Astrid Schomaker is the new executive secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
Schomaker, who is German, was previously the director for green diplomacy and multilateralism with the European Commission.
She took over as the UN’s biodiversity chief in July this year, just months out from the major UN biodiversity summit, COP16, which will take place in Cali, Colombia from 21 October to 1 November.
Carbon Brief spoke to Schomaker ahead of the Cali talks to discuss progress on nature targets, key negotiation sticking points and boosting the profile of biodiversity COPs.
- On COP16: “We had an ambitious framework put in place just two years ago and now we need to look at whether this has actually been the game-changer that people think it has been.”
- On low national biodiversity plan submissions: “The start was never going to be fast. I think the important thing we’re looking at is the work is underway.”
- On combining the efforts of the biodiversity, climate and desertification COPs: “What one would hope is that these three COPs now can actually give a push to countries committing to bringing this together.”
- On biodiversity finance: “There is movement across the world and, therefore, I think the outlook is broadly positive. Is it enough? No. Does it have to be scaled up? Absolutely.”
- On Colombia as host: “They’ve made a lot of efforts to make this COP a success. And, in Susana Muhamad, we have a very knowledgeable and a very charismatic and very dedicated COP host.”
- On security: “We are reassured that good security arrangements are in place, both in the city of Cali and for the COP specifically as well.”
- On world leaders at COP16: “The nature crisis has to be understood as being at the same level of seriousness as the climate crisis and, therefore, also requiring the same level of political attention.”
- On the US and the CBD: “Whatever the outcome of the next elections will be, ratification has not been a subject that was actively discussed in the US recently.”
- On Indigenous input: “This is actually a big issue on our agenda and also one that’s very important for Colombia.”
- On COP17 hosts: “We have two offers on the table at the moment – Azerbaijan and Armenia.”
- On genetic resources: “We think this could actually generate considerable finance streams for biodiversity-rich countries and, therefore, it’s important that we move ahead with it and put in place a mechanism that is workable.”
Carbon Brief: We are less than two weeks out from the start of COP16. There are thousands of people all around the world getting ready to head to Cali in Colombia to discuss implementation of the 2030 targets, sharing of genetic resources, biodiversity finance, all of this range of other issues. I assume this is going to be a huge moment for you in your role, especially as you only took it up in July. How are you feeling ahead of the talks? Are you excited, intimidated?
Astrid Schomaker: Well, mostly excited, and quite optimistic. I think for us in the convention, it’s a big moment. We had an ambitious framework put in place just two years ago [at COP15] and now we need to look at whether this has actually been the game-changer that people think it has been. And that, of course, means we need to look [to see if] these commitments[are being] actually implemented, and COP will give us a good chance.
For us, it’s important to see also the huge mobilisation. We have the biggest COP ever. We have the biggest green zone. We have more media, more business, more stakeholders [and] more delegates than we ever had before.
So we think that, in a way, when people say it’s nature’s moment, now really is nature’s moment. People [have] come to realise that we need to have a different relationship with nature. Take better care of nature. Look at nature together with climate change and see that we cannot solve the climate crisis without looking at the nature crisis. So it’s mostly a moment of anticipation and excitement.
CB: Broadly speaking, what are the main outcomes you want to see from COP16?
AS: The first thing is to have a look at how implementation is actually progressing. We said at COP15 [that] countries should prioritise national targets. So far, we have 79 countries that have put national targets in place. We expect more by COP, and maybe also some to be announced at COP. So that’s quite a good number.
What is important in particular, and then compared to what happened previously under the Aichi process, is that most of these national targets actually reflect the global targets, so they make direct linkages. And also, it’s not just a kind of pick-and-choose approach. But it’s in the majority, actually, [that] all targets of the GBF [Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework] are reflected in the national targets. Or at least, I think more than 75% of those targets are reflected in national targets. So that’s a good number.
On the national biodiversity strategies and action plans [NBSAPs], the number does not look quite so good. We are at 20 so far. Again, we know lots of countries are now finalising their plans, stepping up action. One may think it’s a low number – and certainly this has been pointed out by some NGOs.
On the other hand, we have been holding workshops around the world, and we’ve seen that countries literally around the world are working on these action plans and, in a way, they take longer because countries have taken to heart this call for a whole of government approach.
So it’s not an environment ministry which sits somewhere, drafts a plan, adopts it and submits it. It’s really an exercise where governments come together across the board, where stakeholders are being consulted and then often also where these action plans are then adopted at a higher political level.
So at the COP, we will have an opportunity to look at these first action plans and targets. We have a pre-meeting, our subsidiary body on implementation, that’s basically entirely dedicated to looking at these plans and then to discussing where are the bottlenecks, where are the difficulties, where are the good practices that can be shared.
CB: Back on the NBSAPs then. As you say, there has been criticism from NGOs like WWF and other places about this figure of 20-odd countries at the moment out of 196 – about 10% – that have submitted these national biodiversity plans. That seems like a very low number, especially if you think about the climate COP. If only that number of nationally determined contributions were submitted, there would be uproar, let’s say. Were you surprised by this low level of submissions so far? And also, are you worried that it could indicate that countries are not taking global nature pledges seriously and even that they could not be met by 2030 as a result?
AS: I think if we look at the deadline, it was very short. I mean, COP15 took place in December 2022, so it’s less than two years. Many countries had to put new processes in place, had to get funding. So I mean, the start was never going to be fast. I think the important thing we’re looking at is the work is underway. And there, I’m confident to say, it’s literally underway around the world in countries. So whether the deadline itself is met on the dot is not what I think we’re really looking at. We’re looking at how far countries advance, how are they talking to their stakeholders, how are they managing to also have these new processes that would involve better reflecting traditional knowledge, for example, involving Indigenous people, where that’s relevant.
