When Bali hosted the G20 summit in late 2022, then Indonesian President Joko Widodo seized his moment to shine on the world stage. At a summit dominated by the war in Ukraine, he committed his country to phasing out coal.

Indonesia’s coal consumption has more than doubled over the past 10 years, and the country now ranks eighth in the world for carbon emissions. So it was significant when Widodo launched the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) – a $20-billion plan to move Indonesia from coal to renewables.

The country’s JETP is backed by a host of wealthy nations – among them the UK, Japan, the European Union (EU) and Canada – plus international banks including HSBC, Citi and Bank of America. The US, originally one of the plan’s main proponents, pulled out this year under the administration of climate-change sceptic Donald Trump. The donors’ main goal is to help Indonesia reach net-zero power by 2050.

When the JETP was announced, Noel Quinn, then chief executive of HSBC, hailed it as “further proof that finance has an important role to play in facilitating the changes needed to achieve net zero”. He said his bank would allocate funds where they are “most needed”.

But The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) and Climate Home News can reveal that HSBC and other global banks appear to have undermined the plan from the start by continuing to fund companies driving the construction of new coal-fired power stations across Indonesia.

In total, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and Bank of America – which all joined the JETP – have helped raise almost $2bn for companies involved in coal expansion in Indonesia since the scheme was announced nearly three years ago.

“Ineffective” plan

A year after Indonesia launched its JETP, at the COP28 climate summit in Dubai, every UN member state recommitted to accelerating efforts to phase down coal power, a promise first made at COP26 in Glasgow.

But Indonesia has since continued building coal-fired power stations. Since the JETP was launched, 28 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-fired power capacity has come online, started construction or been announced – more than the output of all the UK’s power stations combined. This expansion has led to an oversupply of electricity, according to Global Energy Monitor, which tracks energy data.

At the Banten Suralaya coal-fired power station in the west of Java, Indonesia’s most populous island, two new units are slated to start operating this year, adding 2GW more power to the grid.

Locals have said the existing plant is so polluting that rainwater runs black with coal dust, and their banana and peanut crops can no longer thrive. According to a complaint filed on behalf of local residents in 2023 to the World Bank Group – one of the project investors – the impact of increasing the power station’s capacity would be “almost unimaginable”.

The new units are being built with backing from KEPCO, South Korea’s publicly owned electricity utility company. As recently as February, HSBC, Bank of America and Citigroup helped raise $400m for KEPCO, despite the banks’ own policies restricting coal financing.

KEPCO said in financial documents that the money raised would not be used for “any efforts and activities pertaining to the construction of new coal-fired generation units”.

But that sort of pledge is largely meaningless if the banks don’t require the company not to engage in such activities, according to Xavier Lerin, a senior research manager at ShareAction, a responsible investment organisation.

“The money raised cannot be distinguished from other financing sources,” he said. “Even if it could, it still supports the company’s financial standing and can free up liquidity elsewhere, indirectly enabling coal expansion.”

In a statement to TBIJ, HSBC said: “We follow a clear set of sustainability risk policies which support our ambition to align the financed emissions in our portfolio to net zero by 2050.” Bank of America and Citigroup did not respond to a request for comment.

Fabby Tumiwa, executive director of the Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR), an Indonesian think-tank that was part of a JETP technical working group, said that if the same banks funding renewables are also financing fossil fuels, the scheme becomes “ineffective”. “I would like to see them spend their money on renewable energy projects listed in the JETP,” he added. “There’s still limited financing going to renewable energy projects right now.”

Indonesia’s JETP secretariat said banks had so far raised just $60m of the $10bn they promised to the scheme. Paul Butarbutar, head of the secretariat, said he did not blame the banks for that: “JETP is about financing projects, not about giving the money to the government. So, because the projects are not there, then of course the financing from the banks is very limited.”

A glaring omission

In 2022, Widodo’s government banned the construction of new coal-fired power connected to Indonesia’s national grid, but the law continues to allow so-called captive stations – which are off-grid and used directly by industry. In Indonesia, captive coal is booming.

