Published

2 years ago

July 26, 2024

Alice Rush

Addressing climate justice calls for a “fundamental, decolonial constitutional change”, according to a new study published in Climate Policy.

While systemic change would only be possible in the long term, there is potential for progress within the constraints of current systems, says the study, which introduces a tool to guide this outcome.

The new “Indigenous climate justice policy analysis tool” is designed to facilitate a “qualitative assessment” of the policymaking process and individual policies.

It evaluates whether a policy encompasses Indigenous climate justice and includes mechanisms to move towards securing “just” outcomes.

While the authors acknowledge the limitations of the tool in providing a measure of true “justness”, the dimensions it tests can provide insight into whether a policy upholds Indigenous climate justice, they argue.

As such, it is designed to empower Indigenous communities to hold governments accountable and to guide non-Indigenous policymakers in improving their practices to achieve “inclusive” climate justice, the authors say.

The tool was designed for assessing policies in New Zealand – the Indigenous Māori use the term Aotearoa rather than the colonial-era name – but the authors say they have “endeavoured to make it adaptable for use in other settings”.

However, one of the study authors noted the “significant political resistance” that might be triggered by attempts to embed the tool in policymaking in New Zealand – and elsewhere.

Climate justice pathways

The new research is designed to help address the gaps in the inclusion of Indigenous climate justice policies within climate action.

Climate justice is a term used to explain efforts to reshape climate action from a technical effort to cut emissions into an approach that also focuses on human rights and social inequality. It includes an understanding that those least responsible for climate change often suffer the worst impacts.

In many parts of the world, Indigenous communities bear the brunt of adverse impacts from climate change, as well as facing systemic disadvantages in climate change mitigation efforts due to structural inequity.

The paper says that, even if a policy is deemed “just”, it will still be inadequate because “true” justice “cannot be achieved in the context of a dominant colonial, capitalist patriarchy whose associated hierarchical structures, oppressive dynamics…are antithetical to Indigenous ways of being”. However, recognising the long-term nature of systemic change, the authors highlight the potential to make progress within current systems.

The tool is, therefore, designed to empower Indigenous communities to realise progress within existing governance systems, even though the authors say they recognise that justice is conditional upon “system transformation”.

Historically, colonialism has significantly contributed to climate change, as revealed by Carbon Brief analysis published in 2023. As such, climate change action necessitates addressing colonial emissions and practices by integrating “decolonial” theories, which prioritise dismantling harmful structures over efforts to reform the status quo, the research argues.

“Climate injustice is inextricably linked to colonialism, capitalism and extractivism, yet dominant environmental justice frameworks often overlook the unique experiences of Indigenous communities,” says Harjeet Singh, global engagement director of the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative, who was not involved in the study. Singh tells Carbon Brief:

“The very countries and corporations responsible for the climate crisis are now positioning themselves as the arbiters of climate solutions. Yet, they steadfastly avoid addressing the broader polycrisis – manifestations of colonial, capitalist, extractive and patriarchal systems from which they have reaped immense benefits.”

Existing approaches have been insufficient in effectively guiding climate policy for Indigenous people’s health and equity, the research states. The authors note that conventional environmental justice literature does not explicitly prioritise kinship relationships (whakapapa), which they say are central to the Indigenous conception of climate justice.

The authors refer to the Māori creation story which follows that all beings “emerge from the realms of Ranginui, the Sky, and Papatūānuku, the Earth – our common ancestors”. These “more-than-human” relatives are central to kin-based systems which emphasise a shared ancestry between humans and the natural world.

This “inherently anti-colonial” conception of climate justice embraces the “restoration and maintenance of harmonious relationships between humans, ancestors of all current beings and those still to come”, the research says, in contrast to settler colonialism which is “a form of violence that disrupts relationships between humans and our more-than-human relations”.

According to the authors, this tenet has largely been overlooked in mainstream climate justice efforts. In fact, limitations within existing political and legal frameworks prevent Indigenous communities from fulfilling the responsibilities they have towards the environment and other beings.

Key criteria

The research is underpinned by Kaupapa Māori – Māori customary practice and principles. This includes “wellbeing, priorities and aspirations, social and cultural contexts, and Indigenous rights”, the authors say, as well as policy frameworks, health impact assessments, ecological models and Indigenous understanding of environmental justice.

This was the basis for the tool, which incorporates 13 essential criteria (C1-C13) shown in the table below and classified under five key dimensions of justice.

Specifically, these five dimensions are relational justice, procedural justice, distributive justice, recognitional justice and restorative justice, described in more detail underneath the table.

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The first three criteria focus on relational justice, including on relationships and how they form rights and responsibilities. In this context, it also extends “cosmopolitanism”, the notion that emphasises equal moral worth and respect for all humans.

Next, there are three criteria on procedural justice. These emphasise transparency and active and fair participation of all in the decision-making process. The paper extends the notion of active participation to non-human entities, such as land, air and water, providing them with political agency through human guardians who represent their interests.

For example, the Whanganui River in New Zealand has been granted legal personhood, represented by the respective local Indigenous people who are imbued with guardianship obligations. This translates to a legal right of recourse if harm is caused to the natural entity by human activities, such as releasing pollution.

The next three criteria focus on distributive justice, including the disproportionate impact of climate change on Indigenous communities who contribute least to greenhouse gas emissions. The authors advocate for free and fair distribution of burdens and benefits across groups.

Criteria 10 and 11 focus on recognitional justice. These emphasise recognition of and respect for diverse cultures, experiences and identities, validating multiple ways of knowledge production and dissemination, including Indigenous epistemologies alongside traditional Western knowledge.

The final two criteria are about restorative justice, focusing on repairing harm to individuals, communities and the environment. The paper’s conceptualisation encompasses correcting the harms against “people, other living things and the natural world” and distinguishes between reparations (financial) and remedying underlying injustices (restoration of land).

