Amid a rapidly fracturing geopolitical order, there have been growing calls for China to “step into [the] leadership gap” left by the US on climate change.
While China has resisted such suggestions – at least officially – it has spent much of the past 12 months nurturing its international status as a partner for other countries, in areas ranging from the economy and global governance through to climate change.
President Xi Jinping has maintained a schedule packed with foreign-policy engagements, meeting with world leaders from Russia and India through to the EU.
Moreover, this April he made his first international climate speech since 2021, while attending a meeting on climate and the just transition hosted by Brazil.
As well as underscoring his nation’s ongoing commitment to climate action, Xi’s presence also hinted at the growing coordination between China and Brazil in this area.
More broadly, there is growing recognition of greater alignment between non-western countries – particularly in the global south – in the face of more aggressive US foreign policy.
Analysts note that pressure from the US could push groups such as the BRICS – of which Brazil and China are two founding members, alongside Russia and India – to become more cohesive and develop more concrete cooperation channels.
In a recent interview with Carbon Brief, UK climate envoy Rachel Kyte said that the “world is changing”, becoming “flatter” and that the BRICS – which now includes 11 countries, including South Africa, Egypt and Indonesia – are “more and more important”.
This Q&A explores the membership, climate stance and energy sectors of the BRICS nations, as well as the potential for China and the bloc to lead on climate change.
- What is the BRICS group?
- How do the BRICS approach climate change?
- Are Brazil and China in the BRICS ‘driving seat’?
- What is the role of fossil fuels in the BRICS?
- What is the economic impact of clean-tech?
- Will China and the BRICS emerge as climate leaders?
What is the BRICS group?
The BRICS group represents a number of emerging economies that aim to “strengthen” cooperation amongst themselves and to “increas[e] the influence of global south countries in international governance”.
They coordinate on a range of topics, from international finance to climate diplomacy.
It was founded by Brazil, Russia, India and China – hence, the original name “BRIC” – which later became “BRICS” with the inclusion of South Africa. More recently, it expanded again to include Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran.
Saudi Arabia has been formally invited to join the bloc, but has not yet accepted the invitation. A number of others participate in the grouping as partner countries, including Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria.
Together, the full members of the group represent 27% of global gross domestic product (GDP), 49% of the world’s population and 52% of emissions, according to Carbon Brief calculations illustrated below.
Four of the members – Brazil, China, India and South Africa – also form the BASIC bloc, a group with a significant voice at UN climate summits and other negotiations.
BASIC was formed in Beijing in 2009, with representatives from the four countries meeting to coordinate on climate negotiations from the standpoint of major emerging economies.
This culminated at the COP15 climate talks in Copenhagen in 2009, when the BASIC group issued a joint set of “non-negotiable terms” and went on to work directly with the US to agree the Copenhagen Accord.
The bloc has used less combative tactics in subsequent COPs, but it continues to issue joint statements on climate change and to strongly advocate for certain issues.
At both COP28 and COP29, BASIC submitted a proposal to have “unilateral trade measures related to climate change” – referring to policies such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) – added to the meeting agenda.
The request was denied both times.
How do the BRICS approach climate change?
Alongside BASIC, the BRICS group is also becoming increasingly focused on climate policy.
COP30 executive director Ana Toni, speaking at a September 2025 event at Tsinghua University attended online by Carbon Brief, said that BRICS countries have “realised that climate is not just a financial issue or a niche”, but rather a “pillar for prosperity, development and growth”.
Lucas Carlos Lima, professor of international law at the Federal University of Minas Gerais in Brazil, wrote in an April 2025 article for Modern Diplomacy that recent joint statements show the BRICS had “placed climate change squarely at the centre of the bloc’s agenda”.
The group has also been playing an increasingly significant role in other multilateral fora. For example, a BRICS proposal at the COP16 UN biodiversity negotiations in February formed the basis of an agreement to mobilise at least $200bn per year to protect nature.
Susana Muhamad, president of the COP16 nature talks, told Reuters in March that BRICS nations had been “bridge builders” in the negotiations.
She added:
“I understand there’s a lot of countries wanting to join BRICS, because…if you have to confront something like the US, you are not alone.”