Indonesia had almost 14GW of captive coal-fired power stations, according to a 2023 report by the Asian Development Bank, with a further 20GW planned or under construction.

At the time of Widodo’s ban, Weda Bay Industrial Park, home to the world’s largest nickel mine, was being built on Halmahera island, with its own 4.5GW coal-fired power station. HSBC and other banks were helping to fund the companies operating there.

Through a sustainability-linked bond, HSBC helped raise €500m ($582m) for one of the nickel mining companies in the area, a French firm called Eramet. The terms of the deal mean Eramet pays higher interest rates on the debt if it does not meet certain targets to cut emissions from its overall operations. Crucially, however, the substantial emissions from Weda Bay mining operations are excluded from the calculation.

Eramet said it does not have sole decision-making power in the Weda Bay nickel mine but “strives to promote best environmental practices to its partner”. It said it was important to distinguish between the nickel mine and the wider industrial park, which processes the metal using coal-fired power. Eramet is not a shareholder in the Weda Bay industrial park.

It added that the sustainability-linked bond complies with international standards, which do not require emissions from companies in which it is a minority shareholder to be included.

Nickel Industries, an Australian mining company that also operates at Weda Bay, has a majority stake in two of the new coal-fired units on the site and raised $400m with the help of Bank of America Securities in 2023. At the time of publication, Nickel Industries had not responded to a request for comment.

Bhima Yudhistira, executive director of the Center of Economic and Law Studies, an Indonesia-based think-tank, said banks justify financing captive coal-fired power in the industrial park by insisting that nickel-producing companies have a transition plan for using renewable energy later. “This is a very ridiculous argument because if you build the coal-fired power station and it has a lifetime of 15-20 years, I don’t think they will use renewable energy,” he argued.

He added that funds flowing from foreign banks have a knock-on effect: “This also triggers actions from the domestic banks in Indonesia to finance many of the new coal plants because they are inspired by the double standards of the [international banks].”

Early-closure test case

Around $3bn in JETP financing has been approved in Indonesia since the programme was launched, surviving a change of government in Indonesia and several of the donor countries.

Some analysts say it has encouraged Indonesia’s new president to double down on climate commitments. “Despite the complexity of the situation, the JETP is still promising to accelerate renewable energy deployment,” Tumiwa said.

The proposed early closure of a coal-fired power station in west Java is seen as a test case for the scheme.

Cirebon Electric Power (CEP) agreed to close the 660-megawatt coal-fired power station in 2035, seven years ahead of schedule. In return, the company would receive $325m in loans channelled by the Asian Development Bank. Negotiations to finalise the deal are ongoing – and their outcome could set an important precedent.

Yet, even as CEP was negotiating the closure of Cirebon-1, it was preparing to open a new coal-fired power station, Cirebon-2, on the same site. Yudhistira said that was a missed opportunity as CEP could have been forced to stop building the new power station as part of the negotiations. Cirebon-2 went online in May 2023, with an expected life of at least 25 years.

JETP banks Standard Chartered and Deutsche Bank raised $455m for CEP’s parent company Indika Energy, which campaigners said highlights the contradictions in the programme.

“No one can ignore the potential moral hazard of using public funds to compensate CEP for the proposed early retirement of Cirebon-1, even while private companies are still investing in and lending to the coal sector,” a report from Friends of the Earth and a network of other civil society organisations argued.

Like KEPCO, Indika said the funds would not be used for any coal-related business, although documentation for the deal shows that it will shore up the company’s finances.

Business-as-usual: Donors pour climate adaptation finance into big infrastructure, neglecting local needs

Deutsche Bank told us it had not participated in any “direct loan” supporting coal expansion in Indonesia and that it has “excluded direct financing of new coal-fired power plants and coal mines” since 2016. But this policy does not seem to have prevented it helping raise money for Indika.