Each of the above criterion is graded against three levels of achievement:

Unacceptable, indicating harmful impacts or no change.
Progress towards justice, indicating some improvement usually within current systems and norms.
Climate justice, signifying complete justice for all human and non-human entities beyond the constraints of current frameworks.

The paper notes that the tool’s multidimensional nature often extends the analysis to matters outside the purview of policymakers.

For example, the case of political agency for non-human entities is useful in understanding the constraints of policymaking within existing frameworks, they note. This, essentially, means that the tool evaluates policies by standards that are currently “impossible to meet within the context in which policy development currently occurs”.

Applying the tool

The tool was piloted in New Zealand by analysing the 2021 advice to the government produced by the country’s Climate Change Commission.

Using 11 questions – six about the criteria and five about the tool as a whole – the authors identified gaps, shortcomings, redundancy and duplication issues for improvement.

The pilot also assessed the feasibility of embedding the framework in the policymaking process, whereby the tool could have continued benefits.

The research is “well-grounded in climate justice theory”, says Dr Zoha Shawoo, a scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute, who was not involved in the study.

She says the tool could be “particularly useful in conducting gap analyses and to guide the implementation of climate finance, to ensure that climate finance projects are also advancing justice”.

Shawoo adds the tool faces many challenges including not “getting a buy-in from decision-makers and those in power, who have a vested interest in not undoing the existing systems that they actively benefit from”.

The tool was designed primarily for the political and geographical context of New Zealand, but the authors say they have “endeavoured to make it adaptable for use in other settings”.

In particular, it could be applied to other settler-colonial nations, the authors add.

Dr Rhys Jones, one of the study authors and associate professor at the University of Auckland, tells Carbon Brief about the challenges to embedding the tool within policymaking:

“First, using the tool requires particular capabilities, knowledge and expertise, which may not always be present in policymaking agencies. Second, it can be quite resource-intensive to undertake a comprehensive analysis using the tool. Third, some of the issues addressed by the tool are beyond the scope of conventional policy considerations, such as the capacity for all (human and non-human) entities to express political agency. Fourth, particularly in the current political climate in many countries, including Aotearoa New Zealand, there may be significant political resistance to the focus on Indigenous rights and recognition of Indigenous values and knowledges in policymaking processes.”

Prof Alexandra Macmillan, an environmental health researcher at the University of Otago, another author involved with the study, tells Carbon Brief:

“[The] current structures, processes and distribution of power in climate policy…are not keeping the world’s populations safe from climate change, instead, continuing to subsidise and support an insupportable status quo.”

She adds that the tool is also “relevant to countries who consider themselves to be post-colonial, including high income countries like the UK whose wealth has accumulated from colonial extractivism, and whose current climate policies risk relying upon ongoing colonial violence in other countries”.

The post Study offers new policy tool for considering ‘Indigenous climate justice’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Study offers new policy tool for considering ‘Indigenous climate justice’

Greenhouse Gases

DeBriefed 6 February 2026: US secret climate panel ‘unlawful’ | China’s clean energy boon | Can humans reverse nature loss?

Published

3 days ago

February 6, 2026

Alice Rush

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Secrets and layoffs

UNLAWFUL PANEL: A federal judge ruled that the US energy department “violated the law when secretary Chris Wright handpicked five researchers who rejected the scientific consensus on climate change to work in secret on a sweeping government report on global warming”, reported the New York Times. The newspaper explained that a 1972 law “does not allow agencies to recruit or rely on secret groups for the purposes of policymaking”. A Carbon Brief factcheck found more than 100 false or misleading claims in the report.

DARKNESS DESCENDS: The Washington Post reportedly sent layoff notices to “at least 14” of its climate journalists, as part of a wider move from the newspaper’s billionaire owner, Jeff Bezos, to eliminate 300 jobs at the publication, claimed Climate Colored Goggles. After the layoffs, the newspaper will have five journalists left on its award-winning climate desk, according to the substack run by a former climate reporter at the Los Angeles Times. It comes after CBS News laid off most of its climate team in October, it added.

WIND UNBLOCKED: Elsewhere, a separate federal ruling said that a wind project off the coast of New York state can continue, which now means that “all five offshore wind projects halted by the Trump administration in December can resume construction”, said Reuters. Bloomberg added that “Ørsted said it has spent $7bn on the development, which is 45% complete”.

Around the world

CHANGING TIDES: The EU is “mulling a new strategy” in climate diplomacy after struggling to gather support for “faster, more ambitious action to cut planet-heating emissions” at last year’s UN climate summit COP30, reported Reuters.
FINANCE ‘CUT’: The UK government is planning to cut climate finance by more than a fifth, from £11.6bn over the past five years to £9bn in the next five, according to the Guardian.
BIG PLANS: India’s 2026 budget included a new $2.2bn funding push for carbon capture technologies, reported Carbon Brief. The budget also outlined support for renewables and the mining and processing of critical minerals.
MOROCCO FLOODS: More than 140,000 people have been evacuated in Morocco as “heavy rainfall and water releases from overfilled dams led to flooding”, reported the Associated Press.
CASHFLOW: “Flawed” economic models used by governments and financial bodies “ignor[e] shocks from extreme weather and climate tipping points”, posing the risk of a “global financial crash”, according to a Carbon Tracker report covered by the Guardian.
HEATING UP: The International Olympic Committee is discussing options to hold future winter games earlier in the year “because of the effects of warmer temperatures”, said the Associated Press.

54%

The increase in new solar capacity installed in Africa over 2024-25 – the continent’s fastest growth on record, according to a Global Solar Council report covered by Bloomberg.

