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The Academy of Macroeconomic Research (AMR) is a research institution under the direct supervision of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the ministry in charge of economic development and planning.

As a “national high-end thinktank”, the AMR’s Energy Research Institute is a well-respected body conducting energy transition research and providing vital suggestions on the energy transition to Beijing. 

At this year’s COP29 in Baku, it launched the executive summary of 2024 China Energy Transformation Outlook (CETO), a key report describing China’s pathways to net-zero.

The launch was attended by a number of high-level officials, including climate envoy Liu Zhenmin and the head of the International Energy Agency, Dr Fatih Birol.

Carbon Brief’s Wanyuan Song was granted a rare – and lengthy – joint interview with its director general, Prof Lyu Wenbin, and director, Prof Bai Quan, who is also the lead author of the report, to hear their views about China’s energy transition.

  • On China’s commitment to climate action: “Climate change doesn’t just affect China, it affects every country in the world…Climate change is not fake. It is happening and we are all on the same boat.”
  • On international collaboration: “The joint work [on energy transition pathways] was meant to allow for a deeper grasp of the problems, making the research findings more scientific and [suggestions] more reasonable.”
  • On an early emissions peak: “[W]e would love to try our best…but we can’t rule out all possibilities to peak even earlier than planned.”
  • On updates in this year’s outlook: [This year w]e have also placed more emphasis on international cooperation.”
  • On the need for global cooperation: “To achieve the best scenario, China shouldn’t be the only country that puts efforts into energy transition.”
  • On stimulus and carbon reduction: “China’s ‘two new’ (“两新”) policy – large-scale equipment renewals and trade-ins of consumer goods – is one of [the policies]. The first three aspects [of ‘two new’] directly promote carbon reduction.”
  • On managing electricity grids and markets: “China has never faced this kind of challenge before. The demand for electricity is huge, and soaring.”
  • On China’s coal use: “With renewable energy becoming more powerful and energy storage becoming cheaper and more flexible, coal plants can play the role of ‘firefighters’ in the system – used in an electricity crisis whenever it is needed.”
  • On the role of “green hydrogen”: “[I]t is very expensive at the moment…Commercial and technology innovation are needed to reduce costs.”
  • On calls for greater ambition from China: “It can’t be the case that developing countries need to cut more emissions than developed countries – that would break the UN’s principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.”

CB: Why is China so determined to achieve its energy transition and combat climate change?

Bai Quan: Climate change doesn’t just affect China, it affects every country in the world. No one is excluded from it. China is one of the victims of extreme weather. The horrifying typhoon in Shanghai in recent months has blown windows off of skyscrapers – Shanghai didn’t have that many typhoons in the past. Autumn in Qinghai province [in west China] used to be cool and dry, but now it has become rainy. The weather forecast [once] said there was light rain in Beijing, but the heavy rain in the neighbouring province Hebei drowned people. Summer is getting hotter and winter is getting colder – this is climate change, and no one can survive alone. If Shanghai was drowned, would London be spared, would New York be OK? Climate change is not fake. It is happening and we are all on the same boat. 

Combating climate change is a must, it is one of our core needs, and the primary thing we need to do to secure life and production. Low-carbon issues have been part of China’s policy  for a long time but it wasn’t as big of a focus until President Xi vouched for climate action with the “dual-carbon” goal. The [“dual-carbon” goal] promise to the world is serious and, after President Xi announced it in 2020, it has become a hot topic [in media and among ordinary people]. The energy transition, as a sustainable solution, helps the “dual-carbon” goal to be realised. 

CB: Your institute is working with national and international partners to produce an annual “China energy transformation outlook”. Can you tell me how that collaboration came about and what the aims of the project are?

Lyu Wenbin: The Chinese government has proposed the “dual-carbon” goal, and the energy transition is an important part of this process. Now that a goal has been clearly set, what we should do to deliver it is to choose the best pathway. Our research was conducted along with the Danish Energy Agency and Columbia University. The joint work was meant to allow for a deeper grasp of the problems, making the research findings more scientific and [suggestions] more reasonable. 

CB: We covered your CETO 2023 report, in which you listed three stages of transformation. The first of these phases is the peaking phase, which lasts until 2030. With China rapidly expanding renewable energy this year and hitting its wind and solar capacity targets six years early, do you think China could peak even earlier than planned – “before 2030”?

