Open and transparent data can accelerate the decarbonisation of China’s industries and boost public interest in climate change, says Ma Jun.
Ma – one of China’s most recognisable environmental activists – says that early experiments with publishing real-time air quality data have paved the way for greater openness from the Chinese government towards publishing greenhouse gas emissions data.
However, he tells Carbon Brief in a wide-ranging interview, more needs to be done to encourage “multi-stakeholder” participation in climate efforts and to improve corporate emissions disclosure.
He also notes that China faces significant “challenges” in reducing emissions from “hard-to-abate” sectors, where companies struggle to find consumers willing to pay a “green premium” for low-carbon versions of their products.
Ma is the founder and director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), a Beijing-based NGO focused on environmental information disclosure and public participation.
The IPE is most well-known for developing the Blue Map, China’s first public database for environment data.
Ma has been a long-term advocate for environmental protection in China.
Prior to founding the IPE, he covered environmental pollution as an investigative reporter at the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.
He also authored China’s first book on the serious water pollution challenges facing the country.
Speaking to Carbon Brief during the first week of COP30 in Brazil last November, the discussion covered the importance of open data, key challenges for decarbonising industry, China’s climate commitments for 2035, cooperation with the EU and more.
- On how data transparency prevents environmental pollution in China: “From that moment [that the general public began flagging environmental violations on social media], it was no longer easy for mayors or [party] secretaries to try to interfere with the enforcement, because it’s being made so transparent, so public.”
- On encouraging the Chinese government to publish data: “The ministry felt that they had the backing from the people, basically, which helped them to gain confidence that data can be helpful and can be used in a responsible way.”
- On China’s new corporate disclosure rules: “We’re talking about what’s probably the largest scale of corporate measuring and disclosure now happening [anywhere in the world].”
- On air-pollution policies creating a template for climate action: “It started from the pollution control side and now we want to see that happen on the climate side.”
- On paying for low-carbon products: “When we engage with them and ask why they didn’t expand production, they say that producing these items will have a ‘green premium’, but no one wants to pay for that. Their users only want to buy tiny volumes for their sustainability reports.”
- On public perceptions of climate change: “It’s more abstract – [we’re talking about] the end of the century or the polar bears. People don’t feel that it’s linked with their own individual behaviour or consumption choices.”
- On the need for better emissions data: “It will be impossible to get started without proper, more comprehensive measuring and disclosure, and without having more credible data available.”
- On criticism of China’s climate pledge: “In the west, the cultural tendency is that if you want to show that you’re serious, you need to set an ambitious target. Even if, at the end of the day, you fail, it doesn’t mean that you’re bad…But in China, the culture is that it is embarrassing if you set a target and you fail to fully honour that commitment.”
- On global climate cooperation: “The starting point could be transparency – that could be one of the ways to help bridge the gap.”
- On the economics of coal: “There’s no business interest for the coal sector to carry on, because increasingly the market will trend towards using renewables, because it’s getting cheaper and cheaper”.
- On working in China as a climate NGO: “What we’re doing is based on these principles of transparency, the right to know. It’s based on the participation of the public. It’s based on the rule of law. We cherish that and we still have the space to work [on these issues].”
- On the climate consensus in China: “The environment – including climate – is the area with the biggest consensus view in [China]. It could be a test run for having more multi-stakeholder governance in our country.”
The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity.
Carbon Brief: You have been at the forefront of environmental issues in China for decades. How would you describe the changes in China’s approach to climate and environment issues over the time you’ve been observing them?
Ma Jun: I started paying attention to the issues when I got the chance to travel in different parts of China. I was struck by the environmental damage, particularly on the waterways, the rivers and lakes, which do not just have all these eco-impacts, but also expose hundreds of millions to health hazards.
That got me to start paying attention. So I authored a book called China’s Water Crisis and readers kept coming back to me to push for solutions. I delved deeper into the research and I realised that it’s quite complicated – not just that the magnitude [of the problem] is so big, but that the whole issue is quite complicated, because we copied rules, laws and regulations from the west but enforcement remained weak.
There are huge externalities, but companies would rather just cut corners to be more competitive, put simply. Behind that, there was a doctrine before of development at whatever cost. That was the starting point in China – not just for policymakers, even people in the street, if you asked them at that time, most likely [they] would say: “China’s still poor. Let’s develop before we even think about the environment.”
But that started changing, gradually. Unfortunately, it needed the “airpocalypse” in Beijing and the big surrounding regions to really motivate that change.
In 2011, Beijing suffered from very bad smog and millions upon millions of people made their voices heard – that they want clean air.
The government lent an ear to them and decided to start from transparency, monitoring and disclosing data to the public. So two years after it started and people were being given hourly air quality data [in 2011] – you realised how bad it was. In the first month [of 2013], the monthly average was over 150 micrograms. The WHO standard was 10 at the time – now it’s dropped to five. [Some news reports and studies, based on readings published at the time by the US embassy in Beijing, note significantly higher figures.]
We believe that it’s good to have that data – of course, it’s very helpful – but it’s not enough. Keeping children indoors or putting on face masks are not real solutions, we need to address the sources. So we launched a total transparency initiative with 24 other NGOs calling for real-time disclosure of corporate monitoring data.
To our surprise, the ministry made it happen. From 2014, tens of thousands of the largest emitters, every hour, needed to give people air [quality] data, and every two hours for water [quality].
We then launched an app to help visualise that for neighbourhoods. For the first time, people could realise which [companies] are not in compliance. Even super-large factories – every hour, if they were not in compliance, then they would turn from blue to red [in the app].
And so many people made complaints and petitioned openly – sharing that on social media, tagging the official [company] account. That triggered a chain reaction and changed that dynamic that I described.
From that moment, it was no longer easy for mayors or [party] secretaries to try to interfere with the enforcement, because it’s being made so transparent, so public. The [environmental protection] agencies got the backing from the people and knocked the door open – and pushed the companies to respond to the people.
Then, the data is also used to enable market-based solutions, such as green supply chains and green finance.
Starting first with major multinationals and then extending to local companies, companies compared their lists with our lists before they signed contracts. If any of their [supplier] companies were having problems, they could get a push notification to their inbox or cell [mobile] phone.
That motivates 36,000 [companies] to come to an NGO like us – to our platform – to make that disclosure about what went wrong and how we try to fix the problem, and after that measure and disclose more kinds of data, starting with local emission data and now extending to carbon data.
And for banking and green finance, an NGO like us now helps banks track the performance of three million corporations who want to borrow money from them, as part of the due diligence process. These are just tiny examples to try to demonstrate that there’s a real change.
Before, when I got started, the level of transparency was so limited. When we first looked at government data, at the beginning, there were only 2,000 records of enforcement. So we launched an index, assessed performance for 10 years across 120 cities.
During this process, [we also saw] consensus being made. In 2015, China’s amended Environmental Protection Law [came into effect] and created a special chapter – chapter five – titled [information] transparency and public participation. That was the first ever piece of legislation in China to have such a chapter on transparency.
CB: What motivated that? Was it because they’d already seen this big public backlash?