Latest climate research

Arctic warming significantly postpones the retreat of the Afro-Asian summer monsoon, worsening autumn rainfall | Environmental Research Letters
“Positive” images of heatwaves reduce the impact of messages about extreme heat, according to a survey of 4,000 US adults | Environmental Communication
Greenland’s “peripheral” glaciers are projected to lose nearly one-fifth of their total area and almost one-third of their total volume by 2100 under a low-emissions scenario | The Cryosphere

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

Solar power, electric vehicles and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment, according to new analysis for Carbon Brief (shown in blue above). Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) – comparable to the economies of Brazil or Canada, the analysis said.

Spotlight

Can humans reverse nature decline?

This week, Carbon Brief travelled to a UN event in Manchester, UK to speak to biodiversity scientists about the chances of reversing nature loss.

Officials from more than 150 countries arrived in Manchester this week to approve a new UN report on how nature underpins economic prosperity.

The meeting comes just four years before nations are due to meet a global target to halt and reverse biodiversity loss, agreed in 2022 under the landmark “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF).

At the sidelines of the meeting, Carbon Brief spoke to a range of scientists about humanity’s chances of meeting the 2030 goal. Their answers have been edited for length and clarity.

Dr David Obura, ecologist and chair of Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)

We can’t halt and reverse the decline of every ecosystem. But we can try to “bend the curve” or halt and reverse the drivers of decline. That’s the economic drivers, the indirect drivers and the values shifts we need to have. What the GBF aspires to do, in terms of halting and reversing biodiversity loss, we can put in place the enabling drivers for that by 2030, but we won’t be able to do it fast enough at this point to halt [the loss] of all ecosystems.

Dr Luthando Dziba, executive secretary of IPBES

Countries are due to report on progress by the end of February this year on their national strategies to the Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD]. Once we get that, coupled with a process that is ongoing within the CBD, which is called the global stocktake, I think that’s going to give insights on progress as to whether this is possible to achieve by 2030…Are we on the right trajectory? I think we are and hopefully we will continue to move towards the final destination of having halted biodiversity loss, but also of living in harmony with nature.

Prof Laura Pereira, scientist at the Global Change Institute at Wits University, South Africa

At the global level, I think it’s very unlikely that we’re going to achieve the overall goal of halting biodiversity loss by 2030. That being said, I think we will make substantial inroads towards achieving our longer term targets. There is a lot of hope, but we’ve also got to be very aware that we have not necessarily seen the transformative changes that are going to be needed to really reverse the impacts on biodiversity.

Dr David Cooper, chair of the UK’s Joint Nature Conservation Committee and former executive secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity

It’s important to look at the GBF as a whole…I think it is possible to achieve those targets, or at least most of them, and to make substantial progress towards them. It is possible, still, to take action to put nature on a path to recovery. We’ll have to increasingly look at the drivers.

Prof Andrew Gonzalez, McGill University professor and co-chair of an IPBES biodiversity monitoring assessment

I think for many of the 23 targets across the GBF, it’s going to be challenging to hit those by 2030. I think we’re looking at a process that’s starting now in earnest as countries [implement steps and measure progress]…You have to align efforts for conserving nature, the economics of protecting nature [and] the social dimensions of that, and who benefits, whose rights are preserved and protected.

Neville Ash, director of the UN Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre

The ambitions in the 2030 targets are very high, so it’s going to be a stretch for many governments to make the actions necessary to achieve those targets, but even if we make all the actions in the next four years, it doesn’t mean we halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. It means we put the action in place to enable that to happen in the future…The important thing at this stage is the urgent action to address the loss of biodiversity, with the result of that finding its way through by the ambition of 2050 of living in harmony with nature.

Prof Pam McElwee, Rutgers University professor and co-chair of an IPBES “nexus assessment” report

If you look at all of the available evidence, it’s pretty clear that we’re going to keep experiencing biodiversity decline. I mean, it’s fairly similar to the 1.5C climate target. We are not going to meet that either. But that doesn’t mean that you slow down the ambition…even though you recognise that we probably won’t meet that specific timebound target, that’s all the more reason to continue to do what we’re doing and, in fact, accelerate action.

Watch, read, listen

OIL IMPACTS: Gas flaring has risen in the Niger Delta since oil and gas major Shell sold its assets in the Nigerian “oil hub”, a Climate Home News investigation found.

LOW SNOW: The Washington Post explored how “climate change is making the Winter Olympics harder to host”.

CULTURE WARS: A Media Confidential podcast examined when climate coverage in the UK became “part of the culture wars”.

Coming up

2-8 February: 12th session of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), Manchester, UK
8 February: Japanese general election
8 February: Portugal presidential election
11 February: Barbados general election
11-12 February: UN climate chief Simon Stiell due to speak in Istanbul, Turkey

Pick of the jobs

UK Met Office, senior climate science communicator | Salary: £43,081-£46,728. Location: Exeter, UK
Canadian Red Cross, programme officer, Indigenous operations – disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation | Salary: $56,520-$60,053. Location: Manitoba, Canada
Aldersgate Group, policy officer | Salary: £33,949-£39,253. Location: London (hybrid)

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 6 February 2026: US secret climate panel ‘unlawful’ | China’s clean energy boon | Can humans reverse nature loss? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 6 February 2026: US secret climate panel ‘unlawful’ | China’s clean energy boon | Can humans reverse nature loss?

