, including oil and gas companies and environmental groups.)
The future plan outlines that the North Sea is an ageing oil and gas basin, “much more so than other areas of the world”, and that production has been “naturally declining over the past 25 years”.
It includes the chart below, showing past and projected oil and gas production.
It adds that the decline of the basin caused direct jobs in oil and gas production to fall by a third between 2014 and 2023, according to official statistics.
The plan also has a section on the UK’s “proud history” of international climate leadership.
It notes that the UK is committed to the Paris Agreement, which has the aim to keep global warming to well-below 2C, while pursuing efforts to keep it at 1.5C, by the end of the century.
It continues:
“Scientific evidence from the International Energy Agency, UN Environment Programme and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that new fossil fuel exploration risks exceeding the 1.5C threshold. The IPCC warns that emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure alone could surpass the remaining global carbon budget, reinforcing the urgency to phase out fossil fuels.”
The plan says that the UK “now has the opportunity to lead in clean energy”, which “is both a national and global imperative”.
With this backdrop, the plan reaffirms Labour’s manifesto commitment to not issue any new oil and gas licences.
However, the plan says that the government will introduce “transitional energy certificates” to allow new oil and gas drilling on or near to existing fields, as long as this additional production does not require exploration.
An analysis by the North Sea transition charity Uplift found that the amount of oil and gas that could be produced by such certificates is “relatively small”.
It suggested that new discoveries within a 50km radius of existing productions contain just 25m barrels of oil and 20m barrels of oil equivalent of gas.
(By comparison, the Rosebank oil field, which is currently seeking development consent from the government, would produce nearly 500m barrels of oil and gas equivalent in its lifetime.)
In a footnote on page 36, the plan says that these certificates will have no effect on the process for giving development consent to new oil and gas projects.
Last year, Carbon Brief reported that several large oil and gas projects are currently seeking development consent from the government.
Because they already have a license, these projects are able to get around Labour’s policy on not issuing any new oil and gas licenses and still seek final approval.
However, a landmark legal case in 2024 means that all of such projects, including Rosebank, will now have to present the government with information about how much emissions will come from burning the oil and gas they plan to produce, before they can be approved.
Responding to today’s budget news, Tessa Khan, executive director of Uplift, said that the “government is right to end the fiction of endless drilling”, but should “put an end to all new fields, including the huge Rosebank oil field”.
The North Sea future plan also says that the government will change the objectives of the North Sea Transition Authority, the government-run company that controls and regulates offshore oil and gas production.
Before the change, the NSTA was in the awkward position of being responsible for both ensuring the oil and gas sector reaches net-zero and maximising the economic recovery of oil and gas reserves from the North Sea.
Now, the government wants the NSTA to balance three objectives: to “maximise societal economic value”; support the energy secretary in meeting net-zero goals; and consider the long-term benefits of the transition for North Sea workers, communities and supply chains.
In addition, the North Sea future plan also announces that the government will establish the “North Sea jobs service”, a national employment programme offering support for oil and gas workers seeking new opportunities in clean energy, defence and advanced manufacturing.
Nuclear, ‘green finance’, critical minerals and rail
The section in the budget about “investing in the UK’s energy security” largely focuses on the government’s plans for nuclear power.
At the last spending review, the government announced £14.2bn of investment in the planned Sizewell C nuclear-power plant in Suffolk.
The plant is set to be supported under the “regulated asset base” (RAB) model, which levies an extra charge on consumer energy bills to support the cost of the development. OBR analysis concludes this will generate £0.7bn in receipts in 2026-27, doubling to £1.4bn in 2030-31.
The budget also says the prime minister is issuing a “strategic steer” on the “safe and efficient delivery” of nuclear developments through “proportionate regulation and stronger collaboration”.
It says the government will additionally issue an “implementation plan”, within three months, in response to the recently published report on nuclear regulation. It says it will “complete implementation within two years”.
The government has also updated its “green financing framework”, which sets guidelines for the type of expenditures that can raise funding from investors under the UK’s green financing programme. It has now added nuclear power to the list of eligible expenditures.