MJ: They started listening to people and the demand for change, for clean air. And then they started seeing how the data can be used – not to disrupt the society, but to help to mobilise people.
The ministry felt that they had the backing from the people, basically, which helped them to gain confidence that data can be helpful and can be used in a responsible way. Before, they were always concerned about the data, particularly on disruption of social stability, because our data is not that beautiful at the beginning, due to the very serious pollution problem.
When our organisation got started, nearly 20 years ago, 28% of the monitored waterways – nationally-monitored rivers – reported water that was good for no use. Basically, it is so polluted that it’s not good for any use. [Some] 300 million [people] were exposed to that in the countryside, it was very serious.
We’re talking about the government changing its mindset. Of course, the reality is that they found [the data] can be used the responsible way and can be helpful, so they decided to embrace that and to tolerate that, to gradually expand transparency.
Now, China is aligning its system with the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB). The environment ministry also created a disclosure scheme, with 90,000 of China’s largest [greenhouse gas] emitters on the list. We and our NGO partners tried to help implement that. We’re talking about billions of tonnes of carbon emissions.
It would have been hard to imagine before, but we’re talking about what’s probably the largest scale of corporate measuring and disclosure now happening [anywhere in the world].
Of course, it’s still not enough. Last year, we also helped the agency affiliated with the ministry to develop a guideline on voluntary carbon disclosure, targeting small and medium sized companies. We now have a new template on our platform – powered by AI – and a digital accounting tool that helps our users measure and disclose nearly 70m tonnes [of carbon dioxide equivalent] last year.
CB: Is there appetite on the industrial side to proactively get involved? Or is local regulation needed that mandates involvement?
MJ: At the beginning, no. If we have the dynamic that I described – at the beginning, whoever cut corners became more competitive. This caused a “race to the bottom” situation and even good companies find it quite difficult to stick to the rules.
But then the dynamic changed. Whoever’s not in compliance with the law will be kicked out of the game. Not only would they receive increasingly hefty penalties or fines, but the data will be put into use in supply chains. Many of our users – the brands – integrate that data into their sourcing, meaning that if [suppliers] don’t solve the problem they will lose contracts. And also banks could give them an unfavourable rating.
All this joint effort could create some sort of – of course, it’s [only a] chance – but some kind of a stick. But it’s also a kind of carrot, because those who decided to do better now benefit. If someone loses business [because they cannot help their consumer with compliance], then that business will [instead] go to those who want to go green.
This change in dynamic is very helpful. It started from the pollution control side and now we want to see that happen on the climate side. That’s why we decided to develop the blue map for zero carbon, to try to map out and further motivate the decarbonisation process – region by region, sector by sector.
You asked about corporations – this is extremely important. China is the factory of the world and 68% of carbon emissions still relate either to the direct manufacturing process or to energy consumption to power the industrial production. So it is very important to motivate them, to create both rules and stimulus – both stick and carrot.
But if you don’t have a stick, you can never make the carrot big enough. That is an externality problem, you never really solve that. We’ve now managed to solve the basic problem – non-compliance and outrageous violations. But that’s the first step. Deep decarbonisation – not just scope one and two, but extending further upstream to reach heavy industry, the hard-to-abate industries – now this is the challenge.
CB: What are your expectations for industrial decarbonisation more broadly, especially given the technology bottlenecks?
MJ: There are still bottlenecks, but we see, actually, some progress is being made. Now corporations in China understand that they need to go in [a low-carbon] direction and some of them are actually motivated to develop innovative solutions.
For example, several major steel manufacturers managed to be able to find ways to produce much lower-carbon steel products. In the aluminium [sector] they also tried and also batteries. Unfortunately, these remain as only pilot projects.
When we engage with them and ask why they didn’t expand production, they say that producing these items will have a “green premium”, but no one wants to pay for that. Their users only want to buy tiny volumes for their sustainability reports – for the rest, they just want the low-cost ones.
They said, the more we produce the green products, the bigger our losses. So we decided to leave these products in our warehouse.
Then we engaged with the brands – the real estate industry, the largest user of iron and steel – and the automobile industry, the second largest. They claimed that if they [purchase greener materials], they would pay a green premium, but their users and consumers have no idea about [green consumption]. They only want to buy the cheapest products – and the more [these manufacturers] produce, the more they suffer losses.
So this means we need a mechanism, with multi-stakeholder participation, to share the burden of that transition – to share that cost of the green transition.
That green premium can only be shared, not one single stakeholder can easily absorb all of this given all the breakneck competition in China – involution – it’s very, very serious and so companies are all stuck there.
What we’re trying to do is to help change that. We assessed the performance of 51 auto brands and tried to help all the stakeholders understand which ones could go low-carbon.
But it’s not enough just to score and rank them. We also need to engage with the public, to have them start gaining an understanding that their choice matters. So how – it’s more difficult, you know? Pollution is much easier. We told them: “Look, people are dumping all this waste.”
CB: It’s all visible.
MJ: Yeah, when people suffer so seriously from pollution – air, water and soil pollution – they feel strongly. They wrote letters to the brands, telling them that they like their products but they cannot accept this.
But on climate, it’s more abstract – [we’re talking about] the end of the century or the polar bears. People don’t feel that it’s linked with their own individual behaviour or consumption choices.
We decided to upgrade our green choice initiative to the 2.0 level. This new solution we developed is called product carbon scan. Basically, you take a picture of any product and services products and an AI [programme] will figure out what product that is and tell you the embodied carbon of that product.
Now, it’s getting particularly sophisticated with automobiles. The AI now – from this year – for most of the vehicles on the streets of China, can figure out not just which brand it is, but which model. We have all these models in our database – 700-800 models and 7,000-8,000 varieties of cars, all of which have specific carbon footprints.
CB: How do you account for all of the different variables? If something changes upstream, if a supplier changes – how do you account for that?
MJ: The idea is like this – now, this is mostly measured by third parties, our partners. We also have our emission factors database that we developed. So we know that, as you said, there are all these variables. For the past six months, we got our users to take pictures of 100,000 cars. We distributed them to 50 brands and [calculated] that the total carbon footprint was 4.2m tonnes, for the lifecycle of these 100,000 cars. Each brand got their own share of this.
So we wrote letters – and we’re still writing letters now, 10 NGOs in China, we’re writing letters now to the CEOs of these 50 brands – to tell them that this is happening. Our users, consumers of their products, are paying attention to this and are raising questions. We have two demands.
First, have you done your own measuring for the product you sell in China? Do you have plans to measure and disclose those specific details? Because if third parties can do it, so can they. It’s not space technology, they can do it and obviously they own all this data. They understand much better about the entire value chain and it’s much easier for them to get more accurate figures. With the “internet of things” and new technologies, for some products, they can get those details already, so the auto industry should be getting close to [achieving] that.
The second question is, you all have set targets for carbon reduction and carbon neutrality. We know that most of you are not on track. Even the best ones – Mercedes-Benz is at the top of our rankings – are seeing their carbon intensity going up. Not just the total volume [of emissions], but products’ carbon intensity is going up instead of going down. So, obviously, they haven’t really decarbonised their upstream – steel and aluminium. So [we ask them]: “What’s your plan? Can you give me an actionable, short- or mid-term plan on the decarbonisation of these upstream, hard-to-abate sectors?”