Bringing the business sector on board was, as you know, in the Global Biodiversity Framework. There are also targets for business. So all of that takes time. Since we’ve done these workshops, and we understand that countries are working on that, I think our assessment is globally positive. This is not to say that more than 20 would [not] have been better, but I think the important thing is to look that progress is there. And I’m confident that by the end of the year, the number will be significantly higher.
CB: Do you have any estimate of what that number could be?
AS: No, I don’t.
CB: Will CBD analysis on the plans and targets put forward by countries still be done this year, in light of the low number of NBSAP submissions?
AS: The full analysis is basically for COP17. That’s when we have our stocktake. So what we’ve done now, and you can see that in the documents that have been published, we’ve been just looking basically at how the targets are reflected. We haven’t got an in-depth analysis and also, at this point in time, countries were asked to submit their targets. They were not asked to report to us how they are implementing those targets. So we’re basically still at this level of really demonstrating that the commitments were taken seriously and looking at how they’re being translated into targets, but we’re not at the stage of analysing implementation.
CB: Do you think that the NBSAP issue indicates that there needs to be a wider, more UN COP-level reform? Susana Muhamad this week was talking about unifying these targets that are put forward to the climate change, biodiversity and desertification COPs. What is your take on that opinion?
AS: I don’t think that’s a call for UN reform or necessarily unifying targets. I think what everybody is looking at is, first of all, the opportunity that we have this year with these three Rio Conventions having their COPs in rapid succession. And, of course, with basically planning processes going on under land degradation neutrality for desertification, and then national adaptation plans and the enhancement of the NDCs [nationally determined contributions] under the climate convention, then our NBSAPs.
What we have all been saying – specifically two weeks ago in New York when the Rio Trio initiative was launched – [is] that it makes sense to bring this planning process together, especially at the national level. We very often have different focal points for climate change, desertification and biodiversity. They don’t necessarily talk to each other. They are often in different ministries.
These planning processes are often subject to different funding streams and support, so it’s actually difficult to bring them together at a national level. But it would make a lot more sense and we’ve seen the potential is big [as] the numbers, the percentages, where the plans refer to each other are not high. So there’s scope for improvement.
What one would hope is that these three COPs now can actually give a push to countries committing to bringing this together and, ideally, also to us as convention secretariats to get a mandate to support this better coordination of processes at national level.
CB: I wanted to ask about finance, because that is obviously going to be a huge talking point as well at this COP. How would you like to see developed countries showing leadership at COP16 in meeting the nature finance target in particular of hitting at least $20 billion per year by 2025 for developing countries? Are you optimistic that this goal will be achieved?
AS: Well, that’s a difficult question. First of all, the goal on ODA [official development assistance] is part of a broader financing goal, of course. But since you asked specifically about ODA, we don’t have figures beyond 2022. The figures that the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] has published, which you may have seen, indicate a very positive trend on nature finance up to 2022. We have no reason to believe that this trend would have changed and if the trend persists, we are probably on a good way towards the $20 billion by 2025.
From the perspective of many developing countries, I think the expectation was that more funds would have been put into the newly created Global Biodiversity Framework Fund at the GEF [Global Environment Facility]. So we hope that at the COP, indeed, new pledges will be made so that this fund will see more funding.
But I think we have to realise that most biodiversity finance streams are bilateral streams and don’t go through the funds. We also have to see that in addition to the framework fund, there is the Kunming Biodiversity Fund that China put in place that has also been capitalised with $200 million.
So there is movement across the world and, therefore, I think the outlook is broadly positive. Is it enough? No. Does it have to be scaled up? Absolutely. I think we will have good discussions at COP [on] how that can be done. And, of course, we also need to continue in the same vein as we discussed before, how the climate and biodiversity crises overlap and how also these funding streams, to an extent, overlap.
CB: Looking then at Colombia’s role as host country for this COP and Susana Muhamad’s role as summit president. Do you think that the profile of both the country and her as president will have a positive impact on the outcome of the talks? Especially compared to COP15, which didn’t end up taking place in the host country of China.
AS: At COP15, we had a very active presidency and then supported by an active host. So there was almost a beautiful coming together of China and Canada and we had an excellent outcome.
For COP16, yes, I think the fact, first of all, that the COP is taking place in a biodiversity-rich country is already positive. We have seen Colombia take leadership on biodiversity issues for many years. Including, for example, at COP15, when they led with Germany on the accelerator initiative.
There’s a lot that this country can bring to the debate including, incidentally, in terms of a very lively Indigenous community and a lot of traditional knowledge and discussion around that which will, in any case, take place at our COP.
So I think Colombia is an excellent host. They’ve made a lot of efforts to make this COP a success. And in Susana Muhamad, we have a very knowledgeable and a very charismatic and very dedicated COP host. So I think the ingredients are in place for this to be a very good, successful COP.
CB: Also, though, their role as host has not been without a couple of difficulties along the way. There were reports during the summer that there was a dissident rebel group threatening to disrupt the COP, although the threat has since been withdrawn. Also there are peace talks ongoing between the government and the ELN [National Liberation Army]. Are you, and the CBD in general, reassured about the security of the summit?
AS: Yes, we are. Of course, we know that Colombia is a country with an ongoing internal conflict. We know that there is an ongoing peace process to which the government is dedicating a lot of attention. We have worked very closely with the government, both at country level, then also at sub-national level with the Valle del Cauca and with the city to look at the security plans. We have seen the government come together, ministries across the board working on that. So, yes, I think, we are reassured that good security arrangements are in place both in the city of Cali and for the COP specifically as well.
CB: There are going to be several world leaders there that you were announcing a couple of weeks ago – Lula, the president of Brazil, the newly inaugurated President Sheinbaum in Mexico, alongside other world leaders. This is definitely a change of pace from COP15 and previous biodiversity COPs, where there was not this same politicking around it, especially compared to climate COPs. Do you think that this will help to bring more attention to the biodiversity COP, given that it generally receives a fraction of the coverage and the interest compared to the climate COP in particular? Was it the aim of inviting world leaders to amp up the profile?