Environment ministers of BRICS countries also recently issued a joint statement that “reaffirm[ed] our steadfast commitments” to addressing climate change, adding that BRICS “can positively contribute to…the global environmental agenda.”
Their finance ministers also agreed in May on a climate-finance framework, outlining priorities including “the reform of multilateral development banks, the scaling up of concessional finance and the mobilising of private capital to support climate efforts in the global south”.
The framework represents “common and collective BRICS action in the area of climate finance” for the first time, notes Tatiana Rosito, international affairs secretary at Brazil’s finance ministry.
The framework was adopted at the BRICS summit in July, where a number of leaders gathered to sign a joint declaration demanding that “accessible, timely and affordable climate finance” is provided to developing countries.
This, it adds, “is a responsibility of developed countries” under the Paris Agreement.
The statement also highlighted the nations’ “resolve to remain united in the pursuit of the purpose and goals of the Paris Agreement”, featuring 21 paragraphs in a section on climate change spanning just transitions, carbon markets and critical minerals.
“It is encouraging that BRICS nations called for more climate lending, deeper green bond markets and better carbon accounting,” Mirela Sandrini, interim executive director for Brazil at the World Resources Institute, said in a statement. She added:
“South-south collaboration of this scale and ambition can inject much-needed momentum into international climate diplomacy ahead of COP30.”
However, the BRICS leaders’ declaration also “acknowledge[s] fossil fuels will still play an important role in the world’s energy mix, particularly for emerging markets and developing economies”.
The inclusion of this language “undermin[es] the positives” of the bloc’s other statements on climate action, according to a response from Jacobo Ocharan, head of political strategies at Climate Action Network International.
Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, global climate and energy lead at WWF, agrees, saying climate change is “treated as background noise” in the joint statement, with “no clear articulation of the BRICS+ role in the global climate response”.
Are Brazil and China in the BRICS ‘driving seat’?
Much of the recent BRICS focus on climate change is due to Brazil being “in the driver’s seat”, says Kate Logan, director of the China climate hub and climate diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), speaking to Carbon Brief.
As well as hosting COP30, Brazil recently chaired the G20 and is currently presiding over the BRICS. It used both of these forums to prioritise climate action on the agenda, she adds.
There has been frequent coordination between COP30, Brazilian and Chinese officials in the run-up to the conference.
This included a meeting of BRICS environment ministers held in April 2025, a separate April meeting between COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago and Chinese minister for the environment and ecology Huang Runqiu, as well as an earlier meeting in March between Huang and UN climate chief Simon Stiell.
Most significantly, Chinese president Xi Jinping appeared at a closed-door April 2025 meeting of global leaders organised by the UN and Brazil, telling his audience that “China’s actions to address climate change will not slow down”.
Many analysts saw the statement as a clear signal of China’s support for multilateralism, in sharp contrast to the US withdrawing from climate negotiations.
Xi’s participation in the meeting also underscored growing solidarity between China and Brazil on accelerating climate action.
Brazil and China have a long history of cooperation on environmental issues, including through the China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation Commission (COSBAN).
The Brazilian government describes COSBAN as the “highest-level governmental mechanism” between the two countries. It includes tracks specifically focused on energy, agriculture and mining, as well as the environment and climate change.
But there has been a notable uptick in engagement under the new Lula administration.
For the current Brazilian administration, China is an “essential partner in global climate solutions”, according to a briefing note published by the Brazilian climate network Observatório do Clima.
A related opinion article in Brazilian newspaper Folha de S. Paolo, written by Stela Herschmann, climate policy specialist at the Observatório do Clima, and Beibei Yin, founder of environmental consultancy Bambu Consulting, argues that China and Brazil could form the “new G2” – the moniker given to the US-China alignment that they say shaped global climate policy for “more than two decades”.
They add that Brazil, through its unique role in the world and current position, can help “fill the current vacuum” of climate leadership. They write:
“Brazil enjoys the respect of the international community because it often mediates the divisions between developed and developing countries in climate negotiations…The presidency of COP30 and BRICS adds to this, making the country a natural candidate to fill the current vacuum of climate leadership.”
However, the two countries’ climate approaches have diverged at times.
