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Nickel demand and nickel prices on the rise

Disseminated on behalf of Alaska Energy Metals Corporation.

On the surface, the global nickel market looks comfortable. Supply appears ample. Prices remain under pressure. Inventories continue to climb. However, this apparent balance hides a deeper problem. The world’s nickel supply has become heavily concentrated in one country, creating long-term risks that today’s surplus does not fully reflect.

The S&P Global Nickel CBS January 2026 report makes this point clear. While Indonesia continues to push large volumes of nickel into the market, warning signs are emerging. Policy uncertainty, slowing demand, and swelling inventories now shape the near-term outlook. At the same time, today’s oversupply is quietly setting the stage for future instability.

The Nickel Market is in Surplus, But Not in Balance

At first glance, the nickel market seems well supplied. S&P Global projects a 156,000-tonne surplus in 2026, even after Indonesia announced sharp cuts to its nickel ore quotas. This surplus explains why prices struggle to move higher, despite occasional rallies.

However, the quota cuts have not reduced output as much as expected. Indonesian smelters continue to run at high utilization rates. They rely on existing ore stockpiles and imports from the Philippines to keep production steady. As a result, global supply still runs ahead of demand.

This imbalance shows up clearly in inventories. LME nickel stocks climbed to 275,634 tonnes in January 2026, marking the largest inflows since 2019. Rising inventories signal that excess nickel has nowhere to go. Even Class 1 nickel remains widely available, keeping prices capped.

Weak Nickel Demand Keeps the Surplus Alive

Strong supply alone does not explain the surplus. Weak demand plays an equally important role.

S&P Global further analysed that in late 2025, manufacturing activity slowed across key regions. U.S. and Eurozone PMIs fell into contraction, weighed down by trade tariffs introduced under President Trump. These tariffs raised costs and disrupted supply chains, hurting industrial activity. At the same time, consumer confidence weakened, reducing demand for stainless steel and other nickel-intensive products.

China offered some support, but not enough to change the overall picture. Its PMI showed mild expansion, backed by measures in the 2026–2030 Five-Year Plan aimed at stabilizing the property sector. Even so, stainless steel production remains oversupplied, and EV battery makers continue to adjust designs to use less nickel.

As a result, near-term nickel demand growth stays muted. Despite this, speculative investors remain optimistic. Net long positions have stayed elevated for seven months, reflecting bets that supply disruptions will eventually outweigh weak fundamentals.

Is Oversupply More Than a Price Problem?

Oversupply does more than suppress prices. It distorts market balance.

When supply consistently exceeds demand, prices lose their ability to send clear signals. Even meaningful policy actions, such as Indonesia’s quota cuts, fail to trigger lasting price increases. The market simply absorbs the news and moves on.

At the same time, oversupply discourages investment outside low-cost regions. Higher-cost producers struggle to survive. In Australia, several operations have already cut output due to poor margins. These curtailments reduce supply diversity without tightening the market.

As a result, the world becomes more dependent on Indonesian nickel. While this keeps prices low today, it increases vulnerability tomorrow.

Nickel supply nickel price
Data source: S&P Global

2030s Set to Flip the Nickel Market Balance

According to S&P Global, today’s surplus will not last forever.

The report projects that global nickel stocks will peak around 2028. After that, inventories begin to fall as demand improves and supply growth slows. By the early 2030s, the market balance flips.

By 2031, S&P Global expects the primary nickel balance to turn negative. EV battery demand accelerates as electrification expands. Stainless steel consumption recovers alongside global manufacturing. Meanwhile, Indonesian supply growth slows as easy expansions run out and regulatory risks increase.

Once inventories drop below comfortable weeks-of-consumption levels, prices respond quickly. S&P Global points to nickel prices rising toward $25,000 per tonne or higher, especially for Class 1 material.

Non-Indonesian Projects Hold the Key to Future Balance

As we understand now, oversupply is reshaping how the market thinks about security. During surplus periods, buyers focus on price. Origin matters less. Reliability takes a back seat. However, as balance tightens, priorities shift. A stable, politically secure supply becomes critical.