It said: “We reject any suggestion that our activities breach our policies or undermine Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership.”

Standard Chartered also said its activities had not undermined the JETP. A spokesperson said: “We do not provide new financial services to support the expansion of coal. The transformation of energy systems in high-growth economies like Indonesia via the JETP is central to achieving this goal and Standard Chartered will continue to support that transition with a view to do so responsibly, transparently, and at scale.”

The other banks declined to comment.

Freeze on captive coal?

Four years since the first JETP for South Africa was announced at COP26 in Glasgow, academics at the University of Sussex concluded after in-depth research that the model has faltered due to conflicting mandates between donor and recipient countries.

Two years after Indonesia’s agreement was struck in Bali, meanwhile, the country’s new president, Prabowo Subianto, outlined a vision for Indonesia to phase out all fossil-fuelled power stations over the next 15 years at the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro.

The country’s recently published climate plan says the government is “preparing policy on just transition” that would seek to ensure “a decent future for workers affected by the transition”. The document also highlights Indonesia’s ambitions to develop “self-sufficient, competitive and green industry”, including raw materials like nickel.

Yudhistira said it is not yet clear whether phasing out captive coal is part of Indonesia’s energy transition plan. “The least that we hope to get from the JETP is to have a moratorium, to freeze the permits for new captive coal power plants,” he added.

He urged the JETP banks to stop funding companies involved in building new coal facilities in Indonesia. “[They] need to collaborate with domestic banks, ensuring both have the same goals to decarbonise the power sector – including in industrial parks.”

This story was published in partnership with The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ)

The post Big banks’ lending to coal backers undermines Indonesia’s green plans  appeared first on Climate Home News.

Big banks’ lending to coal backers undermines Indonesia’s green plans 

Solar companies have figured out how to mix sheep grazing and power production. This company is about to make a push to do it with cows, with huge growth potential.

By Dan Gearino

LANCASTER, Ky.—It is unusual to have a utility-scale solar array in Kentucky, and even more unusual that the grounds crew here is a live-in flock of more than a thousand sheep.

Can Cows and Solar Power Coexist? We’re About to Find Out

Nearly a decade on from the Paris Agreement, there is still not an agreed way to measure progress towards its “global goal on adaptation” (GGA).

Yet climate impacts are increasingly being felt around the world, with the weather becoming more extreme and the risk to vulnerable populations growing. 

At COP30, which takes place next month, negotiators are set to finalise a list of indicators that can be used to measure progress towards the GGA.

This is expected to be one of the most significant negotiated outcomes from the UN climate summit in Belém, Brazil.

In a series of open letters running up to the summit, COP30 president-designate André Corrêa do Lago wrote that adaptation was “no longer a choice” and that countries needed to seize a “window of opportunity”:

“There is a window of opportunity to define a robust framework to track collective progress on adaptation. This milestone will…lay the groundwork for the future of the adaptation agenda.”

However, progress on producing an agreed list of indicators has been difficult, with nearly 90 experts working over two years to narrow down a list of almost 10,000 potential indicators to a final set of just 100, which is supposed to be adopted at COP30.

Below, Carbon Brief explores what the GGA is, why progress on adaptation has been so challenging and what a successful outcome would look like in Belém.

What is the GGA?

What progress has been made?

Why is it hard to choose adaptation indicators?

What to expect from COP30?

What will the GGA mean for vulnerable communities?

What is the GGA?

The GGA was signed into being within the Paris Agreement in 2015, but the treaty included limited detail on exactly what the goal would look like, how it would be achieved and how progress would be tracked.

The need to adapt to climate change has long been established, with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in 1992, noting that parties “shall…cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change”. 

In the subsequent years, the issue received limited focus, however. Then, in 2013, the African Group of Negotiators put forward a proposed GGA, setting out a target for adaptation.

This was then formally established under article 7.1 of the Paris text two years later. The text of the treaty says that the GGA is to “enhanc[e] adaptive capacity, strengthen…resilience and reduc[e] vulnerability to climate change”.