Other climate-related measures mentioned in the budget include regional funding, such as £14.5m for a new low-carbon industrial centre in Grangemouth, Scotland, and support for “critical minerals, renewable energy and marine innovation” in Cornwall.
This builds on the government’s “critical mineral strategy” released last week, which specifically highlights Cornwall as a site of “mineral wealth”, where mining for lithium, tin and tungsten is being undertaken.
The government has also announced a one-year freeze on rail fares, which it states could save commuters taking expensive routes “more than £300 per year”.
The post UK budget 2025: Key climate and energy announcements appeared first on Carbon Brief.
For decades, Europe relied on pipelines bringing Russian gas to heat its homes and provide its electricity, arguing that President Vladimir Putin would not shoot himself in the foot by turning off the taps. That assumption was proved wrong when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, leading to restrictions on gas exports to European countries.
With Russian supplies largely cut off, Europe’s gas and electricity prices shot up, causing a cost-of-living crisis across the continent. While speeding up policies to get their economies off fossil fuels in the long term, European governments scrambled for alternative gas suppliers in the short term.
One of those stepping up supply to Europe was the US, which is building out liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals on its Gulf Coast. But with Donald Trump back in the White House and threatening to invade Greenland, before toning down his rhetoric last week, these energy ties are coming under scrutiny.
A legally binding ban on Russian gas imports was approved by European Union countries on Monday and will take effect by late 2027.
Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said on the same day that “it was a huge mistake to be dependent on Russian fossil fuels. We should never have done that and now we have to make sure that we will have no dependencies on other countries outside Europe.”
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Chris Aylett has co-written a well-timed new research paper for Chatham House titled “Why renewables and electrification hold the keys to EU energy security”. He spoke to Climate Home News about northern Europe’s offshore wind ambitions and who holds the power in the US-Europe gas relationship.
Q: On Monday, ten northern European governments gathered in Hamburg for the North Sea Summit, where they committed to developing offshore wind and interconnecting their national grids. They said this would improve Europe’s energy security. Are they right?
A: Yes. Renewable generation, especially offshore wind, helps to reduce Europe’s dependence on imported gas, which we know only too well can be used against Europe to devastating effect. So there’s a simple energy security benefit in that respect.
The wind projects are also combined with interconnectors. It’s really exciting because the wind assets connect to lots of different countries and this can increase the efficiency of the system and renewable generation. Interconnectors give grid managers in different countries access to more generation options, boosting energy security and pushing down prices.
One caveat though is that new electricity infrastructure does mean new challenges, and nothing is risk free. So there will be work to do to ensure that the infrastructure is resilient to physical attack – for example the undersea cables – and cyberattacks. But that can be done, it can be mitigated, and there’s a lot of work going on in these areas.
Q: How much of the supply chain for offshore wind is European rather than reliant on China and other countries?
A: We live in an integrated, globalised world – and even though Europe has a pretty strong wind sector and much of what is being used to generate electricity from wind in Europe is from European suppliers, there are Chinese components in there and there are Chinese companies now which are trying to get into the European market.
It’s not as simple as ‘use Chinese equipment or don’t use Chinese equipment’. It’s all to do with the entire supply chain. There will be decisions around what aspects you would want to buy in and use, and which you wouldn’t, and there will be security regulations involved in that. It’s certainly an aspect to consider.
Q: In 2024, the US supplied a sixth of the EU’s gas imports. Does this make the EU reliant on the US for its gas in the same way it was on Russia? Or, with the International Energy Agency forecasting declining European gas demand and a global glut of LNG, is the US reliant on Europe? Where does the power lie – with the buyer or seller of gas?
A: The power lies with both at the moment. Europe buys about half of the US’s LNG exports – it’s a massive customer and the US government is very keen to sell it, there’s no doubt about that. You can tell in some of the government rhetoric over the last year and the “energy dominance” agenda that they want to sell. So it seems a little bit like all the power is with the EU.