Jennifer Allan, senior lecturer in international relations at Cardiff University, tells Carbon Brief: “These countries have several similar views, but also have diverged in the past.”
For example, she says, Brazil’s suggestion at COP26 of a “concentric” approach to cutting emissions, with emerging economies offering more stringent targets than other developing countries, was opposed by China, which wanted to “maintain the firewall” between developed and developing countries.
What is the role of fossil fuels in the BRICS?
Many BRICS nations remain heavily reliant on fossil fuels, both for electricity generation and to support their wider energy systems.
However, this picture is starting to shift, with almost all BRICS members having adopted net-zero targets ranging from 2050 for Brazil, South Africa and others, through to 2060 for China and Russia, or 2070 for India.
More tangibly, the addition of new clean-power projects means that fossil-fueled electricity generating capacity now makes up less than half of the installed total in the BRICS group as a whole in 2024, as shown in the figure below.
Non-fossil power, driven by “unprecedented” renewable energy growth in China, India and Brazil, accounted for 53% of the installed electricity generating capacity in BRICS countries overall in 2024, according to recent analysis by the thinktank Global Energy Monitor (GEM). This puts them in line with the global average.
Ethiopia, Brazil and China boast higher-than-average shares of clean capacity – at 100%, 88% and 57% respectively. India’s clean-capacity share stands at 43%.
Continued BRICS focus on clean energy makes it “unlikely that fossil capacity will overtake non-fossil again”, James Norman, research analyst at GEM, tells Carbon Brief, adding that much of this is driven by significant renewable additions in some members, particularly China.
While some BRICS members are continuing to commission “significant amounts of new coal-fired capacity”, he says, it remains uncertain whether these new plants will be completed, or if they will go on to operate at full capacity.
Several BRICS members are also leading producers and exporters of fossil fuels. Russia is a major exporter of all types of fossil fuels, the Statistical Review of World Energy shows, while the UAE, Iran and Indonesia have large oil- or coal-exporting industries.
The data shows that China and India, meanwhile, are by some distance the world’s largest and second-largest coal users, respectively, predominantly fueled by domestic mining. China alone accounts for more than half of global coal production and use.
Norman acknowledges that “fossil dominance remains largely unchanged” among some BRICS members.
He states that countries such as Iran, with “entrenched modes of power production”, or with “limited strategic interest in overhauling the energy sector, such as Russia”, are on a different trajectory to countries such as Brazil or China.
Nevertheless, he says, the “strong economic case for solar and wind”, as well as the fact that nearly all BRICS countries have announced renewable energy targets, “makes continued growth in clean energy across the group highly likely”.
In the short term, meanwhile, the continued reliance of some members on fossil fuels might not lessen the BRICS group’s climate ambition overall. It is “notable” that Russia does not seem to be “blocking” the “solid outcomes” of recent BRICS climate negotiations, Logan tells Carbon Brief.
Indeed, the 2024 Kazan declaration, which featured a lengthy and detailed section on climate change, was released under the Russian BRICS presidency.
Still, the group is not a united front in all areas, for example the rivalry between China and India. Tensions remain high between the two countries on a number of issues, from border disputes to supply chains and geopolitical alliances.
This has spilled into climate-related topics, with India complaining about China’s construction of mega-dams in the Himalayas and launching anti-dumping investigations into solar imports from China.
At COP29, China and India at times took up conflicting stances during negotiations – most notably during the final stages of the climate finance deal, where China “helped prevent” efforts by India to block the deal, Logan wrote in an analysis for Dialogue Earth.
Another area of contention for India at COP29 was CBAM, which it said contributed to a “very, very competitive, hostile environment” that made it “difficult” to enable an energy transition.
By contrast, Logan tells Carbon Brief, China is “much less worried” about CBAM.
(Brazil, too, is unlikely to push hard to include CBAM and other “unilateral” trade measures in the COP30 agenda, Allan says, in order to maintain its “neutral” position as the holder of the COP presidency and the trust of other parties. Indeed, it is reportedly pushing for this issue to be taken up in a new forum, completely outside the climate talks.)
Nevertheless, India and China are united in climate negotiations by their commitment to ensuring all agreements uphold the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC).
“This is something [in which] they’ll continue to be aligned”, Logan says, “but how it plays out in practice is where you start to see divergences”.