Greenhouse Gases

China Briefing 5 February 2026: Clean energy’s share of economy | Record renewables | Thawing relations with UK

Published

4 days ago

February 5, 2026

Alice Rush

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Solar and wind eclipsed coal

‘FIRST TIME IN HISTORY’: China’s total power capacity reached 3,890 gigawatts (GW) in 2025, according to a National Energy Administration (NEA) data release covered by industry news outlet International Energy Net. Of this, it said, solar capacity rose 35% to 1,200GW and wind capacity was up 23% to 640GW, while thermal capacity – which is mostly coal – grew 6% to just over 1,500GW. This marks the “first time in history” that wind and solar capacity has outranked coal capacity in China’s power mix, reported the state-run newspaper China Daily. China’s grid-related energy storage capacity exceeded 213GW in 2025, said state news agency Xinhua. Meanwhile, clean-energy industries “drove more than 90%” of investment growth and more than half of GDP growth last year, said the Guardian in its coverage of new analysis for Carbon Brief. (See more in the spotlight below.)

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DAWN FOR SOLAR: Solar power capacity alone may outpace coal in 2026, according to projections by the China Electricity Council (CEC), reported business news outlet 21st Century Business Herald. It added that non-fossil sources could account for 63% of the power mix this year, with coal falling to 31%. Separately, the China Renewable Energy Society said that annual wind-power additions could grow by between 600-980GW over the next five years, with annual additions of 120GW expected until 2028, said industry news outlet China Energy Net. China Energy Net also published the full CEC report.

STATE MEDIA VOICE: Xinhua published several energy- and climate-related articles in a series on the 15th five-year plan. One said that becoming a low-carbon energy “powerhouse” will support decarbonisation efforts, strengthen industrial innovation and improve China’s “global competitive edge and standing”. Another stated that coal consumption is “expected” to peak around 2027, with continued “growth” in the power and chemicals sector, while oil has already peaked. A third noted that distributed energy systems better matched the “characteristics of renewable energy” than centralised ones, but warned against “blind” expansion and insufficient supporting infrastructure. Others in the series discussed biodiversity and environmental protection and recycling of clean-energy technology. Meanwhile, the communist party-affiliated People’s Daily said that oil will continue to play a “vital role” in China, even after demand peaks.

Starmer and Xi endorsed clean-energy cooperation

CLIMATE PARTNERSHIP: UK prime minister Keir Starmer and Chinese president Xi Jinping pledged in Beijing to deepen cooperation on “green energy”, reported finance news outlet Caixin. They also agreed to establish a “China-UK high-level climate and nature partnership”, said China Daily. Xi told Starmer that the two countries should “carry out joint research and industrial transformation” in new energy and low-carbon technologies, according to Xinhua. It also cited Xi as saying China “hopes” the UK will provide a “fair” business environment for Chinese companies.

Sign up to Carbon Brief’s free “China Briefing” email newsletter. All you need to know about the latest developments relating to China and climate change. Sent to your inbox every Thursday.

OCTOPUS OVERSEAS: During the visit, UK power-trading company Octopus Energy and Chinese energy services firm PCG Power announced they would be starting a new joint venture in China, named Bitong Energy, reported industry news outlet PV Magazine. The move “marks a notable direct entry” of a foreign company into China’s “tightly regulated electricity market”, said Caixin.

PUSH AND PULL: UK policymakers also visited Chinese clean-energy technology manufacturer Envision in Shanghai, reported finance news outlet Yicai. It quoted UK business secretary Peter Kyle emphasising that partnering with companies “like Envision” on sustainability is a “really important part of our future”, particularly in terms of job creation in the UK. Trade minister Chris Bryant told Radio Scotland Breakfast that the government will decide on Chinese wind turbine manufacturer Mingyang’s plans for a Scotland factory “soon”. Researchers at the thinktank Oxford Institute for Energy Studies wrote in a guest post for Carbon Brief that greater Chinese competition in Europe’s wind market could “help spur competition in Europe”, if localisation rules and “other guardrails” are applied.

More China news

LIFE SUPPORT: China will update its coal capacity payment mechanism, which will raise thresholds for coal-fired power plants and expand to cover gas-fired power and pumped and new-energy storage, reported current affairs outlet China News.
FRONTIER TECH: The world’s “largest compressed-air power storage plant” has begun operating in China, said Bloomberg.
PARTNERSHIP A ‘MISTAKE’: The EU launched a “foreign subsidies” probe into Chinese wind turbine company Goldwind, said the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. EU climate chief Wopke Hoekstra said the bloc must resist China’s pull in clean technologies, according to Bloomberg.
TRADE SPAT: The World Trade Organization “backed a complaint by China” that the US Inflation Reduction Act “discriminated against” Chinese cleantech exports, said Reuters.
NEW RULES: China has set “new regulations” for the Waliguan Baseline Observatory, which provides “key scientific references for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, said the People’s Daily.

Captured

New or reactivated proposals for coal-fired power plants in China totalled 161GW in 2025, according to a new report covered by Carbon Brief.

Spotlight

Clean energy drove China’s economic growth in 2025

New analysis for Carbon Brief finds that clean-energy sectors contributed the equivalent of $2.1tn to China’s economy last year, making it a key driver of growth. However, headwinds in 2026 could restrict growth going forward – especially for the solar sector.

Below is an excerpt from the article, which can be read in full on Carbon Brief’s website.

Solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment.

Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP)

Analysis shows that China’s clean-energy sectors nearly doubled in real value between 2022-25 and – if they were a country – would now be the 8th-largest economy in the world.

These investments in clean-energy manufacturing represent a large bet on the energy transition in China and overseas, creating an incentive for the government and enterprises to keep the boom going.

However, there is uncertainty about what will happen this year and beyond, particularly due to a new pricing system, worsening industrial “overcapacity” and trade tensions.

Outperforming the wider economy

China’s clean-energy economy continues to grow far more quickly than the wider economy, making an outsized contribution to annual growth.

Without these sectors, China’s GDP would have expanded by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%, missing the target of “around 5%” growth by a wide margin.

Clean energy made a crucial contribution during a challenging year, when promoting economic growth was the foremost aim for policymakers.