According to the World Resources Institute (WRI), the GGA was designed to set “specific, measurable targets and guidelines for global adaptation action, as well as enhancing adaptation finance and other types of support for developing countries”. 

However, unlike the goal to cut emissions – established in article 4 of the Paris Agreement – measuring progress on adaptation is “inherently challenging”.

Emilie Beauchamp, lead for monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) for adaptation at the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), tells Carbon Brief that this challenge relates to the context-specific nature of what adaptation means. She says: 

“The main [reason] it’s hard to measure progress on adaptation is because adaptation is very contextual, and so resilience and adapting mean different things to different people, and different things in different places. So it’s not always easy to quantify or qualify…You need to integrate really different dimensions and different lived experiences when you assess progress on adaptation. And that’s why it’s been hard.”

Beyond this, attribution of the impact of adaptive measures remains a “persistent challenge”, according to Dr Portia Adade Williams, a research scientist at the CSIR-Science and Technology Policy Research Institute and Carbon Brief contributing editor, “as observed changes in vulnerability or resilience may result from multiple climatic and non-climatic factors”. She adds:

“In many contexts, data limitations and inconsistent monitoring systems, particularly in developing countries, constrain systematic tracking of adaptation efforts. Existing monitoring frameworks tend to emphasise outputs, such as infrastructure built or trainings conducted, rather than outcomes that reflect actual reductions in vulnerability or enhanced resilience.”

Despite these challenges, the need for increased progress on adaptation is clear. Nearly half of the global population – around 3.6 billion people – are currently highly vulnerable to these impacts. This includes vulnerability to droughts, floods, heat stress and food insecurity. 

However, for six years following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the GGA did not feature on the agenda at COP summits and there was limited progress on the matter. 

This changed in 2021, at COP26 in Glasgow, when parties initiated the two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work program to begin establishing tangible adaptation targets. 

This work culminated at COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, with the GGA “framework”. 

Agreeing the details of this framework and developing indicators to measure adaptation progress has been the main focus of negotiations in recent years.

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What progress has been made?

Following the establishment of the GGA, there was – for many years – only limited progress towards agreeing how to track countries’ adaptation efforts.

COP28 was seen as a “pivotal juncture” for the GGA, with the creation of the framework and a new two-year plan to develop indicators, which is supposed to culminate at COP30. 

Negotiations across the two weeks in Dubai in 2023 were tense. It took five days for a draft negotiating text on the GGA framework to emerge, due to objections from the G77 and China group of developing countries around the inclusion of adaptation finance.

Within the GGA – as with many negotiating tracks under the UNFCCC – finance to support developing nations is a common sticking point. Other disagreements included the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR–RC). 

Ultimately, a text containing weakened language around both CBDR-RC and finance was waved through at the end of COP28 and a framework for the GGA was adopted.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Ana Mulio Alvarez, a researcher on adaptation at thinktank E3G,  said that the framework was the “first real step to fulfilling” the adaptation mandate laid out in the Paris Agreement, adding: 

“The GGA is the equivalent of the 1.5C commitment for mitigation – a north star to guide efforts. It will be hugely symbolic if the GGA indicators are agreed at COP and the GGA can be implemented.”

The framework agreed at COP28 includes 11 targets to guide progress against the GGA. Of these, four are related to what it describes as an “iterative adaptation cycle” – risk assessment, planning, implementation and learning  – and seven to thematic targets.

These “themes” cover water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, poverty eradication and cultural heritage.

Within these, there are subgoals for countries to work towards. For example, within the water theme, there is a subgoal of achieving universal access to clean water.

While this framework was broadly welcomed as a step forward for adaptation work, there remains concern from some experts about the focus of the programme.

Prof Lisa Schipper, a professor of development geography at the University of Bonn, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) author and Carbon Brief contributing editor, tells Carbon Brief that without the framework there would likely have been continued delays, but there was still “significant scientific pushback against this approach to adaptation”. 