A recent rapprochement in China-India relations saw Indian prime minister Narendra Modi visit China for the first time in seven years.
The two countries also came together at the International Maritime Organization, where they successfully pushed for publicly-available data on shipping emissions to be anonymised.
Earlier, Brazil, China, South Africa and several other developing countries also lobbied against the creation of a global levy on shipping emissions.
Allen notes that whether or not BRICS and BASIC can align on climate may, ultimately, be a moot point, given that BASIC is just one of several coalitions that China operates in and that it is currently “less active” than other coalitions.
For example, she says, unlike the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) group, BASIC “doesn’t negotiate as a group in contact groups” at the UN climate talks. She adds:
“Multiple coalitions are a way for [a country] to multipl[y] their influence, while also perhaps hiding its individual views among those of the group.”
What is the economic impact of clean-tech?
Beyond the realms of climate diplomacy, it is increasingly clear that there is a hard-nosed economic reality to the positions being taken by China and other BRICS nations.
Indeed, as China works with Brazil and the BRICS to centre emerging markets’ concerns in climate policy, it also plays a key role in the economics of the energy transition.
The country accounts for more than 80% of global solar manufacturing, more than 70% of electric vehicle production and more than 75% of battery production.
While most of this is consumed domestically, exports of each of these categories – which it often calls the “new-three” – are “booming”, finance news outlet Caixin reports.
Historically these exports would have been destined for developed countries. But, in 2024, “half of all China’s exports of solar and wind power equipment and electric vehicles (EVs) [went] to the global south”, Lauri Myllyvirta and Hubert Thieriot, lead analyst and data lead at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), write at Dialogue Earth.
Separate analysis by Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief revealed that China’s exports of clean-energy technologies in 2024 alone will reduce emissions in the rest of the world by 1%, avoiding some 4bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2 over their lifetimes).
Moreover, clean-energy industries accounted for more than 10% of China’s GDP in 2024 for the first time ever, driving a quarter of economic growth that year.
Meanwhile, Chinese lending overseas is also increasingly focused on low-carbon infrastructure, according to the Boston University Global Development Policy Center.
Their analysis finds that the “share of renewable energy in China’s portfolio has increased significantly”, with solar and wind projects “dominat[ing]” the types of projects funded in 2022 and 2023.
This stands in sharp contrast to typical Chinese lending activity before 2021, which showed a preference for conventional power projects, such as coal and hydropower.
According to Myllyvirta and Thieriot, the “important role that clean-energy technology plays in the country’s economy and exports” will encourage China to ensure that the global energy transition “keeps accelerating”.
They add: “That will be seen in bilateral lending and diplomacy, and could also lead the country to take more forward-leaning positions in multilateral climate negotiations.”
Will China and the BRICS emerge as climate leaders?
With the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement under the Trump administration, there have been increasing calls for China to take up the mantle of climate leadership.
Many are watching for signs of whether China’s upcoming international climate pledge, which may be published by the UN general assembly meeting next week, will contain ambitious targets that will encourage greater global ambition.
Beatriz Mattos, research coordinator at Brazil-based climate-research institute Plataforma CIPÓ, tells Carbon Brief that China’s position as a “major investor in the renewable energy sector” means there is “enormous potential” for both it and the BRICS to assume a climate leadership role.
China, at least publicly, is eschewing these calls. In an interview with state-owned magazine China Newsweek, climate envoy Liu Zhenmin said in response to a question about China’s climate leadership that the calls are just “the west giving us a ‘tall hat’” – an expression meaning trying to flatter China. He added:
“Of course, within their respective camps, major countries should play a more leading role, such as the EU and US in the developed countries camp, and the BASIC countries in the developing countries camp. But BASIC cannot be a substitute for all developing countries, and developing countries will still participate in [climate] negotiations within the framework of ‘G77+China’. This is the basis for cooperation in the global south.”
Notably, this does not seem to preclude China from agreeing to “demonstrate leadership” in tandem with others, as seen in an EU-China joint statement on climate change published in late July.
BASIC is “important for China in climate negotiations given the influence of other large emerging economies”, Yixian Sun, associate professor in international development at the University of Bath, tells Carbon Brief.
