Nornickel, Russia’s largest mining company, and the world’s leading nickel producer announced its consolidated production results for nickel in 2024. The company exceeded its production guidance for this metal which was driven by operational efficiency improvements and capital upgrades.
Nornickel’s Nickel Production Exceeds All Expectations
In 2024, Nornickel produced 205 kt of nickel, slightly above its target range of 196–204 kt. This marked a 2% decline year-over-year due to scheduled repairs but still showcased robust performance. Notably, all nickel output originated from the company’s Russian feedstock.
Senior Vice-President – Operating Director, Alexander Popov commented on the production results,
“In 2024, the output of all key metals exceeded our production guidance as a result of improved operating efficiency
Significantly, completing a major reconstruction project at the Nadezhda Metallurgical Plant’s smelting furnace #2 played a pivotal role. This upgrade boosted the furnace’s smelting capacity by 25% and was completed in just 60 days—30 days ahead of schedule.
The company also increased production of premium nickel products catering to China’s electroplating market, alongside advancements in developing specialized nickel powders Kola Division. This carbonyl nickel department was successfully launched after
annual schedule capital maintenance.
Nickel Outlook for 2025
For 2025, Nornickel expects nickel production to range between 204–211 kt and copper output from its Russian feed to reach 353–373 kt. This reflects the company’s focus on maintaining strong production levels while continuing to modernize facilities and diversify its product portfolio.
Notably, the mining giant aims to boost nickel and copper production by 20–30% and increase platinum group metals (PGMs) output by 40–50% by 2030.

Copper Output Sees Steady Growth
Nornickel’s total copper production reached 433 kt in 2024, reflecting a 2% year-on-year increase. This growth stemmed from process optimizations to improve copper cathode quality and meet customer requirements. Copper output from its Russian feedstock, excluding the Trans-Baikal Division, exceeded guidance, totaling 363 kt.
The Trans-Baikal Division also delivered a strong performance, producing 70 kt of copper in concentrate, surpassing its target range of 64–68 kt. This growth was also attributed to increased ore volumes and enhanced operational efficiency.
Nornickel’s Strategy for Sustainable Mining
Nornickel has adopted a long-term sustainable development strategy that emphasizes environmentally friendly production. The company is modernizing production assets with clean technologies, reducing its carbon footprint, improving energy efficiency, and building resilience to climate risks.
In 2022–2023, Nornickel collaborated with the Institute of Atmospheric Physics of the Russian Academy of Sciences to better understand climate risks. The partnership analyzed historical climate data from the 1960s and modeled scenarios to predict climate risk factors through 2050. These scenarios were adapted to the specific regions where Nornickel operates, enabling targeted solutions to local challenges.
Impressive Results
Nornickel has one of the lowest carbon footprints among global mining companies. Key achievements include:
- 9.7 million tons of Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, reflecting the company’s commitment to reducing direct and indirect emissions.
- 5.1 million tons of CO2 equivalent Scope 3 emissions as of 2023, which represent emissions across the value chain.
- A carbon footprint of 8.5 kg of CO2 per kg of nickel, is calculated in line with international standards such as ISO 14040, 14044, and 14067.
Reducing Emissions with Sulfur Program 2.0
The Sulfur Program 2.0 revolves around Nornickel’s efforts to minimize greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and improve air quality in the Norilsk region. The company’s emissions include contributions from electricity and heat supply to the Norilsk industrial region through JSC NTEK, as well as carbon dioxide from the Sulfur Program.
Nornickel calculates its GHG emissions by the GHG Protocol methodology. The assessment covers emissions from carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen oxide (N2O), and methane (CH4). Gas transportation units and energy supplies primarily generate these gases.

The company has also standardized its approach to identifying GHG emission sources to reduce uncertainty in upstream Scope 3 emissions calculations.
The completion of the Sulfur Program 2.0 and the use of cleaner energy from JSC NTEK shows its dedication to reducing its environmental impact. At the same time, the company continues to invest in innovation and data-driven strategies to enhance energy efficiency and meet long-term climate goals.
In conclusion, Continued investments in modernization and sustainable mining will help Nornickel meet rising global demand for nickel and copper while supporting decarbonization goals.
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The post Nornickel’s 2025 Nickel Target: Will Production Hit New Highs? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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Carbon Footprint
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