There is a “mismatch” between the importance of peatlands and their current level of protection, a new study warns.
The paper, published in Conservation Letters, combines maps showing global peatlands, protected areas and human impact in the year 2020, to provide a snapshot of the current level of global peatland protection.
The authors stress that peatlands are crucial carbon stores, holding more carbon than all the world’s forest biomass combined.
However, they find that only 17% of peatlands fall within protected areas – a “substantially lower” proportion than other “high-value ecosystems”, such as mangroves, saltmarshes and tropical forests, they say.
The study finds that 22% of global peatlands are under “high human pressure”, with regions in Europe and the east coast of the US under particular threat.
Furthermore, one-third of the global peatlands in protected areas and Indigenous people’s lands still experience “medium to high human pressure”, the paper finds.
‘Disproportionate’ carbon stores
Despite peatlands’ relatively small footprint – they cover only 3% of the Earth’s land surface – the ecosystems store a “disproportionate amount” of carbon.
Research has shown that there is more carbon contained in peatlands than in all of the world’s forests combined – around 600bn tonnes (GtC).
They also provide myriad other “ecosystem services”, such as regulating air temperatures, storing water and creating habitat for many species.
Peatlands are wetland ecosystems that form slowly over time. When plant matter in one of these habitats dies, the high water content of the soils prevents it from decomposing completely.
As a result, plant matter accumulates, building up as carbon-rich peat over time. Peatlands are found on every inhabited continent, primarily in the high latitudes of the northern hemisphere and in the tropics.
The degradation and destruction of peatlands is a significant carbon source, contributing 2-4% of human-driven greenhouse gas emissions each year. Peatlands are often drained or degraded during use for agriculture, and about 16% of peatlands globally have been drained to date. In some places, peat is intentionally removed to be used as fuel or fertile soil.
Prof Chris Evans, a biogeochemist at the UK Centre for Ecology & Hydrology, who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief:
“Peatland degradation is second only to tropical deforestation as a source of greenhouse gas emissions from land use, yet peatlands are often overlooked in conservation and climate policy.”
At the same time, climate change itself is putting peatlands at risk.
Increased temperatures are causing permafrost thaw, allowing the once-frozen peat to decompose and release CO2 into the atmosphere. Warmer temperatures also increase microbial activity, leading to faster rates of decomposition, while warmer, drier peatlands are more susceptible to fires.
Losing peatlands has “cascading effects on local water supplies, agriculture and fisheries, disproportionately affecting Indigenous and rural communities”, says Dr Michelle Kalamandeen, a geospatial scientist at McMaster University in Ontario, who was not involved in the study.
Protected areas
This study centres on an existing map of global peatland. The map divides the world into grid cells and, using a machine learning model trained on data collected on the ground, estimates the proportion of each cell that contains peatland at least 30cm deep.
The map identifies around 4m square kilometres (km2) of peatland globally. More than 60% of this is “boreal peatland” – found in the high-latitude northern regions, such as Canada, Russia and Scandinavia – and the rest is found in temperature or tropical regions, according to the study.
The authors then cross-reference the map with a database of global protected areas. The database encompasses both “strict” protection areas, such as national parks and nature reserves, as well as less strict land-management regimes where some human activity is permitted.
The database also shows Ramsar sites, a subset of protected areas designated to be of international importance under the Ramsar convention – also known as the “Convention on Wetlands”. (The convention seeks to promote “the wise use of all wetlands” in participating countries and encourage international co-operation with other countries.)
The authors find that only 17% of peatlands are located in protected areas. This is “substantially lower than other high-value ecosystems such as mangroves, 42% of which are within official protected areas globally, saltmarshes (50%) and tropical forests (38%)”, the study says.
Dr Kemen Austin is the director of science at the Wildlife Conservation Society‘s forests and climate change programme, and lead author of the new study. In a press release, she says that the study “reveals that these vital ecosystems don’t have anywhere near the level of protection they need”.