“On many issues (especially sensitive issues regarding its developing country status), China doesn’t want to stand out by itself,” he says, with the grouping providing cover in negotiations.
Mattos agrees, stating that “remaining part of this group serves as a way [for China] to reinforce its identity as a developing country in climate negotiations”.
More broadly, it will likely continue to align with the other BRICS nations, when this offers a way to advance its positions in climate negotiations.
Sun expects Brazil and China to sustain their elevated levels of climate cooperation even after Brazil hands over the COP presidency, based on their 2023 joint statement. However, he says there are still questions around what new bilateral climate initiatives would look like and how “concrete” they would be in practice.
Looking ahead, Logan notes, BRICS could also be in a position to sustain its influence if India hosts COP33 in 2028.
“BRICS has in multiple documents endorsed India’s bid for COP33”, she says, which, given India’s presidency of BRICS in 2026, could allow Brazil and China to “influence India in a more constructive direction” on climate, over a number of years.
The post Q&A: Will China and the BRICS fill the ‘leadership gap’ on climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: Will China and the BRICS fill the ‘leadership gap’ on climate change?
After a five-year long legal battle, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has blocked Shell and local partner Impact Africa’s permit to explore for oil and gas off the country’s East Coast, in a landmark victory for local communities and civil society.
“Today’s judgment makes me feel very happy and proud that the ocean is not for profit for mining companies,” said East Coast resident and environmental campaigner Siyabonga Ndovela.
The verdict culminates a years-long process in which non-profits Sustaining the Wild Coast, Natural Justice, Greenpeace Africa, and others took legal action against Shell, Impact Africa and the South African government for failing to consult affected communities – a legal requirement in the country.
The Constitutional Court ruled that Shell and Impact Africa had not complied with resource governance law, had failed to meaningfully conduct public consultation and had failed to consider the impact on climate change, cultural rights, livelihoods and ecological harm.
The ruling references last year’s landmark advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, which states that countries have a legal duty to prevent and repair damage to the climate system. The South African judges argued climate change “transcends borders” and that states’ obligations “must be understood within the broader framework of international law.”
“This case must also be understood against the backdrop of well-documented struggles by coastal communities to protect their land, marine resources and ways of life in the face of extractive activities that they believe threaten their very existence,” wrote Justice Narandran Kollapen.
The Constitutional Court found that the exploration right had been unlawfully granted by the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources.The ruling upholds a 2022 regional court decision against Shell and overturns a 2024 appeal that allowed the company to conduct fresh public consultations under the original exploration right. Today’s decision means the right, initially granted in 2014, must be set aside.
Celebrating the decision, Sherelee Odyar, oil and gas campaigner at Greenpeace Africa, told Climate Home News that the court confirmed “serious failures” in the awarding of exploration rights to Shell and Impact Africa, which “can not simply be corrected later”.
The Wild Coast is a biodiversity hotspot which has been conserved over generations by coastal communities who rely on the ocean and land. “Our land and sea are central to our livelihoods and our way of life. Over generations we have conserved them, and they have conserved us,” reads the founding statement in the case.
A Shell spokesperson said it noted the ruling, responding that “we are committed to responsible offshore exploration, meaningful stakeholder engagement and environmental stewardship.”
The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources did not respond to requests for comment at the time of publication.
“Renewed strength” for communities
The ruling adds to a series of legal challenges brought by civil society groups against oil companies and the government as South Africa has expanded oil and gas development since 2014 under Operation Phakisa, a plan aimed at “unlocking the economic potential of the oceans”.
On the West Coast, Walter Steenkamp, Chair of Aukotowa Fisheries Cooperative, which is involved in a separate ongoing legal action against TotalEnergies, said that “today’s court case gave me renewed strength.”
The case could also set a precedent for future oil developments, said Alessandro Mazzi, legal governance researcher at the University of Wageningen. He added that the verdict “sends a strong signal to investors that where projects affect people’s land, livelihoods and environment, meaningful consultation and genuine ecological assessment are an integral part of responsible investment”.
Janet Solomon, coordinator of advocacy group Oceans not Oil, said that the Court’s emphasis on democratic participation, culture, livelihoods and the health of future generations in handing down the verdict signals a shift in jurisprudence on environmental governance, saying that this focus “may prove to be the judgment’s most enduring legacy.”