I think this is the way to try to tap into the success of pollution control and now extend that to cover carbon.
CB: It seems a challenge facing China’s climate action that policymakers often flag is MRV [monitoring, reporting and verification] and data in general. You’re the expert on this. Would you agree? Are there big challenges around MRV that China needs to address before it can progress further?
MJ: This is a prerequisite, in my view. To have [to] measure, disclose and allow access to data is a prerequisite for any meaningful multi-stakeholder effort. I wouldn’t underestimate the challenge in the follow-up process – the solutions, the innovations, the new technologies that need to be developed to decarbonise – but it will be impossible to get started without proper, more comprehensive measuring and disclosure, and without having more credible data available.
I take this as a starting point – a most important starting point. I’m so happy to see that there’s a growing consensus on that. In China, the government decided to embrace the concept of the ISSB, embrace the concept of ESG reporting, and to allow an NGO like us to try to help with the disclosure mechanism.
This is very powerful and very productive, and the reason that we could create that solution is because China pays so much attention to product carbon footprints, of course, motivated by the EU legislations, like the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and others. In some ways, it’s quite interesting to see the EU set these very progressive rules, but then China responds and decides to create solutions and scale them up.
On the product carbon footprint alone, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) coordinated 15 different ministries to work on it, with a very tight schedule – targets set for 2027 and then 2030 – [implying] very fast progress. We work together with our partners on a new book telling businesses – based on emission factors – how to handle it and how to proceed, in terms of practical solutions.
All this is just to say that, on the data and MRV side, China has already overcome its initial reluctance, or even resistance. Now [it] is in the process of not just making progress and expanding data transparency, but also trying to align that with international practice.
And at COP30, I actually launched a new report [titled the Global City Green and Low-Carbon Transparency Index]…The transparency index actually highlighted that, of course, developed cities are still doing better, but a whole group of Chinese cities are quickly catching up. Trailing behind are other global south cities.
When China decides to do something, it isn’t just individual businesses or even individual cities [that see action taken]. There will be more of a platform-based system – meaning there is an [underlying] national requirement, which can help to level the playing field, with regions or sectors possibly taking up stricter requirements, but not being able to compromise the national ones [by setting lower targets].
So, with MRV, I have some confidence. That doesn’t mean it’s easy. Particularly on the product carbon footprint, there are so many challenges. Trying to make emission factors more accurate is quite difficult, because products have so many components and the whole value chain can be very long and complicated. But with determination, with consensus, I’m still confident that China can deliver.
And in the meantime, what is now going on in China, increasingly, could become a contribution to global MRV practice.
CB: It’s interesting that you mentioned that. Talking to people at the COP30 China pavilion, people from global south countries see China as a climate leader and want to learn about what’s going on in China. By contrast, developed countries seem more focused on the level of ambition in China’s NDC [its climate pledge, known as a nationally determined contribution]. How would you view China’s role in climate action in the next five years?
MJ: On the NDC, my personal observation – I come from an NGO, so I don’t represent the government’s decision here – is that culturally, there’s some sort of differences, nuanced differences – or very obvious differences – here.
In the west, the cultural tendency is that if you want to show that you’re serious, you need to set an ambitious target. Even if, at the end of the day, you fail, it doesn’t mean that you’re bad, you still achieve more than if you’d set a lower target. That’s the mentality.
But in China, the culture is that it is embarrassing if you set a target and you fail to fully honour that commitment. So they tend to set targets in a slightly more conservative way.
I’m glad to see that [China’s] NDC is leaving space for flexibility – it said that China will try to achieve a higher target. This is the tone, and in my view it gives us the space and the legitimacy to try to motivate change and develop solutions to bend the curve faster. Even if the target is not that high, we know that we will try to beat that.
And then, there’s the renewables target for 1,200 gigawatts (GW) by 2030, a target that was achieved last year – six years early. Now we’ve set a target of 3,600GW – that means adding 180GW every year. But, as you know, over the past several years [China’s renewable additions] have been above 200GW.
So you can see that there’s a real opportunity there and we know that China will try to overdeliver. There’s no kind of a good or bad, or right or wrong, with these two different cultural [approaches].
But one thing I hope that we all focus more on is implementation – on action. Because we do see that, for some of the global targets that have already been set, no-one seems to be paying any real attention to them – such as the tripling of [global] renewable capacity.
We all witnessed that, in Dubai at COP28, a target was agreed and accepted by the international community. China’s on track, but what about the others? Most countries are not on track.
The global south, it’s not only for their climate targets – the [energy] transition is essential for their SDG [sustainable development goal] targets. But now they lag so far behind. That’s a pity, because now there’s enough capacity – and even bigger potential – to help them access all this much faster.
But geopolitical divides, resource competition, nationalism, protectionism – all of this is dividing us. It’s making global climate governance a lot more difficult and delaying the process to help [others in the] global transition. It’s very difficult to overcome these problems – probably it will get worse before it gets better.
But if we truly believe that climate change is an existential threat to our home planet, then we should try to find a way to collaborate a bit more. The starting point could be transparency – that could be one of the ways to help bridge the gap.
In China, we used to have a massive gap of distrust between different stakeholders. People hated polluting factories, but they also had suspicions around government agencies giving protection to those factories. So there’s all this distrust.
With transparency, it’s easier for trust to be built, gradually, and the government started gaining confidence [in sharing data] because they saw with their own eyes that people came together behind them. Before, [people] always suspected that [the government] were sheltering the polluters. But from that moment, they realised that the government was serious and so gave them a lot of support.
Globally – maybe I’m too negative – I do think that it would [improve the chances for us all to collaborate] if we had a global data infrastructure and a global data platform, that doesn’t just give [each country’s] national data but drills down – province by province, city by city, sector by sector and, eventually, to individual factories, facilities and mines. For each one of these, there would be a standardised reporting system, giving people the right to know. I think through this we could build trust and use it as a starting point for collaboration.
I sit on several international committees – on air, water, the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TFND), transition minerals, and so on. In each of these, I often make suggestions on building global data infrastructure. Increasingly, I see more nodding heads, and some have started to make serious efforts. TNFD is one example. They already have a proposal to develop a global data facility on data. The International Chamber of Commerce also put forward a proposal on the global data infrastructure on minerals and other commodities.
Of course, in reality, there will be many difficulties – data security, for example. So maybe it cannot be totally centralised, we need to allow for decentralised regional systems, but you could also create catalogues to allow the users to [dig into] all this data.
CB: And that then inspires people to look into issues they care about?
MJ: Yes and through that process, we will create more consensus, create more trust and gradually formulate unified rules and standards.
And we need innovative solutions. In today’s world, security is something that’s not just paid attention to by China, in the west it’s a similar [story]. There are a lot of concerns about data security – growing concerns – so I think eventually there will be innovation to solve them. I’m still hopeful!
CB: Speaking of international cooperation, how has the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement affected prospects for China-EU cooperation?