But the issue is that there are not that many countries that export LNG – not in these quantities anyway. And the glut in LNG that is starting to emerge and is likely to play out in the run up to 2030 and beyond, most of that is going to be US producers. So you haven’t got that many options if you’re looking at which countries you get LNG from, and some of the EU’s other gas suppliers – Norway, Algeria – they’re not likely to be expanding anytime soon. Australia is expensive, Qatar is difficult.
So there’s a mutual dependency at the moment, but the EU has a chance to escape this by reducing demand. Once it brings gas demand down by switching to renewable resources, energy efficiency and so on, then it’s in a much better situation. Whereas for the US, it might find that it’s not got any other markets to sell into, as the big hope was the US would start selling to China and that now doesn’t look to be happening.
Q: Could the US government order its gas companies to restrict exports to Europe, in the same way Vladimir Putin did? Would it do so, given that the oil and gas industry is a major funder of the Trump administration and Trump promised to support them?
In principle, the US government could not stop US companies exporting to Europe. There’s the rule of law, there’s contracts between companies but, with this administration, it’s not totally clear that this would be an insurmountable barrier if they wanted to exert leverage.
What the US government could do is incentivise that the gas which would have been bound to Europe is sold into the domestic market instead. LNG is flighty, it goes where the highest price it can fetch is. We’re seeing that now with the winter storm in the US. Gas production has gone down and there’s huge demand for heating and electricity so prices have shot up in the US, so LNG is going there. Europe has had to start buying from Australia.
If you look at the upward trajectory of US demand for electricity, with data centres combined with the scrapping of incentives for renewable deployment, you’ve got a situation where demand for gas in the US is increasing and prices are going up.
You can imagine a situation where a populist government could go ‘right, we know US citizens benefit from US gas and we’re not going to export it’. So there’s a quite subtle sort of interplay there which wouldn’t necessarily be as brutal as what Putin did in 2022.
This interview was shortened and edited for clarity.
The post Q&A: Trump’s Greenland threats push Europe to question reliance on US gas appeared first on Climate Home News.
Q&A: Trump’s Greenland threats push Europe to question reliance on US gas
For the second time since the Paris Agreement on climate change was adopted, the US this week formally withdrew from the global pact following a 12-month mandatory period since President Donald Trump announced he would pull his country out on his first day in office in January 2025.
Since then, the US has axed most of its international climate funding and this month said it would exit the UN climate convention (UNFCCC) – which underpins the UN climate process and the Paris Agreement – the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which is the world’s most authoritative climate science body, and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the world’s biggest multilateral climate fund.
Trump to pull US out of UN climate convention and climate science body
As the Trump administration turns its back on the UN climate regime, UN climate chief Simon Stiell described the move as a “colossal own goal”, while the GCF – to which the US has failed to deliver billions of dollars in promised support – said the country would lose its board seat but operations would continue.
Climate diplomacy experts say some of the changes announced by the US president could remain symbolic or be reversed in the future, while warning that the reputation of the world’s second-biggest emitting country could suffer a big hit in the long term.
Other countries may follow US Paris exit
Marta Schaaf, Amnesty International’s climate programme director, said the US’s second exit from the Paris Agreement on January 27 (the first was during Trump’s first term) “sets a disturbing precedent” that could instigate a “race to the bottom”, encouraging other countries to leave.
“The US is one of several powerful anti-climate actors but as an influential superpower, this decision, along with acts of coercion and bullying of other countries and powerful actors to double down on fossil fuels, causes particular harm and threatens to reverse more than a decade of global climate progress under the agreement,” she said in a statement.
So far no other signatories have publicly announced they will quit the 2015 climate agreement, but Israeli media recently reported that the country is discussing a withdrawal under pressure from the US. Last year, Argentina also hinted at a possible exit but did not follow through.
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COP30 President André Aranha Corrêa do Lago said himself that in the months leading up to last year’s UN climate conference in Brazil, there was “a lot of noise about possible additional exits”, after the world’s largest economy said it would withdraw.
The Trump administration has been called out in other UN processes, after being accused of employing “bullying” tactics at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to persuade smaller countries to vote against the entry into force of a green shipping deal. This pressure resulted in a delayed decision.