AS: Yes to both. I think the presence of world leaders amplifies the profile of the convention. I think the intention of Colombia as a host – and, of course, we very much support that – is to demonstrate that the nature crisis has to be understood as being at the same level of seriousness as the climate crisis and therefore also requiring the same level of political attention.
That’s why they have invited heads of state and government to come to the COP. We think that’s a very good signal, especially because, as I think Susana Muhamad always indicates, and I mentioned earlier, we will not be able to look at climate change in isolation from the nature and biodiversity crisis.
So if we want the climate targets of 1.5C to be within reach, we really also need to look at how nature can contribute. And by bringing heads of state and government that are talking about this a lot to our COP, I think we will succeed more to get this message heard by a wider audience.
CB: My next question is slightly off topic but, out of curiosity, has the CBD engaged in any talks with the US in recent years about them ratifying the convention? And also, could the upcoming presidential election have any impact on this prospect?
AS: I mean, we always have contacts with the United States. We’re just across the border [at the CBD headquarters in Montreal], so we regularly talk to the government. The United States are always participating at the COPs with reasonably big delegations. They are engaged in all our meetings. I’m not aware that we have had specific discussions about ratification and, at the same level, whatever the outcome of the next elections will be, ratification has not been a subject that was actively discussed in the US recently. As well as I know, inter alia, because it needs a congressional majority that has not been available in the past years.
CB: Looking at your own background in the European Commission, you must be well versed in figuring out how to make policies work for both developed and developing countries. Particularly around policies like the anti-deforestation regulation, which was recently postponed for a year. How do you plan to ensure that the input of biodiverse, developing countries and also Indigenous peoples and local communities, these other key stakeholders, remain at the front and centre of COP16 talks?
AS: Well, especially on this latter issue, on the Indigenous peoples and local communities, this is actually a big issue on our agenda and also one that’s very important for Colombia. [It’s] where a lot of mobilisation has taken place over the past weeks, of Indigenous groups coming together and formulating their policies.
So what we think will happen at the COP is that we will adopt a new work programme for Indigenous people, but possibly also look at the upgrading of what we currently have as a working group to a proper subsidiary body. So that would elevate, in a way, the voice of Indigenous people and all the traditional knowledge they bring to the debate.
For developing countries, I mean more broadly, I think everybody realises that, like climate change, biodiversity may be a localised issue, but it is a global challenge. So we need action at all levels and the biodiversity-rich countries are, notably, [largely] in the global south.
So that’s why we have such a big discussion on resource mobilisation, why we have a big discussion on sharing of expertise, of knowledge and technology. This will have to continue at COP. There’s a lot of south-south cooperation that we also like to support and there’s a lot of, let’s say, willingness and mobilisation across the global south that will also come with big delegations that we hope to support through the COP discussions and also through the decisions that are being taken and through the various support programmes that UN agencies like UNEP [UN Environment Programme] and UNDP [UN Development Programme] run, for example, in supporting NBSAP processes and others.
CB: Looking far ahead into the future, it was recently confirmed that Azerbaijan has put its name forward to host COP17, the next UN biodiversity summit. Firstly, what is your reaction to that, especially given some of the controversies around their hosting of the climate COP – given that they are a petrostate – and also their human rights issues? Also, when will the next host be decided? Will the announcement be made at the end of COP16?
AS: The way that works for the biodiversity convention, we adopted a decision I think at COP13 that looks at a regional rotation. And, indeed, COP17 should be hosted by the eastern European group. We have two offers on the table at the moment – Azerbaijan and Armenia. If there would be no consensus in the eastern European group, that they would sort of put forward one or the other, the way this works for us is that this is a procedural decision. Such procedural decisions could be taken by vote at the end of the COP.
CB: What is your reaction then to both Azerbaijan and Armenia having put their names forward for it? Are you excited about either option?
AS: Well, hosting a COP is a huge responsibility and I think Azerbaijan experiences this now as they’re getting ready to host the climate COP. If a country puts itself forward, it puts its national policies under a global spotlight. So I think it takes courage to do it and we’re grateful that we have two candidates that want to host us in 2026.
CB: Thank you for taking the time to speak, I really appreciate it. Is there anything else you wanted to add, or anything else you think would be good to mention just two weeks out from the start of COP?
AS: As you mentioned yourself in the beginning, there are important decisions to be taken. You might think it’s just an implementation COP, but it is an implementation COP. And implementation, in many ways, is just as important or more important than making new commitments.
Maybe one area I would highlight in addition to the ones we discussed, and that’s that of digital sequencing information [DSI]. At COP15, we already put in place a decision to say that we wanted a multilateral mechanism that looks at how this digital sequence information from genetic information, [how] the benefits of it could be shared more equitably.
So we are looking forward to this complex issue now being resolved at COP16 with such a mechanism being instituted. Because we think this could actually generate considerable finance streams for biodiversity-rich countries and, therefore, it’s important that we move ahead with it and put in place a mechanism that is workable for all countries and that allows us, in a way, to move ahead with this mindset shift that we see in the business world. With more and more businesses coming to the discussion, but also the businesses realising that you cannot build your business model and your business success on nature for free.
So there is a price to be paid and the sequencing information discussion sort of exemplifies this very well. As, in general, the fact that business is now coming to the table in greater numbers and is asking a lot of questions about how they can measure their impacts, how they can disclose what are the right metrics.
All these discussions that will take place at COP16, I think, are very important given that business is not only very dependent on nature, but also has important impacts on nature. They just need to be part of the discussion along with everybody else.
CB: On that, on both DSI and also businesses showing up in greater numbers at COP, are you worried about a potential impact of lobbying weakening the text around DSI, in particular now that the talks that have been ongoing for so long are reaching their end stage and everything is going to hit the fan, essentially, with businesses and countries needing to start taking these things into account? Are you worried that there could be a ramping up of this lobbying at this COP?