BQ: There are many uncertainties and changes in the world economy, geopolitics and even military actions at the moment. Uncertainty also exists in climate change. China’s electricity consumption grew faster than expected and we would love to try our best to overcome all the difficulties to meet China’s carbon peaking goal before 2030, but we can’t rule out all possibilities to peak even earlier than planned.

CB: What differences are there in your outlook for China’s energy transition this year, compared to 2023?

BQ: The scenarios are different, although they are basically aligned. We have also placed more emphasis on international cooperation. The report itself has absorbed experiences from different places, such as Denmark’s experience in heating, for modelling, pathway design and other suggestions in the report. We would be very interested in discussing more new ideas and sharing our experience with everyone else.

CB: What would be needed for China to realise the most ambitious energy transition scenario featured in your report?

BQ: To achieve the best scenario, China shouldn’t be the only country that puts efforts into energy transition. China, as a developing country, at the government level and at the individual level, has already done a lot. The energy transition needs global cooperation. More people will realise the urgent need to combat climate change if we all join hands together. Solving some problems, such as commercialising hydrogen, also needs more joint research.

CB: You have previously said China’s energy transition relies on comprehensive policy support for green industry, “effective” investment in the green and low-carbon sector as well as promoting green consumption. Do you see signs of this in government plans for economic stimulus? 

BQ: Yes, many! China’s “two new” (“两新”) policy – large-scale equipment renewals and trade-ins of consumer goods – is one of them. In the document issued by the State Council [China’s central government], there are four aspects: “implementing equipment updates, trade-in of consumer goods, recycling, and improving standards”. 

The first three aspects directly promote carbon reduction. The first one is to service industrial sectors, the second one is to serve the general public, and the third one is for China’s “circular economy”. The last aspect indirectly serves energy saving and carbon reduction goals, by setting standards [for energy usage, emissions and recycling] to prevent people from re-purchasing outdated equipment with low energy efficiency.

In the past, it was difficult to recycle old production equipment, such as large motors. One obstacle is the challenge of acquiring a “first receipt” to be eligible for tax deductions. [Scrapped product sellers often cannot provide the purchase receipt – the “first receipt” – to the resource recycling companies for value-added tax deductions.] The new policy allows an ordinary invoice to be used for pre-tax deduction, solving the problem. This is a very important incentive to meet the 2027 goals [of the “two new” policy]. 

For the ordinary people, the “two new” policy also benefits their daily life. For example, they can receive subsidies for about 10-20% of a new purchase, with up to 2,000 yuan ($276) to trade-in a new fridge. [Trade-in subsidies for home appliances cover fridges, washing machines, televisions, air conditioners and computers.] They can get new energy saving electronics appliances at a very low price.

The “two new” policy documents clearly state the delineation of responsibilities of both the central and local governments, including funding they should provide. [The central government accounts for about 90% of funding and has issued a 300bn yuan ($41bn) bond to support this effort.] China holds regular press conferences stating progress on the “two new” policy, including on the renewal of outdated solar and wind equipment.

Another vital policy is the “guidelines to ramp up green transition of economic, social development” issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council. [See Carbon Brief’s China Briefing for more.] That is to say, it’s not just the [state-affiliated] State Council that promotes the “green transformation”, the Central Committee [the leading body of the Communist party] also really values it. There was a green transition policy before, but this new policy is a top-level design of “full green transition” [across every aspect of society]. It is a blueprint of China’s transition in industry, building [construction], transportation, energy and many other areas. Together with the “two new”, which is an implementation document for this top-level design, we now have both a direction and a manual for the energy transition. 

CB: China is attempting to upgrade its electricity grids and markets to manage the variability of wind and solar power. What are the biggest challenges it faces in this area?

BQ: China has never faced this kind of challenge before. The demand for electricity is huge, and soaring. Reforms in the electricity pricing system and grid management are underway, and so are many other reforms. These reforms need to be economical, fair and feasible. Reforms, in general, have less impact on the rich than the poor. In the end, we can’t just ignore energy safety and cut electricity supply, nor ignore the poor being unable to afford it. This is a big challenge for the government to achieve in such a short time, especially if we are to peak carbon before 2030. Current price reform, in terms of whole reform effort, is happening very quickly, with the medium-to-long term contract reforms, as well as the spot market and the ancillary market reforms. However, it is a complicated matter, with each province facing different situations. Industrial usage and civilian usage are also different – we need to protect ordinary people’s needs.