The authors also present case studies of individual countries. For example, they find that nearly 90% of peatland in the Republic of the Congo is protected. However, they warn that “most of this falls within a designated Ramsar site that has not yet been backed-up by strong government commitments”.
The study identifies a large body of literature showing that “Indigenous land rights and community-based management result in positive environmental outcomes, such as reduced deforestation and forest degradation”. The authors analyse data on Indigenous stewardship and find that one-quarter of global peatlands sit on land owned by Indigenous groups.
Human impact
The authors assess human pressures on peatland using the Human Impact Index (HII). This metric quantifies the “cumulative anthropogenic pressures” on a region, using a scale of 0-50 that incorporates factors such as accessibility, land use and population density.
The map below shows human pressure in areas that contain more than 5% peatland by area. Light pink shows “low-pressure” regions, medium pink shows “medium-pressure” regions and dark pink shows “high-pressure” regions.
The top map shows the whole planet, while the three inset maps below highlight chosen case studies in Peru, the Congo Basin and Indonesia.
The authors find that globally, 22% percent of peatlands are under high human pressure, 12% are under medium pressure and 61% are under low pressure. The remaining 5% are in areas without reported HII data.
The authors find that almost half of peatlands in temperate regions are facing high human pressure, adding that Europe and the US east coast are under particular stress. At the other end of the scale, they estimate that human pressure is low in Brazil, the lowlands of Peru, the Republic of the Congo and eastern Indonesia.
The study says that, as expected, human pressure is “somewhat higher” in unprotected peatlands than protected peatlands. However, it adds:
“Nearly one-third of global peatlands, and nearly half of temperate and tropical peatlands in protected areas and Indigenous people’s lands, still experience medium-to-high human pressure.”
The chart below shows the area of peatland in protected and unprotected boreal, temperate and tropical regions that is facing high (black) medium (grey) and low (light grey) human pressure.
Kalamandeen tells Carbon Brief that the study “underscores a fundamental disconnect between conservation priorities and real-world climate needs”.
However, she notes that there are some limitations to the methodology. For example, she tells Carbon Brief that the underlying peatland map “performs well in data-rich regions”, but says that “its accuracy drops where ground-truth data is lacking, notably in Africa, South America and boreal regions”.
Furthermore, the map only recognises peatlands deeper than 30cm, meaning that “shallower, but still ecologically valuable peatlands, are ignored”.
She continues:
“This study is an excellent starting point, but if we are serious about peatland protection, countries need to invest in better mapping and monitoring technologies such as using Earth observations and improving ground surveys to help refine conservation strategies.”
Peatland conservation
The new research “quantifies an issue that was previously known: that peatlands are under-protected when compared to other critical ecosystem types”, Dr Julie Loisel, a palaeoecologist at the University of Nevada, Reno, tells Carbon Brief. Loisel, who was not involved in the study, adds:
“In the face of rapid environmental change, ensuring that peatlands can ‘do their job’ of storing CO2 into their soils for the next few thousands of years is very important and any policy or land management effort that is enabling this simple goal should be put forth and prioritised.”
The study notes that several international policy frameworks, such as the global stocktake process under the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, can be applied to further the protection of wetlands.
For example, the authors note that Peru’s nationally determined contribution includes strategies for improving peatland management, such as establishing new conservation areas and recognising Indigenous peoples’ knowledge about peatlands.
However, Peru is one of the few countries with plans for the preservation of peatlands, alongside the UK, according to the study. Austin adds:
“Based on the nationally determined contributions countries have submitted to date, the continued disturbance and damage to global peatlands is getting very little attention as a significant and avoidable source of greenhouse gas emissions.”
In addition to protection of intact peatlands, peatland restoration “will be necessary for managing peat fires and meeting climate targets nationally”, the study says. Restoration typically involves altering the wetland’s water flows to “rewet” drained peat. It can also encompass controls on pollution, protection from burning and grazing and regrowing plants.