AS: Well, I think there are different groups of businesses that will be involved at COP, and there’s only a certain subset of businesses that might be concerned in the first place by the DSI.
So yes, of course, if you are a company, you are worried about how this mechanism will work and I think they will come to the table expressing their concerns and arguing for a workable mechanism.
But we have heard lots of companies from sectors that are most concerned, of pharmaceuticals, biotech, etc, that have actually already done this what I call the ‘mindset shift’ and that have said ‘we realise this is something we need to do, we want to do, but we also want it to be workable’. And I think that’s an important consideration and they will bring that to the table for sure.
CB: Great, thanks again.
AS: Thank you and see you in Cali.
The post The Carbon Brief Interview: UN biodiversity chief Astrid Schomaker appeared first on Carbon Brief.
The Carbon Brief Interview: UN biodiversity chief Astrid Schomaker
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.
China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
Tasks for 2026
‘GREEN RESOLVE’: The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) said at its annual national conference that it is “essential” to “maintain strategic resolve” on building a “beautiful China”, reported energy news outlet BJX News. Officials called for “accelerating green transformation” and “strengthening driving forces” for the low-carbon transition in 2026, it added. The meeting also underscored the need for “continued reduction in total emissions of major pollutants”, it said, as well as for “advancing source control through carbon peaking and a low-carbon transition”. The MEE listed seven key tasks for 2026 at the meeting, said business news outlet 21st Century Business Herald, including promoting development of “green productive forces”, focusing on “regional strategies” to build “green development hubs” and “actively responding” to climate change.
CARBON ‘PRESSURE’: China’s carbon emissions reduction strategy will move from the “preparatory stages” into a phase of “substantive” efforts in 2026, reported Shanghai-based news outlet the Paper, with local governments beginning to “feel the pressure” due to facing “formal carbon assessments for the first time” this year. Business news outlet 36Kr said that an “increasing number of industry participants” will have to begin finalising decarbonisation plans this year. The entry into force of the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism means China’s steelmakers will face a “critical test of cost, data and compliance”, reported finance news outlet Caixin. Carbon Brief asked several experts, including the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Li Shuo, what energy and climate developments they will be watching in 2026.
COAL DECLINE: New data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed China’s “mostly coal-based thermal power generation fell in 2025” for the first time in a decade, reported Reuters, to 6,290 terawatt-hours (TWh). The data confirmed earlier analysis for Carbon Brief that “coal power generation fell in both China and India in 2025”, marking the first simultaneous drop in 50 years. Energy news outlet International Energy Net noted that wind generation rose 10% to 1,053TWh and solar by 24% to 1,573TWh.
EV agreement reached
‘NORMALISED COMPETITION’?: The EU will remove tariffs on imports of electric vehicles (EV) made in China if the manufacturers follow “guidelines on minimum pricing” issued by the bloc, reported the Associated Press. China’s commerce ministry stated that the new guidelines will “enable Chinese exporters to address the EU’s anti-subsidy case concerning Chinese EVs in a way that is more practical, targeted and consistent with [World Trade Organization] rules”, according to the state-run China Daily. An editorial by the state-supporting Global Times argued that the agreement symbolised a “new phase” in China-EU economic and trade relations in which “normalised competition” is stabilised by a “solid cooperative foundation”.
SOLAR REBATES: China will “eliminate” export rebates for solar products from April 2026 and phase rebates for batteries out by 2027, said Caixin. Solar news outlet Solar Headlines said that the removal of rebates would “directly test” solar companies’ profitability and “fundamentally reshape the entire industry’s growth logic”. Meanwhile, China imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of “solar-grade polysilicon” from the US and Korea, said state news agency Xinhua.
OVERCAPACITY MEETINGS: The Chinese government “warned several producers of polysilicon…about monopoly risks” and cautioned them not to “coordinate on production capacity, sales volume and prices”, said Bloomberg. Reuters and China Daily covered similar government meetings on “mitigat[ing] risks of overcapacity” with the battery and EV industries, respectively. A widely republished article in the state-run Economic Daily said that to counter overcapacity, companies would need to reverse their “misaligned development logic” and shift from competing on “price and scale” to competing on “technology”.
High prices undermined home coal-to-gas heating policy
SWITCHING SHOCK: A video commentary by Xinhua reporter Liu Chang covered “reports of soaring [home] heating costs following coal-to-gas switching [policies] in some rural areas of north China”. Liu added that switching from coal to gas “must lead not only to blue skies, but also to warmth”. Bloomberg said that the “issue isn’t a lack of gas”, but the “result of a complex series of factors including price regulations, global energy shocks and strained local finances”.
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HEATED DEBATE: Discussions of the story in China became a “domestically resonant – and politically awkward – debate”, noted the current affairs newsletter Pekingnology. It translated a report by Chinese outlet Economic Observer that many villagers in Hebei struggled with no access to affordable heating, with some turning back to coal. “Local authorities are steadily advancing energy supply,” People’s Daily said of the issue, noting that gas is “increasingly becoming a vital heating energy source” as part of China’s energy transition. Another People’s Daily article quoted one villager saying: “Coal-to-gas conversion is a beneficial initiative for both the nation and its people…Yet the heating costs are simply too high.”
DEJA-VU: This is not the first time coal-to-gas switching has encountered challenges, according to research by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, with nearby Shanxi province experiencing a similar situation. In Shanxi, a “lack of planning, poor coordination and hasty implementation” led to demand outstripping supply, while some households had their coal-based heating systems removed with no replacement secured. Others were “deterred” from using gas-based systems due to higher prices, it said.
More China news
- LOFTY WORDS: At Davos, vice-premier He Lifeng reaffirmed commitments to China’s “dual-carbon” goals and called for greater “global cooperation on climate change”, reported Caixin.
- NOT LOOKING: US president Donald Trump, also at Davos, said he was not “able to find any windfarms in China”, adding China sells them to “stupid” consumers, reported Euronews. China installed wind capacity has ranked first globally “for 15 years consecutively”, said a government official, according to CGTN.
