The European Commission has set out a proposal to cut EU emissions 90% by 2040, with up to 3% coming via carbon credits purchased from other countries.
In a proposed amendment to EU climate legislation, the commission has laid out what it calls a “new way to get to 2040”, including “flexibilities” to ease the burden on member states.
Besides the limited use of carbon credits, the proposal also gives a potentially larger role to carbon dioxide (CO2) removal technologies and leaves the door open for weaker sectoral goals.
It has drawn criticism from climate NGOs and left-leaning European politicians, who argue that it “waters down” the EU’s climate ambitions and presents “considerable risks”.
Yet, the proposal is seen by many as an acceptable compromise option, following strong pushback from many member states to the 90% target, originally proposed last year.
With all nations expected to come forward with new international climate targets for 2035 by September and ahead of the COP30 climate summit, the 2040 goal will also be crucial in determining where the EU’s pledge lands.
In this Q&A, Carbon Brief outlines what the amendment proposed by the commission includes, why it has proved controversial and what is expected to happen next.
What has the European Commission proposed?
The European Commission has proposed an amendment to the EU Climate Law, which would set a target for a 90% reduction in net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2040, compared to 1990 levels.
It will “give certainty to investors, innovation, strengthen industrial leadership of our businesses and increase Europe’s energy security”, the commission says.
In a statement, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, added:
“As European citizens increasingly feel the impact of climate change, they expect Europe to act. Industry and investors look to us to set a predictable direction of travel. Today we show that we stand firmly by our commitment to decarbonise [the] European economy by 2050. The goal is clear, the journey is pragmatic and realistic.”
The proposal includes new “flexibilities”, such as a limited role for “high-quality international credits” from 2036, the use of domestic permanent emissions removals within the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and additional flexibilities across certain hard-to-decarbonise sectors.
These additional flexibilities are designed to allow countries to meet targets in a cost-effective and “socially fair” way, the commission adds. It says they will provide the possibility that a member state could compensate for a struggling land-use sector with overachievement in other areas, such as emissions from waste or transport.
The target will “send a signal to the global community” that the EU will “stay the course on climate change, deliver the Paris Agreement and continue engaging with partner countries to reduce global emissions”, says the commission.
It has been announced ahead of the UN COP30 climate summit in Belém, Brazil in November.
The European Commission says it will now work with the council presidency – representing EU member state governments – to finalise the EU’s climate pledges for 2035, so that the EU can submit its “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) under the Paris Agreement.
The EU was among the 95% of countries that missed the UN deadline to submit their NDCs by February of this year.
A recent update from the European parliament noted that the EU “needs to update its NDC…by September”, in order to meet an extended deadline from the UN.
In 2023, independent advisory body the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change recommended that the EU should aim for net emissions reductions of 90-95% by 2040, compared to 1990 levels.
As such, the advisory board said that the bloc would need to limit its cumulative emissions from 2030-50 to 11-14bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e), in order to be in line with bringing global warming down to 1.5C by the end of the century.
The 90% emissions reduction figure set out by the EU is on the lower end of guidance.
Why is the commission making this proposal now?
The European Commission’s new proposal builds on previous targets and roadmaps, representing a significant step towards enshrining the 2040 target in law.
In July 2021, the European Climate Law officially entered into force, setting a target of a net GHG reduction of at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, as shown in the chart below.
Rules were introduced governing sectors, such as clean energy, energy efficiency and transport, among others, to help meet this target.
If all were successful in their implementation, they would reduce emissions by roughly 57% by 2030, according to a European parliament assessment in 2022.
Subsequently, the commission has been working on developing a target for 2040, as an interim benchmark between the 2030 target and the EU goal – announced in 2018 – to be “climate neutral” by 2050. At this point, the bloc would reach net-zero emissions overall and would stop adding to global warming.
In 2024, the commission published an impact assessment, detailing the underlying qualitative analysis it had undertaken around emissions reduction targets for 2040.
This, together with the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change’s report (detailed above) and advice from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, formed the basis for the 90% target, the commission says.
The headline 90% target for 2040 was announced as part of a roadmap outlined by the commission in February 2024.
The roadmap kicked off a lengthy process in which EU politicians and institutions worked to cement the details of this target, ahead of this week’s proposal on turning it into law.
This process included “substantial engagement” with member states, the European parliament, stakeholders, civil society and citizens, the commission says.