MJ: It will have a mixed impact, of course. Having the largest economy and second-largest emitter withdraw will have a big impact on global climate governance, and will in some way create negative pressure on other regions, because we’re all facing the question of: “If they don’t do it, why should we?” We also have those questions back home. I’m sure the EU is also facing this question.
But in the meantime, I hope that China and the EU realise that they have no choice but to work together – if they still, as they claim, truly believe in [the importance of] recognising the existential threat posed by climate change, then what choice do they have but to work together?
Fundamentally, we need a multilateral process to deal with this global challenge. The Paris Agreement, with all its challenges, still managed to help us avoid the worst of the worst. We still need this UNFCCC process and we need China and the EU to help maintain it.
At the last COP[29 in Azerbaijan], for the first time, it was not China and the US who saved the day. Before, it was always the US and China that made a deal and helped [shepherd] a global agreement. But last year, it was China and the EU that made the agreement and then helped to reach [a global deal] in Azerbaijan.
I do think that China and the EU have both the intention and the innovative capacity, as well as a very, very powerful business sector. I’m still hopeful that these two can come together at this COP [in Brazil].
CB: We’ve spoken a lot about heavy industry and industrial processes. Coal is a very big part of China’s emissions profile. In the short term, how do you see China’s coal use developing over the next five to 10 years?
This ties into that complicated issue of the geopolitical divide. The original plan was to use natural gas as the transition [fuel], which would make things much easier. But geopolitical tensions means gas is no longer considered safe and secure, because China has very little of this resource and has to depend on the other regions, including the US, for gas.
That, in some way, pushed towards authorising new coal power plants and, in some way, we are all suffering for that. In the west as well. We all have to create massive redundancies for so-called insecurity, we’re all bearing higher costs and we’re all facing the risk of stranded assets, because we have such a young coal-power fleet.
The only thing we can do is to try to make sure that these plants increasingly serve only as a backup and as a way to help absorb high penetration of renewables, because now this is a new challenge. Renewables have been expanding so fast that it’s very difficult – because of its intermittent nature – to integrate it into the power grid. New coal power can help absorb, but only if we can make [it] a backup and not use it unless there’s a need. Of course, that means we have to pay to cover the cost for those coal plants.
The funny thing is that there’s no business interest for the coal sector to carry on, because increasingly the market will trend towards using renewables, because it’s getting cheaper and cheaper. So the coal sector, for security and integration of renewables, will be kept. But it will play an increasingly smaller role. In the meantime, the coal sector can help balance the impact through making chemicals, rather than just energy.
In the meantime, [we need to] try to find ways to accelerate the whole energy transition and electrify our economy even faster. That’s a clear path towards both carbon peaking and carbon neutrality in China.
It’s already going on. Carbon Brief’s research already highlights some of the key issues, such as from March [2024] emissions are actually going down. That cannot happen without renewables, because our electricity demand is still going up significantly. In the meantime, the cost of electricity is declining.
This allows China to find its own logic to stick to the Paris Agreement, to stick to climate targets and even try to expand its climate action, because it can benefit the economy. It can benefit the people.
I think Europe probably could also learn from that, because Europe used to focus on climate for the climate’s sake. With [the Russia-Ukraine] war going on, that makes it even more difficult.
CB: You mean the green economy narrative?
MJ: Yes, the green economy narrative is not highlighted enough in Europe. Now, suddenly, it’s about affordability, it’s about competition, and suddenly they feel that they’re not in a very good position. But China actually focuses more on the green economy side. China and the EU could – hand-in-hand – try to pursue that.
CB: That leads perfectly to my last question. How important is the role of civil society now in developing climate and environmental policy in China?
MJ: We all trust in the importance of civil society. This is our logo, which we designed 20 years ago. Here are three segments: the government, business and civil society.

Civil society should be part of that. But we all, realistically, understand that the government is very powerful, businesses have all the resources, but civil society is still very limited in terms of its capacity to influence things.
But still, I’m glad to see that we have a civil society and NGOs like us continue to have the space in China to do what we’re doing. What we’re doing is based on these principles of transparency, the right to know. It’s based on the participation of the public. It’s based on the rule of law. We cherish that and we still have the space to work [on these issues].
We’re lucky, because the environment – including climate – is the area with the biggest consensus view in our society. It could be a test run for having more multi-stakeholder governance in our country. I hope that, increasingly, this can help build social trust between stakeholders and to see [climate action] benefit society in this way.
I know it’s not easy – there are still a lot of challenges [for NGOs] and not just in China. We work with partners in other regions – south-east Asia, south Asia, Africa and Latin America – and it’s hard to imagine the challenges they could face, such as serious challenges to their personal safety.
Now, even in the global north, NGOs are under pressure. So we have a common challenge. Back to the issue of transparency. I hope that transparency also can be a source of protection for NGOs.
When all of us need to [take action to address climate issues], whether that be taking samples of water, protesting on the ground – being face-to-face and on the front line – without some sort of multi-stakeholder governance, then it will be far more difficult for NGOs to participate.
If the government can provide environmental monitoring data to the public, if corporations can make self-disclosures, then it will help with this, to some extent. Because it’s not new – environmental blacklists in China are managed by the government, based on data, based on a legal framework. That can be a source of protection.
So I hope that NGO partners in other parts of the world can recognise that we should work together to promote transparency.
CB: Thank you.
The post Ma Jun: ‘No business interest’ in Chinese coal power due to cheaper renewables appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Ma Jun: ‘No business interest’ in Chinese coal power due to cheaper renewables
Climate Change
IPCC: ‘Frustrating and disappointing’ meeting leaves AR7 timeline in deadlock
Governments are still at loggerheads over the timeline for publishing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) next three-part report, after countries doubled down on existing positions at a meeting in Bangkok.
Last week, around 330 delegates from more than 100 countries met in Thailand for the 64th session (IPCC-64) of the UN’s climate science body.
The meeting, set against the backdrop of a global energy shock triggered by war in the Middle East, comes more than two-and-a-half years into the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle (AR7).
There was disagreement on a range of issues, including the workplan for the cycle’s “working group” reports.
For five consecutive meetings, countries have failed to agree on whether the reports should be completed before, or after, the second “global stocktake” process under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), due to culminate in 2028.
IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea tells Carbon Brief the “frustrating and disappointing” meeting delivered “minimal outcomes”.
“We made some formal decisions by consensus, but I would say they were more to postpone the decision making than they were to take decisions,” he says.
AR7 report timeline
As is typical for an IPCC assessment report cycle, AR7 will include three “working group” reports – on the physical science of climate change, impacts and adaptation, and mitigation. These will be summarised in a synthesis report.
Work is already underway on the three headline reports, as well as a special report on cities and climate change and methodology reports on carbon dioxide removal technologies and inventories for short-lived climate forcers.
However, countries are yet to reach an agreement as to when the three headline reports will be published, after deadlocked negotiations at meetings at Lima, Hangzhou, Sofia and Istanbul.
A coalition of developing and developed countries have backed a plan – proposed by the IPCC’s co-chairs – that would see the three reports published in 2028. This would enable their findings to feed into the second global stocktake, due to conclude that year at the COP33 conference.