But while restoration can slow the release of CO2 and promote some ecosystem services, it is not an adequate substitute for peatland protection. The study notes:
“Notably, once emitted to the atmosphere, the carbon lost from peatlands cannot be restored on timescales that matter for preventing dangerous climate change.”
Promoting Indigenous peoples’ land rights is one way to support the protection of peatlands, Loisel says. She tells Carbon Brief:
“Conservation efforts do not necessarily imply ‘protection from use’, but are rather meant to ensure their ‘proper use’, or ‘sustainable use’. Indigenous community uses of peatlands have been known to be sustainable.”
Kalamandeen tells Carbon Brief that, while legal protections are “crucial”, their impact “depends on enforcement, management capacity and local engagement”. Meanwhile, she says that “Indigenous and community-managed lands, even without formal protection, often demonstrate strong conservation outcomes”.
Dr Adam Todd Hastie is the leader of the carbon and wetlands group at Charles University, and was not involved in the study. He agrees, calling Indigenous stewardship “often the best and most simple solution” to protecting peatlands.
However, he adds that global-north countries “need to be thoughtful in our calls for less economically developed countries to protect their peatlands”. He tells Carbon Brief:
“If we want less economically developed countries to take a different path of protecting their peatlands – and peat carbon – and to forgo short-term economic benefits, such as revenue from plantations or mining, we (especially Europe and North America) must contribute in real terms to developing alternative sustainable solutions, both environmentally and economically.”
The post Just 17% of world’s peatlands are protected, new study warns appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Just 17% of world’s peatlands are protected, new study warns
After a five-year long legal battle, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has blocked Shell and local partner Impact Africa’s permit to explore for oil and gas off the country’s East Coast, in a landmark victory for local communities and civil society.
“Today’s judgment makes me feel very happy and proud that the ocean is not for profit for mining companies,” said East Coast resident and environmental campaigner Siyabonga Ndovela.
The verdict culminates a years-long process in which non-profits Sustaining the Wild Coast, Natural Justice, Greenpeace Africa, and others took legal action against Shell, Impact Africa and the South African government for failing to consult affected communities – a legal requirement in the country.
The Constitutional Court ruled that Shell and Impact Africa had not complied with resource governance law, had failed to meaningfully conduct public consultation and had failed to consider the impact on climate change, cultural rights, livelihoods and ecological harm.
The ruling references last year’s landmark advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, which states that countries have a legal duty to prevent and repair damage to the climate system. The South African judges argued climate change “transcends borders” and that states’ obligations “must be understood within the broader framework of international law.”
“This case must also be understood against the backdrop of well-documented struggles by coastal communities to protect their land, marine resources and ways of life in the face of extractive activities that they believe threaten their very existence,” wrote Justice Narandran Kollapen.
The Constitutional Court found that the exploration right had been unlawfully granted by the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources.The ruling upholds a 2022 regional court decision against Shell and overturns a 2024 appeal that allowed the company to conduct fresh public consultations under the original exploration right. Today’s decision means the right, initially granted in 2014, must be set aside.
Celebrating the decision, Sherelee Odyar, oil and gas campaigner at Greenpeace Africa, told Climate Home News that the court confirmed “serious failures” in the awarding of exploration rights to Shell and Impact Africa, which “can not simply be corrected later”.
The Wild Coast is a biodiversity hotspot which has been conserved over generations by coastal communities who rely on the ocean and land. “Our land and sea are central to our livelihoods and our way of life. Over generations we have conserved them, and they have conserved us,” reads the founding statement in the case.
A Shell spokesperson said it noted the ruling, responding that “we are committed to responsible offshore exploration, meaningful stakeholder engagement and environmental stewardship.”
The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources did not respond to requests for comment at the time of publication.
“Renewed strength” for communities
The ruling adds to a series of legal challenges brought by civil society groups against oil companies and the government as South Africa has expanded oil and gas development since 2014 under Operation Phakisa, a plan aimed at “unlocking the economic potential of the oceans”.