In particular, certain European countries have been placing pressure on the commission to change or adapt the 2040 target, slowing the progress of this week’s proposal, which had been due out in February.
For example, Italy called for the goal to be weakened and France asked for “flexibility” to be introduced (See: Who has supported and opposed the proposed climate target?).
The commission hopes that publishing the proposed target now will allow it to be factored into the EU’s upcoming NDC, in which it will establish an emissions reduction target for 2035.
What does it say about international carbon credits and ‘flexibilities’?
The European Commission’s proposal sets out a “pragmatic” pathway towards the 2040 target, including specific measures to give EU member states “flexibility”.
Of these, the one that has received the most attention is to allow limited use of international carbon credits, under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, starting in 2036.
In effect, this flexibility means that emissions within the EU would only need to fall to 87% below 1990 levels by 2040, with the remaining 3% taking place overseas.
This would mean member states could buy credits generated by emissions-cutting projects in other countries and count those cuts towards their own targets.
Other nations, including Japan and Switzerland, have already welcomed the use of international credits to meet their climate goals.
In an unusual intervention that coincided with the proposal itself, the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change stated that the EU should not count such credits towards the 2040 target. It said:
“Using international carbon credits to meet this target, even partially, could undermine domestic value creation by diverting resources from the necessary transformation of the EU’s economy.”
The board also mentioned other concerns that are frequently levelled at “carbon offsetting”, such as credits not resulting in real-world emissions cuts.
The commission’s proposal refers to “high-quality international credits under Article 6”, but does not specify which types of credit. This leaves the door open for lower quality options.
For example, carbon trading under Article 6.2 is subject to far less oversight than trading of Article 6.4 credits.
The proposal also states that: “The origin, quality criteria and other conditions concerning the acquisition and use of any such credits shall be regulated in union law.”
This suggests that the EU would conduct its own assessment of any credits used by member states, beyond the rules that have been negotiated at an international level.
Jonathan Crook, the lead expert on global carbon markets at Carbon Market Watch, tells Carbon Brief that additional safeguards would be “essential”, given outstanding issues with Article 6 carbon credits.
A Q&A accompanying the commission proposal states that credits would be bought from “credible and transformative” projects in nations with Paris-aligned climate goals.
It mentions direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) as examples of the kinds of projects that the EU could source credits from.
This could severely limit the pool of available credits, because – as it stands – almost all carbon credits are from tree planting, forest conservation and clean-energy projects.
DACCS and BECCS projects could result in relatively permanent carbon removal. Crook says this would be one of the “many necessary safeguards” needed for credit purchases, although he points to potential issues with such projects. He adds:
“This potential durability criterion is only mentioned in the Q&A, rather than in the actual commission proposal and so currently has very limited standing unless it is introduced [into the legal text] during the co-legislation process.”
There are two additional “new flexibilities” mentioned in the commission’s proposal, to help member states meet the 2040 emissions target more easily.
One is the inclusion of permanent carbon dioxide (CO2) removal in the EU ETS, something that was already being discussed as part of an ETS revision.
This would mean that DACCS and BECCS projects in EU member states could sell credits to help high-emitting companies, such as steel plant operators, stay within their ETS limits.
Paying for such credits could become more appealing as the number of available emissions “allowances” under the overall “cap” for ETS system shrinks and the allowances become more expensive.
The commission says this would help to “compensate for residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors”, referring to those that are expensive or difficult to reduce to zero.
The need to remove CO2 from the atmosphere is widely recognised and inclusion in the ETS could help to drive investment into early-stage technologies, such as DACCS.
However, there are concerns that focusing on removals diverts investment from readily available technologies that cut emissions, such as electric-arc furnaces for steel plants.
In its recommendations, the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change says there should be separate targets for emissions reductions and removals. This would ensure the removals contribute to EU targets “without deterring emission reductions”, it says.
Finally, the commission’s proposal also includes a vague mention of “enhanced flexibility across sectors, to support the achievement of targets in a cost-effective way”.
Linda Kalcher, executive director of the thinktank Strategic Perspectives, tells Carbon Brief that this is “alluding to the fact that we might see weakening of some laws”.
Michael Forte, a senior policy advisor at thinktank E3G, expands on this, noting that it could mean member states adjusting emissions targets between different parts of the EU climate architecture, depending on where they were over- or underperforming.