Allie Rosenbluth, Oil Change International’s US campaign manager, said the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement “is a betrayal of the communities at risk from climate disaster, especially those on the frontlines of the crisis in the Global South”.
Legal uncertainties around UNFCCC withdrawal
This January, in an unprecedented move, the White House also announced the US would leave the broader UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This would take effect one year after formally notifying the UN, which it had yet to do as of the time of publication.
The UNFCCC could be harder to rejoin than the Paris Agreement – which was last done through an executive order issued by former President Joe Biden – because the US Senate first gave unamimous “advice and consent” for ratification of the UNFCCC in 1992, making the legal situation more complex.
Some experts believe the US would need Senate authorisation to formally withdraw from the UNFCCC, and there are questions around whether the move would be legal at all.
Trump’s presidential memorandum says that “for United Nations entities, withdrawal means ceasing participation in or funding to those entities to the extent permitted by law”. To all intents and purposes, the US had already disengaged from the UN climate process during Trump’s first year in office, cutting funding for the UN’s climate body and not sending a delegation to COP30.
However, if the US does not formally notify the UN of its withdrawal from the UNFCCC, that could potentially ease legal concerns for the Trump administration, according to Michael Gerrard, climate change law professor at Columbia Law School.
Could the US rejoin the UNFCCC?
Gerrard told Climate Home News that if the Trump administration does not officially withdraw from the UNFCCC, “then I don’t see a legal obstacle to a subsequent administration resuming funding and participation”. “Even if the US does formally withdraw now, a new president might well be able to rely on the prior consent in rejoining; that issue has never been decided by the Supreme Court,” he added.
Sue Biniaz, the US State Department’s Principal Deputy Special Envoy for Climate until January 2025, and Jean Galbraith, professor at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, wrote on the Just Security blog that the mainstream legal view is that the president may constitutionally withdraw the US from a Senate-approved treaty where – as here – the withdrawal is lawful under international law and neither the Senate’s resolution of “advice and consent” nor a congressional law has put limits on withdrawal.
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Under international law, they added, rejoining is straightforward. For the UNFCCC, a state can become a party 90 days after depositing its instrument of ratification or accession, and following that, the US could rejoin the Paris Agreement, which would take 30 days after the deposit of its instrument.
From the perspective of domestic law, the two climate law experts argued that the original Senate resolution remains in effect (unless repealed by the Senate) and provides the legal authority needed for a future president to rejoin the UNFCCC. He or she could also seek a second round of “advice and consent”, ask Congress to approve rejoining, or potentially join the UNFCCC under the president’s independent constitutional powers, they added.
Loss of US leadership and credibility
Irrespective of whether the White House does move to rejoin the UN climate regime at any point, analysts said the Trump administration’s hostile attitude and disengagement has damaged the standing of the US when it comes to global climate action and the energy transition.
Biniaz and Galbraith wrote that the world is used to the US “flip-flopping on climate”, because it refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and quit the Paris Agreement once before, but “withdrawal from the entire regime takes US abdication of climate leadership to a new level”.
Though many countries may be relieved that the Trump administration is not participating given its current policies, they said: “in the longer term, US absence could have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the regime and the willingness of other countries to take ambitious action.”
Nikki Reisch, climate and energy director at the Center for International Environmental Law, warned that “it will not be easy for the US to regain credibility or leadership on climate.”
While an “informal withdrawal” from the UNFCCC may “avoid some paperwork” and avoid potential lawsuits, she said it would not “insulate this administration from scrutiny and legal challenge on other grounds, particularly as it continues to unwind climate progress, dismantle environmental protections, and expand production of the fossil fuels”.
Reisch noted that US states and local governments have been making efforts to “fill the void where the federal government has abdicated its duties”. “Other countries, too, should see the Trump administration’s retreat as an invitation to step up, stand together and move forward,” she added.
The post Explainer: Out of Paris, but will the US formally quit the UN climate regime? appeared first on Climate Home News.
Explainer: Out of Paris, but will the US formally quit the UN climate regime?
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