In 2024, EVs and solar had been the largest growth drivers. In 2025, it was EVs and batteries, which delivered 44% of the economic impact and more than half of the growth of the clean-energy industries.

The next largest subsector was clean-power generation, transmission and storage, which made up 40% of the contribution to GDP and 30% of the growth in 2025.

Within the electricity sector, the largest drivers were growth in investment in wind and solar power generation capacity, along with growth in power output from solar and wind, followed by the exports of solar-power equipment and materials.

But investment in solar-panel supply chains, a major growth driver in 2022-23, continued to fall for the second year, as the government made efforts to rein in overcapacity and “irrational” price competition.

Headwinds for solar

Ongoing investment of hundreds of billions of dollars represents a gigantic bet on a continuing global energy transition.

However, developments next year and beyond are unclear, particularly for solar. A new pricing system for renewable power is creating uncertainty, while central government targets have been set far below current rates of clean-electricity additions.

Investment in solar-power generation and solar manufacturing declined in the second half of the year.

The reduction in the prices of clean-energy technology has been so dramatic that when the prices for GDP statistics are updated, the sectors’ contribution to real GDP – adjusted for inflation or, in this case deflation – will be revised down.

Nevertheless, the key economic role of the industry creates a strong motivation to keep the clean-energy boom going. A slowdown in the domestic market could also undermine efforts to stem overcapacity and inflame trade tensions by increasing pressure on exports to absorb supply.

Local governments and state-owned enterprises will also influence the outlook for the sector.

Provincial governments have a lot of leeway in implementing the new electricity markets and contracting systems for renewable power generation. The new five-year plans, to be published this year, will, therefore, be of major importance.

This spotlight was written for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), and Belinda Schaepe, China policy analyst at CREA. CREA China analysts Qi Qin and Chengcheng Qiu contributed research.

Watch, read, listen

PROVINCE INFLUENCE: The Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, a Beijing-based thinktank, published a report examining the climate-related statements in provincial recommendations for the 15th five-year plan.

‘PIVOT’?: The Outrage + Optimism podcast spoke with the University of Bath’s Dr Yixian Sun about whether China sees itself as a climate leader and what its role in climate negotiations could be going forward.

COOKING FOR CLEAN-TECH: Caixin covered rising demand for China’s “gutter oil” as companies “scramble” to decarbonise.

DON’T GO IT ALONE: China News broadcast the Chinese foreign ministry’s response to the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement, with spokeswoman Mao Ning saying “no country can remain unaffected” by climate change.

$6.8tn

The current size of China’s green-finance economy, including loans, bonds and equity, according to Dr Ma Jun, the Institute of Finance and Sustainability’s president,in a report launch event attended by Carbon Brief. Dr Ma added that “green loans” make up 16% of all loans in China, with some areas seeing them take a 34% share.

New science

China’s official emissions inventories have overestimated its hydrofluorocarbon emissions by an average of 117m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (mtCO2e) every year since 2017 | Nature Geoscience
“Intensified forest management efforts” in China from 2010 onwards have been linked to an acceleration in carbon absorption by plants and soils | Communications Earth and Environment

Recently published on WeChat

China Briefing is written by Anika Patel and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org

The post China Briefing 5 February 2026: Clean energy’s share of economy | Record renewables | Thawing relations with UK appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China Briefing 5 February 2026: Clean energy’s share of economy | Record renewables | Thawing relations with UK

Greenhouse Gases

Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025

Published

5 days ago

February 4, 2026

Alice Rush

Solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment.

Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) – comparable to the economies of Brazil or Canada.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures, industry data and analyst reports, shows that China’s clean-energy sectors nearly doubled in real value between 2022-25 and – if they were a country – would now be the 8th-largest economy in the world.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

Without clean-energy sectors, China would have missed its target for GDP growth of “around 5%”, expanding by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%.
Clean-energy industries are expanding much more quickly than China’s economy overall, with their annual growth rate accelerating from 12% in 2024 to 18% in 2025.
The “new three” of EVs, batteries and solar continue to dominate the economic contribution of clean energy in China, generating two-thirds of the value added and attracting more than half of all investment in the sectors.
China’s investments in clean energy reached 7.2tn yuan ($1.0tn) in 2025, roughly four times the still sizable $260bn put into fossil-fuel extraction and coal power.
Exports of clean-energy technologies grew rapidly in 2025, but China’s domestic market still far exceeds the export market in value for Chinese firms.

These investments in clean-energy manufacturing represent a large bet on the energy transition in China and overseas, creating an incentive for the government and enterprises to keep the boom going.

However, there is uncertainty about what will happen this year and beyond, particularly for solar power, where growth has slowed in response to a new pricing system and where central government targets have been set far below the recent rate of expansion.

An ongoing slowdown could turn the sectors into a drag on GDP, while worsening industrial “overcapacity” and exacerbating trade tensions.

Yet, even if central government targets in the next five-year plan are modest, those from local governments and state-owned enterprises could still drive significant growth in clean energy.

This article updates analysis previously reported for 2023 and 2024.

Clean-energy sectors outperform wider economy

China’s clean-energy economy continues to grow far more quickly than the wider economy. This means that it is making an outsize contribution to annual economic growth.

The figure below shows that clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy overall in 2025 and more than 90% of the net rise in investment.

Contributions to the growth in Chinese investment (left) and GDP overall (right) in 2025 by sector, trillion yuan. Source: Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) analysis for Carbon Brief.

In 2022, China’s clean-energy economy was worth an estimated 8.4tn yuan ($1.2tn). By 2025, the sectors had nearly doubled in value to 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn).

This is comparable to the entire output of Brazil or Canada and positions the Chinese clean-energy industry as the 8th-largest economy in the world. Its value is roughly half the size of the economy of India – the world’s fourth largest – or of the US state of California.