This is when non-Indonesian projects regain importance. Oversupply may delay their development, but it also ensures that fewer alternatives exist when demand rebounds. As a result, high-quality projects outside Indonesia gain strategic value.

Nickel demand supply
Source: IEA

nickel Price Analysis Today

Global nickel prices rose 0.88% to $17,429.65/Ton, with Chinese spot markets reaching ¥120,144/Ton. This upward movement is primarily driven by tightening structural supply, following Indonesia’s aggressive reduction of its nickel ore production quotas. Additionally, firm restocking demand from Chinese stainless steel mills and EV battery manufacturers provides strong fundamental support. While macroeconomic headwinds, including a surging US dollar and Middle Eastern geopolitical tensions, cap further upside, elevated raw material and freight costs firmly protect the downside.

AEMC’s Nikolai Project Stands Apart

This shifting market context brings Alaska Energy Metals Corp. (AEMC) into focus.

AEMC’s Eureka deposit, part of the Nikolai Nickel Project in Alaska, is now the largest known nickel resource in the United States. Importantly, the project is polymetallic. Alongside nickel, it hosts copper, cobalt, chromium, platinum, and palladium—materials critical to clean energy, infrastructure, and defense.

In March 2025, AEMC released an updated NI 43-101 compliant mineral resource estimate, prepared by Stantec Consulting Services. The update significantly expanded the project’s scale.

The estimate includes:

  • 1.19 billion tonnes of Indicated resources, up 46%
  • 2.09 billion tonnes of Inferred resources, up 133%
  • 61 billion pounds of contained nickel in the Indicated category
  • 9.38 billion pounds of nickel in the Inferred category

On a nickel-equivalent basis, the resource exceeds 29 billion pounds, placing it among the world’s largest undeveloped nickel assets.

Long-Life Supply with Strong Economics

Beyond size, the project’s quality strengthens its case.

The Eureka deposit features a low strip ratio of about 1.6:1, which supports lower operating costs. A higher-grade core sits near the surface, reducing early capital requirements. Mineralization remains consistent and continuous, extending in multiple directions with room for expansion.

Early metallurgical work suggests the ore should respond well to conventional processing, avoiding complex or risky technologies. Together, these factors support a long-life, stable supply source—something the U.S. currently lacks.

aemc nikolai nickel
Source: AEMC

Why AEMC Fits the U.S. Strategy

The United States faces a widening gap between critical mineral demand and domestic supply. Nickel ranks near the top of that list, driven by EVs, grid infrastructure, and defense needs.

AEMC aligns closely with this strategy. The company is advancing permitting under the FAST-41 framework, plans to deliver a Preliminary Economic Assessment in Q1 2026, and continues hydrometallurgical testing to support future U.S.-based refining.

In a market dominated by Indonesian supply, AEMC offers diversification, security, and scale.

Today’s nickel surplus keeps prices low and inventories high. However, it also hides growing structural risks.

As oversupply fades and demand accelerates, the market will need new, reliable sources of nickel. Projects like AEMC’s Nikolai are not competing with today’s surplus—they are preparing for tomorrow’s shortage.

And when balance finally tightens, supply security may matter just as much as price.


Live Nickel Spot Price

Unit: USD/Tonne

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  • MUST READ: AEMC’s Nikolai: America’s Answer to Indonesia’s Nickel Crunch

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    New Era Publishing Inc. and/or CarbonCredits.com (“We” or “Us”) are not securities dealers or brokers, investment advisers, or financial advisers, and you should not rely on the information herein as investment advice. Alaska Energy Metals. (“Company”) made a one-time payment of $75,000 to provide marketing services for a term of three months. None of the owners, members, directors, or employees of New Era Publishing Inc. and/or CarbonCredits.com currently hold, or have any beneficial ownership in, any shares, stocks, or options of the companies mentioned.

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The post Nickel Demand for EVs Could Flip the 2030 Market Balance appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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