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Nickel Price Takes a Hit, A Temporary Setback or a Long-Term Trend

In recent developments within the global nickel market, the trajectory of prices has undergone a significant downturn, reflecting a complex interplay of economic factors and strategic decisions. 

As reported by S&P Global Commodity Insights, the London Metal Exchange (LME) three-month closing nickel price experienced a notable decline from $19,830 per metric ton at the end of May to $17,891 per ton by June 10. This movement marks a pivotal shift, as it is the first time since mid-April that nickel prices have dipped below the $18,000 per ton threshold.

Nickel Price Movement and Market Influences

Nickel prices year to date

The retreat in nickel prices can be largely attributed to decisive actions taken by investment funds. These investors opted to liquidate their long positions amid a backdrop of strengthening US dollar and less-than-stellar manufacturing data emerging from China. These factors collectively exerted downward pressure on nickel prices, overturning earlier gains made in May when prices surged to a nine-month high of $21,615 per ton. 

During that period, concerns over potential supply disruptions and increased investor optimism in the base metals sector had fueled a bullish trend. However, as economic indicators shifted, investors reevaluated their positions, leading to a swift reversal in nickel prices.

This price drop occurred despite bullish headlines, including the following major market events: 

  • European Central Bank’s interest rate cut, 
  • Ongoing production standstill in New Caledonia, and 
  • Potential permit terminations for ferronickel and nickel pig iron plants in Indonesia. 

The sharp price decline reflected a contraction in investment funds’ net long positions on the LME, indicating substantial liquidation of long positions.

LME nickel price retreats

Nickel Supply Chains in Focus

Beyond these market dynamics, the strategic maneuvers of key global players have also influenced nickel’s price trajectory. 

Notably, the United States has expressed a strategic interest in forging a partnership with the Philippines, the world’s second-largest nickel producer, to secure nickel supplies essential for its burgeoning battery sector. This strategic move comes at a time when the US is grappling with the reality of its limited domestic nickel reserves compared to major producers like Indonesia. 

The Philippines exported 39.9 million metric tons of nickel ore to China, underscoring its importance in the global supply chain. The US anticipates a substantial increase in nickel demand for EV batteries, with an expected growth of 211,000 metric tons between 2023 and 2028. This demand surge underscores the need for a reliable nickel supply chain.

Furthermore, Indonesia’s significant processing capacity falls under the US government’s “foreign entities of concern” (FEOC) guidance, making Indonesian nickel potentially ineligible for certain US EV tax credits. This has led the US to enter trilateral talks with the Philippines and Japan.

Discussions are underway to enhance infrastructure and production capabilities in the Philippines. This market development signals a potential shift in global nickel trade dynamics as the US seeks to fortify its supply chains for EV production.

Short-Term Slump, Long-Term Promise: Nickel’s Dual Outlook

Looking forward, analysts at S&P Global Commodity Insights predict that the global primary nickel market will continue to face challenges driven by oversupply conditions throughout the remainder of the year. Despite bullish sentiments, the underlying imbalance between supply and demand is expected to restrain nickel prices.

Short-Term Price Outlook:

The sharp price drop observed in June aligns with S&P Global’s earlier expectations of a potential correction. Despite a strong buying surge in May, investor confidence in nickel remains vulnerable due to the fundamental oversupply in the market. 

The S&P analysts anticipate that weak global primary nickel market fundamentals will continue to exert downward pressure on prices. Specifically, they forecast that total primary nickel stocks, measured in terms of weeks of consumption, will reach a 4-year high in 2024. This anticipated increase in stocks will likely limit any significant price recovery for the remainder of the year.

nickel market outlook 2028

Long-Term Considerations:

While short-term price movements are driven by speculative activities and immediate market conditions, the long-term outlook for nickel remains positive, primarily due to its critical role in the energy transition.

Increasing demand from the electric vehicle (EV) sector, renewable energy technologies, and energy storage solutions will drive long-term demand growth for nickel. However, for the rest of 2024, the oversupply and high stock levels will cap price gains.

Key Nickel Insights to Digest:

  • Supply Dynamics. Global nickel production is expected to continue growing, driven by expansions in major producing countries and increased output from new projects. However, the pace of growth may vary depending on geopolitical developments, regulatory changes, and technological advancements in nickel extraction and processing.
  • Demand Trends. Demand for nickel is projected to rise, particularly from the EV and energy storage sectors. Nickel’s role as a critical component in lithium-ion batteries positions it as a key beneficiary of the global shift towards electrification and renewable energy. 
  • Price Projections. While prices may remain subdued in the short term due to oversupply, the medium to long-term outlook suggests potential price recovery as demand catches up with supply. Market participants will closely monitor factors such as technological advancements in battery chemistry, policy support for clean energy, and macroeconomic conditions.

Nickel prices have recently declined due to market recalibrations and strategic decisions by key global players. Stakeholders should brace for continued market volatility with limited immediate price recovery.

The post Nickel Price Drops: A Temporary Setback or a Long-Term Trend? appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide

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Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.

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Carbon Footprint

Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions

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Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?

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