- ‘GREEN’ FACTORIES: China issued “new guidelines to promote green [industrial] microgrids” including targets for on-site renewable use, said Xinhua. The country “pledged to advance zero-carbon factory development” from 2026, said another Xinhua report.
- JET-FUEL MERGER: A merger of oil giant Sinopec with the country’s main jet-fuel producer could “aid the aviation industry’s carbon reduction goals”, reported Yicai Global. However, Caixin noted that the move could “stifl[e] innovation” in the sustainable air fuel sector.
- NEW TARGETS: Chinese government investment funds will now be evaluated on the “annual carbon reduction rates” achieved by the enterprises or projects they support, reported BJX News.
- HOLIDAY CATCH-UP: Since the previous edition of China Briefing in December, Beijing released policies on provincial greenhouse gas inventories, the “two new” programme, clean coal benchmarks, corporate climate reporting, “green consumption” and hydrogen carbon credits. The National Energy Administration also held its annual work conference.
Spotlight
Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy
While gas is seen in some countries as an important “bridging” fuel to move away from coal use, rapid electrification, uncompetitiveness and supply concerns have suppressed its share in China’s energy mix.
Carbon Brief explores the current role of gas in China and how this could change in the future. The full article is available on Carbon Brief’s website.
The current share of gas in China’s primary energy demand is small, at around 8-9%.
It also comprises 7% of China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fuel combustion, adding 755m tonnes of CO2 in 2023 – twice the total CO2 emissions of the UK.
Gas consumption is continuing to grow in line with an overall uptick in total energy demand, but has slowed slightly from the 9% average annual rise in gas demand over the past decade – during which time consumption more than doubled.
The state-run oil and gas company China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) forecast in 2025 that demand growth for the year may slow further to just over 6%.
Chinese government officials frequently note that China is “rich in coal” and “short of gas”. Concerns of import dependence underpin China’s focus on coal for energy security.
However, Beijing sees electrification as a “clear energy security strategy” to both decarbonise and “reduce exposure to global fossil fuel markets”, said Michal Meidan, China energy research programme head at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
A dim future?
Beijing initially aimed for gas to displace coal as part of a broader policy to tackle air pollution.
Its “blue-sky campaign” helped to accelerate gas use in the industrial and residential sectors. Several cities were mandated to curtail coal usage and switch to gas.
(January 2026 saw widespread reports of households choosing not to use gas heating installed during this campaign despite freezing temperatures, due to high prices.)
Industry remains the largest gas user in China, with “city gas” second. Power generation is a distant third.
The share of gas in power generation remains at 4%, while wind and solar’s share has soared to 22%, Yu Aiqun, research analyst at the thinktank Global Energy Monitor, told Carbon Brief. She added:
“With the rapid expansion of renewables and ongoing geopolitical uncertainties, I don’t foresee a bright future for gas power.”
However, gas capacity may still rise from 150 gigawatts (GW) in 2025 to 200GW by 2030. A government report noted that gas will continue to play a “critical role” in “peak shaving”.
But China’s current gas storage capacity is “insufficient”, according to CNPC, limiting its ability to meet peak-shaving demand.
Transport and industry
Gas instead may play a bigger role in the displacement of diesel in the transport sector, due to the higher cost competitiveness of LNG – particularly for trucking.
CNPC forecast that LNG displaced around 28-30m tonnes of diesel in the trucking sector in 2025, accounting for 15% of total diesel demand in China.
However, gas is not necessarily a better option for heavy-duty, long-haul transportation, due to poorer fuel efficiency compared with electric vehicles.
In fact, “new-energy vehicles” are displacing both LNG-fueled trucks and diesel heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs).
Meanwhile, gas could play a “more significant” role in industrial decarbonisation, Meidan told Carbon Brief, if prices fall substantially.
Growth in gas demand has been decelerating in some industries, but China may adopt policies more favourable to gas, she added.
An energy transition roadmap developed by a Chinese government thinktank found gas will only begin to play a greater role than coal in China by 2050 at the earliest.
Both will be significantly less important than clean-energy sources at that point.
This spotlight was written by freelance climate journalist Karen Teo for Carbon Brief.
Watch, read, listen
EV OUTLOOK: Tu Le, managing director of consultancy Sino Auto Insights, spoke on the High Capacity podcast about his outlook for China’s EV industry in 2026.
‘RUNAWAY TRAIN’: John Hopkins professor Jeremy Wallace argued in Wired that China’s strength in cleantech is due to a “runaway train of competition” that “no one – least of all [a monolithic ‘China’] – knows how to deal with”.
‘DIRTIEST AND GREENEST’: China’s energy engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative was simultaneously the “dirtiest and greenest” it has ever been in 2025, according to a new report by the Green Finance & Development Center.
INDUSTRY VOICE: Zhong Baoshen, chairman of solar manufacturer LONGi, spoke with Xinhua about how innovation, “supporting the strongest performers”, standards-setting and self-regulation could alleviate overcapacity in the industry.
$574bn
The amount of money State Grid, China’s main grid operator, plans to invest between 2026-30, according to Jiemian. The outlet adds that much of this investment will “support the development and transmission of clean energy” from large-scale clean-energy bases and hydropower plants.
New science
- The combination of long-term climate change and extremes in rainfall and heat have contributed to an increase in winter wheat yield of 1% in Xinjiang province between 1989-2023 | Climate Dynamics
- More than 70% of the “observed changes” in temperature extremes in China over 1901-2020 are “attributed to greenhouse gas forcing” | Environmental Research Letters
China Briefing is written by Anika Patel and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
The post China Briefing 22 January 2026: 2026 priorities; EV agreement; How China uses gas appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China Briefing 22 January 2026: 2026 priorities; EV agreement; How China uses gas
Ten years ago, switching from burning coal to gas was a key element of China’s policy to reduce severe air pollution.