“I would infer that this means letting member states transfer a greater share of their mitigation efforts between these different instruments,” Forte tells Carbon Brief.
Kalcher notes that such changes cannot be regulated in this law, but instead would need to be part of the expected 2040 framework or other pieces of law:
“They are more alluding to future changes, instead of making them now. So that…gives confidence to the countries that have concerns [about the 2040 target] that something will happen.”
Who has supported and opposed the proposed climate target?
Climate campaigners and left-leaning politicians were highly critical of the “flexibilities” included in the commission’s proposal, in particular the use of international carbon credits.
The options proposed were described by civil-society groups as “creative accounting” and a “dangerous new precedent” that relies on “outsourcing Europe’s responsibility” to other countries.
The European parliament’s centre-left Socialists and Democrats coalition issued a statement warning that “the inclusion of international carbon credits as a means to meet the target carries considerable risks”.
Critics also noted that using such flexibilities contradicted the official advice offered by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change.
Yet the proposal, presented as a “new way to get to 2040”, is widely viewed as an attempt to find a political compromise against a tricky geopolitical backdrop.
It allows the EU to aim for the target set out by its scientific advisers, albeit at the lower end of the “90-95%” emissions reduction that had been proposed. This is in spite of a strong political pushback from some member states.
A statement released by Peter Liese and Christian Ehler, German members of the European parliament’s centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) group, explained:
“We think it’s very dangerous to criticise the European Commission because they intend to include flexibility in their proposal on the 2040 target. We don’t see a majority in parliament nor council for any 2040 target without flexibility.”
Some member states, including Spain and Denmark, supported the 90% target without asking for major concessions. Others, including Poland and Italy, have argued for a less stringent headline goal.
Meanwhile, others pushed for some kind of compromise during discussions of the new target.
Notably, the newly elected, right-leaning German government gave qualified support for the 90% goal in its coalition agreement, subject to conditions such as the inclusion of international carbon credits. Other influential nations have also increasingly stressed the need for “flexibility” around the target.
Meanwhile, according to Politico, France has been part of a push – alongside “climate laggards” Hungary and Poland – to separate discussions of the EU’s domestic 2040 target from its international 2035 NDC pledge.
According to the news outlet, such decoupling could result in a weaker 2035 target, compared to the 2035 target that is expected to be derived from the 90% reduction 2040 goal.
How does the goal fit with the EU’s industrial growth plans?
The commission says its 2040 proposal goes “hand in hand” with its clean industrial deal strategy, its affordable energy action plan and its “competitiveness compass” plan.
Alongside tabling its 2040 climate goal, the commission issued a new “communication” on “delivering on the clean industrial deal”. (The deal was first announced in February.)
The communication says that “decarbonisation and reindustrialisation are two sides of the same coin” and reaffirms that the aim of the deal is to “enable the EU to lead in
developing the clean-technology markets of the future”.
The commission says delivery of the deal is “already underway”. It points to the adoption of the clean industrial deal state aid framework on 25 June, an €85bn ($100bn) state-aid package for helping member states transition their economies.
Environmental law charity Client Earth said a draft version of the framework risked “entrenching support for fossil gas and fossil based low-carbon gases”.
The clean industrial deal communication also notes that the commission this week published recommendations on tax incentives for speeding up the energy transition.
On 18 June, the European parliament and council agreed on a commission proposal to simplify the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), a policy for taxing carbon-intensive imports at levels equivalent to the EU ETS.
The agreement introduces a new exemption threshold of 50 tonnes for CBAM goods, meaning small and medium-sized companies that do not exceed this weight of imports per year will now be exempt from the measure.
EU climate commissioner Wopke Hoekstra described it as a “win for both climate policy and competitiveness of our companies”, with the new measure meaning 90% of companies will now be exempt from the CBAM, but 99% of emissions will still be covered.
Previous analysis has found that, in isolation, the CBAM will have a limited impact on global emissions.
What comes next?
Before the target can be adopted, it must be agreed by member states and pass through the European parliament.
Once the parliament and national ministers have agreed on their separate positions, three-way “trialogue” negotiations between them and the commission can begin with the aim of finalising the 2040 legislative proposal.
All nations were asked to submit new 2035 climate pledges, known as “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), to the UN by February of this year (see: What has the European Commission proposed?). The EU was among the vast majority of parties to miss the deadline.