On the West Coast, Walter Steenkamp, Chair of Aukotowa Fisheries Cooperative, which is involved in a separate ongoing legal action against TotalEnergies, said that “today’s court case gave me renewed strength.”
The case could also set a precedent for future oil developments, said Alessandro Mazzi, legal governance researcher at the University of Wageningen. He added that the verdict “sends a strong signal to investors that where projects affect people’s land, livelihoods and environment, meaningful consultation and genuine ecological assessment are an integral part of responsible investment”.
Janet Solomon, coordinator of advocacy group Oceans not Oil, said that the Court’s emphasis on democratic participation, culture, livelihoods and the health of future generations in handing down the verdict signals a shift in jurisprudence on environmental governance, saying that this focus “may prove to be the judgment’s most enduring legacy.”
The post South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right appeared first on Climate Home News.
South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right
China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.
The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030.
This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.
Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.
However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.
It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.
But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.
Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry.
Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.
Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.
What does the plan say about peaking coal?
Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.
The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy.
Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.
The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:
“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”
However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.
The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.
Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region.
Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions.
But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.
The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.
In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.
It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”.
The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.
The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.
The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:
- Peaking coal consumption;
- “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
- Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
- Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
- “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
- Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
- Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
- Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.
The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.
“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”.
A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”.
This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy”
However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption.
State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.
“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.
While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.
Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.
“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.
What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.
The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.
The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.
Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”.
Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024.
“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.
Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.
It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.
This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.
New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.
This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.
The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.
What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.
The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption.
Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.
In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.
It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.
This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.
Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.
Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.
China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.
Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.
It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]
The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.
At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.
In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.
Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively.
In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.
However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”.
She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.
How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?
Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.
As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.
Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.
A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.
But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.
China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.
The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”
The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions.
Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.
Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds:
“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”
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The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action?
The world saw the lowest amount of new coal mine capacity brought online for at least 10 years in 2025, according to a new report, as clean energy displaces coal for electricity generation in East Asia.
A report by Global Energy Monitor (GEM) found that new coal mine capacity declined by nearly 40% from 2024, the second consecutive year new mine capacity has hit a decade low. This represents an acceleration of a steady decline that began in 2019.
The slowdown in new coal mine openings was driven by China and Australia, where new additions fell by 44% and 96%, respectively. In China, the report said this was partly due to solar and wind displacing coal for electricity generation – although coal rebounded in the first half of 2026 – and the National Energy Administration implementing new rules to curb new mine openings.
In Australia, a 96% reduction in new coal mine capacity was driven by shrinking demand from the countries that import Australian coal for electricity, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the report said.
This trend is likely to continue, according to GEM, as the Australian state of New South Wales recently banned new coal mines on undeveloped greenfield land. South Korea has promised to stop building coal-fired power plants that cannot capture and store the emissions produced. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for a post-Fukushima nuclear revival to displace coal.
This Australian coal community is co-designing its own green future
Globally, growth in coal demand has slowed over the last few years and the International Energy Agency expects it to plateau through to 2030 because of the growth of renewable energy, nuclear and fossil gas.
Openings down, pipeline up
But while new coal mine openings fell, the amount of global coal mine capacity proposed increased by 11%. This was almost entirely driven by a spate of projects in the eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Odisha.
“If built,” the GEM report says, “the projects would commit India – a country with no formal coal phaseout timeline – to years of coal expansion and would put a 1.5C-aligned transition away from fossil fuels farther out of reach”.
The Indian government says it needs to increase coal production to meet growing electricity demand from economic growth and from dealing with heatwaves. It plans to open more than 20 new coal mines to meet its coal production targets.
Because of energy security concerns, India is also aiming to produce chemicals with Indian coal rather than imported gas. China is also pursuing this strategy, although the Global Energy Monitor report said that Indian coal’s high ash content means the South Asian nation will find it harder to make chemicals from coal.
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Since then, wealthy nations have partnered with coal-producing countries like South Africa, Vietnam and Indonesia on plans to transition from coal to clean energy. But, after preliminary talks, India and these governments did not agree a JETP.
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