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The year 2024 was the fourth warmest on record for the UK, behind only 2022, 2023 and 2014.

In this review, we look back at the UK’s climate in 2024 to highlight how the key events of the year fit into the wider picture of long-term human-caused climate change. We find:

  • Eight months of the year were warmer than average.
  • Spring was the warmest on record for the UK, which saw a record-high average temperature for May. 
  • February was the second warmest on record for the UK and December the fifth warmest.
  • In contrast, the summer months of June, July and September were slightly cooler than average.
  • On 28 January, a strong Foehn effect resulted in a temperature of 19.9C at Achfary, Sutherland, marking the highest temperature for January since records began. 
  • The year was relatively wet, with 7% more rainfall than average, making it the UK’s 17th wettest in a series going back to 1836. 
  • Oxfordshire, Wiltshire, Gloucestershire, Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire saw their second-wettest year on record, driven by large rainfall totals in February and September.
  • Storm Lilian in August marked the first time that storm names reached ‘L’ in the alphabetised list since storm naming was introduced in 2015. 
  • An attribution study found that rainfall in the winter season of 2023-24 was 20% more intense due to human-caused climate change. It also showed the amount of rainfall observed during the season was 10 times more likely.  

(See our previous annual analysis for 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019 and 2018.) 

The year in summary

The Met Office relies on the long-running HadUK-Grid dataset to place recent UK weather and climate into its historical context. The gridded, geographically complete dataset combines observational data for monthly temperature since 1884, rainfall since 1836 and sunshine since 1910.

Unless stated otherwise, the rankings of events and statements (such as “warmest on record”) in this article relate to the HadUK-Grid series.

The “climate anomaly” maps below show the difference between the average temperature (left), rainfall total (middle) and sunshine duration (right) between 2024 and the 1991-2020 period. In other words, they show how much warmer, cooler, wetter, drier, sunnier or cloudier the year was than average.

UK weather anomalies 2024
Maps showing anomalies in 2024 relative to a 1991-2020 reference period for temperature (C), precipitation (%) and sunshine (%). The darker shading indicates a greater departure from average. Credit: Met Office

The maps show that the whole country was warmer than average, with slightly lower temperature anomalies in Scotland, and slightly higher anomalies seen in East Anglia.

Rainfall shows more regional variation, with the wettest regions relative to average in central and southern England, but a slightly drier year than average for Northern Ireland and parts of Scotland.

Meanwhile, it was a relatively dull year across the country with lower-than-average sunshine across the vast majority of the UK, particularly in western regions.

The UK annual average absolute temperature for 2024 was 9.78C, which is 0.64C above the 1991-2020 average.

This makes 2024 the fourth-warmest year since records began, coming only after 2022, when the average temperature was 10.03C; 2023, when the average temperature was 9.97C; and 2014, when temperatures averaged at 9.88C. Rounding off the top-five warmest years on record is 2006, when the average temperature was 9.70C.

The timeseries plot below shows how average temperature in the UK has followed a clear long-term warming trend since the 1960s.

Mean temperature UK
Timeseries chart of annual UK mean absolute temperature 1884-2024. The trend is represented by a black dashed line, the 1991-2020 average is shown in pink and the highest and lowest values in the series are shown by the red and blue dashed lines, respectively. The 2024 value is represented by the horizontal brown line. Credit: Met Office

Daily minimum and maximum temperatures have been recorded in the UK since the 19th century.

These observe the highest and lowest temperature reached during a 24-hour period which starts and ends at 9:00 GMT each day. The daily maximum temperature tends to be in the early afternoon and the minimum temperature in the hours before dawn, but not exclusively. In the winter season in particular, changes in weather patterns can result in larger swings in temperature.

In 2024, the annual average minimum temperature for the UK was the equal-warmest on record, matching the previous record set in 2023. The consequence of this has been some mild nights and far fewer frosts than normal, particularly in February and December. Meanwhile, the annual average daily maximum temperature was 8th warmest in the series.