However, while gas is seen in some countries as a “bridging” fuel to move away from coal use, rapid electrification, uncompetitiveness and supply concerns have suppressed its share in China’s energy mix.
As such, while China’s gas demand has more than doubled over the past decade, the fuel is not currently playing a decisive role in the country’s strategy to tackle climate change.
Instead, renewables are now the leading replacement for coal demand in China, with growth in solar and wind generation largely keeping emissions growth from China’s power sector flat.
While gas could play a role in decarbonising some aspects of China’s energy demand – particularly in terms of meeting power demand peaks and fuelling heavy industry – multiple factors would need to change to make it a more attractive alternative.
Small, but impactful
The share of gas in China’s primary energy demand is small and has remained relatively unchanged at around 8-9% over the past five years.
It also comprises 7% of China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fuel combustion, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Gas combustion in China added 755m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) into the atmosphere in 2023 – double the total amount of CO2 emitted by the UK.
However, its emissions profile in China lags well behind that of coal, which represented 79% of China’s fuel-linked CO2 emissions and was responsible for almost 9bn tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2023, according to the same IEA data.
Gas consumption continues to grow in line with an overall uptick in total energy demand. Chinese gas demand, driven by industry use, grew by around 7-8% year-on-year in 2024, according to different estimates.
This rapid growth is, nevertheless, slightly below the 9% average annual rise in China’s gas demand over the past decade, during which consumption has more than doubled overall, as shown in the figure below.
The state-run oil and gas company China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) forecast in 2025 that demand growth for the year may slow further to just over 6%.
The majority of China’s gas demand in 2023 was met by domestic gas supply, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).
Most of this supply comes from conventional gas sources. But incremental Chinese domestic gas supply in recent years has come from harder-to-extract unconventional sources, including shale gas, which accounted for as much as 45% of gas production in 2024.
Despite China’s large recoverable shale-gas resources and subsidies to encourage production, geographical and technical limitations have capped production levels relative to the US, which is the world’s largest gas producer by far.
CNPC estimates Chinese gas output will grow by just 4% in 2025, compared with 6% growth in 2024. Nevertheless, output is still expected to exceed the 230bn cubic metre national target for 2025.
Liquified natural gas (LNG) is China’s second most-common source of gas, imported via giant super-cooled tankers from countries including Australia, Qatar, Malaysia and Russia.
This is followed by pipeline imports – which are seen as cheaper, but less reliable – from Russia and central Asia.
One particularly high-profile pipeline project is the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline project. However, Beijing has yet to explicitly agree to investing in or purchasing the gas delivered by the project. Disagreements around pricing and logistics have hindered progress.
Evolving role
Beijing initially aimed for gas to displace coal as part of a broader policy to tackle air pollution.
A three-year action plan from 2018-2020, dubbed the “blue-sky campaign”, helped to accelerate gas use in the industrial and residential sectors, as gas displaced consumption of “dispersed coal” (散煤)”– referring to improperly processed coal that emits more pollutants.
Meanwhile, several cities across northern and central China were also mandated to curtail coal usage and switch to gas instead. Many of these cities were based in provinces with a strong coal mining economy or higher winter heating demand.
China’s pollution levels saw “drastic improvement” as a result, according to a report by research institute the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA).
(In January 2026, there were widespread media reports of households choosing not to use gas heating despite freezing temperatures, as a result of high prices following the expiry of subsidies for gas use.)
Industry remains the largest gas user in China, with “city gas” – gas delivered by pipeline to urban areas – trailing in second, as shown in the figure below. Power generation is a distant third.
Gas has never gained momentum in China’s power sector, with its share of power generation remaining at 4% while wind and solar power’s share has soared from 4% to 22% over the past decade, Yu Aiqun, a research analyst at the US-based thinktank Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief.
Yu adds that this stagnation is largely due to insufficient and unreliable gas supply, which drives up prices and makes gas less competitive compared to coal and renewables. She says:
“With the rapid expansion of renewables and ongoing geopolitical uncertainties, I don’t foresee a bright future for gas power.”
Average on-grid gas-fired power prices of 0.56-0.58 yuan per kilowatt hour (yuan/kWh) in China are far higher than that of around 0.3-0.4 yuan/kWh for coal power, according to some industry estimates. Recent auction prices for renewables are even cheaper than this.
Meanwhile, the share of renewables in China’s power capacity stood at 55% in 2024, compared with gas at around 4%.
Generation from wind and solar in particular has increased by more than 1,250 terawatt-hours (TWh) in China since 2015, while gas-fired generation has increased by just 140TWh, according to IEEFA.
As the share of coal has shrunk from 70% to 61% during this period, IEEFA suggests that renewables – rather than gas – are displacing coal’s share in the generation mix.
However, China’s gas capacity may still rise from approximately 150 gigawatts (GW) in 2025 to 200GW by 2030, Bloomberg reports.
A report by the National Energy Administration (NEA) on development of the sector notes that gas will continue to play a “critical role” in “peak shaving”, where gas turbines can be used for short periods to meet daily spikes in demand. As such, the NEA says gas will be an “important pillar” in China’s energy transition.
In 2024, a new policy on gas utilisation also “explicitly promoted” the use of gas peak-shaving power plants, according to industry outlet MySteel.
China’s current gas storage capacity is “insufficient”, according to CNPC, reducing its ability to meet peak-shaving demand. The country built 38 underground gas storage sites with peak-shaving capacity of 26.7bn cubic metres in 2024, but this accounts for just 6% of its annual gas demand.
Transport use
Gas is instead playing a bigger part in the displacement of diesel in the transport sector, due to the higher cost competitiveness of LNG as a fuel – particularly in the trucking sector.
CNPC expects that LNG displaced around 28-30m tonnes of diesel in the trucking sector in 2025, accounting for 15% of total diesel demand in China.
This is further aided by policy support from Beijing’s equipment trade-in programme, part of efforts to stimulate the economy.