CB: There has been significant international criticism of China’s decision to use coal-fired power plants as “flexibility providers” in its energy transition. Will coal continue to be necessary for China’s energy mix as it approaches carbon neutrality in 2060 and beyond, and how effective are China’s current efforts to develop low-carbon coal-fired power?

BQ: China’s principle is “construction new before destruct old” (先立后破), which is also translated as “build before breaking”. [See Carbon Brief’s articles from 2021 and 2022 for background.] The challenge China faces is different [from other countries], our electricity consumption is growing too fast. Energy security for us is most important, and cutting coal out completely does not match the basic principle of energy supply. What we can do is to increase the share of green electricity when improving the overall quantity and quality of electricity supply. Power grids also need to improve capacity for electricity generated from renewable sources, to counter their variable nature. Energy storage is an ideal solution for us, but it is too expensive at the moment. 

The only pragmatic solution at the moment is asking coal plants to “tiao feng” (调峰, part-load operation, which means run below full-capacity). The old design of a coal-fired power plant was to operate for 5,500 hours annually, but they are at about 4,000 hours now. With renewable energy becoming more powerful and energy storage becoming cheaper and more flexible, coal plants can play the role of “firefighters” in the system – used in an electricity crisis whenever it is needed. 

Overall, electricity is the core of future development. Reforms in electricity generation, power grids, electricity usage and electricity demand are all needed. Developing countries in particular face harder challenges. It is not only China – Vietnam and India also are exploring solutions to their power problems. Therefore, we emphasise global cooperation, which is vital for finding a solution for us all.

CB: Will “green hydrogen” play a significant role in China’s future energy mix and, if so, when do you think it will be deployed at scale?

BQ: Yes. Green hydrogen is a great alternative for fossil fuels in the chemical industry and the transportation sector. We were excited about it when it was first discovered, but it is very expensive at the moment. To deploy green hydrogen, commercial and technology innovation are needed, to reduce costs.

China’s carbon pricing has not reached the chemical industry yet, but it might change with changes in the market. The commercialisation of hydrogen is very important, a hydrogen fuel-cell vehicle needs to be affordable. We face the same problem that the EU faces and we would love to learn from them. 

CB: Recent research has suggested that China should reduce emissions to at least 30% below 2023 levels by 2035, to align with the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5C. Some Chinese scientists have called this 30% figure “too ambitious”. Do you think a 30% reduction would be achievable? 

BQ: I haven’t read the paper so can’t comment on it. I am not sure if there are suggestions for other countries in this research paper. [International expectations for China’s climate goals] need to be fair for China, as a developing country. [They] need to consider the shared responsibilities of the developed countries, including the US and EU. It can’t be the case that developing countries need to cut more emissions than developed countries – that would break the UN’s principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. China has not yet reached carbon peak, it still has some ways to go.

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Carbon Brief Quiz 2026: Picture Round 1 and 2

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All answers will need to be submitted via the Google form by the end of the half-time break

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Landmark deal to share Chile’s lithium windfall fractures Indigenous communities

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Rudecindo Espíndola’s family has been growing corn, figs and other crops for generations in the Soncor Valley in northern Chile, an oasis of green orchards in one of the driest places on Earth the Atacama desert.

Perched nearly 2,500 metres above sea level, his village, Toconao, means “lost corner” in the Kunza language of the Indigenous people who have lived and farmed the land in this remote spot for millennia.

“Our deep connection to this place is based on what we have inherited from our ancestors: our culture, our language,” said Espíndola, a member of a local research team that found evidence that people have inhabited the desert for more than 12,000 years.

This distant outpost is at the heart of the global rush for lithium, a silvery-white metal used to make batteries for electric vehicles (EV) and renewable energy storage that are vital to the world’s clean energy transition. The Atacama salt flat is home to about 25% of the world’s known lithium reserves, turning Chile into the world’s second-largest lithium producer after Australia.

For decades, the Atacama’s Indigenous Lickanantay people have protested against the expansion of the lithium industry, warning that the large evaporation ponds used to extract lithium from the brine beneath the salt flats are depleting scarce and sacred water supplies and destroying fragile desert ecosystems.