Tracking the impact of climate change

For 2022 and 2023, attribution analysis conducted by Met Office scientists has shown that the temperatures experienced in both years were exceptional in more than 140 years of observational data, and would have been a 1-in-500 year event in a climate unaffected by humans.  

However, in the context of the current climate, such average temperatures are not necessarily extreme – in fact, they now have a “return period” closer to one-in-three years. 

The observed temperature for the UK in 2024 – despite being the fourth warmest on record – is not unusual when seen through the context of the warming climate. The UK has warmed by a rate that is comparable to the observed rise in the global average temperature. 

The internationally-agreed observational reference period for climate averages is the period 1991-2020. Variability in the Earth’s climate means that cooler years can still occur, such as in 2010. However, it is notable that the UK has not had a year with below-average temperature since 2013. 

The 2024 climate statistics continue a pattern of warming in the UK, which highlights how climate change is not a distant challenge for the future, but is happening now.

The year 2024 also fits into a general picture of a wetter climate for the UK overall. The timeseries plot below shows how rainfall in the UK has increased over recent decades

Rainfall amount UK
Timeseries of UK total rainfall from 1836 to 2024 and (bottom). The trend is represented by a black dashed line, the 1991-2020 average is shown in pink and the highest and lowest values in the series are shown by the red and blue dashed lines, respectively. The 2024 value is represented by the horizontal brown line. Credit: Met Office

However, the drivers of annual rainfall trends are more complex than for temperature, with annual totals masking regional and seasonal variations.

Climate projections for the UK show that winters are more likely to become wetter and summers are more likely to be drier through the 21st century. 

One important driver of this change is that a warmer ocean and atmosphere can result in more water vapour in the atmosphere, which brings greater rainfall totals, or more intense rain, associated with weather systems. 

However, the impact of a warming atmosphere alone is not sufficient to wholly account for the observed rainfall increase evident in the UK annual rainfall series. Other factors include decadal-scale natural variations in the climate, and the influence of climate change on large-scale circulation patterns across the northern hemisphere.

The rainfall amount of 2024 would have been considered a notably wet year if compared to much of the 19th and 20th centuries. However, last year was drier than a cluster of relatively wet years that have occurred since the late 1990s.

The timeseries below, which tracks annual sunshine in the UK over 1910-2024, highlights some of the vagaries of the UK’s climate.

The plot shows how 2024 was a relatively dull year for the UK, receiving the lowest hours of bright sunshine since 1998. However, this is against a backdrop of a longer-term trend of increasing sunshine in the UK, which has been especially notable since the 1980s. Sunshine amounts in winter and spring have seen the largest changes with 15-16% increases in the past decade, compared to the 1961-90 reference period.

Sunshine duration UK
Timeseries of UK total sunshine from 1910 to 2024. The trend is represented by a black dashed line, the 1991-2020 average is shown in pink and the highest and lowest values in the series are shown by the red and blue dashed lines, respectively. The 2024 value is represented by the horizontal brown line. Credit: Met Office

These trends are driven by a combination of natural variability, changes in dominant circulation patterns, as well as possible human influence from increases and decreases in aerosol pollutants that influence cloud cover.

Regionally, exceptionally wet weather – particularly in February and September – resulted in parts of central and southern England having an extremely wet year overall.

Oxfordshire, Wiltshire, Gloucestershire, Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire all saw their second-wettest year, while Dorset, Cheshire and Berkshire had their third wettest and Hertfordshire and Shropshire their fifth wettest.

The year was in the top-10 wettest for a further 10 counties and in the upper third for a majority of regions. However, parts of east Scotland and Northern Ireland had slightly below-average rainfall for the year.

Rainfall amount UK 2024

Map showing the ranking by county of annual rainfall in 2024. The counties shaded darkest blue had one of their top five wettest years in a series from 1836. No counties had their overall wettest year. Credit: Met Office

Weather through the year

Temperature

The chart below shows average UK temperature through the year, with orange highlighting periods that were warmer than average and blue showing cooler than average.