She notes that the IPCC’s sixth assessment report (AR6) “didn’t necessarily provide any concrete inputs that could be useful for the GGA”. Beyond this, there are political challenges that the framework does not address, Schipper adds, continuing:

“There are also political reasons why global-north countries or annex-one countries don’t necessarily want specificity [in adaptation targets], because they also don’t want to be held accountable and to be forced to pay for things, right? So, the science was pathetic in one way, it was just not sufficient. And then you have a political agenda that’s fighting against clarity on this. 

“So, even though [the framework] came together, it was still not very concrete, right? It was a framework, but it didn’t have a lot in it.”

As with the language around finance, thematic targets within the GGA were weakened over the course of the negotiations. Additionally, parties ultimately did not agree to set up a specific, recurring agenda item to continue discussing the GGA.

However, a further two-year programme was established at COP28. The UAE-Belém work programme was designed to establish concrete “indicators” that can be used to measure progress on adaptation going forward.  

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Why is it hard to choose adaptation indicators?

In the two years following COP28, work has been ongoing to narrow down a potential list of more than 9,000 indicators under the GGA to just 100.

At the UNFCCC negotiations in June 2024 in Bonn, parties agreed to ask for a group of technical experts to be convened to help with this process.

This led to a group of 78 experts meeting in September 2024. They were split into eight working groups – one for each of the seven themes and one for the iterative adaptation cycle – to begin work reviewing a list of more than 5,000 indicators, which had already been compiled from submissions to the UNFCCC. 

In October 2024, a second workshop was held under the UAE-Belém work programme, at which the experts agreed that they should also consider an additional 5,000 indicators compiled by the Adaptation Committee, another body within the UN climate regime. 

One key challenge, Beauchamp tells Carbon Brief, was that the group of experts had very limited time and a lack of resources. She expands:

“They had to finish their work by the end of the summer [of 2025]. This means they’ve not even had a year [and] they have no funding. So of the 78 experts, the number of whom could actually contribute was much lower, and it’s not by lack of desire and expertise. But [because] they have day jobs, they have families…And the lack of clear instructions from parties also didn’t help.”

COP29 formed the mid-way point in the work programme to develop adaptation indicators, with parties stressing it was “critical” to come away with a decision from the summit.

As with previous sessions, finance quickly became a sticking point in negotiations, however, alongside the notion of “transformational adaptation”. 

This is a complex concept centred around the idea of driving systemic shifts – in infrastructure, governance or society more broadly – so as to address the root causes of vulnerability to climate change. 

Ultimately, COP29 adopted a decision that made reference to finance as “means of implementation” (MOI), recognised transformational adaptation and launched the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR). The BAR is designed to advance progress towards the GGA, however, the details of how it will operate are still unclear.  

Going into the Bonn climate negotiations in June 2025, the list of potential indicators had been “miraculously” refined to a list of 490 through further work by the group of experts. While this was a major step forward, it was still a long way off the aim of agreeing to a final set of just 100 indicators at COP30. 

Once again, disagreement quickly arose in Bonn around finance and this dominated much of the two weeks of negotiations. As such, a final text did not get uploaded until mid-way through the final plenary meeting of the negotiations. 

This was seen as contentious, as some parties complained that they did not have time to fully assess it, before it was gavelled through.

Bethan Laughlin, senior policy specialist at the Zoological Society of London, tells Carbon Brief: 

“Adaptation finance has consistently lagged behind mitigation for decades, despite growing recognition of the urgent need to build resilience to climate shocks. The gap between the needs of countries and the funding provided is stark, with an adaptation financing gap in the hundreds of billions annually.

“Within the GGA negotiations, the implications of this finance issue are clear. Disagreements persist over how MoI [finance] should be measured in the indicator set, particularly around whether private finance should count, how support from developed countries is defined, and how national budgets are tracked versus international climate finance.”

The final text produced in Bonn was split into two, with an agreed section capturing the GGA indicators and a separate “informal note” covering the BAR and transformation adaptation. 