Espíndola joined the protests, fearing that competition for water could pose an existential threat to his community.

But last year, he was among dozens of Indigenous representatives who sat across the table from executives representing two Chilean mining giants to hammer out a governance model that gives Indigenous communities living close to lithium sites a bigger say over operations, and a greater share of the economic benefits.

A man wearing a black T-shirt and a hat stands in front of a tree
Rudecindo Espíndola stands in a green oasis near the village of Toconao in the Atacama desert (Photo: Francisco Parra)

A pioneering deal

The agreement is part of a landmark deal between state-owned copper miner Codelco and lithium producer the Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile (SQM) to extract lithium from the salt flats until 2060 through a joint venture called NovaAndino Litio.

The governance model that promises people living in Toconao and other villages around the salt flats millions of dollars in benefits and greater environmental oversight is the first of its kind in mineral-rich Chile, and has been hailed by industry experts as the start of a potential model for more responsible mining for energy transition metals.

NovaAndino told Climate Home News the negotiations with local communities represented an “unprecedented process that has allowed us to incorporate the territory’s vision early in the project’s design” and creates “a system of permanent engagement” with local communities.

The company added it will contribute to sustainable development in the area and help “the safeguarding of [the Lickanantay people’s] culture and environmental values”.

    For mining companies, such agreements could help reduce social conflicts and protests, which have delayed and stalled extraction in other parts of South America’s lithium-rich region, known as the lithium triangle.

    “Argentina and Bolivia could learn a lot from what we’re doing [here],” said Rodrigo Guerrero, a researcher at the Santiago-based Espacio Público think-tank, adding that adopting participatory frameworks early on could prevent them from “going through the entire cycle of disputes” that Chile has experienced.

    Justice at last?

    As part of the governance deal, NovaAndino has pledged to adopt technologies that will reduce water use and mitigate the environmental impacts of lithium extraction.

    It has also committed to hold more than 100 annual meetings with community representatives to build a “good faith” relationship, and an Indigenous Advisory Council will meet twice a year with the company’s sustainability committee to discuss its environmental strategy, company sources said. The meetings are due to begin next month.

    To oversee the agreement’s implementation, an assembly – composed of representatives from all 25 signatory communities – will track the project’s progress. In addition, NovaAndino will hold one-on-one meetings with each community to address issues such as the hiring of local people and the protection of Indigenous employees.

    A flamingo at the Chaxa Lagoon in the Atacama salt flat (Photo: REUTERS/Cristian Rudolffi)

    Espíndola said the deal, while far from perfect, was an important step forward.

    “Previously, Indigenous participation was ambiguous. Now we talk about participation at [every] hierarchical level of this process, a very strong empowerment for Indigenous communities,” said Espíndola, adding that it did not give local communities everything they had asked for. For instance, they will not hold veto power over NovaAndino’s decisions or have a formal shareholder role.

    But after years of conflict with mining companies, a form of “participatory justice is being done”, he said.

    Not everyone is convinced that the accord, pushed by Chile’s former leftist government, marks progress, however.

    “Not in our name”

    The negotiations have caused deep divisions among the Lickanantay, some of whom say greater engagement with mining companies will not stop irreparable damage to the salt flats on which their traditional way of life depends. Others fear the promise of more money will further erode community bonds.

    In January 2024, Indigenous communities from five villages closest to the mining operations, including Toconao, blocked the main access roads to the lithium extraction sites. They said the Council of Atacameño Peoples, which represents 18 Lickanantay communities and was leading discussions with the company, no longer spoke for them.

    Official transcripts of consultations on the extension of the lithium contracts and how to share the promised benefits reveal deep divisions. Tensions peaked when communities around the mining operations clashed over how to distribute the multimillion-dollar windfall, with villages closest to the mining sites demanding the largest share.

    Eventually, separate deals establishing a new governance framework over mining activities were reached between Codelco and SQM with 25 local communities, including a specific agreement for the five villages closest to the extraction sites.

    Codelco’s chairman Maximo Pacheco (Photo: REUTERS/Rodrigo Garrido)

    The division caused by the separate deal for the five villages “will cause historic damage” to the unity of the Atacama desert’s Indigenous peoples, said Hugo Flores, president of the Council of Atacameño Associations, a separate group representing farmers, herders and local workers who oppose the mining expansion.