The global stocktake is a five-yearly appraisal of global progress on tackling climate change that is designed to inform the national climate goals countries must submit to the UN under the Paris Agreement.
A separate group of countries, including China, India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia, have argued for a longer timeline on the grounds that developing nations need more time to review and approve the reports, according to reports from inside the meeting. This would mean some of the working group reports would be published after the second global stocktake is completed.
Dr Bill Hare, CEO and senior scientist at Climate Analytics, tells Carbon Brief that “the majority of countries, across geographies and levels of development, including least developed countries and small island developing states” support a timeline where the AR7 reports align with the stocktake.
Speaking during the opening session of IPCC-64, UNFCCC executive secretary Simon Steill said that 194 nations who attended COP30 in Belem last year had “emphasised the critical importance of the IPCC’s work in ensuring that the best available science feeds into the global stocktake”.
The timeline of the AR7 reports was not on a provisional agenda released ahead of the meeting.
However, the contentious issue was belatedly added to the agenda on the meeting’s first day, according to the Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB) reporting from inside the meeting.
This came after objections about the omission from a raft of countries, including Algeria, China, Egypt, Kenya, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Venezuela.
According to the ENB, Saudi Arabia “insisted” the issue be included on the agenda and warned that deferring it to the next meeting “risked a scenario in which the budget would not be approved and further work would be delayed”.
In response to calls for clarification on why there was no formal agenda item on report timelines, IPCC AR7 chair Prof Jim Skea said the secretariat had “not detected the flexibility” among governments that could lead to its resolution, according to the ENB.
Skea thus proposed that “informal consultations” would be held in order to “identify the basis for any flexibility”. He also suggested the subject be discussed in a session earmarked for “any other business”.
This proposal was rejected by some delegations, who argued the issue required more formal treatment and said informal consultations might not be inclusive, the ENB says.
In the end, the IPCC agreed to add the item to the agenda and establish a contact group, co-chaired by Brazil and Canada, tasked with advising the IPCC on how to make progress.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Skea explains that the secretariat did not put the issue on the agenda because it had “very low expectations about the success of such a discussion” and felt that more preparation was needed “to build the foundations for a decision” at a future meeting.
The last-minute addition of AR7 timelines to the agenda prompted some delegations to question the inclusivity of discussions. They noted that some countries had come without permission from their governments to discuss the issue, the ENB reports, whereas others with “limited resources” had decided to skip the meeting altogether.
This position was articulated at different stages of negotiations by Antigua and Barbuda, the Netherlands and Singapore in interventions supported by Canada, China, Cuba, Mexico, South Korea and Tanzania.
Climate Analytics’ Hare explains:
“The agenda item ‘progress with the timeline of AR7’ was added at the last minute upon pressure by countries including India and Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to introduce their own timelines into the process, which would push both WG2 and WG3 to 2029.
“As the AR7 timeline was not on the provisional agenda, many developing countries with resource and capacity constraints across the continent did not attend the session.”
One observer to the talks tells Carbon Brief that logistical issues prompted by the war in Iran had contributed to some countries’ decision not to attend.
‘Heated and polarised’
Discussions about the AR7 report timeline were focused on how to reach agreement by the IPCC’s next session.
A number of solutions were proposed, including for the IPCC secretariat to hold “informal conversations” between sessions to the creation of an “options paper” based on country submissions that would be presented at IPCC-65. Ultimately, all options ultimately failed to get the consensus required to be officially ratified by the IPCC.
On Thursday, the co-chairs of a contact group tasked with advising on how to progress with the timeline issue reported that “no consensus had been reached” and said there was a need for a “further exchange of views”, according to ENB.
Singapore subsequently suggested a plan for countries to formally submit views on the topic to the IPCC secretariat, which would then summarise submissions and present an “options report” for discussion at IPCC-65, says ENB. This would allow countries that were not prepared or not present at IPCC-64 to contribute, the country delegation said.
On the other hand, the Cook Islands said that “time is of the essence and further submissions from members should not be invited”, reports ENB. The country delegation also said the report timeline presented by co-chairs in Lima provided “sufficient time” for report reviews. This intervention was supported by Australia, Belize, Chile, Dominican Republic, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Samoa and Vanuatu.
Saudi Arabia repeated objections raised at previous meetings and said there was a need to address issues relating to overlaps in report scheduling, back-to-back reviews, inclusivity and capacity, as well as how the IPCC aligns with the UNFCCC processes, reports the ENB.
Instead, Saudi Arabia suggested that a later publication of working group reports in 2028 and 2029 would “provide sufficient intervals between IPCC sessions, time for developing countries to undertake their reviews and inclusive engagement”. This intervention was backed by Bahrain, Belarus, Kenya, Russia and Yemen, according to ENB.
As in previous IPCC sessions, there were diverging opinions around whether the IPCC needed to align report production with the global stocktake.
Some countries – including Bangladesh, Panama and South Korea, emphasised the need for the reports to align with the UNFCCC process.
The Netherlands, backing the plan for countries to submit their views ahead of IPCC-65, said delivery of AR7 reports after the global stocktake would “significantly lower” their policy relevance. The delegation noted that “never before” had the timeline given rise to such “heated and polarised debate”, according to the ENB.
Others – including Saudi Arabia, China and Russia – minimised the role of IPCC reports as an input into the stocktake, reports ENB.




A selection of interventions by country delegations at the IPCC’s Bangkok meeting, as reported in the ENB’s meeting summary. ENB (2026).
A number of countries, including France, Haiti and Panama, stressed that the absence of several delegations from the Bangkok meeting, including many small-island states, made the discussions about the timeline less inclusive, according to ENB.
Skea tells Carbon Brief that none of the talking points raised by countries around AR7 reports were new:
“I didn’t hear any new arguments offered at this meeting.”

No decision
By close of play on Thursday, Skea presented a draft decision text which proposed that governments entrust the IPCC secretariat to develop an “options paper” that would be circulated ahead of IPCC-65, with a view to making a decision at the meeting.
India, Russia and Saudi Arabia said that they would prefer the creation of a “task group” that would produce a “compilation of views and proposals” on options for the timeline, according to the ENB. This would provide the “basis for further discussion” at IPCC-65.
Skea subsequently advised IPCC vice-chair Ladislaus Chang’a to form a huddle to find a middle ground between these two approaches.
On Friday, Chang’a presented a compromise solution where the IPCC chair and secretariat would “facilitate an exchange on the timeline with a view to reaching a decision at IPCC-65”, according to ENB. This would include overseeing a “task group” that would work between now and the next session.
This “draft decision” was backed by Brazil, China, India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia.
However, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, the Cook Islands, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Sweden and Switzerland said they could not support it, ENB says.
Antigua and Barbuda, the Cook Islands and a coalition of European nations instead suggested the chair hold “informal conversations” with governments over the coming months, with a view to coming to a timeline agreement at IPCC-65, says the ENB.
Skea subsequently proposed eliminating the reference to the task group in the decision text and to postpone all further deliberations on the timeline to IPCC-65.