Mean temperature in UK in 2024
Timeseries of daily UK average temperature during 2024. Orange shading are periods of above average temperature, blue shading is below average, and the solid black line is the 1991-2020 reference period by day of the year. The grey shading reflects the 5th, 10th, 90th and 95th percentiles of the temperature distribution and the red and blue lines are the highest and lowest values for each day of the year, based on a dataset of daily data from 1960. Credit: Met Office

There were numerous spells of warm conditions (relative to the time of year), particularly in January, February, May and December. Overall, 60% of the year (220 days) was warmer than average and 40% (146 days) was cooler. A total of 13% (49 days) was above the 95th percentile (that is, in the top 5% warmest for the time of year). Cold snaps were not common and relatively short-lived, with only 3% (12 days) below the 5th percentile (that is, in the top 5% of coldest days for the time of year).

The highest maximum temperature of the year was 34.8C, recorded in Cambridge on 12 August during a relatively short hot spell in an otherwise unremarkable summer. The lowest minimum temperature of the year was -14.0C, recorded at Dalwhinnie in the Scottish Highlands on 17 January. 

Extremes in temperature have increased at a much faster rate than the average, and the annual maximum temperature in 2024 – which would have once been an occasional event – is now much more common.

There were only nine years in the 20th century where the maximum temperature of the year in the climate archive exceeds the 2024 value (34.8C), but there are already eight years in the 21st century that have done so. Six of those have been in the last 10 years.

Rainfall

The two plots below show the accumulation of rain day-by-day through the course of the year, averaged across Scotland and for England and Wales combined.

The blue-shaded regions highlight periods when total rainfall was above average for the time of year and the orange-shaded regions times when it was below. For example, the first chart shows that Scotland had reached around 500mm by early April, which is close to average for that point in the year. (This equates roughly to a volume of water that could fill Loch Ness five times over).

Rainfall across the UK in 2024
Timeseries showing rainfall accumulation through 2024 for Scotland (top) and England and Wales (bottom). Brown shading represents a deficit in rainfall compared to average for that point in the year, and blue shading is an excess of rainfall compared to average. The solid line represents the 1991-2020 average, grey shading shows the 5th, 10th, 90th and 95th percentiles of the distribution, and blue and red the lowest and highest values based on a dataset of daily rainfall from 1891 to 2022. Credit: Met Office

In Scotland, total rainfall was close to average for much of the year. August was notably wet – the third wettest on record for western Scotland region – but this was offset by a dry autumn. A wet December, particularly for northern Scotland, brought the overall rainfall accumulation for 2024 close to average.

In contrast, rainfall in England remained well-above average for most of the year, leading to the year being the 8th wettest on record for the nation.

England saw its fourth-wettest February, followed by a wet March. In southern England, February saw well over 200% of average rainfall, dipping slightly to nearly 180% in March. Accumulated rainfall was further boosted by exceptional rain in September, which saw some regions recording more than 300% of average rainfall.

Storms

The Met Office has been naming storms – in collaboration with the Irish weather service, Met Eireann – since 2015. The Dutch weather service, KNMI, joined the initiative in 2019.

The 2023-24 storm season had a very active start with seven named storms occurring from September to December 2023. This continued into early 2024 with Henk, Isha and Jocelyn occurring in January. 

The winter half-year from October 2023 to March 2024 was the wettest on record for both England and Wales, including in the long-running England and Wales Precipitation series (EWP), which dates back to 1766.

An attribution study – bringing together scientists from the UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and Germany – looked into the impact of climate change on the autumn-winter storm season, which ran from October 2023 to March 2024. It found that the average rainfall on stormy days has increased by about 20% due to human-caused climate change. This echoes wider studies and climate projections that suggest UK winters are likely to become wetter due to climate change. 

An analysis of the intensity of storms based on wind speed in the study found that a stormy season was slightly less likely because of climate change. However, other studies, using other methods, have suggested an increase in storminess is likely in a future climate. The diverging findings highlight how uncertainty remains about the response of storm systems affecting the UK in a changing climate, and underscores the need for ongoing research on this topic.