However, gas is not necessarily a better option for heavy-duty, long-haul transportation, due to poorer fuel efficiency compared with electric vehicles (EVs).
In fact, “new-energy vehicles” (NEVs) – including hydrogen fuel-cell, pure-electric and hybrid-electric trucks – are displacing both LNG-fueled trucks and diesel heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs).
In the first half of 2025, battery-electric models accounted for 22% of all HDV sales, a year-on-year increase of 9%, while market share for LNG-fueled trucks fell from 30% in 2024 to 26%.
Gas can be cheaper than oil but is not competitive with EVs and – with the emergence of zero-emission fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia – gas may eventually lose even this niche market, says Yu.
Supply security
Chinese government officials frequently note that China is “rich in coal, poor in oil and short of gas” (“富煤贫油少气”). Concerns around import dependence have underpinned China’s focus on coal as a source of energy security.
However, Beijing increasingly sees electrification as a more strategic way to decarbonise its transport sector, according to some analysts.
“Overall, electrification is a clear energy security strategy to reduce exposure to global fossil fuel markets,” says Michal Meidan, head of the China energy research programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
Chinese oil and gas production grew dramatically in the last few years under a seven-year action plan from 2019-25, as Beijing ordered its state oil firms to ramp up output to ensure energy security.
Despite this, gas import dependency still hovers at around 40% of demand. This, according to assessments in government documents, exposes the country to price shocks and geopolitical risks.
The graph below shows the share of domestically produced gas (dark blue), LNG imports (mid-blue) and pipeline imports (light blue), in China’s overall gas supply between 2017 and 2024.
“Gas use is unlikely to play a significant role in decarbonising the power system, but could be more significant in industrial decarbonisation,” Meidan tells Carbon Brief.
She estimates that if LNG prices fall to $6 per million British thermal units (btu), compared to an average of $11 in 2024-25, this could encourage fuel switching in the steel, chemical manufacturing, textiles, ceramics and food processing industries.
The chart below shows the year-on-year change in gas demand between 2001-2022.
Growth in gas demand has been decelerating in some industries in recent years, such as refining. But it also remains unclear if Beijing will adopt more aggressive policies favouring gas, Meidan adds.
A roadmap developed by the Energy Research Institute (ERI), a thinktank under the National Development and Reform Commission’s Academy of Macroeconomic Research, finds that gas only begins to play an equivalent or greater role in China’s energy mix than coal by 2050 at the earliest – 10 years ahead of China’s target for achieving carbon neutrality.
Both fossil fuels play a significantly smaller role than clean-energy sources at this point.
Wang Zhongying and Kaare Sandholt, both experts at the ERI, write in Carbon Brief:
“Gas does not play a significant role in the power sector in our scenarios, as solar and wind can provide cheaper electricity while existing coal power plants – together with scaled-up expansion of energy storage and demand-side response facilities – can provide sufficient flexibility and peak-load capacity.”
Ultimately, China’s push for gas will be contingent on its own development goals. Its next five-year plan, from 2026-2030, will build a framework for China’s shift to controlling absolute carbon emissions, rather than carbon intensity.
Recent recommendations by top Chinese policymakers on priorities for the next five-year plan did not explicitly mention gas. Instead, the government endorses “raising the level of electrification in end-use energy consumption” while also “promoting peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
The Chinese government feels that gas is “nice to have…if available and cost-competitive but is not the only avenue for China’s energy transition,” says Meidan.
The post Explainer: Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Explainer: Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy
Every year, understanding of climate science grows stronger.
With each new research project and published paper, scientists learn more about how the Earth system responds to continuing greenhouse gas emissions.
But with many thousands of new studies on climate change being published every year, it can be hard to keep up with the latest developments.
Our annual “10 new insights in climate science” report offers a snapshot of key advances in the scientific understanding of the climate system.
Produced by a team of scientists from around the world, the report summarises influential, novel and policy-relevant climate research published over the previous 18 months.
The insights presented in the latest edition, published in the journal Global Sustainability, are as follows:
- Questions remain about the record warmth in 2023-24
- Unprecedented ocean surface warming and intensifying marine heatwaves are driving severe ecological losses
- The global land carbon sink is under strain
- Climate change and biodiversity loss amplify each other
- Climate change is accelerating groundwater depletion
- Climate change is driving an increase in dengue fever
- Climate change diminishes labour productivity
- Safe scale-up of carbon dioxide removal is needed
- Carbon credit markets come with serious integrity challenges
- Policy mixes outperform stand-alone measures in advancing emissions reductions
In this article, we unpack some of the key findings.
A strained climate system
The first three insights highlight how strains are growing across the climate system, from indications of an accelerating warming and record-breaking marine heatwaves, to faltering carbon sinks.
Between April 2023 and March 2024, global temperatures reached unprecedented levels – a surge that cannot be fully explained by the long-term warming trend and typical year-to-year fluctuations of the Earth’s climate. This suggests other factors are at play, such as declining sulphur emissions and shifting cloud cover.
(For more, Carbon Brief’s in-depth explainer of the drivers of recent exceptional warmth.)
Ocean heat uptake has climbed as well. This has intensified marine heatwaves, further stressing ecosystems and livelihoods that rely on fisheries and coastal resources.
The exceptional warming of the ocean has driven widespread impacts, including massive coral bleaching, fish and shellfish mortality and disruptions to marine food chains.
The map below illustrates some of the impacts of marine heatwaves from 2023-24, highlighting damage inflicted on coral reefs, fishing stocks and coastal communities.
Land “sinks” that absorb carbon – and buffer the emissions from human activity – are under increasing stress, too. Recent research shows a reduction in carbon stored in boreal forests and permafrost ecosystems.
The weakening carbon sinks means that more human-caused carbon emissions remain in the atmosphere, further driving up global temperatures and increasing the chances that warming will surpass the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit.