The outperformance of the clean-energy sectors means that they are also claiming a rising share of China’s economy overall, as shown in the figure below.

Share of China’s GDP contributed by clean-energy sectors, %. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

This share has risen from 7.3% of China’s GDP in 2022 to 11.4% in 2025.

Without clean-energy sectors, China’s GDP would have expanded by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%, missing the target of “around 5%” growth by a wide margin.

Clean energy thus made a crucial contribution during a challenging year, when promoting economic growth was the foremost aim for policymakers.

The table below includes a detailed breakdown by sector and activity.

Sector	Activity	Value in 2025, CNY bln	Value in 2025, USD bln	Year-on-year growth	Growth contribution	Value contribution	Value in 2025, CNY trn	Value in 2024, CNY trn	Value in 2023, CNY trn	Value in 2022, CNY trn
EVs	Investment: manufacturing capacity	1,643	228	18%	10.4%	10.7%	1.6	1.4	1.2	0.9
EVs	Investment: charging infrastructure	192	27	58%	2.9%	1.2%	0.192	0.122	0.1	0.08
EVs	Production of vehicles	3,940	548	29%	36.4%	25.6%	3.94	3.065	2.26	1.65
Batteries	Investment: battery manufacturing	277	38	35%	3.0%	1.8%	0.277	0.205	0.32	0.15
Batteries	Exports: batteries	724	101	51%	10.1%	4.7%	0.724	0.48	0.46	0.34
Solar power	Investment: power generation capacity	1,182	164	15%	6.3%	7.7%	1.182	1.031	0.808	0.34
Solar power	Investment: manufacturing capacity	506	70	-23%	-6.5%	3.3%	0.506	0.662	0.95	0.51
Solar power	Electricity generation	491	68	33%	5.1%	3.2%	0.491	0.369	0.26	0.19
Solar power	Exports of components	681	95	21%	4.9%	4.4%	0.681	0.562	0.5	0.35
Wind power	Investment: power generation capacity, onshore	612	85	47%	8.1%	4.0%	0.612	0.417	0.397	0.21
Wind power	Investment: power generation capacity, offshore	96	13	98%	2.0%	0.6%	0.096	0.048	0.086	0.06
Wind power	Electricity generation	510	71	13%	2.4%	3.3%	0.51	0.453	0.4	0.34
Nuclear power	Investment: power generation capacity	173	24	18%	1.1%	1.1%	0.17	0.15	0.09	0.07
Nuclear power	Electricity generation	216	30	8%	0.7%	1.4%	0.216	0.2	0.19	0.19
Hydropower	Investment: power generation capacity	54	7	-7%	-0.2%	0.3%	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
Hydropower	Electricity generation	582	81	3%	0.6%	3.8%	0.582	0.567	0.51	0.51
Rail transportation	Investment	902	125	6%	2.1%	5.8%	0.902	0.851	0.764	0.714
Rail transportation	Transport of passengers and goods	1,020	142	3%	1.3%	6.6%	1.02	0.99	0.964	0.694
Electricity transmission	Investment: transmission capacity	644	90	6%	1.5%	4.2%	0.64	0.61	0.53	0.5
Electricity transmission	Transmission of clean power	52	7	14%	0.3%	0.3%	0.052	0.046	0.04	0.04
Energy storage	Investment: Pumped hydro	53	7	5%	0.1%	0.3%	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.03
Energy storage	Investment: Grid-connected batteries	232	32	52%	3.3%	1.5%	0.232	0.152	0.08	0.02
Energy storage	Investment: Electrolysers	11	2	29%	0.1%	0.1%	0.011	0.009	0	0
Energy efficiency	Revenue: Energy service companies	620	86	17%	3.8%	4.0%	0.62	0.528003	0.52	0.45
Total	Investments	7,198	1001	15%	38.2%	46.7%	7.20	6.28	6.00	4.11
Total	Production of goods and services	8,216	1,143	22%	61.8%	53.3%	8.22	6.73	5.58	4.32
Total	Total GDP contribution	15,414	2144	18%	100.0%	100.0%	15.41	13.01	11.58	8.42

EVs and batteries were the largest drivers of GDP growth

The contribution to nominal GDP growth – unadjusted for inflation – was even larger, as EV prices held up year-on-year while the economy as a whole suffered from deflation. Investment in battery manufacturing rebounded after a fall in 2024.

The major contribution of EVs and batteries is illustrated in the figure below, which shows both the overall size of the clean-energy economy and the sectors that added the most to the rise from year to year.

Contribution of clean-energy sectors to China’s GDP and GDP growth, trillion yuan, 2022-2025. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

The next largest subsector was clean-power generation, transmission and storage, which made up 40% of the contribution to GDP and 30% of the growth in 2025.

Investment in solar-panel supply chains, a major growth driver in 2022-23, continued to fall for the second year. This was in line with the government’s efforts to rein in overcapacity and “irrational” price competition in the sector.

Finally, rail transportation was responsible for 12% of the total economic output of the clean-energy sectors, but saw relatively muted growth year-on-year, with revenue up 3% and investment by 6%.

Note that the International Energy Agency (IEA) world energy investment report projected that China invested $627bn in clean energy in 2025, against $257bn in fossil fuels.

For the same sectors as the IEA report, this analysis puts the value of clean-energy investment in 2025 at a significantly more conservative $430bn. The higher figures in this analysis overall are therefore the result of wider sectoral coverage.

Electric vehicles and batteries

EVs and vehicle batteries were again the largest contributors to China’s clean-energy economy in 2025, making up an estimated 44% of value overall.

Of this total, the largest share of both total value and growth came from the production of battery EVs and plug-in hybrids, which expanded 29% year-on-year. This was followed by investment into EV manufacturing, which grew 18%, after slower growth rates in 2024.