Two red warnings for wind were issued in 2024. These were for storm Isha in January, which affected north-east Scotland and storm Darragh in December, which affected west Wales. The two wind storms were the UK’s most powerful since storm Eunice in February 2022.

Storm name Date/s of impact in UK Maximum wind gust Number of observing sites recording wind gusts over 50 knots
2023-2024 names
Henk 2 January 82 knots (94 mph), Needles, Isle of Wight 37
Isha 21-22 January 86 knots (99 mph), Brizlee Wood, Northumberland 92
Jocelyn 23-24 January 84 knots (97 mph) Capel Curig, Gwynedd 50
Kathleen 6-7 April 66 knots (76 mph), Loch Glascarnoch, Ross&Cromarty 30
Lilian 22-23 August 64 knots (74 mph), Capel Curig, Gwynedd 16
2024-2025 names
Ashley 20-21 October 71 knots (82 mph) Aberdaron, Gwynedd 46
Bert 22-25 November 71 knots (82 mph) Capel Curig, Gwynedd 32
Conall 27 November 51 knots (59 mph) Needles, Isle of Wight 1
Darragh 6-7 December 83 knots (96 mph) Berry Head, Devon 58

Overall, the average wind speed in 2024 was close to, but slightly below, the 1991-2020 average, while being the highest since 2020. This aligns with a long-term decline in the average wind speed for the UK since 1969, shown in the chart below. 

Mean wind speed UK
Timeseries showing UK annual average wind speed over 1969-2024 (dark blue line) with the trend represented by a black dashed line. The 1991-2020 average is shown in pink and the highest and lowest values in the series are shown by the red and blue dashed lines, respectively. The 2024 value is represented by the horizontal brown line. Credit: Met Office

This long-term trend should be interpreted with some caution as it is possible that non-climatic factors – such as changes in instrumentation and exposure of the observing network through time – influences these trends. However, the decline is consistent with a widespread global slowdown termed “global stilling”. 

More recently, global and UK data have shown that, since 2010, the decline in the average wind speed has stopped or even reversed.

Winter

The climatological UK winter spans the calendar months of December, January and February. Winter 2023-24 was mild and the fifth warmest on record for the UK. For England and Wales combined it was the second warmest on record.

The year commenced with some significant flooding impacts from storm Henk, which brought damaging winds and heavy rain to central and southern England and Wales on 2 January. The rain fell on already saturated ground, leading to flood warnings. High pressure became more established from mid-January, bringing a spell of cooler and drier conditions. The month concluded with storms Isha and Jocelyn in quick succession.

On 28 January, exceptionally high temperatures for the time of year were recorded in parts of north-west Scotland, reaching 19.9C at Achfary and 19.6C at Kinlochewe, surpassing both stations’ previous record of 18.3C by a large margin. There was a marked contrast between cooler and more moist conditions on the windward side of the highlands, and warmer, drier conditions on the leeward side. 

This is the classic consequence of the Foehn effect, which can result in remarkably unseasonable temperatures locally due to the air losing moisture as it passes up and over the higher ground, resulting in warmer drier conditions when it descends. 

Maximum temperature, Scotland

Map showing temperature anomaly for 28 January 2024, relative to 1991-2020. Credit: Met Office.

The Foehn effect was the primary driver of January’s exceptional temperatures. However, it is worth acknowledging that global warming has led to high temperature records across all seasons in recent years. New maximum temperature records were set for January in 2024, February in 2019, July in 2022, October in 2011, November in 2015 and December in 2019.

In other words, new temperature records have been set for six of the 12 months of the year since 2011. Conversely, no months have set new lowest minimum records.

It was the warmest February on record for both England and Wales, and the second warmest for the UK overall. The years 2019, 2022, 2023 and 2024 also had warm Februaries which ranked in the top 10 warmest on record.

Meanwhile, the south of England has its wettest February on record, and England its fourth wettest. This resulted in widespread disruption, particularly to transport, due to flooding and landslips. 