This proposal faced opposition from a swathe of developing and emerging-economy countries, including Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Burundi, Cuba, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Libya, Russia, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.
At this juncture, a growing number of countries supported pressing ahead without a decision text, citing lack of consensus as the meeting clock was running down, notes ENB.
Among these countries was Canada. Its delegation noted there was little time left in the session – and that countries had heard “basically nothing” about the scientific work of the IPCC at the meeting, reports ENB.
Despite some last-hour calls from India and South Africa for previous proposals to be revisited, no agreement was reached and no decision issued.
Review of IPCC principles and procedures
Another issue discussed in Bangkok was a review of the IPCC’s principles and procedures, which inform how the panel goes about putting together its reports.
The principles and procedures came into force in 1998 and are meant to be reviewed every five years. However, the last review was delayed due to the Covid pandemic.
Opening the agenda item on the IPCC’s principles and procedures towards the beginning of the talks on Tuesday, IPCC officials laid out 12 topics that the IPCC bureau had prioritised for review, according to the ENB. These included:
- Author selection criteria
- Responsibility for author selection
- Chapter scientists
- Scope of literature/Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge. (See Carbon Brief’s recent report on considering Indigenous knowledge within the IPCC.)
- Selection criteria and responsibilities for review editors
- Terms of reference for the chair, vice chairs and working group co-chairs
- Terms of reference for technical support units
- Developing country engagement and broader finance concerns
- Carbon footprint and inclusivity
- Artificial intelligence
- Copyright
- Timing and guidance on conflict of interest
Skea told countries that, while the bureau’s input was meant to inform discussions, it was for them to decide if a review of the principles and procedures was needed and what topics should be covered.
In discussions that followed, some countries called for the review to focus on the inclusivity of global south countries, while others said the review should be “targeted”, “focused” and “completed within a set time frame” to allow the IPCC to make swift progress.
Noting countries’ differing views, Skea proposed a huddle to discuss whether a task force on the review should be created.
On Wednesday, countries once again set out their priorities for the review.
According to the ENB, many countries “prioritised copyright, conflict of interest procedures, AI, and ensuring inclusivity by supporting the participation of developing and least developed countries and incorporating Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge”.
Many also said the “principles and procedures are working well and supported a limited review that could be completed by IPCC-65, ahead of the report approval sessions starting in 2027”, the ENB says.
A small number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, India and Russia, called for the procedures to dictate that the timing of IPCC reports should be unaffected by “external factors”.
This could be interpreted as a reference to the push for the next IPCC assessment report to coincide with the next global stocktake – something that Saudi Arabia, India and Russia oppose.
Skea proposed the establishment of a contact group to try to take discussions forward, appointing Egypt and Ireland as co-chairs.
On Friday, the contact group co-chairs told the talks that they had found no agreement on whether to complete a review of the principles and procedures at these talks or at a future session.
Skea then presented a draft decision produced by the contact group co-chairs, which stated that the “IPCC’s principles and procedures are robust and have worked well” and expressed thanks to the bureau “for their work in preparing for a review of the principles and procedures”.
In response, Saudi Arabia said the draft “lacked a clear process and could be misleading”, with India adding that the “group had not reached agreement”, according to the ENB.
Colombia suggested “specifying that the review of principles and procedures had ended and would be considered again in 2031”, it continues.
This idea was opposed by Saudi Arabia, who said the “review has just begun”.
India, Kenya and Saudi Arabia also opposed language indicating the principles and procedures “have worked well and are robust”.
Norway “observed that lack of consensus could be interpreted to mean that no amendments of the principles and procedures were appropriate and the panel could consider the review complete”, according to the ENB.
Skea presented a slightly revised text for adoption, which was adopted without further discussion.
The text notes the “diversity of views expressed at the session” and “decides to consider the review of the IPCC principles and procedures at future sessions, as appropriate”.
The ENB notes that this outcome left countries confused, saying:
“Some countries saw lack of consensus as an indication that discussions on the issue are now complete, while others believe the review process has just begun.”
Approval of meeting summaries
In what could be viewed as a signifier of the high levels of disagreement between countries, the talks failed to approve the meeting reports from its past three sessions in Peru, China and Bulgaria.
(The approval of the reports from China and Bulgaria had already been shifted to this meeting after countries failed to agree to them at previous sessions.)
During discussions on Wednesday, many European countries, along with Panama, complained about a “lack of transparency” in the reports, according to the ENB.
They suggested that countries making interventions should be named in the reports and that the number of speakers showing their support or opposition to an issue should be included.
This idea was opposed by Saudi Arabia.
In response, Skea called for a huddle to convene to discuss the matter further.
On Friday, Skea noted that some countries had suggested that the “quality” of the report from the most recent meeting in Peru was higher than those from China and Bulgaria and suggested that countries adopt it.
Germany opposed this, expressing “openness” to further revisions of the report, in light of “diverging views” and a “lack of consensus in the room”, according to the ENB.
France requested that “past and future reports include everything that has been said by all delegates”, a view that was described as “unacceptable” by Saudi Arabia.
Skea said the lack of consensus from countries meant the issue would be deferred to the next IPCC meeting. This was reflected in a text adopted at the meeting.
Funding crunch
The IPCC receives funding from its parent organisations, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UN Environment Programme (UNEP), in addition to voluntary contributions from its member governments and the UNFCCC. This money is held in a “trust fund”.
According to the IPCC, the trust fund “supports IPCC activities, in particular the participation of developing country experts in the IPCC, the organisation of meetings as well as publication and translation of IPCC reports”.
However, in her opening remarks at last week’s meeting, UNEP executive director Inger Andersen warned that “expenditures from the IPCC trust fund have exceeded contributions over the last few years”, according to the ENB. She added:
“If this continues, the trust fund’s cash balance will be depleted before the end of the seventh cycle, impacting both this cycle and the transition to the next.”
The IPCC secretariat presented nine different IPCC funding scenarios for 2026-29 to the delegates. These scenarios include three different future expenditure levels, ranging from a “business as usual” scenario to a “severe spending cuts” scenario, which would see “fully virtual operations with suspension of multiple activities”.
They combine these expenditure scenarios with three different contribution scenarios, including a scenario in which annual contributions match annual expenditure and another that is equivalent to 2025 expenditure.
These scenarios highlighted that the IPCC trust fund is “likely to be depleted soon without new and larger financial contributions, expenditure cuts, or both,, the ENB says. It continues:
“The message was clear: if contributions do not increase, significant cuts in operations and more efficient meeting formats will need to be implemented. Possible ways forward include reduced activities and the greater use of virtual meetings, which run counter to the needs voiced by many countries for inclusivity, equity and capacity.”
The ENB adds that “the timing of this situation is particularly difficult”, because the IPCC is moving into its “busiest and most difficult part” of the assessment cycle, when the initial draft of reports are being written and reviewed.
According to the ENB, “the pattern of contentious meetings may also increase costs, especially if the panel requires late night sessions or extended days to conclude its work”.