UN climate chief Simon Stiell has now asked all parties to submit their NDCs “by September”. This is to allow time for the preparation of a report on the collective ambition of all nations’ pledges before COP30 in November.
The EU’s NDC will include an “indicative 2035 figure” derived from the bloc’s 2040 climate target, according to the commission.
The commission says it will work with the Danish presidency of the EU council and member states to finalise its NDC.
It is expected that the EU will aim to finalise both its 2035 NDC and its 2040 climate goal ahead of the next UN general assembly, which starts on 9 September in New York.
The post Q&A: European Commission’s proposal to cut EU emissions 90% by 2040 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: European Commission’s proposal to cut EU emissions 90% by 2040
Hundreds of scientists in dozens of institutions are embarking on the next phase of the world’s largest coordinated climate-modelling effort.
Climate-modelling groups use supercomputers to run climate models that simulate the physics, chemistry and biology of the Earth’s atmosphere, land and oceans.
These models play a crucial role in helping scientists understand how the climate is responding as greenhouse gases build up in the atmosphere.
For four decades, the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) has guided the work of the climate-modelling community by providing a framework that allows for millions of results to be collected together and compared.
The resulting projections are used extensively in climate science and policy and underpin the landmark reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Now, the seventh phase of CMIP – CMIP7 – is underway, with more than 30 climate-modelling centres expected to contribute more than five million gigabytes of data – so much that downloading it using a fast internet connection would take two and a half years.
Here, we look at what is new for CMIP7, including its model experiments, updated emissions scenarios and “assessment fast track” process.
What is CMIP?
Around the world, climate models are developed by different institutions and groups, known as modelling centres.
Each model is built differently and, therefore, produces slightly different results.
To better understand these differences, CMIP coordinates a common set of climate-model experiments.
These are simulations that use the same inputs and conditions, allowing scientists to compare the results and see where models agree or differ.
The figure below shows the countries that have either produced or published CMIP simulations.
During this time, scientists use new and improved models to run experiments from previous CMIP phases for consistency, as well as new experiments to investigate fresh scientific questions.
These simulations produce a trove of data, in the form of variables – such as temperature, rainfall, winds, sea ice extent and ocean currents. This information helps scientists study past, present and future climate change.
As scientific understanding and technical capabilities improve, models are refined. As a result, each CMIP phase incorporates higher spatial resolutions, larger ensembles, improved representations of key processes and more efficient model designs.
CMIP7 objectives
Each CMIP phase has an “experimental design” that outlines which climate-model experiments should be run and their technical specifications, including the time period the models should simulate.
The CMIP7 experimental design has several components.
As in CMIP6, for a modelling centre to contribute, they are asked to produce a suite of experiments that maintain continuity across past and future CMIP phases.
This suite of experiments is known as the “diagnostic, evaluation and characterisation of klima” (DECK) and is used to understand how their model “behaves” under simple, standard conditions. These experiments are designed and requested directly by CMIP’s scientific governing panel.
Alongside the DECK, CMIP also incorporates experiments developed by model intercomparison projects (MIPs) run by different research communities. For example, experiments exploring what the climate could look like under different levels of emissions or those that explore how sea ice might have changed between the last two ice-ages.
Currently, CMIP is working with 40 MIPs. These groups investigate specific scientific questions at their own pace, rather than on timelines prescribed by CMIP.
Running a large number of simulations can take modelling centres a long time. To speed up the process, CMIP7 has launched the “assessment fast track”.
This is a small subset of CMIP7 experiments, drawn from past and present community MIPs, identified through community consultation as being critical for scientific and policy assessments.
Data from the assessment fast track will be used in the reports that will together form the seventh assessment (AR7) of the IPCC.
It will also be used as an input by other groups that create climate information, including organisations involved in regional downscaling and modelling climate impacts and ice-sheet changes.
The figure below shows the different components of CMIP7. It shows how a subset of CMIP7 experiments will be delivered on an accelerated timeline, while the majority of experiments will be led by MIPs.
CMIP7 experiments
There are three categories of experiments set to take place in CMIP7:
- Historical experiments, which are designed to improve scientific understanding of past climates. Model runs exploring the recent historical period also allow scientists to evaluate the performance of models by checking how well they replicate real-world observations.
- Prediction and projection experiments, which allow scientists to analyse what different climates could look like under varying levels of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as near-term (10-year) prediction experiments.