Overall, it was the eighth-wettest winter for the UK, continuing a trend of wetter winters consistent with climate projections that indicate that human-caused climate change will drive a shift to wetter winters.

Spring

The year 2024 saw the warmest May, and spring, on record for the UK.

It was also the sixth wettest spring on record, after a succession of low-pressure systems brought rain to much of the country, with the exception of north-west Scotland, which was drier than average.

The preponderance of wet weather contributed to considerable surprise – and in some cases disbelief – of the extent to which May broke its all-time temperature record. The possible disconnect between the recorded temperatures and perception of the conditions was also due to extreme daily minimum temperatures occurring overnight. An exceptionally warm month in spring does not necessarily mean a month of fine and dry weather.   

A Met Office analysis of the May 2024 event demonstrated that a significant contributing factor to the high temperatures was from a marine heatwave affecting the waters around the UK for the whole of May and early June. Although the UK was under cloudy skies for much of May, clearer skies coupled with weak winds and wave conditions over the North Sea contributed to very high sea temperatures.

In addition to the contribution from the marine heatwave, a Met Office attribution analysis also found that human-induced climate change made the May average temperature between six and 14 times more likely than it would have been in a pre-industrial climate. The chart below shows how the likelihood of temperatures at or exceeding May 2024 are lower in a natural – or pre-industrial – climate compared to one impacted by human activities.

May temperature distributions

Chart showing the distribution of UK May mean temperature for simulations with human and natural forcings (ALL, in orange) and equivalent but with natural only forcings (NAT, blue). Credit: Met Office

Summer

The summer was arguably rather disappointing for many, with warm spells generally being short-lived and the season being cooler than average overall, and the coolest summer since 2015.

Although July was wetter than average for parts of the country, both June and August were relatively dry for most. Western Scotland and parts of north-west England were the exception and were notably wet in August, with some areas receiving more than 200% of average rainfall for the month. It was the third-wettest August on record for western Scotland.

A short hot spell across central and southern England on 11-12 August saw the highest temperature of the year, of 34.8C in Cambridge. This was followed – as is often the case in the breakdown of summer heat events – with an outbreak of thunderstorms. These particularly affected northern and western parts of the UK.

Storm Lilian in late August resulted in high winds and rain with significant disruption to road, rail and power supply across northern England. Storm Lilian means that the 2023-24 season has had the most named storms since the naming system was launched 10 years ago.

The storm naming system is designed for raising awareness of the potential of risk to life and property from extreme storms. The decision to name considers both the severity of the storm and also its likelihood to cause impacts. For example, a storm system passing over heavily populated regions coinciding with rush hour in the summer months when trees are in full leaf can carry higher risks than a storm of the same wind severity passing through overnight in winter.

Storm naming criteria and the partners involved have evolved over time. For these reasons the number of named storms over time cannot itself be used as an indicator of change. 

Autumn and December

Autumn continued the rainy theme. A succession of low-pressure systems throughout September resulted in some exceptional rainfall for southern and central England, with more than 300% of average rainfall observed across a wide region.

It was the seventh-wettest September for England and the wettest September on record for 10 counties in central and southern England. For Bedfordshire and Oxfordshire, September was the wettest calendar month the counties have experienced in a series dating back to 1836. Meanwhile, the Oxford Radcliffe meteorological station recorded its wettest month since September 1774.

September rainfall map, UK

Map showing the percentage of average rainfall that fell in September 2024. The purple regions highlight those areas that had in excess of 300% of average. White areas were close to average and brown regions drier than average. Credit: Met Office

The remainder of autumn saw the first named storms for the 2024-25 season: Ashley in October and Bert and Conall in November. Storm Bert brought heavy rain and snow.

The day of 21 November saw the most significant November snow event since 2010, with lying snow as far south as Devon and Cornwall. This was one of the coldest spells of weather in the year, although lower temperatures were recorded during the January cold snap earlier that year. The spell was short-lived and conditions were much milder again throughout December. It was the fifth-warmest December in a series dating back to 1884.

