Disseminated on behalf of Surge Battery Metals Inc.
The lithium market is experiencing a major rebound due to rising demand and tightening supply. Battery-grade lithium carbonate spot prices have jumped to about $24,086 per metric ton, based on data from Shanghai Metals Market (SMM). This marks a sharp increase from earlier lows in 2025, after a period of oversupply had weighed on the market.
What Causes Lithium Prices to Rebound

Several factors are behind the lithium price surge. First, the growth in stationary energy storage systems has been rapid. In 2025, demand for lithium in storage applications jumped about 71%, and analysts expect another 55% growth in 2026. As more utilities, data centers, and industrial players adopt battery storage, lithium demand continues to expand beyond just electric vehicles (EVs).
Second, China’s battery manufacturing sector is ramping up production to meet both domestic and global demand. Policy support for clean energy and EV adoption has helped absorb excess lithium that previously contributed to oversupply.
Meanwhile, regions like Europe and North America are boosting support for EVs and energy storage. European demand for batteries could reach 1 terawatt-hour by 2030. At the same time, U.S. incentives from the Inflation Reduction Act have already led to hundreds of new battery projects. These programs are driving additional lithium demand, putting further pressure on an already tight supply.
Third, supply constraints are becoming a concern. Forecasts for 2026 suggest a shift from surplus to a potential supply deficit of 22,000 to 80,000 metric tons, depending on how quickly new projects come online. This deficit is boosting hope among producers and investors. Prices might stay high if demand keeps outstripping supply.

Lithium’s Double Boost: AI + Data Center Batteries
Additional factors include rising interest in AI and data center batteries, which require large amounts of high-quality lithium. Emerging markets are generating new demand for battery-grade lithium. This adds to the existing need for electric vehicles. Coupled with a limited number of major lithium producers and delays in bringing new projects online, the market has become increasingly tight.
Other factors driving lithium prices up are the fast-growing need for batteries in AI data centers and energy storage systems. The global lithium-ion battery market for data centers was around $5.2 billion in 2024, per Prsedence Research. It is set to grow to nearly $17.7 billion by 2034, most of which will come from lithium batteries.

Lithium battery shipments for data center energy storage might rise over 80% in the next five years. Operators are expanding systems to support AI workloads that need steady power and load balancing. This surge in demand from new markets adds to the traditional battery needs of electric vehicles.
In short, the surge in lithium prices reflects a perfect storm of strong demand, constrained supply, and supportive policies. Investors and companies are taking note, as this environment signals higher revenues for producers. It also creates more opportunities for juniors to develop high-grade resources.
Surge Battery Metals Step Into the Spotlight
Surge Battery Metals (TSX-V: NILI | OTCQX: NILIF) is one such company advancing its position in the lithium supply chain. Surge focuses on the Nevada North Lithium Project (NNLP), which hosts the highest-grade lithium clay resource in the United States. It has a mineral resource estimate of 11.24 million tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) grading 3,010 ppm lithium at a 1,250 ppm cutoff.
The company has also seen strong investor interest in recent trading. In early 2026, its stock rose about 35%, and over the past month, it gained nearly 46%. This rally reflects the overall optimism in the lithium market. It also matches the strong gains of major producers like Albemarle. The increase shows growing confidence in NILI’s high-grade Nevada project and its potential role in meeting rising lithium demand.

In early January 2026, Surge announced a key executive hire to strengthen its commercial leadership. The company appointed Steffen Ball as Vice President of Commercial Development for Nevada North Lithium LLC, the joint venture between Surge and Evolution Mining. Mr. Ball brings senior experience from major automakers’ battery material sourcing teams, including roles at Nissan North America and Ford.
This appointment signals Surge’s focus on preparing the project for eventual production and strategic partnerships. It also shows the company’s plan to create a team with strong industry knowledge and connections in the lithium value chain.
Alongside personnel moves, Surge has attracted increased investment from institutional groups. The Quaternary Group, for example, increased its ownership in Surge by buying shares on the open market. Now, it holds about 7.8% of the company on an undiluted basis.
Nevada North: High-Grade, High Stakes
Surge Battery Metals stands out among junior lithium miners. Its main asset, the Nevada North Lithium Project, sits in a well-established U.S. mining region with strong infrastructure.
Early exploration shows lithium clay grades up to 7,630 ppm, with updated drill intercepts as high as 8,070 ppm, considered high for clay-based deposits. A Preliminary Economic Assessment (PEA) shows an after-tax NPV of US$9.2 billion. It also has an IRR of 22.8% when lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) is priced at US$24,000 per tonne.