Investment in battery manufacturing also rebounded after a drop in 2024, driven by new battery technology and strong demand from both domestic and international markets. Battery manufacturing investment grew by 35% year-on-year to 277bn yuan.

The share of electric vehicles (EVs) will have reached 12% of all vehicles on the road by the end of 2025, up from 9% a year earlier and less than 2% just five years ago.

The share of EVs in the sales of all new vehicles increased to 48%, from 41% in 2024, with passenger cars crossing the 50% threshold. In November, EV sales crossed the 60% mark in total sales and they continue to drive overall automotive sales growth, as shown below.

Production of combustion-engine vehicles and EVs in China, million units. EVs include battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. Source: China Association of Automobile Manufacturers data via Wind Financial Terminal.

Electric trucks experienced a breakthrough as their market share rose from 8% in the first nine months of 2024 to 23% in the same period in 2025.

Policy support for EVs continues, for example, with a new policy aiming to nearly double charging infrastructure in the next three years.

Exports grew even faster than the domestic market, but the vast majority of EVs continue to be sold domestically. In 2025, China produced 16.6m EVs, rising 29% year-on-year. While exports accounted for only 21% or 3.4m EVs, they grew by 86% year-on-year. Top export destinations for Chinese EVs were western Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.

The value of batteries exported also grew rapidly by 41% year-on-year, becoming the third largest growth driver of the GDP. Battery exports largely went to western Europe, north America and south-east Asia.

In contrast with deflationary trends in the price of many clean-energy technologies, average EV prices have held up in 2025, with a slight increase in average price of new models, after discounts. This also means that the contribution of the EV industry to nominal GDP growth was even more significant, given that overall producer prices across the economy fell by 2.6%. Battery prices continued to drop.

Clean-power generation

The solar power sector generated 19% of the total value of the clean-energy industries in 2025, adding 2.9tn yuan ($41bn) to the national economy.

Within this, investment in new solar power plants, at 1.2tn yuan ($160bn), was the largest driver, followed by the value of solar technology exports and by the value of the power generated from solar. Investment in manufacturing continued to fall after the wave of capacity additions in 2023, reaching 0.5tn yuan ($72bn), down 23% year-on-year.

In 2025, China achieved another new record of wind and solar capacity additions. The country installed a total of 315GW solar and 119GW wind capacity, adding more solar and two times as much wind as the rest of the world combined.

Clean energy accounted for 90% of investment in power generation, with solar alone covering 50% of that. As a result, non-fossil power made up 42% of total power generation, up from 39% in 2024.

However, a new pricing policy for new solar and wind projects and modest targets for capacity growth have created uncertainty about whether the boom will continue.

Under the new policy, new clean-power generation has to compete on price against existing coal power in markets that place it at a disadvantage in some key ways.

At the same time, the electricity markets themselves are still being introduced and developed, creating investment uncertainty.

Investment in solar power generation increased year-on-year by 15%, but experienced a strong stop-and-go cycle. Developers rushed to finish projects ahead of the new pricing policy coming into force in June and then again towards the end of the year to finalise projects ahead of the end of the current 14th five-year plan.

Investment in the solar sector as a whole was stable year-on-year, with the decline in manufacturing capacity investment balanced by continued growth in power generation capacity additions. This helped shore up the utilisation of manufacturing plants, in line with the government’s aim to reduce “disorderly” price competition.

By late 2025, China’s solar manufacturing capacity reached an estimated 1,200GW per year, well ahead of the global capacity additions of around 650GW in 2025. Manufacturers can now produce far more solar panels than the global market can absorb, with fierce competition leading to historically low profitability.

China’s policymakers have sought to address the issue since mid-2024, warning against “involution”, passing regulations and convening a sector-wide meeting to put pressure on the industry. This is starting to yield results, with losses narrowing in the third quarter of 2025.

The volume of exports of solar panels and components reached a record high in 2025, growing 19% year-on-year. In particular, exports of cells and wafers increased rapidly by 94% and 52%, while panel exports grew only by 4%.

This reflects the growing diversification of solar-supply chains in the face of tariffs and with more countries around the world building out solar panel manufacturing capacity. The nominal value of exports fell 8%, however, due to a fall in average prices and a shift to exporting upstream intermediate products instead of finished panels.

Hydropower, wind and nuclear were responsible for 15% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2025, adding some 2.2tn yuan ($310bn) to China’s GDP in 2025.

Nearly two-thirds of this (1.3tn yuan, $180bn) came from the value of power generation from hydropower, wind and nuclear, with investment in new power generation projects contributing the rest.

Power generation grew 33% from solar, 13% from wind, 3% from hydropower and 8% from nuclear.

Within power generation investment, solar remained the largest segment by value – as shown in the figure below – but wind-power generation projects were the largest contributor to growth, overtaking solar for the first time since 2020.

Value of new clean-power generation capacity, billion yuan, by year added. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

In particular, offshore wind power capacity investment rebounded as expected, doubling in 2025 after a sharp drop in 2024.

Investment in nuclear projects continued to grow but remains smaller in total terms, at 17bn yuan. Investment in conventional hydropower continued to decline by 7%.

Electricity storage and grids

Electricity transmission and storage were responsible for 6% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2025, accounting for 1.0 tn yuan ($140bn).

The most valuable sub-segment was investment in power grids, growing 6% in 2025 and reaching $90bn. This was followed by investment in energy storage, including pumped hydropower, grid-connected battery storage and hydrogen production.

Investment in grid-connected batteries saw the largest year-on-year growth, increasing by 50%, while investments in electrolysers also grew by 30%. The transmission of clean power increased an estimated 13%, due to rapid growth in clean-power generation.