This links to the fourth insight, which shows how climate change and biodiversity loss can amplify each other by leading to a decrease in the accumulation of biomass and reduced carbon storage, creating a destabilising feedback loop that accelerates warming.
New evidence demonstrates that climate change could threaten more than 3-6 million species and, as a result, could undermine critical ecosystem functions.
For example, recent projections indicate that the loss of plant species could reduce carbon sequestration capacity in the range of 7-145bn tonnes of carbon over the coming decades. Similarly, studies show that, in tropical systems, the extinction of animals could reduce carbon storage capacity by up to 26%.
Human health and livelihoods
Growing pressure on the climate system is having cascading consequences for human societies and natural systems.
Our fifth insight highlights how groundwater supplies are increasingly at risk.
More than half the global population depends on groundwater – the second largest source of freshwater after polar ice – for survival.
But groundwater levels are in decline around the world. A 2025 Nature paper found that rapid groundwater declines, exceeding 50cm each year, have occurred in many regions in the 21st century, especially in arid areas dominated by cropland. The analysis also showed that groundwater losses accelerated over the past four decades in about 30% of regional aquifers.
Changes in rainfall patterns due to climate change, combined with increased irrigation demand for agriculture, are depleting groundwater reserves at alarming rates.
The figure below illustrates how climate-driven reductions in rainfall, combined with increased evapotranspiration, are projected to significantly reduce groundwater recharge in many arid regions – contributing to widespread groundwater-level declines.
These losses threaten food security, amplifying competition for scarce resources and undermining the resilience of entire communities.
Human health and livelihoods are also being affected by changes to the climate.
Our sixth insight spotlights the ongoing and projected expansion of the mosquito-borne disease dengue fever.
Dengue surged to the largest global outbreak on record in 2024, with the World Health Organization reporting 14.2m cases, which is an underestimate because not all cases are counted.
Rising temperatures are creating more favourable conditions for the mosquitoes that carry dengue, driving the disease’s spread and increasing its intensity.
The chart below shows the regions climatically suitable for Aedes albopictus (blue line) and Aedes aegypti (green line) – the primary mosquitoes species that carry the virus – increased by 46.3% and 10.7%, respectively, between 1951-60 and 2014-23.
The maps on the right reveal how dengue could spread by 2030 and 2050 under an emissions scenario broadly consistent with current climate policies. It shows that the climate suitable for the mosquito that spreads dengue could expand northwards in Canada, central Europe and the West Siberian Plain by 2050.
The ongoing proliferation of these mosquito species is particularly alarming given their ability to transmit the zika, chikungunya and yellow fever viruses.
Heat stress is also a growing threat to labour productivity and economic growth, which is the seventh insight in our list.
For example, an additional 1C of warming is projected to expose more than 800 million people in tropical regions to unsafe heat levels – potentially reducing working hours by up to 50%.
At 3C warming, sectors such as agriculture, where workers are outdoors and exposed to the sun, could see reductions in effective labour of 25-33% across Africa and Asia, according to a recent Nature Reviews Earth & Environment paper.
Meanwhile, sectors where workers operate in shaded or indoor settings could also face meaningful losses. This drain on productivity compounds socioeconomic issues and places a strain on households, businesses and governments.
Low-income, low-emitting regions are set to shoulder a greater relative share of the impacts of extreme heat on economic growth, exacerbating existing inequalities.
Action and policy
Our report illustrates not only the scale of the challenges facing humanity, but also some of the pathways toward solutions.
The eighth insight emphasises the critical role of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in stabilising the climate, especially in “overshoot” scenarios where warming temporarily surpasses 1.5C and is then brought back down.
Scaling these CDR solutions responsibly presents technical, ecological, justice, equity and governance challenges.
Nature-based approaches for pulling carbon out of the air – such as afforestation, peatland rewetting and agroforestry – could have negative consequences for food security, biodiversity conservation and resource provision if deployed at scale.
Yet, research has suggested that substantially more CDR may be needed than estimated in the scenarios used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC’s) last assessment report.
Recent findings showed that a pathway where temperatures remain below 1.5C with no overshoot would require up to 400Gt of cumulative CDR by 2100 in order to buffer against the effect of complex geophysical processes that can accelerate climate change. This figure is roughly twice the amount of CDR assessed by the IPCC.
This underscores the need for robust international coordination on the responsible scaling of CDR technologies, as a complement to ambitious efforts to reduce emissions. Transparent carbon accounting frameworks that include CDR will be required to align national pledges with international goals.
Similarly, voluntary carbon markets – where carbon “offsets” are traded by corporations, individuals and organisations that are under no legal obligation to make emission cuts – face challenges.
Our ninth insight shows how low-quality carbon credits have undermined the credibility of these largely unregulated carbon markets, limiting their effectiveness in supporting emission reductions.
However, emerging standards and integrity initiatives, such as governance and quality benchmarks developed by the Integrity Council for Voluntary Carbon Markets, could address some of the concerns and criticism associated with carbon credit projects.
High-quality carbon credits that are verified and rigorously monitored can complement direct emission reductions.
Finally, our 10th insight highlights how a mix of climate policies typically have greater success than standalone measures.
Research published in Science in 2024 shows how carefully tailored policy packages – including carbon pricing, regulations, and incentives – could consistently achieve larger and more durable emission reductions than isolated interventions.
For example, in the buildings sector, regulations that ban or phase out products or activities achieve an average effect size of 32% when included in a policy package, compared with 13% when implemented on their own.
Importantly, policy mixes that are tailored to the country context and with attention to distributional equity are more likely to gain public support.
These 10 insights in our latest edition highlight the urgent need for an integrated approach to tackling climate change.
The science is clear, the risks are escalating – but the tools to act are available.
The post Guest post: 10 key climate science ‘insights’ from 2025 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China Briefing 22 January 2026: 2026 priorities; EV agreement; How China uses gas
Climate at Davos: Oil execs bemoan “burden” of bank boycotts
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