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Japan’s largest polluters are rushing to buy carbon credits ahead of the launch of the country’s mandatory emissions trading system. Trading activity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) has surged as companies prepare for tighter climate rules and try to meet their corporate sustainability targets before the fiscal year ends.

According to Bloomberg, major Japanese companies are already purchasing credits on the TSE’s voluntary market in anticipation of the GX-ETS launch.

This buying spree highlights growing anxiety about future compliance costs. At the same time, it signals that Japan’s carbon market is shifting from a voluntary experiment to a central pillar of its climate strategy.

What Is the GX-ETS and Why Does It Matter

The Green Transformation Emissions Trading System (GX-ETS) is Japan’s national carbon trading program. The government launched it in 2023 under the GX League, a public-private platform designed to accelerate corporate decarbonization.

The GX-ETS mirrors the European Union’s emissions trading system. Companies receive or buy emissions allowances and can trade them. If they emit less than their cap, they can sell extra allowances. If they exceed limits, they must buy more or face penalties.

Timeline and Key Features

Japan is rolling out the GX-ETS in stages:

  • Phase 1 (2023–2025): Voluntary participation and market testing
  • Phase 2 (2026 onward): Mandatory participation for large emitters
  • Future phases: Auctions, price bands, and fuel levies

Japan plans to introduce power sector auctions around 2033 and a fossil fuel importer levy by 2028. Policymakers are also considering price bands of ¥4,000 to ¥6,000 per tonne by 2027, with potential increases by 2030. Significantly, the compliance market will include a price ceiling and phased expansion with additional policy tools.

The system integrates voluntary credits into compliance trading. Companies can trade GX credits via call auctions on the TSE, with unmatched orders carried forward. This design aims to improve liquidity and price discovery.

Japan’s Path to Net-Zero by 2050

Japan made modest progress in reducing emissions in the first half of 2025. The Ministry of the Environment reported a 2.8% decline compared with the same period in 2024. For the full year, emissions are estimated at 1,070 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent, down from about 1,272 million tonnes in 1990.

Much of this improvement came from energy efficiency gains in the industrial sector. However, Japan still relies heavily on fossil fuels, and transport emissions remain difficult to reduce. Consequently, current policies are projected to cut emissions by 31% to 37% below 2013 levels by 2030, which still falls short of the country’s 46% national climate target, excluding land-use emissions.

Japan emissions
Source: Climate Scorecard

Heavy industries—such as steel, chemicals, cement, and power generation—account for more than 60% of national emissions, making them key GX-ETS targets. Therefore, the GX-ETS is expected to cover roughly 60% of Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions and support the country’s goal of achieving net zero by 2050.

Japan’s carbon tax remains low at about ¥289 per tonne (roughly $2.16), emphasizing the need for stronger market-based mechanisms. As a result, policymakers view the GX-ETS as a critical lever to accelerate emissions reductions and drive the nation toward net-zero.

Who Must Participate in the GX-ETS

Phase 1 of the GX-ETS was voluntary. However, Phase 2 will become mandatory in spring 2026. Companies emitting more than 100,000 tonnes of CO₂ per year must participate.

This rule affects roughly 300 to 400 companies. Together, they account for about 60% of Japan’s total emissions. Key sectors include steel, chemicals, cement, power generation, automotive manufacturing, and aviation.

Under current proposals, companies can use carbon credits to offset up to 10% of regulated emissions. Therefore, credits complement emissions cuts rather than replace them.

Pre-Compliance Buying Surge Among Big Polluters

Large Japanese companies are buying voluntary credits aggressively before the mandatory launch. TSE officials see strong demand driven by companies preparing for GX-ETS and rushing to retire credits before the fiscal year ends.

Reports also reveal that members of the GX League, such as Toshiba, Tokyo Gas, and Isuzu Motors, have already participated in voluntary trading. Analysts expect steelmakers, utilities, and other heavy industries to dominate future purchases.

This early buying strategy helps companies hedge against future allowance shortages. It also reduces the risk of penalties once compliance rules take effect.

Japan’s Carbon Credits: Demand Soars Ahead of Mandatory GX-ETS

Japan’s carbon credit market is expanding fast. It was valued at about $28.2 billion in fiscal 2023 and could reach more than $121 billion by 2031, growing at roughly 20% annually.

Trading on the TSE began in 2023 and focuses on GX credits, including:

  • J-Credits from domestic renewable and efficiency projects
  • JCM credits from international projects under Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism

However, demand already exceeds supply. J-Credit issuance averages around 1 million tonnes per year. Analysts expect demand to reach about 3 million tonnes annually once the mandatory phase begins.

Therefore, limited supply could push prices higher and increase compliance costs for heavy emitters.

Carbon Credit Prices and Market Dynamics

Bloomberg also highlighted that carbon credit prices on the TSE have fluctuated as the market matures. Renewable electricity credits peaked at about ¥6,600 per tonne in early 2025. Since then, prices have fallen by nearly 25%.

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has proposed a price ceiling of ¥4,300 per tonne for the compliance market. Renewable-linked credits still trade above that level, reflecting strong demand and limited supply. And the prices across voluntary credit categories are converging ahead of the mandatory phase. This trend suggests growing liquidity and market confidence.

carbon credit Japan
Source: Bloomberg

Challenges Facing the GX-ETS

Despite strong momentum, several challenges remain. Limited credit supply could push prices higher if demand grows faster than new issuances. Credit quality also poses a risk, as regulators must ensure offsets deliver real and permanent emissions reductions to avoid greenwashing.

At the same time, Japan still depends heavily on coal, gas, and oil, meaning carbon trading alone cannot transform the energy system. Transport emissions also remain a major hurdle, especially in the road and aviation sectors, where decarbonization is progressing slowly.

Past regional trading systems, such as Tokyo’s cap-and-trade program, achieved emissions reductions of around 15% to 27%. However, scaling that success nationwide will require strict enforcement, transparent monitoring, and strong policy support.

Strategic Role of Carbon Credits in Japan’s Transition

For hard-to-abate sectors such as steel and power, carbon credits provide a temporary bridge while low-carbon technologies mature. Companies can offset a small share of emissions while investing in hydrogen, electrification, and carbon capture.

Early purchases also hedge against future price spikes. If allowance supply tightens, companies holding credits will face lower compliance costs.

Globally, Japan wants J-Credits to align with international carbon markets and potential EU carbon border rules. This strategy could strengthen Japan’s role in Article 6 carbon trading frameworks.

In conclusion, the surge in carbon credit buying shows Japanese companies are taking the GX-ETS seriously. The market is transitioning from a voluntary pilot to a compliance-driven system that will shape corporate strategies for decades.

As climate pressures mount, Japan must close the gap between current policies and its 2030 target. The GX-ETS could become one of the country’s most powerful tools to drive emissions cuts, attract investment, and accelerate clean energy deployment.

However, success depends on credit supply, price stability, and strong governance. Industry analysts and experts suggest early credit buying reflects corporate hedging strategies as Japan’s carbon market moves toward full compliance.

If Japan manages these challenges, the GX-ETS could transform its carbon market and set a model for other Asian economies.

The post Japan’s GX-ETS Sparks Carbon Credit Surge as Major Polluters Prep for Compliance appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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