Skea tells Carbon Brief that he is “more confident” about the budget than the “mood music that came out of some of the reporting”. He notes:
“It is really only in the worst-case scenarios where you combine low levels of contributions with high levels of spend that you run into real difficulties during the [AR7] cycle.
“During the first Trump administration, other countries stepped in [with funds] and we are now seeing these signs as well.”
The ENB reports that “Sweden has committed to increasing its contribution by 150% and encouraged all countries to contribute financially or host plenary sessions”.
The IPCC did not publish an updated budget in the documents for the IPCC-64 meeting.
Working group updates
The co-chairs of the three AR7 working group reports (WG1, WG2 and WG3) also presented updates on progress.
All three working group reports highlight the first joint lead author meeting, which was held in Paris in December. The meeting brought together lead authors from all three working groups and saw a total of 650 attendees.
All working groups have also submitted “zero order drafts” – an initial draft text – of their reports to their respective technical support units.
Meanwhile, the World Climate Research Programme and IPCC co-sponsored a workshop on high-impact events and Earth system tipping points in Paris in November 2025.
Separately, the IPCC undertook an expert review of the first order draft of the “special report on climate change and cities” between October and December 2025.
The agenda for the Bangkok meeting also included a range of other items.
IPCC legal officer Jennifer Lew Schneider reported that there are currently 263 organisations with “observer status” to the IPCC, alongside 20 new applications.
IPCC vice-chair Diana Ürge-Vorsatz presented a progress report on an expert meeting on “gender, diversity, equity and Inclusivity”, which was held in September 2025.
The UNFCCC’s Annett Möhner presented a review of collaborations between the IPCC and UNFCCC. In its summary of the meeting, the ENB says:
“She described activities and outcomes from UNFCCC COP30 including decisions on the global mutirão, procedural and logistical elements of the global stocktake process, and the Belém gender action plan, as well as conclusions on research and systematic observation.”
Similarly, Simone Schiele – programme officer at the IPBES secretariat – noted outcomes of the IPBES-12 meeting held in February 2026, as well as ongoing IPBES work.
‘Frustrating and disappointing’
IPCC chair Skea tells Carbon Brief that, overall, the meeting delivered “minimal outcomes”. He says:
“It was a frustrating and disappointing meeting. It was only a business meeting – there was no science involved in it. The lack of progress was a frustration to me, sitting there, chairing it.”
The next meeting – IPCC-65 – will take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, during the second week of October 2026.
During this session, delegates hope to finalise the timeline for the AR7 reports and approve the draft reports of the IPCC’s 61st, 62nd and 63rd sessions.
As such, the ENB notes that “intersessional work” will play an important role in preparing panel members for meetings at IPCC-65. This, it says, includes the “submission of proposals on the AR7 timeline and informal consultations with the chair to identify points of convergence and possible flexibility”.
Skea says the secretariat will be working between sessions “to figure out the process that will move [things] in the right direction”. He continues:
“One of the issues that we have to consider is that there has been, in my view, quite a loss of trust between different groups of countries. We do need to address the trust issue, as well as the technicalities of how the timeline is constructed.”
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IPCC: ‘Frustrating and disappointing’ meeting leaves AR7 timeline in deadlock
Climate Change
Funding gap threatens next round of IPCC climate science reports, chair warns
A lack of money is hampering the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a substantial funding boost is needed to ensure its scientists can complete their next set of flagship reports, the chair of the UN body has warned.
Funding from governments fell in 2024 and 2025 and the organisation could run out of money by 2028 unless it receives fresh funds or implements spending cuts, chair Jim Skea told an official meeting of IPCC scientists in Bangkok last week, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), which provides coverage of UN negotiations.
Skea told the IPCC’s 64th session that without a substantial increase in contributions, the completion of the next set of reports, known as AR7, would be jeopardised.
To deal with this crisis, the IPCC is now considering cutting costs by holding meetings virtually, reducing staff travel, media training, recruitment, pay and website upgrades and cutting down on the editing, translating and printing of its reports, according to scenarios prepared by the IPCC secretariat.
Nepal’s representative Manjeet Dhakal told Climate Home News he was concerned about the situation, while the ENB report said Japan’s government had called the funding crunch alarming.
While South Korea and Sweden announced increased funding, the European Union – a major funder – cautioned against assuming past contributors will continue to give the same amounts, ENB reported.
No end to row over reports’ timing
The five AR7 reports, which will assess how the climate is changing, how to adapt, how to cut emissions, a synthesis report and a special report on climate change and cities – are further threatened by a long-running disagreement over when they should be completed.
While some countries want them finished by 2028, so they can feed into the UN climate process’s five-yearly global stocktake, others say this is too rushed and want to stick to the IPCC’s usual seven-year cycle, meaning reports would be finished by 2030.
Despite not being on the initial agenda, this issue dominated much of the scientists’ time in Bangkok. With time running out as delegates flew home, the meeting was unable to agree even on a plan to reach agreement by the next meeting in October 2026, ENB said.
Delegates also failed to agree to approve reports of previous meetings, after arguing over transparency, and were divided on how to respond to a scientific conference on climate tipping points.
Funding cuts
To fund its work, the IPCC relies on voluntary funding from governments. Most of the money is spent funding the participation of scientists from developing countries, the IPCC says.
But a report prepared by the IPCC secretariat for the Bangkok meeting said that “in recent years, the IPCC’s financial situation has come under strain, including amid current geopolitical challenges”.
It did not mention any governments, but reduced US funding has had a major impact, the IPCC’s financial documents show.
During Joe Biden’s presidency, the US gave the IPCC an average of $1.7 million a year, but President Donald Trump announced he would end US support and the latest data shows the US contributed no money in the first half of 2025.
The IPCC spent more money than it received in 2024 and the shortfall grew in 2025, prompting the raft of cost-cutting proposals – from switching to online meetings to cutting budgets for translating reports.
Further cost savings could be achieved, the IPCC said, by suspending IPCC travel to outreach events, freezing non-essential updates to the IPCC’s website, not creating any new staff positions until at least 2029 and no longer providing media training for the IPCC’s scientists.
Richard Klein, a scientist who has been involved in the IPCC since 1994, told Climate Home News there was “a growing discrepancy between the ambition of the IPCC and what is feasible given the budget”.
“In the end it means more pressure on authors who are already volunteering their time, and quite possibly less inclusivity of experts from developing countries,” he said.
Nepal’s Dhakal, who advises the Least Developed Countries group, called on governments to give more money to the IPCC and for the IPCC secretariat to “explore options to reduce costs without compromising inclusivity, particularly for small delegations and those with limited capacity to engage”.
Bitter divides on timeline
Since January 2024, delegates to IPCC meetings have been arguing over when the deadline for the AR7 reports should be. Delegations including Saudi Arabia and India have opposed attempts to ensure that the reports are published by 2028, in time to inform the second global stocktake.
The issue was not included on the Bangkok meeting’s formal draft agenda, with ENB reporting that Skea said this was because he did not think delegations had shown enough flexibility to be able to resolve it.
After pressure from Saudi Arabia, India and several others, the issue was added to the agenda despite delegations complaining that their governments had not authorised them to discuss it and that many countries were not represented at the meeting.