Importantly, the main text invited the experts to continue working on the indicators and to submit a final technical report with a list of potential indicators by August 2025.

As this work continued, one of the biggest challenges was “balancing technical rigour with political feasibility while ensuring ambition”, says Laughlin, adding:

“The scale and diversity of adaptation action means a diverse menu of indicators per target is needed, but this must not be so vast as to be unfeasible for countries to measure, especially those countries with limited resources and capacity.”

Meetings took place subsequently, within which experts focused on “ensuring adaptation relevance of indicators, reducing redundancy and ensuring coverage across thematic indicators”, according to a technical report. 

Beauchamp notes the importance of these themes for continued work on adaptation, saying:

“The themes were really helpful to bring some attention and to communicate about the GGA. They echo more easily what adaptation results can look like, because people find it difficult to talk about processes. But they’re really important. Without the targets on the adaptation cycle, we can too easily forget that you need resilient processes to have resilient outcomes.”

The table below, from the same technical report, shows how nearly 10,000 adaptation indicators have been whittled down to a proposed final list of 100. The table also shows how the indicators are split between the themes (9a-g) and iterative adaptation cycle (10a-d) of the GGA framework.

Source: GGA technical report.

Further consultations took place in September and the final workshop under the UAE-Belém work programme took place on 3-4 October.

Following on from the numerous sessions held under the GGA, negotiators are now able to go into COP30 with a consolidated list of indicators to discuss, agree and bring into use, allowing progress towards the adaptation goal in Paris to be finally measured.

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What to expect from COP30?

A final decision on the adaptation indicators is expected at COP30, potentially marking a significant milestone under the GGA.

In his third letter, COP30 president-designate Correa do Lago noted that a “special focus” was to be given to the GGA indicators at the summit. 

He wrote that adaptation is “the visible face of the global response to climate change” and a “central pillar for aligning climate action with sustainable development”.

Therefore, he said COP30 should focus on “delivering tangible benefits for societies, ecosystems and economies by advancing and concluding the key mandates in this agenda”. These “key mandates” are the GGA and the related topic of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). 

Correa do Lago’s letter added:

“There is a window of opportunity to define a robust framework to track collective progress on adaptation. This milestone will also lay the groundwork for the future of the adaptation agenda.”

Indeed, adaptation has moved up the political agenda this year, with the topic being discussed during the “climate day” at the UN general assembly in September. This included a “leaders’ dialogue” on the sidelines of the assembly, where Carbon Brief understands that leaders of climate-vulnerable nations pushed for specific adaptation targets.

Elsewhere, nearly three-quarters (73%) of new country climate pledges include adaptation components, further emphasising the increased focus the topic is now receiving. 

Despite the increased attention, there are still likely to be challenges at COP30, including the continued fight over finance. This will likely be felt particularly keenly, given that the COP26 commitment to double adaptation finance comes to an end this year.

This was part of the “Glasgow dialogue”, which saw parties commit to “at least double” adaptation finance between 2019 and 2025.

Adade Williams tells Carbon Brief:

“A major expectation [at COP30] is that parties will tackle the gaps in adaptation finance, consider how to link MoI – finance, technology, capacity‐building – with the GGA indicators and possibly set new finance ambitions or roadmaps. The emphasis on MoI means capacity building, data systems, technology transfer and institutional strengthening will gain more traction.”

Adaptation finance was also a key topic during pre-COP meetings in Brasilia in October, with E3G noting that it is a “political litmus test for success in Belém, with vulnerable countries signalling urgency and demanding greater clarity that finance will flow”.

Laughlin tells Carbon Brief that she expects discussions on finance to “dominate in Belém” – in particular, given the legacy of the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) for climate finance agreed at COP29, which many developing countries were “starkly disappointed” by. 