- Process understanding experiments, which are designed to better understand specific processes and isolate cause-and-effect relationships. For example, a set of experiments might change the emissions of one greenhouse gas at a time to see how much each pollutant contributes to warming or cooling the climate.
Modelling centres typically produce and publish their data for the historical and projection experiments first.
CMIP expects the first datasets to be available by this summer, with broader publication recommended by the end of the year, in time to be assessed by IPCC AR7 authors.
Drafting of the reports of AR7 is currently underway. However, countries are yet to agree on the timeline for when they will be published. This presents a challenge for the climate-modelling community, given the difficulties of working with a moving deadline.
(For more on the ongoing standoff between countries around the timing of publication of the reports, read Carbon Brief’s explainer.)
New emissions scenarios
Scientists use emissions scenarios to simulate the future climate according to how global energy systems and land use might change over the next century.
Crucially, these scenarios – also known as “pathways” – are not forecasts or predictions of the future.
The group tasked with designing the scenarios for CMIP phases, as well as producing the “input files” for climate models, is the “scenario model intercomparison project”, or ScenarioMIP.
In a new paper, the group has set out the new set of scenarios for CMIP7:
- High (H): Emissions grow to as high as deemed plausibly possible, consistent with a rollback of current climate policies. This scenario will result in strong warming.
- High-to-low (HL): Emissions rise as in the high scenario at first, but are cut sharply in the second half of the century to reach net-zero by 2100.
- Medium (M): Emissions consistent with current policies, frozen as of 2025, leading to a moderate level of warming.
- Medium-to-low (ML): Emissions are slowly reduced, eventually reaching net-zero emissions by the end of the century.
- Low (L): Emissions consistent with likely keeping warming below 2C and not returning to 1.5C before the end of the century.
- Very low (VL): Emissions are cut to keep temperatures “as low as plausible”, according to the paper. This scenario limits warming to close to 1.5C by the end of the century, with limited overshoot beforehand.
- Low-to-negative (LN): Emissions fall slightly slower than in the VL scenario, with temperatures just rising above 1.5C. Emissions then rapidly drop to negative to bring warming back down.
The figures below show the emissions (left) and the estimated global temperature changes (right) under the seven new scenarios for CMIP7, from the low-to-negative emissions scenario (turquoise) to a high-emissions scenario (brown).
As a set, the ScenarioMIP scenarios “cover plausible outcomes ranging from a high level of climate change (in the case of policy failure) to low levels of climate change resulting from stringent policies”, the paper says.
Compared to the scenarios in CMIP6, the range in future emissions they cover is now narrower, the authors say:
“On the high-end of the range, the CMIP6 high emission levels (quantified by SSP5-8.5) have become implausible, based on trends in the costs of renewables, the emergence of climate policy and recent emission trends…At the low end, many CMIP6 emission trajectories have become inconsistent with observed trends during the 2020-30 period.”
Put simply, progress on climate policies and cheaper renewable technologies means that scenarios of very high emissions have now been ruled out.
However, this progress has not been sufficient to keep society on track for the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C goal. The paper notes that, “at this point of time, some overshoot of the 1.5C seems unavoidable”.
The change to the high end of the scenarios has sparked misleading commentary in the media and on social media – even from US president Donald Trump. A Carbon Brief factcheck unpacks the debate.
Also notable in the new scenarios is the “low-to-negative” pathway, which has the explicit feature of emissions becoming “net-negative”. In other words, through carbon dioxide removal (CDR) techniques, society reaches the point at which more carbon is being taken out of the atmosphere than is being added through greenhouse gas emissions.
Reaching net-negative emissions is fundamental to “overshoot scenarios”, where global warming passes a target and then is brought back down by large-scale CDR.
Overshoot scenarios allow scientists and policymakers to investigate the impacts of a delay to emissions reductions and better understand how the world might respond to passing a warming target. This includes the question of whether some impacts of climate change, such as ice sheet melt, are reversible.
CMIP has encouraged modelling centres to run simulations using the “high” and “very low” scenarios first to ensure downstream users of the data – including groups working on regional climate projections (CORDEX), climate impacts modelling (ISIMIP) and ice-sheet modelling (ISMIP) – have enough time to produce their data for IPCC reports.
These two scenarios were selected as they sit at opposite ends of the spectrum of climate outcomes. The high scenario will demonstrate how models behave under high emissions, while the very low scenario will demonstrate how models behave when emissions are rapidly reduced.
CMIP has recommended that modelling centres then run the “medium” and “high-to-low” scenarios. The remaining scenarios should then follow and no official recommendation has been made yet on their production order.
Other new features
In addition to the assessment fast track and new scenarios, CMIP7 has a number of other new developments.
Updated data for simulations
Climate models use input datasets to define the set of external drivers – or “forcings” – that have caused the global warming observed so far. These drivers include greenhouse gases, changes to incoming solar radiation and volcanic eruptions.
CMIP recommends modelling groups use the same input datasets, as this makes it easier to compare model results.
In CMIP7, the historical forcing datasets available for modelling groups to use have been improved to better represent real-world changes and extended closer to the present day. The historical simulations will be able to simulate the past climate from 1850 through to the end of 2021, whereas CMIP6 only simulated the past climate through to 2014.
CMIP is also planning to extend these historical datasets through to 2025 and maybe further throughout the course of CMIP7.
Emissions-driven simulations
CMIP7 introduces a new focus on CO2 emissions-driven simulations, providing a more realistic representation of how the climate responds to changes in emissions.
In older generations of climate models, atmospheric levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gas concentrations have been needed as an input to the model. These levels would be produced by running scenarios of CO2 emissions through separate carbon cycle models. The resulting climate-model runs were known as “concentration-driven simulations”.
However, many of the latest generation of models are now able to run in “emissions-driven mode”. This means that they receive CO2 emissions as an input and the model itself simulates the carbon cycle and the resulting levels of CO2 in the atmosphere.
This development is important, as climate policies are typically defined in terms of emissions, rather than overall atmospheric concentrations.
This new development in modelling will enable a more realistic representation of the carbon cycle and a better understanding of how it might change under different levels of warming.
Enhanced model documentation and evaluation
All CMIP7 models will be required to supply standardised model documentation that ensures consistency across model descriptions and makes it easier for end users to understand the data.
Additionally, CMIP scientists have developed a new open-access tool that dramatically speeds up the evaluation of climate models.
This “rapid evaluation framework” allows researchers to compare model outputs with real-world observations, providing immediate insight into model performance.
The post Guest post: How CMIP7 will shape the next wave of climate science appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How CMIP7 will shape the next wave of climate science
Democrats are within reach of a majority on Georgia’s Public Service Commission, a little-known body that oversees Georgia Power and utility rates.
Georgia Public Service Commission elections historically received limited public attention and turnout. That changed last year, when voters, frustrated by rising electric bills, ousted two GOP members of the utility regulator, previously made up entirely of Republicans. This year, Democrats have a chance to flip control of the five-member commission.
Like many Yemeni farmers, Salem Abdallah first bought solar panels to power a well pump to irrigate his fruit and vegetable crops. Now, he has a new use for the surplus electricity they generate – a Chinese-made electric pickup truck.
“The roads between villages are rough and my farms aren’t all in one place, so the power and height give me a real advantage,” the 60-year-old told Climate Home News as he charged his plug-in hybrid Geely Riddara in Yemen’s capital of Sanaa, where nearly a dozen charging stations have sprung up in the last two years.
Prices for Abdallah’s Riddara model run from $25,000 to $40,000 – out of reach for all but a few in the impoverished country, where more than a decade of civil war has shattered the economy and made fuel supplies unaffordable for many.
The conflict has also taken a heavy toll on the national grid, which only 12% of Yemenis rely on for electricity, according to the World Bank.
Many homes and businesses have instead installed off-grid solar systems to confront frequent blackouts and patchy coverage in rural areas, and this improbable solar boom has caught the attention of Chinese electric vehicle (EV) brands.
Solar boom stirs Chinese interest
China’s BYD, Geely and Jetour have opened dealerships in Yemen in recent years, betting that enthusiastic solar uptake, coupled with high fuel prices and shortages, will lead to rapid growth in the nation’s small and incipient EV market, at least among those able to afford the initial outlay.
At the other end of the scale, electric two-wheelers are also starting to make inroads in Yemen among delivery services and salaried employees.
Mohammed Ali, 25, an accountant at an exchange office in Sanaa, said the $1,050 he spent on a Chinese-made electric motorcycle was “the best decision I ever made”.
“I charge my electric motorcycle at work and it saves me transportation expenses and time,” he said.
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But even as the global energy shock caused by the Iran war spurs the shift to electric transport in some lower-income countries, buying an EV still remains an impossible dream for most of Yemen’s 40 million people, said Mustafa Nasr, head of the Yemen-based Centre for Economic Studies and Media.
“Most Yemenis can barely secure their basic needs,” Nasr said.
Shrinking incomes, rising prices
Yemen has been gripped by civil war since 2014, plunging it into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is projected to fall to about $384 this year, according to estimates from the International Monetary Fund – less than a quarter of what it was when the war began.
At the same time, petrol and diesel for transport and to power generators have become increasingly out of reach. A litre of petrol in Sanaa costs the equivalent of $0.94 – close to what many Yemenis earn in a day.
Charging stations spring up
But for those able to buy them, EVs are proving a revolutionary solution to Yemen’s road transport woes. Sustained fuel price rises and solar adoption could push a gradual widening of the market, particularly if EV and battery prices continue to fall, Nasr said.
For large-scale farmers like Abdallah who already own solar installations generating between 60 and 80 kilowatts, built to run irrigation systems, charging an EV at night is a no-brainer.
EVs started appearing on the streets of Sanaa and the southern port city of Aden in late 2024, when the first charging point was installed by Al-Raebi Company, which holds the concession to build charging infrastructure in Sanaa and several other provinces and also sells electric Farizon trucks and Riddara pickups.
Al-Raebi’s sales manager, engineer Mundhar al-Farran, said the company has sold hundreds of electric vehicles this year to farmers, traders and institutions. Like Abdallah, many of them say EVs’ simpler construction reduces breakdowns, while the immediate torque of electric motors suits Yemen’s mountainous terrain, he said.
There are now 11 charging stations in Sanaa, and one each in Aden, Dhamar, Ibb and Hodeidah. On long inter-provincial routes there is one station per corridor, al-Farran said.
The price per kilowatt at a public charging station is 120 Yemeni rials ($0.22). According to economic expert Ali al-Tuwaiti, this translates to a per-kilometre cost of about 18 rials for an EV – two and a half times less than for a fuel-efficient petrol car.
“The absence of charging infrastructure was the biggest obstacle at the start,” al-Tuwaiti said. “Al-Raebi’s initiative was the first turning point in this sector.”
Al-Raebi is also working to bring fuel station operators into the transition, offering to cover half the cost of installing solar-powered charging equipment and financing the rest, al-Farran said.
Solar power backbone
Such efforts seek to leverage the country’s investments in solar generation. Over recent years, the country has imported solar systems totalling more than 1,000 megawatts of capacity, representing an estimated investment of about $250 million, al-Tuwaiti said.
That accounts for almost a quarter of Yemen’s current electricity needs of 4,500 megawatts, he added.
It has also given an unexpected boost to the climate-vulnerable country’s efforts to further shrink its tiny carbon emissions. Al-Tuwaiti estimates that solar generation now displaces the equivalent of 7,800 barrels of oil and more than 1.2 million litres of diesel per day.
Recent estimates show Yemen contributes only around 0.03%-0.06% of global emissions, with most energy-related emissions coming from transport and power generation.
China’s BYD starts with hybrids
Yemen’s nascent EV market comes amid faster-than-expected transport electrification in some emerging countries, where Chinese manufacturers are seeking to attract buyers with lower prices in markets seen as having unlocked potential.
China’s EV giant BYD mostly sales hybrid models at its dealership in Aden for now, but it also offers repayment plans for its popular battery electric Seagull car model, which retails for about $13,000.
The dealer also sells several other models that are available as plug-in hybrids, which tend to be popular in places with limited charging infrastructure and erratic power supplies.
One recent buyer, food trader Amin, 50, paid $50,000 for his new BYD model.
“It’s powerful, has four-wheel drive, and a better launch than modern conventional cars,” he told Climate Home News outside his home, adding that the air conditioning runs efficiently even when stationary – a serious consideration in Aden’s sometimes sweltering heat.
“It’s wonderful … it has all that I want in a car,” he said.
This story was published in collaboration with Egab.
The post Chinese EV brands woo Yemen’s wealthy elite as war prompts solar boom appeared first on Climate Home News.
Chinese EV brands woo Yemen’s wealthy elite as war prompts solar boom
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