China’s total electricity storage capacity reached more than 213GW, with battery storage capacity crossing 145GW and pumped hydro storage at 69GW. Some 66GW of battery storage capacity was added in 2025, up 52% year-on-year and accounting for more than 40% of global capacity additions.

Notably, capacity additions accelerated in the second half of the year, with 43GW added, compared with the first half, which saw 23GW of new capacity.

The battery storage market initially slowed after the renewable power pricing policy, which banned storage mandates after May, but this was quickly replaced by a “market-driven boom”. Provincial electricity spot markets, time-of-day tariffs and increasing curtailment of solar power all improved the economics of adding storage.

By the end of 2025, China’s top five solar manufacturers had all entered the battery storage market, making a shift in industry strategy.

Investment in pumped hydropower continued to increase, with 15GW of new capacity permitted in the first half of 2025 alone and 3GW entering operation.

Railways

Rail transportation made up 12% of the GDP contribution of the clean-energy sectors, with revenue from passenger and goods rail transportation the largest source of value. Most growth came from investment in rail infrastructure, which increased 6% year-on-year

The electrification of transport is not limited to EVs, as rail passenger, freight and investment volumes saw continued growth. The total length of China’s high-speed railway network reached 50,000km in 2025, making up more than 70% of the global high-speed total.

Energy efficiency

Investment in energy efficiency rebounded strongly in 2025. Measured by the aggregate turnover of large energy service companies (ESCOs), the market expanded by 17% year-on-year, returning to growth rates last seen during 2016-2020.

Total industry turnover has also recovered to its previous peak in 2021, signalling a clear turnaround after three years of weakness.

Industry projections now anticipate annual turnover reaching 1tn yuan in annual turnover by 2030, a target that had previously been expected to be met by 2025.

China’s ESCO market has evolved into the world’s largest. Investment within China’s ESCO market remains heavily concentrated in the buildings sector, which accounts for around 50% of total activity. Industrial applications make up a further 21%, while energy supply, demand-side flexibility and energy storage together account for approximately 16%.

Implications of China’s clean-energy bet

Ongoing investment of hundreds of billions of dollars into clean-energy manufacturing represents a gigantic economic and financial bet on a continuing global energy transition.

In addition to the domestic investment covered in this article, Chinese firms are making major investments in overseas manufacturing.

The clean-energy industries have played a crucial role in meeting China’s economic targets during the five-year period ending this year, delivering an estimated 40%, 25% and 37% of all GDP growth in 2023, 2024 and 2025, respectively.

However, the developments next year and beyond are unclear, particularly for solar power generation, with the new pricing system for renewable power generation leading to a short-term slowdown and creating major uncertainty, while central government targets have been set far below current rates of clean-electricity additions.

Investment in solar-power generation and solar manufacturing declined in the second half of the year, while investment in generation clocked growth for the full year, showing the risk to the industries under the current power market set-ups that favour coal-fired power.

A recent CREA survey of experts working on climate and energy issues in China found that the majority believe that economic and geopolitical challenges will make the “dual carbon” goals – and with that, clean-energy industries – only more important.

Local governments and state-owned enterprises will also influence the outlook for the sector. Their previous five-year plans played a key role in creating the gigantic wind and solar power “bases” that substantially exceeded the central government’s level of ambition.

Provincial governments also have a lot of leeway in implementing the new electricity markets and contracting systems for renewable power generation. The new five-year plans, to be published this year, will therefore be of major importance.

About the data

Reported investment expenditure and sales revenue has been used where available. When this is not available, estimates are based on physical volumes – gigawatts of capacity installed, number of vehicles sold – and unit costs or prices.

The contribution to real growth is tracked by adjusting for inflation using 2022-2023 prices.

All calculations and data sources are given in a worksheet.

Estimates include the contribution of clean-energy technologies to the demand for upstream inputs such as metals and chemicals.

This approach shows the contribution of the clean-energy sectors to driving economic activity, also outside the sectors themselves, and is appropriate for estimating how much lower economic growth would have been without growth in these sectors.

Double counting is avoided by only including non-overlapping points in value chains. For example, the value of EV production and investment in battery storage of electricity is included, but not the value of battery production for the domestic market, which is predominantly an input to these activities.

Similarly, the value of solar panels produced for the domestic market is not included, as it makes up a part of the value of solar power generating capacity installed in China. However, the value of solar panel and battery exports is included.

In 2025, there was a major divergence between two different measures of investment. The first, fixed asset investment, reportedly fell by 3.8%, the first drop in 35 years. In contrast, gross capital formation saw the slowest growth in that period but still inched up by 2%.

This analysis uses gross capital formation as the measure of investment, as it is the data point used for GDP accounting. However, the analysis is unable to account for changes in inventories, so the estimate of clean-energy investment is for fixed asset investment in the sectors.

The analysis does not explicitly account for the small and declining role of imports in producing clean-energy goods and services. This means that the results slightly overstate the contribution to GDP but understate the contribution to growth.

For example, one of the most important import dependencies that China has is for advanced computing chips for EVs. The value of the chips in a typical EV is $1,000 and China’s import dependency for these chips is 90%, which suggests that imported chips represent less than 3% of the value of EV production.

The estimates are likely to be conservative in some key respects. For example, Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates “investment in the energy transition” in China in 2024 at $800bn. This estimate covers a nearly identical list of sectors to ours, but excludes manufacturing – the comparable number from our data is $600bn.

China’s National Bureau of Statistics says that the total value generated by automobile production and sales in 2023 was 11tn yuan. The estimate in this analysis for the value of EV sales in 2023 is 2.3tn yuan, or 20% of the total value of the industry, when EVs already made up 31% of vehicle production and the average selling prices for EVs was slightly higher than for internal combustion engine vehicles.