    Sonia Ramos, 83, a renowned Lickanantay healer and well-known anti-mining activist, lamented the fracturing of social bonds over money, and for the sake of meeting government objectives.

    “There is fragmentation among the communities themselves. Everything has transformed into disequilibrium,” said the 83-year-old.

    “[NovaAndino] supposedly has economic significance for the country, but for us, it is the opposite,” she said.

    The company told Climate Home News it has “acted consistently” to promote “transparent, voluntary, and good-faith dialogue with the communities in the territory, recognising their diversity and autonomy, and always respecting their timelines and forms of participation”.

    A one-off deal or a model for others?

    The NovaAndino joint venture is a pillar of Chile’s strategy to double lithium production by 2031 and consolidate the copper-producing nation’s role in the clean energy transition as demand for battery minerals accelerates.

    Chile’s new far-right president, José Antonio Kast, who was sworn in last week, promised to respect the lithium contracts signed by his predecessor’s administration – including the governance model.

    Still, some experts say the splits over the new model highlight the need for legislation that mandates direct engagement and minimum community benefits for all large mining projects.

    “In the past, this has lent itself to clientelism, communities who negotiate best or arrive first get the better deal,” said Pedro Zapata, a programme officer in Chile for the Natural Resource Governance Institute.

    “This can be to the detriment of other communities with less strength. We cannot have first- and second-class citizens subject to the same industry,” he added.

    The government is already negotiating two more public-private partnerships to extract lithium with mining giant Rio Tinto, which it said would include a framework to engage with Indigenous communities and share some of the revenues. The details will need to be negotiated between local people, the government and the company.

    Sharing the benefits of mining

    Under the deal in the Atacama, NovaAndino will run SQM’s current lithium concessions until they expire in 2030 before seeking new permits to expand mining in the region under a vast project known as “Salar Futuro” – a process which will require further mandatory consultations with communities.

    Besides the participatory mechanism, the new agreement promises more money than ever before for salt flat communities.

    A stone arch welcomes visitors to the village of Peine, one of the closest settlements to lithium mining sites in the Atacama salt flat (Photo: REUTERS/Cristian Rudolffi)

    Depending on the global price of lithium and their proximity to the mining operations, Indigenous communities could collectively receive roughly $30 million annually in funding – about double what SQM currently disburses under existing contracts.

    When taking into account the company’s payments to local and regional authorities, contributions could reach $150 million annually, according to the government.

    To access these resources, each community will need to submit a pipeline of projects they would like funding for under a complex arrangement that includes five separate financial streams:

    • A general investment fund will distribute funding based on each village’s size and proximity to the mining sites
    • A development fund will support projects specifically in the five communities closest to the extraction sites
    • Contributions to farmers and livestock associations
    • Contributions to local governments
    • A groundbreaking “intergenerational fund” held in trust for the Lickanantay until 2060

    For many isolated communities in the Atacama desert, financial contributions from mining firms have funded essential public services, such as healthcare and facilities like football pitches and swimming pools.

    In the past, communities have used some of the benefits they received from mining to build their own environmental monitoring units, hiring teams of hydrogeologists and lawyers to scrutinise miners’ activities.

    Espíndola said the new model could pave the way for more ambitious development projects such as water treatment plants and community solar energy projects.

    A man in a white shirt and glasses stands in front of a stone wall
    Sergio Cubillos, president of the Peine community, was one of the Indigenous representatives in the negotiations with Codelco and SQM (Photo credit: Formando Rutas/ Daniela Carvajal)

    Competition for water

    The depletion of water resources is one of local people’s biggest environmental concerns.

    To extract lithium from the salt flats, miners pump lithium-rich brine accumulated over millions of years in underground reservoirs into gigantic pools, where the water is left to evaporate under the sun and leaves behind lithium carbonate.

    One study has shown that the practice is causing the salt flat to sink by up to two centimetres a year. SQM recently said its current operations consume approximately 11,500 to 12,500 litres of industrial freshwater for every metric ton of lithium produced.

    NovaAndino has committed to significantly reduce the company’s water use by returning at least 30% of the water it extracts from the brine and eliminating the use of all freshwater in its operations within five years of obtaining an environmental permit.

      Cristina Dorador, a microbiologist at the University of Antofagasta, told Climate Home News that reinjecting the water underground is untested at a large scale and could impact the chemical composition of the salt flats.