Additionally, there may be challenges around the process of negotiations on the GGA indicators, notes Beauchamp, adding:

“We’ve not agreed yet if it is acceptable to open up text of some indicators [to negotiation]. We have 100 of them and, as a technical expert, on one hand [it] is quite worrying, because changing one term in an indicator can change its entire methodology, right? But, at the same time, there is definitely more work that can be done on the indicators.

“So, are we only keeping indicators that can work or that everybody is happy with now, and then we review the set later, for example, with the review of the UAE framework in 2028? Or do we open the whole Pandora’s box and then we start hashing out some new indicators? That’s the first big challenge parties need to grapple with at COP30.”

Despite the challenges, Mulio Alvarez says she would expect a final list of indicators to be adopted at COP30, even if some change during the negotiation process. She adds:

“The Brazilian presidency knows that this is the biggest negotiated outcome of COP30 and they want it to go through smoothly. The adoption of the list would officially launch the UAE framework so that it can begin to track and guide efforts.”

While agreement on indicators would be seen as a political win at COP30, several experts highlighted that it is only a step towards enabling further adaptation work, with Beauchamp noting that parties “need to see this as an opportunity”.

Laughlin adds:

“Although finalising the indicator list is a core deliverable, it is also important that COP30 makes progress on the next steps for the GGA following COP30, including the expectations for reporting, and regular updates to the indicator list so it keeps up with the latest science.”

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What will the GGA mean for vulnerable communities?

COP30 kicks off on 10 November and negotiators are hoping to hit the ground running with the condensed list of indicators to discuss.

There remain key questions about what the GGA could mean for adaptation around the world – in particular, for those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Mulio Alvarez notes:

“In the short term, the GGA metrics [indicators] will likely paint a very challenging picture of the needs for adaptation. In the medium to long term, we hope the GGA will be embedded in policy planning and implementation – supporting risk assessments, helping identify gaps, driving planning and resources and even unlocking investments.”

Others are more cautious about the potential impact of the GGA, the associated framework and its indicators, in terms of driving real progress for adaptation.

Schipper notes that, while the GGA indicators are welcome from a political perspective, “from a scientific perspective, and I think from a development perspective, I think there’s a sort of a high risk that this ends up making people worse off in the end”.

She adds that the incremental approach currently being taken for adaptation is not working and that the indicators can “at best” show us incremental progress.

Schipper notes that there is a risk that the indicators narrow the approach to adaptation to the extent that they are either ineffective or actually produce maladaptive outcomes. She adds:

“I’m not saying that we should abandon the indicators, but I think it’s important to recognise that this is not enough. This is nowhere near enough.”

Others are more optimistic about the long-term potential of the GGA. Laughlin suggests that the indicators could help build systemic resilience, adding that if they were successfully implemented it could mean adaptation is integrated into national development and planning, “making sure that climate resilience becomes a core part of policymaking”. She says:

“For vulnerable populations, this means moving from a reactive approach to a proactive one – embedding resilience into development planning, restoring ecosystems and empowering local communities.

“The success of the GGA in delivering for vulnerable populations hinges on political will, finance and inclusive governance – many of which are currently lacking.”

Beyond COP30, the GGA framework agreed at COP28 includes a number of overarching targets to help guide countries in developing and implementing their NAPs, although these targets are not quantified. 

The targets include countries conducting risk assessments to identify the impact of climate change and areas of particular vulnerability, by 2030. The framework says this would inform a country’s NAP and that “by 2030 all parties have in place” adaptation planning processes or strategies, as shown in the image below.

Adade Williams tells Carbon Brief that if the GGA is “effectively implemented” it could help develop systemic resilience in the long term, helping to address “not just climate hazards but also underlying structural vulnerabilities”. She adds:

“However, this long-term potential depends heavily on the extent of political will, sustained finance and capacity support available to developing countries. Without these, the GGA risks becoming a reporting framework rather than a transformative mechanism for resilience.”

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The post Q&A: COP30 could – finally – agree how to track the ‘global goal on adaptation’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: COP30 could – finally – agree how to track the ‘global goal on adaptation’