December was also notable for a red weather warning issued for storm Darragh for west Wales and the Bristol Channel, with extreme wind gusts along exposed coastal and upland areas. Some of the strongest winds were from an unusual northerly direction, likely influencing the number of fallen trees. A number of fatalities were reported and more than 2 million people were left without power during the storm. 

The weather of the UK within any single year is diverse and at times surprising, and 2024 was no different. Where records have been broken, they have been for exceptionally high temperatures and high rainfall totals. This is another reminder that climate change is already having an impact on the UK’s weather, shifting the probabilities to make high temperature extremes and records increasingly likely to be broken and re-broken.

The drivers of rainfall records are more complex, but climate projections have consistently pointed to a general pattern of wetter winters, drier summers and more intense rainfall when it occurs. It is therefore vital to continue to monitor the indicators of change both globally and in the UK, in order to better understand what changes can be expected in the future, and how to respond to climate-related risks.

The post Met Office: A review of the UK’s climate in 2024 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right

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After a five-year long legal battle, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has blocked Shell and local partner Impact Africa’s permit to explore for oil and gas off the country’s East Coast, in a landmark victory for local communities and civil society.

“Today’s judgment makes me feel very happy and proud that the ocean is not for profit for mining companies,” said East Coast resident and environmental campaigner Siyabonga Ndovela.

The verdict culminates a years-long process in which non-profits Sustaining the Wild Coast, Natural Justice, Greenpeace Africa, and others took legal action against Shell, Impact Africa and the South African government for failing to consult affected communities – a legal requirement in the country.

The Constitutional Court ruled that Shell and Impact Africa had not complied with resource governance law, had failed to meaningfully conduct public consultation and had failed to consider the impact on climate change, cultural rights, livelihoods and ecological harm.

The ruling references last year’s landmark advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, which states that countries have a legal duty to prevent and repair damage to the climate system. The South African judges argued climate change “transcends borders” and that states’ obligations “must be understood within the broader framework of international law.”

“This case must also be understood against the backdrop of well-documented struggles by coastal communities to protect their land, marine resources and ways of life in the face of extractive activities that they believe threaten their very existence,” wrote Justice Narandran Kollapen.

Protesters march to the Constitutional Court in 2025 (Photo: Ihsaan Haffejee/GroundUp)

The Constitutional Court found that the exploration right had been unlawfully granted by the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources.The ruling upholds a 2022 regional court decision against Shell and overturns a 2024 appeal that allowed the company to conduct fresh public consultations under the original exploration right. Today’s decision means the right, initially granted in 2014, must be set aside.

Celebrating the decision, Sherelee Odyar, oil and gas campaigner at Greenpeace Africa, told Climate Home News that the court confirmed “serious failures” in the awarding of exploration rights to Shell and Impact Africa, which “can not simply be corrected later”.

The Wild Coast is a biodiversity hotspot which has been conserved over generations by coastal communities who rely on the ocean and land. “Our land and sea are central to our livelihoods and our way of life. Over generations we have conserved them, and they have conserved us,” reads the founding statement in the case. 

A Shell spokesperson said it noted the ruling, responding that “we are committed to responsible offshore exploration, meaningful stakeholder engagement and environmental stewardship.”

The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources did not respond to requests for comment at the time of publication.

“Renewed strength” for communities

The ruling adds to a series of legal challenges brought by civil society groups against oil companies and the government as South Africa has expanded oil and gas development since 2014 under Operation Phakisa, a plan aimed at “unlocking the economic potential of the oceans”.

On the West Coast, Walter Steenkamp, Chair of Aukotowa Fisheries Cooperative, which is involved in a separate ongoing legal action against TotalEnergies, said that “today’s court case gave me renewed strength.”

The case could also set a precedent for future oil developments, said Alessandro Mazzi, legal governance researcher at the University of Wageningen. He added that the verdict “sends a strong signal to investors that where projects affect people’s land, livelihoods and environment, meaningful consultation and genuine ecological assessment are an integral part of responsible investment”.