The project could produce an average of 86,300 tonnes of LCE annually, peaking at 109,100 tonnes in Year 6. Operating costs are estimated at US$5,243 per tonne of LCE, giving Surge a competitive edge.
The project is now progressing toward a Pre-Feasibility Study targeted for completion in late 2026, led by global engineering firm Fluor Corporation.
Surge is expanding its resource base through drilling across several kilometers of strike. The company recently reported additional strong drill results from Nevada North. It announced a 30.6-meter intercept grading 4,196 ppm lithium from surface in a 640-meter step-out hole to the southeast.
In infill drilling, Surge also reported 116 meters averaging 3,752 ppm lithium, including 32.1 meters grading 4,521 ppm near surface, highlighting a strong high-grade core within the deposit. These results confirm that high-grade lithium extends beyond the current resource area.
The wide step-out distance also shows strong potential for further expansion. Consistent high grades near the surface can support future resource growth and strengthen the project’s development outlook.
Moreover, Nevada’s mining-friendly environment, with access to roads, power, and skilled labor, reduces development risk. Strategic hires with experience in battery supply chains signal the company’s readiness to move toward production and partnerships.
High-grade resources, strong economics, and a strategic location put Surge in a great spot in the growing lithium market.
From Clay to Clean Energy
The recent rise in lithium prices shows how supply and demand dynamics are shifting. As energy storage and electric vehicles expand, major companies are boosting their market positions. Higher lithium prices support stronger revenue forecasts and have led analysts to raise price targets on key stocks.
At the same time, projects further upstream, including junior developers like Surge, are gaining strategic significance. Investments in early-stage lithium resources help diversify supply beyond dominant producers and geographies. Surge’s focus on commercial leadership and resource development reflects how smaller companies can play a role in meeting future demand.
If lithium prices keep rising and demand stays strong, both current producers and new developers could gain. For mining giants, this could mean the expansion of production capacity and stronger earnings. For Surge and similar companies, it could support project financing and advancement toward commercial output.
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- READ MORE: Surge Battery Metals Strengthens Nevada North With High-Grade Expansion and Infill Success
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CAUTIONARY STATEMENT AND FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION
Certain statements contained in this news release may constitute “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable securities laws. Forward-looking information generally can be identified by words such as “anticipate,” “expect,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “plan,” and similar expressions suggesting future outcomes or events. Forward-looking information is based on current expectations of management; however, it is subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors that may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated.
These factors include, without limitation, statements relating to the Company’s exploration and development plans, the potential of its mineral projects, financing activities, regulatory approvals, market conditions, and future objectives. Forward-looking information involves numerous risks and uncertainties and actual results might differ materially from results suggested in any forward-looking information. These risks and uncertainties include, among other things, market volatility, the state of financial markets for the Company’s securities, fluctuations in commodity prices, operational challenges, and changes in business plans.
Forward-looking information is based on several key expectations and assumptions, including, without limitation, that the Company will continue with its stated business objectives and will be able to raise additional capital as required. Although management of the Company has attempted to identify important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially, there may be other factors that cause results not to be as anticipated, estimated, or intended.
There can be no assurance that such forward-looking information will prove to be accurate, as actual results and future events could differ materially. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking information. Additional information about risks and uncertainties is contained in the Company’s management’s discussion and analysis and annual information form for the year ended December 31, 2025, copies of which are available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.
The forward-looking information contained herein is expressly qualified in its entirety by this cautionary statement. Forward-looking information reflects management’s current beliefs and is based on information currently available to the Company. The forward-looking information is made as of the date of this news release, and the Company assumes no obligation to update or revise such information to reflect new events or circumstances except as may be required by applicable law.
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Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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