Nuclear energy is back in focus in the U.S., fueled by rising power demand, data centers, and new government support. In May 2025, President Trump signed executive orders (EOs) to boost the nuclear industry.
The goal is clear: expand capacity to 400 gigawatts (GW) by 2050, up from about 100 GW today. That would mean building 250–300 new reactors, a scale unseen in decades.
In the near term, the plan targets 10 new reactors by 2030. The EOs also speed up NRC licensing, expand DOE and DOD roles in plant siting, and release government uranium reserves. Additionally, to ease fuel shortages, the White House will also provide 20 metric tons of HALEU to private industry.
And all these steps could change the course of the U.S. nuclear sector, which is just starting to recover after decades of stagnation. More nuclear reactors will also mean higher demand for nuclear fuel — uranium, the yellow metal.
Nuclear Ambitions and America’s Uranium Supply Gap
A Goldman Sachs report pointed out that the U.S. is the world’s largest uranium consumer, using 29% of global supply each year. Its ~100 reactors represent a quarter of the world’s nuclear capacity.
Much of today’s demand is being fueled by tech giants. Hyperscale data centers require massive amounts of electricity, making clean and reliable power a business necessity. This shift is putting nuclear energy back in focus.

Furthermore, private sector demand is now aligning with government ambitions. Nuclear is increasingly viewed as the only scalable clean energy source that can run 24/7 while meeting both grid needs and the energy appetite of digital industries.
Yet domestic supply tells a different story. The report also says that in 2024, the U.S. produced just 0.7 million pounds of U₃O₈. Production may climb to 3.1 million pounds in 2025, but that still covers only a fraction of the nation’s needs.
This heavy reliance on foreign uranium has long been seen as a national security risk, especially amid geopolitical tensions and fragile supply chains.
Now, with Washington pushing to secure critical minerals, the tide is turning. As America works to build a self-sufficient nuclear fuel cycle, domestic suppliers like Uranium Energy Corp (UEC) will play a pivotal role.

Why Uranium Energy Corp Stands Out
Against this high uranium demand scenario, Uranium Energy Corp (UEC) has emerged as an important player. The company is already America’s largest and fastest-growing uranium supplier. It is focused on In-Situ Recovery (ISR) mining projects in the U.S., as well as high-grade conventional assets in Canada.
UEC operates three hub-and-spoke platforms across South Texas and Wyoming, with a combined licensed production capacity of 12.1 million pounds of U₃O₈ per year. This gives the company a strong foundation to scale as U.S. nuclear demand accelerates.
More importantly, as a pure-play uranium producer, the company is positioned to directly benefit from federal policies that aim to rebuild a domestic nuclear fuel supply chain. The company’s growth is tied to both rising uranium demand and pricing power in a market where U.S. supply has long fallen short.

UEC Launches Refining and Conversion Subsidiary to Secure U.S. Nuclear Future
In a major step forward, UEC recently announced the creation of the United States Uranium Refining & Conversion Corp (UR&C). The wholly owned subsidiary will explore building a state-of-the-art uranium refining and UF₆ conversion facility in the U.S.
Key Highlights:
- Full Nuclear Supply Chain – UR&C would make UEC the only American firm with the capability to move uranium from mining and milling through refining, conversion, and delivery of natural UF₆ to enrichment plants for LEU and HALEU production.
- Aligned with Federal Policy – The initiative directly supports Trump’s executive orders that call for quadrupling U.S. nuclear capacity and reducing reliance on foreign sources. The plan also leverages the Defense Production Act (DPA) to prioritize an onshore fuel cycle.
- Tight Market Dynamics – UF₆ conversion pricing remains near record highs, with spot prices at $64–66/kgU and long-term contracts at around $52/kgU. The lack of U.S. conversion capacity is a key bottleneck in the supply chain.
- Designed for Scale – The proposed plant would be the largest and most modern UF₆ conversion facility in the U.S., capable of producing 10,000 metric tonnes of uranium per year. That represents more than half of U.S. demand, currently estimated at 18,000 MtU annually.
- First-Mover Advantage – UEC has already completed a year of engineering and design work with Fluor Corporation, a Fortune 500 EPC firm with deep nuclear experience. This partnership gives the project a significant head start.
- Phased Development – The project will advance in stages, with updates as government partnerships, regulatory approvals, and utility contracts progress.
If successful, the UR&C initiative would close one of the biggest gaps in America’s nuclear fuel cycle while cementing UEC’s role as a strategic supplier.
Advancing Production Across Hubs
UEC continues to expand production across its three hubs.
- Wyoming Hub – With a measured and indicated resource base of 54 million pounds, the hub supports a 14-year mine life at full capacity of 4 million pounds per year. The Irigaray Processing Plant is already active, processing, drying, and drumming yellowcake.
- Texas Hub – Holds 13 million pounds of measured and indicated resources. Expected to start production in late fiscal Q1 2026, the hub has a licensed capacity of 4 million pounds but a physical capacity of 2 million pounds per year, giving it a 6.5-year mine life.
- Sweetwater Hub – Recently acquired, it brings 4.1 million pounds of licensed capacity. The company is preparing a technical report to define resources by July 2025, with ISR production projected as early as 2029 under fast-track permitting.
Combined, these assets provide UEC with a path to 10.1 million pounds of annual physical capacity (12.1 million licensed). That makes it the largest American uranium producer by scale.
Strategic Positioning in a Tight Market
The uranium market is tightening as global nuclear expansion accelerates. North America, Europe, and Asia are all ramping up nuclear plans in response to energy security concerns and net-zero commitments.
UEC’s focus on ISR mining—considered more cost-effective and environmentally friendly than traditional methods—adds another advantage. The company is positioned not only as a volume supplier but also as a potential price-setter as U.S. utilities look to secure domestic contracts.
With conversion and refining capacity also in play through UR&C, UEC is on track to offer utilities a vertically integrated solution, reducing reliance on foreign intermediaries.
UEC Stock Holds Strong Buy Ratings
UEC currently trades at $12.26 per share, with a market cap of $5.45 billion. Analysts maintain a “Strong Buy” consensus, with price targets clustered between $10.65 and $13 over the next year.
The company remains unprofitable, with negative EPS and no dividend, but the trajectory is improving. Analysts expect uranium demand and prices to strengthen in tandem with new reactor builds, restarts, and life extensions.
Short-term volatility remains a factor, with bearish reports occasionally weighing on sentiment. However, the structural drivers of the market—domestic energy security, rising nuclear capacity, and tight supply chains—suggest a favorable long-term outlook.

A Strategic Bet on Nuclear Fuel Security
The U.S. nuclear industry is entering a new era. With government mandates, private sector demand, and rising global momentum, nuclear is positioned for its strongest growth in decades.
Uranium Energy Corp sits at the center of this shift. Its ISR mining hubs, refining and conversion ambitions, and alignment with federal policy make it a strategic asset for America’s nuclear future.
As the U.S. works to close its uranium supply gap and build a self-sufficient fuel cycle, UEC offers investors exposure to both the near-term upswing in uranium prices and the long-term buildout of nuclear capacity.
In short, in many ways, UEC is not just supplying uranium—it is shaping the foundation of American energy security for decades to come.
The post U.S. Nuclear Boom and A Guide to UEC’s Role in Closing America’s Uranium Supply Gap appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
![]()
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
-
Climate Change1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Renewable Energy10 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
嘉宾来稿:探究火山喷发如何影响气候预测
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits

