在特朗普(Donald Trump)开始第二个美国总统任期之际,中美再次打响贸易战几乎已成定局,而对能源转型至关重要的矿物可能会陷入这场交锋的漩涡。
特朗普已威胁要对来自中国、以及通过其他国家输往美国的中国商品加征关税。
与此同时,中国正在制定一套“多样化”的政策工具包,以应对日益加剧的贸易紧张局势。最近一个值得注意的例子是中国对锗、镓、石墨和锑等四种矿物实行出口管制。
所有这些矿物都在低碳技术中发挥着重要作用,但同时也具有军事等其他用途。
Carbon Brief等机构的分析表明,中国于2023年夏季首次实施的出口管制并未对关键矿物供应链产生持续影响。
然而,2024年12月初宣布的更严格的管控措施,特别是对美出口的限制,引发了关于这些措施可能产生多大影响的辩论。
在本文中,Carbon Brief探讨了美中之间围绕关键矿物的紧张关系,可能对供应链稳定性以及清洁能源转型产生的影响。
哪些矿物对清洁能源转型至关重要?
矿物对多种低碳技术的发展至关重要。
例如,铟和镓用于太阳能电池板的涂层,铜和“稀土”金属用于风力发电机的导体和永磁体,而从锂到锰的各种矿物则广泛应用于不同类型的电池。
中国在许多矿物的供应链中占据重要地位,尤其是在加工环节。如下表所示,全球超过一半的石墨、稀土元素(REEs)和钒的开采,以及大部分铝、钴、石墨、铟、锂、稀土元素和硅的加工均集中在中国。
然而,并非所有这些材料都被视为“关键矿物”。“关键矿物”是一个政治术语,用于描述那些在重要战略领域中发挥作用的矿物。
美国将50种矿物列为关键矿物,欧盟确定了34种关键矿物和另外16种“战略原材料”,而日本的清单上列出了35种矿物。
尽管中国自2016年以来没有更新其官方的关键矿物清单,但2023年11月,中国国家安全部官方公众号发布的一篇文章透露,中国至少将31种矿物视为关键矿物。
该文章比较了中国(橙色)、欧盟(绿色)和美国(蓝色)关键矿物清单中的重叠与差异部分。
大宗商品咨询公司CRU集团中国办事处特别顾问、前首席执行官约翰·约翰逊(John Johnson)告诉Carbon Brief,中国与欧盟和美国“清单上相似”的矿物在采购方面“竞争更激烈”。
尽管一些国家试图多样化关键矿物进口,以减少对中国的依赖,但国际能源署(IEA)的分析发现,根据已宣布的项目,从现在到2030年,矿物供应的现状不太可能改变。
不过,IEA指出,在电池制造等部分领域,欧洲和美国“已宣布的产能增加”应该“足以”满足2030年的国内应用需求。
但价格评估机构Benchmark Minerals Intelligence专注于石墨的高级分析师托尼·奥尔德森(Tony Alderson)对这一乐观预测表示怀疑。他告诉Carbon Brief,“对于设施利用率能达到100%的情况几乎闻所未闻”。他补充称,2030年以后,美国和欧盟对石墨的需求可能会远远超过供应。
中国控制关键矿物的能力如何演变?
在拜登政府时期,美国采用了“小院高墙”(small yard, high fence)策略,对半导体行业实施了一系列出口管制,并鼓励盟友采取类似措施。
作为回应,中国开始限制一些关键矿物的出口,包括在2023年8月对某些类型的镓和锗的出口实施管制,随后于2023年12月对石墨实施管制、于2024年9月对锑实施管制。
除锑之外,这些管制显然是北京对美国遏制中国半导体进口措施的回应。
与此同时,中国加强了出口管制制度,将分散的一系列出口管制政策统一整合为单一框架。
这包括制订“不可靠实体清单”、出口管制法、反外国制裁法和对被认为是“两用”物项的监管。
策纬咨询公司(Trivium China)的关键矿物和供应链研究负责人科里·康布斯(Cory Combs)告诉Carbon Brief:“(中国)过去的出口管制体系极为零散。”
他补充道,最近政策推进的主要目标之一是通过“确保所有内容集中管理且规则一致”来改善合规性。
这些举措为中国在2024年12月初加强关键矿物出口限制铺平了道路,其加大了对石墨出口的限制,并“原则上”禁止向美国出口镓、锗和锑。
中国商务部发言人表示,此举是对美国通过对中国芯片制造业实施广泛限制,将自己的出口管制“武器化”的回应。
初步出口禁令对关键矿物贸易流向的影响如何?
对中国初步出口管制(涉及镓、石墨和锗)的分析显示,尽管新规出台,但贸易大体上仍在继续。
如下方Carbon Brief汇编的图表所示,在2023年8月限制生效后,受限类型的镓和锗出口暂停了两个月。然而,这些出口从2023年10月起恢复,尽管水平略有下降。
并非所有类型的目标关键矿物都受到了为期两个月的暂停的影响,非管制产品(如锗氧化物)的流量没有明显变化。
对于石墨而言,主要产品的出口量总体保持稳定,但在限制措施实施前出现了出口量激增,这可能是由于囤积所致。2024年的平均出口量高于2022年水平。
奥尔德森告诉Carbon Brief,出口商发现,当局对韩国和日本的出口审批特别迅速,而针对美国和印度的产品“需要更长时间”才能获批。其他分析师报告说,大多数许可证似乎已经获批。
这种结果可能是有意为之。Trivium China的康布斯告诉Carbon Brief,初步出口管制的目标是提高中国对其加工的矿物使用情况的了解,这也是为何要求出口商申请许可证,而不是直接全面禁止出口的原因。
因此,立即切断对其他国家的供应并不是最初公告的目的。
对关键矿物的初步管制总体上遵循了中国之前非关税贸易措施的类似模式。除了锑以外,对关键矿物的管制都是为了应对被认为“损害中国国家主权、安全和发展利益”的企图,而非打响贸易争端的第一枪。
英国皇家联合研究所(RUSI)的一份报告指出,这是因为中国意识到全面出口禁令会加速其他国家实行去风险和实现供应链多样化,从而削弱中国的长期地位。
严格的出口管制也会让中国国内付出代价,影响工业活动和更广泛的经济增长。因此,皇家联合研究所认为,出口管制可能会被调整到既能吸引关注,又不会造成其所说的严重经济影响的程度。
对美管制是否标志着中国战略的重大变化?
2024年12月初宣布的措施显示,中国在对关键矿物出口管制方面进行了明显升级。
根据新规,镓、锗和锑“原则上”将不再允许出口到美国,石墨的销售也将受到更严格的控制。
康布斯与Trivium China联合创始人安德鲁·波尔克(Andrew Polk)在分析中写道,这些限制措施是一个信号,表明中国“准备更积极地反击美国的行动”。
这呼应了中国央行前行长易纲的说法。据《南华早报》报道,易纲表示:“我们都明白,从经济学角度,不予报复是最优解……但(面对国内压力),决策者几乎没有选择。”
奥尔德森指出,还需要更多时间观察政策实施的“严格程度”。就石墨而言,目前尚不清楚哪些产品会受到影响——更严格的管制可能仅限于“用于军事最终用途材料的99.999%(纯度)”,而非用于电动车电池的低纯度石墨。
Trivium China的评估指出,此次宣布表明中国将“堵住”允许“出口泄漏”的漏洞,但目前尚不清楚“北京会在多大程度上调查或惩罚涉嫌违规转口的第三国”。
彭博经济(Bloomberg Economics)高级地缘经济分析师杰拉德·迪皮波(Gerard di Pippo)对威胁的严重性持怀疑态度,他写道:“中国缺乏强制第三国遵守规定所需的法律影响力、出口管制监控能力和联盟网络。”
其他分析人士告诉《麻省理工科技评论》(MIT Technology Review),由于美国已采取措施使其供应链多样化,因此“在大多数情况下,这些禁令不会产生重大经济影响”。
尽管如此,奥尔德森表示,当前的不确定性凸显了对关键矿物的依赖者而言,“本地化至关重要”。
未来中美紧张局势会加剧对关键矿物的控制吗?
康布斯和波尔克写道,中国近期管制的动机尚不明确。这可能是为了抗议美国限制特定芯片及制造工具的出口,以及将140家中国公司列入贸易黑名单,也可能是为了“警告即将上台的特朗普政府”不要加剧紧张局势。
外界普遍预计,特朗普开始其第二任期后,美中贸易紧张关系将加剧。
美国两党都对中国“威胁”其工业能力表示担忧。然而,特朗普第二任期可能会优先使用广泛的关税来缩小对华贸易逆差。
康布斯告诉Carbon Brief,北京的目标是“改变美国的行为”,因此在争端中会使用特朗普能够理解的手段,如广泛的贸易关税,而不是出口管制等更细微的工具。
他补充说,特朗普的顾问们会在多大程度上重视关键矿物还有待观察。如果北京使用额外管制施压特定的美国公司,促使它们向美国政府施压,这一问题可能会进入决策视野。
约翰逊指出,中国有理由避免将关键矿物出口问题进一步升级,鉴于其在高纯度石英、铁矿石和钾肥等矿物出口等方面依赖于美国。
此外,他表示,各国认为的关键矿物“会随着时间而变化”,因为新技术会创造对新矿物的需求,同时使其他矿物变得过时。
回收技术的发展也可能缓解供应链压力。国际能源署指出,如果成功扩大回收利用规模,“到2050年,新采矿活动需求可降低25%至40%”。
The post Q&A: 中美贸易战对能源转型意味着什么? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Climate Change
When taps run dry in the Caribbean, it’s not enough to blame El Niño
Amira Odeh Quiñones is a hydrologist and Caribbean organiser for the 350.org climate campaign group
El Niño, likely to be one of the strongest in modern history, has arrived on Caribbean shores.
Drought is slowly creeping up on our islands. But unlike the fiery wildfires ravaging parts of Europe, there’s no smoke signalling the damage being done, no sirens to warn of the danger. Only announcements from public health officials to stay indoors and remain hydrated — as if outdoor workers and farming communities have the luxury to heed such advice.
During El Niño, strong atmospheric winds alter rain patterns and trap heat across the Caribbean. But while we have experienced El Niño many times before, it has become very visible in recent years how climate change is making this natural phenomenon worse.
Across the Greater Antilles, temperatures are soaring past 38°C (100°F), with real-feel indexes reaching a gruelling 43°C in parts of Puerto Rico where I live. Cuba has it worse. Widespread power outages mean that methods for cooling down are unavailable for most of the day, leaving millions of vulnerable people at risk of heat stroke when temperatures hit 38°C.
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During the last strong drought a decade ago, I had water only two days a week in my home. Today, there are many families whose taps are about to run completely dry. Water authorities have already begun strict rationing in some municipalities, with more on the list scheduled for rationing if conditions don’t change.
Water rationing is far more than an inconvenience; it is an immediate health risk. This means thousands of people need to constantly haul heavy buckets up flights of stairs just so they could bathe, cook, stay hydrated – the basics of survival.
Heat causes health problems
Puerto Rico is home to roughly 300,000 elderly residents. Many live alone, isolated and without support. They risk severe physical injury when carrying heavy water containers, and are wont to suffer from silent heat exhaustion in unventilated rooms.
Furthermore, when water shortages force residents to store water in open household containers, it inadvertently creates breeding grounds for Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. Paired with scorching temperatures that tend to shorten the mosquito breeding cycle, the region is facing explosive outbreaks of dengue fever that endanger our most vulnerable: children and the elderly.
The economic fallout is equally devastating. Dry fields mean millions of dollars in lost crops, forcing small agricultural businesses to collapse, needing urgent government relief to survive. Extreme fuel shortages have already paralyzed Cuba’s agricultural sector, cutting food output by 60% – the El Niño dry spell threatens to decimate it.
At sea, warmer ocean waters fuel massive influxes of sargassum seaweed. Rotting sargassum chokes our beaches, destroying the local tourism industry that so many working families rely on. Tangled seaweed also damages nets and boat engines, slashing fish catches and driving up equipment costs for local fishers.
In the south of Puerto Rico, the coastal town of La Parguera is currently witnessing a historic amount of sargassum on its shores. This has halted most of the boating activity in the area, which is the seaside town’s main tourist draw and economic driver.
All over the Caribbean, from town halls to local group gatherings, the story I hear is always the same: constant headaches, lost work hours, failing health, and a sense that quality of life is silently being stolen. The compounding effects of heatwaves, drought, and marine destruction are exhausting our people, our islands.
Climate change to blame
Climate change makes each El Niño year hotter and more damaging. Higher baseline global temperatures increase the energy and moisture available for extreme weather. Latest projections show that El Niño may push the monthly global average temperature past 2°C of warming for the first time in early 2027. In the Caribbean islands, that will not just be breaking records – it’ll be breaking lives.
Recently, I had the opportunity to share a panel with climate scientists behind what is known as the field of “attribution science” – or the science that compares today’s climate conditions to what the Earth’s climate would be like without human activity, particularly burning fossil fuels. They’re unequivocal: it’s no longer a question of whether extreme weather is caused by climate change, it’s just a question of how much.
Attribution science recently got a boost from the U.S.’ top scientific advisory body. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine recognized that researchers’ methods have advanced considerably in recent years, resulting in better assessments on how much extreme weather can be attributed to human-caused climate change. It noted that attribution findings could be relevant in some types of legal cases, including those seeking damages from oil companies for climate impacts.
This crisis, which is already taking a heavy toll on our communities’ survival, needs real, urgent, and structural action that goes beyond aid. With similar droughts now gripping parts of Asia and Africa, we’re falling into the familiar narrative of treating the looming humanitarian crisis as if no one was to blame, as if it is being caused solely by a natural phenomenon we can’t control.
It’s not. The world was already on fire before its regular visitor, El Niño, came. While we need humanitarian action, we need climate action too, in order to permanently put out the flames.
The post When taps run dry in the Caribbean, it’s not enough to blame El Niño appeared first on Climate Home News.
When taps run dry in the Caribbean, it’s not enough to blame El Niño
Climate Change
Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change?
China has released a five-year plan dedicated to addressing climate change.
The 15th five-year plan for a national response to climate change is the latest in a series to outline in-depth climate and energy targets for the 2026-2030 period.
These include five-year plans for “building a Beautiful China”, developing a “new-type energy system” and developing renewable energy.
There are also separate “action plans” for the 2026-2030 period, such as for peaking carbon emissions.
China has pledged to peak its emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality before 2060.
The new plan does not include any major new targets, instead consolidating and reaffirming existing policies.
Nevertheless, it includes significant signals on key policy areas, such as non-carbon dioxide (CO2) greenhouse gases, global climate governance and carbon markets.
Below, Carbon Brief examines some of the notable elements in the latest five-year plan and what it reveals about China’s policy direction through to 2030.
What does the climate plan cover?
The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) released the plan in late July, in unison with 18 other government departments. These include the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planning agency, and the National Energy Administration.
The document covers a range of topics, including CO2 emissions, other greenhouse gases (non-CO2 GHGs), carbon markets, carbon footprints, climate adaptation and international cooperation on climate change.
For the first time at the five-year plan level, the plan creates a comprehensive target system covering all areas of climate policy, say officials in a MEE Q&A.
They describe it as “the main policy instrument” for advancing China’s climate action during 2026-2030.
China rarely issues high-level multi-year policies dedicated to “responding to climate change”. In 2014, the NDRC published a plan on the topic running through to 2020, but this was not linked to a five-year plan period.
Qin Yan, principal analyst at ClearBlue Markets, tells Carbon Brief that the plan shows that China’s climate governance has reached “an unprecedented strategic level”.
She adds that the plan creates an “all-encompassing target system” to support China’s Paris Agreement climate pledges for 2030 and 2035.
In its 2030 pledge, China aimed to peak emissions “before 2030” and reduce carbon intensity – its emissions per unit of GDP – by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Last year, president Xi Jinping personally announced China’s 2035 pledge to cut China’s greenhouse gas emissions to 7-10% below peak levels by 2035, while “striving to do better”.
The five-year plan marks a new phase in China’s climate policy, according to researchers at CIB Research, an economic research body affiliated with the Industrial Bank, whose largest shareholder is the Fujian provincial government.
Their analysis adds that the plan represents a broad effort to strengthen China’s climate-governance system, implementation mechanisms and underlying capacity.
Nevertheless, several headline targets and policies in the document simply reiterate already established plans.
These include:
- Cutting carbon intensity by 17% across the five years
- Reducing carbon intensity per product in industries under China’s carbon market by 3%
- Substituting fossil fuels with renewables
- Strengthening climate adaptation
- Supporting the “free flow” of cleantech
What does the plan say about non-CO2 GHGs?
The plan also goes into detail on China’s approach to non-CO2 GHGs. This includes reaffirming a target of an emissions “reduction capacity” from these gases totalling 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) by 2030, although the baseline is unclear.
The target previously appeared in the overarching five-year plan, as well as the plan for building a “Beautiful China”.
The goal refers to emissions reductions, which can be realised through implementing current non-CO2 emissions reduction policies and projects, says Chen Meian, programme director and senior analyst at the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress (iGDP).
She adds that it is “relatively achievable”, with sources including increasing the number of coal-mine methane utilisation projects.
She points to an MEE explanatory note for a draft methodology under the China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) scheme, China’s voluntary carbon-credit market. Chen says the note suggests that projects using ventilation air methane and coal-mine methane with concentrations below 8% alone could deliver around 20MtCO2e of reduction by 2030.
The note states that, currently, such projects are estimated to be able to “generate annual emission reductions of approximately 4.5MtCO2e”.
In addition, Chen says, measures targeting industrial nitrous oxide (N2O) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) could help make up the remainder needed to meet the target.
According to iGDP analysis of biennial reports submitted by China to the UNFCCC, China emitted around 14,000MtCO2e of GHGs in 2021, excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF).
Non-CO2 GHGs accounted for around 2,700MtCO2e, or 19%, of the total, the majority of which was methane, as shown in the figure below.

China’s plans to curb these super-pollutants in the five-year period include coal-mine methane utilisation projects, end-of-pipe destruction technologies for HFCs and guidance on the use of catalysts to reduce N2O emissions.
The plan also calls for the recovery and replacement of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) in power equipment.
For Chen, the plan’s focus on SF6 control is particularly noteworthy. She says the gas is “finally receiving policy attention” and that proactive action is “timely and will help avoid future emissions growth” as China’s power system expands.
What does the plan say about global climate governance?
One of the plan’s clearest objectives for international cooperation is for China to play a more active role in global climate governance.
By 2030, it says China should markedly increase its “influence, guiding power, shaping power and moral appeal” in this area.
It says China’s climate action could also feed into the Global Governance Initiative, a policy initiative aimed at reforming the global governance system.
China will also aim to “build a new narrative on climate governance”, it adds.
Prof Thomas Hale, a professor in public policy at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, writes on LinkedIn that the plan “marks a major rhetorical shift” towards China being increasingly willing to “lead and shape” global climate action.
Another clear focal point for international cooperation is in carbon markets.
The plan calls for China to expand the global influence of its carbon market, such as through international rule-setting, cooperation on standards and by hosting the China Carbon Market Conference.
Qin says China’s more active role in global carbon pricing is already evident in the launch of the open coalition on compliance carbon markets with the EU and Brazil. This coalition is expected to adopt a work plan at the China Carbon Market Conference in September.
Qin also notes that China “could become the world’s largest [carbon] offset buyer” as its energy transition progresses.
The country would, therefore, “benefit from helping shape global rules under the Article 6 framework [for carbon trading under the Paris Agreement]”, she adds.
Related
Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’
Q&A: What do China’s provincial five-year plans say about climate and energy?
Analysis: China’s new carbon metric leaves Germany-sized gap in its emissions
Q&A: China’s leadership calls for ‘strict control’ of fossil fuels
The post Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change?
Climate Change
Quarter of countries still missing UN climate plans 18 months after deadline
About a quarter of the countries signed up to the Paris Agreement are still breaching its rules by failing to submit a new national climate plan, 18 months after the February 2025 deadline.
Forty-five nations had not submitted a plan known as a nationally determined contribution (NDC), according to the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee’s (PAICC) newly-published report of its 7-10 July 2026 meeting. One, Oman, has published it since the meeting.
Twelve countries ignored the committee’s repeated attempts to find out why they had not yet produced a climate plan, the report said. They will be invited to the committee’s next meeting, from September 1-4, so it can identify the challenges and constraints they face.
Members of the committee are divided, as they were at their last meeting, on whether to name those countries publicly and will debate the question again in September.
The PAICC does not have any power to punish governments, as building these powers into the Paris Agreement was thought to be so controversial that it could have stopped some governments from joining, experts have previously told Climate Home News.
A key requirement of the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement is that governments publish a more ambitious NDC every five years, setting targets to reduce their planet-heating emissions and outlining their policies to adapt to climate change, in order to meet the accord’s goals on limiting global warming and protecting people from its effects.
The latest set – the third round of plans, with new targets for 2035 – was due in 2025.
Some medium-sized emitters
Countries without an updated NDC include Egypt, Vietnam, Argentina and the Phillippines, all of which rank among the world’s 40 largest greenhouse gas emitters. The rest of the countries are smaller, poorer nations, with many in Africa or the Caribbean.
Some nations have argued that they cannot put together an NDC – which requires a significant amount of work in tracking emissions and consulting on how to curb them across the economy – because of exceptional circumstances. For example, a letter from a Sudanese official to the PAICC committee, seen by Climate Home News, says that the country’s civil war has led to the suspension of its NDC preparation.
The US and Iran are not signed up to the Paris Agreement, although the US submitted a 2035 NDC under the Biden administration before Donald Trump pulled the US out of the UN climate accords.
The committee also expressed concern that the UN’s NDC registry continued to label the climate plans of countries that are no longer party to the Paris Agreement as “active”, according to its report. The US submission has since been archived.
Since the last PAICC meeting in March, ten countries have published NDCs. The committee did not name them but they include India, Algeria, Cameroon and Guyana.
The post Quarter of countries still missing UN climate plans 18 months after deadline appeared first on Climate Home News.
Quarter of countries still missing UN climate plans 18 months after deadline
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