But, after four days, delegates were unable to even agree on a plan on how to reach agreement by the next meeting in October. Nepal’s Dhakal said he was “concerned with the lack of agreement on delivering the full AR7 package by 2028 to inform the second global stocktake”.

France’s Environment Ministry said in a statement that it had “deep concern at attempts to slow down and arbitrarily delay the publication schedule for the reports”.
Klein said that, while scientists are continuing their work on these reports, the likelihood of them being finalised before the second global stocktake “diminishes with every delay in making a decision”.
Transparency and tipping points
Delegates were also divided on the usually-routine issue of approving the summaries, prepared by the IPCC secretariat, of previous meetings.
According to ENB, France, Germany and Belgium wanted reports to specify speakers’ names. While France said reports should include everything that has been said by all delegates, Saudi Arabia responded that this would be unacceptable. The issue was deferred to the next meeting in October.
Saudi Arabia and India also objected to a reference in a report to a workshop that took place at Paris’s Sorbonne University in November on “tipping points and their consequences”. They argued that the concept of tipping points, which are thresholds beyond which the Earth’s climate changes suddenly, was contentious at the IPCC, ENB reported.
While journalists are not allowed to observe IPCC sessions, staff from ENB – which is an arm of the IISD think tank – are allowed to watch sessions and report on what is said.
The post Funding gap threatens next round of IPCC climate science reports, chair warns appeared first on Climate Home News.
Funding gap threatens next round of IPCC climate science reports, chair warns
Climate Change
Nigerians bet on solar as global oil shock hits wallets and power supplies
Business has never been as brisk for Nigerian solar panel retailer Samuel Okechukwu and his team of installation technicians, who are struggling to keep up with orders since the Iran war caused local fuel prices to double.
“There’s too much work, I’m even having to outsource some services to keep up with the work rate,” Okechukwu told Climate Home News, as he installed solar panels on the roof of an apartment building in the southern city of Port Harcourt.
Before the war, he had installations once or twice a week, but is now busy almost every day.
Okechukwu’s surge in orders in recent weeks suggests that more Nigerians are buying solar systems due to soaring fuel prices caused by the conflict in the Middle East, which has effectively blocked the Strait of Hormuz through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas previously flowed.
Plagued by frequent failures on Nigeria’s national grid, many homes and businesses buy diesel and petrol to supply generators to keep the lights on and equipment operating.
Even before the latest fuel price shock, solar installations had been increasing in Nigeria in recent years as an alternative to generators among those able to afford the initial outlay.
It costs about 600,000 naira ($450) to buy just one inverter battery and two 300-watt solar panels to charge it – roughly 10 times the minimum monthly wage – and eyebrows were raised when the government announced last year that the presidential villa was being kitted out with a $6 million solar mini-grid.
Power plants hit by gas shortages
Nigeria’s erratic power supplies have become even more unreliable in recent weeks as gas shortages constrain already fragile power generation. Most of Nigeria’s electricity supply comes from gas-fired plants.


Last month, the Nigerian Independent System Operator said several of the oil- and gas-producing nation’s thermal power plants were being affected by “persistent gas supply constraints” that were causing a decline in electricity generation.
While Nigeria has abundant gas reserves, the shortages are largely driven by structural issues, including mounting government debts owed to gas suppliers and pipeline constraints. Power Minister Adebayo Adelabu said last week that gas suppliers are prioritising export markets which have become more attractive and offer better returns over domestic markets.
This week, the Nigerian government increased gas prices for power generation companies, a move likely to deepen cost pressures in the electricity sector already struggling with debt and supply shortages.
At the same time, Okechukwu said rising temperatures in recent years were also increasing demand for an affordable source of electricity to power air conditioners.
Global oil shock makes case for renewables
Installations of solar power in Africa jumped 54% in 2025, according to a report by the Global Solar Council (GSC), marking the fastest annual growth on record.
The continent’s solar power capacity still represents only about 1% of the world’s total, though industry experts say the continent may have significantly more than official data reflects, with many rooftop installations going uncounted.
Precarious power supplies are already a key driver of solar adoption in many African nations, propelling fast growth rates in countries including Nigeria, which was Africa’s second-largest solar installer last year, installing more than 800 MW of capacity, according to the GSC, a nonprofit trade body.


Surging energy costs due to the Iran war could give further momentum to growth, the GSC’s CEO Sonia Dunlop told Climate Home News.
“It’s clear the people of Nigeria saw the writing on the wall … and have gone all in on rooftop solar as a result,” Dunlop said.
The increase in energy prices since the conflict began have cost consumers and businesses around the world more than $100 billion, according to a March 2026 analysis by 350.org, a non-profit organisation.
It said that would be enough to build sufficient solar capacity to supply about 150 million people in lower-consumption countries, for example in Africa, adding that investing in renewables was the best way to stabilise prices and strengthen energy security.
Anne Jellema, 350.org’s CEO, urged governments meeting in Colombia next month to discuss the transition away from oil and gas to “seize this moment to adopt binding targets to phase out fossil fuels and ramp up investment in a clean, safe energy future”.
Africa records fastest-ever solar growth, as installations jump in 2025
The global energy shock unleashed by the U.S.-Israeli war “definitely supports the case for longer-term mitigation, not being reliant on imported oil”, said Karl Boyce, CEO of ARC Power, a mini-grid developer operating in Africa, adding that securing sufficient investment would be crucial to realising Africa’s renewables potential.
“It’s so reliant on really heavy investment,” Boyce said. “So globally, there should be a focus on seeing how more investment can go into that sector just to give more stability in the longer term.”


“Forget about buying petrol”
In Port Harcourt, another solar trader, Sunday Onuchukwu, said his business has been “moving faster than before” as people get tired of power cuts and rising fuel costs that make investing in panels seem a better bet.
Located in a solar panels retail market, Onuchukwu’s shop was busy with customers, but the market itself was unusually quiet – without the usual whirr of generators thanks to the solar panels on the roof.
“Most of my customers complain that the fuel issue is one reason why they have decided to go solar. I have clients who transition both their offices and homes at the same time and move away from the bad power supply,” Onuchukwu told Climate Home News.
He said many businesses spend more than 20,000 naira ($15) per day on petrol to power generators.
Green Climate Fund picks locations for five developing country hubs
“With that money, calculated over a one-year period, you can install solar and forget about ever buying petrol,” he said, adding that some lower-cost solar products were now becoming available such as a 50,000-naira ($36) kit that provides enough power to light a single bulb and charge a mobile phone.


Lifting two heavy panels onto his head in Onuchukwu’s shop, one customer said ensuring a steady supply of power – after months without mains supplies – was vital for his barber shop and would also help his wife’s small business.
“This is what I am using to run my business and ensure electricity,” the man said, giving his family name as Amadi.
“With these two panels, I can also power my wife’s inverter freezer for her to be selling frozen foods.”
The post Nigerians bet on solar as global oil shock hits wallets and power supplies appeared first on Climate Home News.
Nigerians bet on solar as global oil shock hits wallets and power supplies
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