The post South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right appeared first on Climate Home News.
South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right
China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.
The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030.
This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.
Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.
However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.
It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.
But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.
Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry.
Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.
Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.
What does the plan say about peaking coal?
Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.
The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy.
Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.
The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:
“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”
However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.
The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.
Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region.
Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions.
But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.
The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.
In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.
It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”.
The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.
The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.
The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:
- Peaking coal consumption;
- “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
- Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
- Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
- “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
- Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
- Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
- Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.
The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.
“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”.
A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”.
This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy”
However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption.
State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.
“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.
While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.
Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.
“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.
What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.
The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.
The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.
Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”.
Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024.
“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.
Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.
It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.
This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.
New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.
This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.
The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.
What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.
The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption.
Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.
In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.
It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.
This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.
Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.
Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.
China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.
Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.
It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]
The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.
At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.
In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.
Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively.
In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.
However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”.
She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.
How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?
Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.
As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.
Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.
A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.
But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.
China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.
The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”
The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions.
Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.
Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds:
“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”
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The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action?
The world saw the lowest amount of new coal mine capacity brought online for at least 10 years in 2025, according to a new report, as clean energy displaces coal for electricity generation in East Asia.
A report by Global Energy Monitor (GEM) found that new coal mine capacity declined by nearly 40% from 2024, the second consecutive year new mine capacity has hit a decade low. This represents an acceleration of a steady decline that began in 2019.
The slowdown in new coal mine openings was driven by China and Australia, where new additions fell by 44% and 96%, respectively. In China, the report said this was partly due to solar and wind displacing coal for electricity generation – although coal rebounded in the first half of 2026 – and the National Energy Administration implementing new rules to curb new mine openings.
In Australia, a 96% reduction in new coal mine capacity was driven by shrinking demand from the countries that import Australian coal for electricity, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the report said.
This trend is likely to continue, according to GEM, as the Australian state of New South Wales recently banned new coal mines on undeveloped greenfield land. South Korea has promised to stop building coal-fired power plants that cannot capture and store the emissions produced. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for a post-Fukushima nuclear revival to displace coal.
This Australian coal community is co-designing its own green future
Globally, growth in coal demand has slowed over the last few years and the International Energy Agency expects it to plateau through to 2030 because of the growth of renewable energy, nuclear and fossil gas.
Openings down, pipeline up
But while new coal mine openings fell, the amount of global coal mine capacity proposed increased by 11%. This was almost entirely driven by a spate of projects in the eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Odisha.
“If built,” the GEM report says, “the projects would commit India – a country with no formal coal phaseout timeline – to years of coal expansion and would put a 1.5C-aligned transition away from fossil fuels farther out of reach”.
The Indian government says it needs to increase coal production to meet growing electricity demand from economic growth and from dealing with heatwaves. It plans to open more than 20 new coal mines to meet its coal production targets.
Because of energy security concerns, India is also aiming to produce chemicals with Indian coal rather than imported gas. China is also pursuing this strategy, although the Global Energy Monitor report said that Indian coal’s high ash content means the South Asian nation will find it harder to make chemicals from coal.
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China’s coal-chemicals boom risks repeating the mistakes of the past
By reviving the problematic industry in the name of energy security, China runs the risk of higher emissions, stranded assets and setting back its ambitions as a clean energy leader -
South Africa’s offshore oil push meets grassroots resistance in court
Two court cases against oil majors TotalEnergies and Shell could derail South Africa’s plan to expand offshore fossil fuels -
Quarter of countries still missing UN climate plans 18 months after deadline
Egypt, Vietnam, Argentina and the Philippines are among the 45 nations that have breached the Paris Agreement by not submitting a new NDC to the UN
Nations agreed at COP26 five years ago to “phase down” coal power – a commitment that China and India successfully pushed to weaken from “phase out”. At COP28 in 2023, governments agreed to transition away from all fossil fuels in energy systems.
Since then, wealthy nations have partnered with coal-producing countries like South Africa, Vietnam and Indonesia on plans to transition from coal to clean energy. But, after preliminary talks, India and these governments did not agree a JETP.
The post New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus appeared first on Climate Home News.
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