Janet Solomon, coordinator of advocacy group Oceans not Oil, said that the Court’s emphasis on democratic participation, culture, livelihoods and the health of future generations in handing down the verdict signals a shift in jurisprudence on environmental governance, saying that this focus “may prove to be the judgment’s most enduring legacy.”

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Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action?

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China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.

The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030.

This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.

Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.

However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.

It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.

But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.

Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry.

Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.

Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.

Article Contents

What does the plan say about peaking coal?

Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.

The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy.

Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.

The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:

“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”

However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.

The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.

Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region.

Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions.

But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.

Coal's share of total energy consumption in China fell to 51% in 2025. The share of coal and non-fossil energy in China's total energy consumption from 2015-2025, %. Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Carbon Brief analysis of China Energy Transformation Outlook 2025, Yicai analysis of NBS statistics - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)

The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.

Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.

In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.

It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”.

The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.

The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.

The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:

  • Peaking coal consumption;
  • “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
  • Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
  • Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
  • “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
  • Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
  • Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
  • Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.

The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.

“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”.

A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”.

This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy”

However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption.

State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.

“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.

While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.

Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.

“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.

What does the plan say about China’s coal production?

The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.

The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.

The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.

Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”.

Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024.

“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.

Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.

It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.

This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.

New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.

This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.

The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented.

Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.

What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?

The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.

The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption.

Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.

In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.

It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.

This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.

Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.

Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.

China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.

Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.

It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]

The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.

At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.

In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.

Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively.

In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.

However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”.

She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.

How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?

Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.

As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.

Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.

A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.

But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.

China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.

The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”

The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions.

Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.

As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.

Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds:

“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”

The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus

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The world saw the lowest amount of new coal mine capacity brought online for at least 10 years in 2025, according to a new report, as clean energy displaces coal for electricity generation in East Asia.

A report by Global Energy Monitor (GEM) found that new coal mine capacity declined by nearly 40% from 2024, the second consecutive year new mine capacity has hit a decade low. This represents an acceleration of a steady decline that began in 2019.

The slowdown in new coal mine openings was driven by China and Australia, where new additions fell by 44% and 96%, respectively. In China, the report said this was partly due to solar and wind displacing coal for electricity generation – although coal rebounded in the first half of 2026 – and the National Energy Administration implementing new rules to curb new mine openings.

In Australia, a 96% reduction in new coal mine capacity was driven by shrinking demand from the countries that import Australian coal for electricity, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the report said.

This trend is likely to continue, according to GEM, as the Australian state of New South Wales recently banned new coal mines on undeveloped greenfield land. South Korea has promised to stop building coal-fired power plants that cannot capture and store the emissions produced. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for a post-Fukushima nuclear revival to displace coal.

This Australian coal community is co-designing its own green future

Globally, growth in coal demand has slowed over the last few years and the International Energy Agency expects it to plateau through to 2030 because of the growth of renewable energy, nuclear and fossil gas.

Openings down, pipeline up

But while new coal mine openings fell, the amount of global coal mine capacity proposed increased by 11%. This was almost entirely driven by a spate of projects in the eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Odisha.

“If built,” the GEM report says, “the projects would commit India – a country with no formal coal phaseout timeline – to years of coal expansion and would put a 1.5C-aligned transition away from fossil fuels farther out of reach”.

The Indian government says it needs to increase coal production to meet growing electricity demand from economic growth and from dealing with heatwaves. It plans to open more than 20 new coal mines to meet its coal production targets.

Because of energy security concerns, India is also aiming to produce chemicals with Indian coal rather than imported gas. China is also pursuing this strategy, although the Global Energy Monitor report said that Indian coal’s high ash content means the South Asian nation will find it harder to make chemicals from coal.

    Nations agreed at COP26 five years ago to “phase down” coal power – a commitment that China and India successfully pushed to weaken from “phase out”. At COP28 in 2023, governments agreed to transition away from all fossil fuels in energy systems.

    Since then, wealthy nations have partnered with coal-producing countries like South Africa, Vietnam and Indonesia on plans to transition from coal to clean energy. But, after preliminary talks, India and these governments did not agree a JETP.

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