      Continuing to extract lithium from the flats until 2060 could be the “final blow” for this fragile ecosystem, she said.

      Asked to comment on such concerns, NovaAndino said any new technology will be “subject to the highest regulatory standards”, and pledged to ensure transparency through “an updated monitoring system with the participation of Indigenous communities”.

      High price for hard-won gains

      For the five communities living on the doorstep of the lithium pools, one of the biggest gains is being granted physical access to the mining sites to monitor the lithium extraction and its impact on the salt flats.

      That is a first and will strengthen communities’ ability to call out environmental harms, said Sergio Cubillos, the community president of Peine, the village closest to the evaporation ponds. It could also give them the means to seek remediation through the courts if necessary, Espíndola said.

      Gaining such rights represents long-overdue progress, Cubillos said, but it has come at a high price for the Lickanantay people.

      “Communities receiving money today is what has ultimately led to this division, because we haven’t been able to figure out what we want, how we want it, and how we envision our future as a people,” he said.

      Main image: A truck loads concentrated brine at SQM’s lithium mine at the Atacama salt flat in Chile (Photo: REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado)

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      Roadmap launched to restart deadlocked UN plastics treaty talks

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      Diplomats will hold a series of informal meetings this year in a bid to revive stalled talks over a global treaty to curb plastic pollution, before aiming to reconvene for the next round of official negotiations at the end of 2026 or early 2027.

      Hoping to find a long-awaited breakthrough in the deeply divided UN process, the chair of the talks, Chilean ambassador Julio Cordano, released a roadmap on Monday to inject momentum into the discussions after negotiations collapsed at a chaotic session in Geneva last August.

      Cordano wrote in a letter that countries would meet in Nairobi from June 30 to July 3 for informal discussions to review all the components of the negotiations, including thorny issues such as efforts to limit soaring plastic production.

        The gathering should result in the drafting of a new document laying the foundations of a future treaty text with options on elements with divergent views, but “no surprises” such as new ideas or compromise proposals. This plan aims to address the fact that countries left Geneva without a draft text to work on – something Cordano called a “significant limitation” in his letter.

        “Predictable pathway”

        The meeting in the Kenyan capital will follow a series of virtual consultations every four to six weeks, where heads of country delegations will exchange views on specific topics. A second in-person meeting aimed at finding solutions might take place in early October, depending on the availability of funding.

        Cordano said the roadmap should offer “a predictable pathway” in the lead-up to the next formal negotiating session, which is expected to take place over 10 days at the end of 2026 or early 2027. A host country has yet to be selected, but Climate Home News understands that Brazil, Azerbaijan or Kenya – the home of the UN Environment Programme – have been put forward as options.

        Countries have twice failed to agree on a global plastics treaty at what were meant to be final rounds of negotiations in December 2024 and August 2025.

        Divisions on plastic production

        One of the most divisive elements of the discussions remains what the pact should do about plastic production, which, according to the UN, is set to triple by 2060 without intervention.

        A majority, which includes most European, Latin American, African and Pacific island nations, wants to limit the manufacturing of plastic to “sustainable levels”. But large fossil fuel and petrochemical producers, led by Saudi Arabia, the United States, Russia and India, say the treaty should only focus on managing plastic waste.

        As nearly all plastic is made from planet-heating oil, gas and coal, the sector’s trajectory will have a significant impact on global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

        Countries still far apart

        After an eight-month hiatus, informal discussions restarted in early March at an informal meeting of about 20 countries hosted by Japan.

        A participant told Climate Home News that, while the gathering had been helpful to test ideas, progress remained “challenging”, with national stances largely unchanged.

        The source added that countries would need to achieve a significant shift in positions in the coming months to make reconvening formal negotiations worthwhile.

        Deep divisions persist as plastics treaty talks restart at informal meeting

        Jacob Kean-Hammerson, global plastics policy lead at Greenpeace USA, said the new roadmap offers an opportunity for countries to “defend and protect the most critical provisions on the table”.

        He said that the document expected after the Nairobi meeting “must include and revisit proposals backed by a large number of countries, especially on plastic production, that have previously been disregarded”.

        “These measures are essential to addressing the crisis at its source and must be reinstated as a key part of the negotiations,” he added.

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