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history of uranium market and impact on energy transition

Many fail to realize this is not the first energy transition.

Although the media have made it appear as if it’s the first energy transition, it’s not.

For example, the nuclear energy industry development which started in WW2 was a major energy transition. In today’s dollars, half a trillion dollars went into the research and development of nuclear reactors along with uranium mines and fabrication plants that would feed the operating nuclear reactors.

In fact, one of the most fascinating stories of collusion, corruption and cartels happened as America was developing its first energy transition. Amazingly, it almost “destroyed” the nuclear industry.

So, before you think the current Energy Transition has failed (which it is not over and will happen) let’s explain the drama that almost took down the first major Energy Transition in America.

Have you ever heard of the Yellow Cartel?

The Yellow Cartel

Everyone knows about the oil cartel called OPEC. But did you know that in the 1970s, a uranium cartel was conspired by one of the largest mining companies in the world and the Canadian government?

From 1955 through 1970 hundreds of billions of dollars were being committed by the US, France, Sweden, Japan and West Germany to build nuclear power plants. The Yellow Cartel started in 1971 with the London based mining giant, Rio Tinto approaching the Canadian government concerning the formation of a cartel for controlling uranium market pricing.

The first official meeting occurred in February 1972, in Paris, and the International Uranium Cartel was created.

Eventually, 29 producing companies would become members of the International Uranium Cartel, which was nicknamed the ‘Yellow Cartel” for the color of yellowcake that the cartel was colluding to price fix.

Rio Tinto, Uranerz (the large German uranium producer in the 70s), the Canadian Government and ultimately a total 29 uranium producers made up the Uranium Cartel.

The Uranium Cartel was successful in increasing the price of uranium almost 10-fold in a few short years by deploying illegal tactics such as price fixing schemes.

Later, the Canadian government would form two uranium entities which would lead to the creation of Cameco, a top 5 uranium producer worldwide.

There were two real catalysts that caused the formation of the International Uranium Cartel. But why did Rio Tinto pitch this plan that almost would turn the energy world upside down and risk America’s energy security and the first major energy transition?

The first catalyst was the move by the US government to place an embargo on all foreign uranium in 1964 to protect its own uranium mines.

At that time, the United States consumed about 70% of the global uranium production (for both its military and energy needs) and with that demand for uranium now gone outside the USA, the price of uranium crashed to $5 per pound in 1970.

But because the price of uranium was so high during the 1950s and first half of the 1960s, significant amounts of risk capital was spent on exploration for new uranium deposits globally. As a result of all this new uranium exploration was major uranium discoveries were made in places like Niger and Australia.

By the late 1960s significant uranium deposits would be discovered in Australia such as Jabiluka 1 & 2.

Eventually the massive discovery of Olympic Dam which would become one of the largest polymetallic mines (including uranium) in the world. Olympic Dam would soon replace the depleting uranium from the Rum Jungle Mine in Australia which was producing uranium since 1954 and was shut down for good in 1971.

Because of and other events such as those mentioned above, by 1971, there was over 220 Million pounds of global uranium production and only 55 Million pounds of uranium global demand. The uranium market was oversupplied by 400%.

Because of both the US embargo on foreign supplies of uranium and an oversupply of uranium production to demand by 400%, the price of uranium was hovering around $5/pound in 1971.

But because of the price fixing tactics of the Uranium Cartel, the price of uranium surged to $40/pound.

a line graph showing the price of carbon credits and the united states uranium price

The move in uranium prices brought down the world’s largest nuclear reactor builder in the world, Westinghouse Electric Corp. on September 8, 1975.

Westinghouse was able to become the world’s largest developer and installer of nuclear reactors because it had the best track record, nuclear technology and most importantly it promised a long-term supply of uranium feed to power the Westinghouse PWR reactors. A dream trifecta for large utilities and government entities alike.

To put things in perspective, half of the world’s current operating nuclear power plants are using the basis of Westinghouse’s PWR reactor technology. Between 1960 and 1970, Westinghouse was able to secure US government backed utility contracts (and same in Sweeden) worth tens of billions of dollars because Westinghouse committed to supply 65 million pounds to the American and Swedish nuclear reactors with a fixed price contract.

But things quickly turned very bad for Westinghouse. The utilities, citizens and the American Government. Because the price of uranium increased 10X (1000%) from when Westinghouse signed those fixed price utility contracts, on September 8th, 1975 Westinghouse announced that it would not honor the 65 million pounds of uranium it committed to the American and Swedish utilities.

It was revealed in legal documents that the American consumer ended up paying billions of dollars in additional electricity costs due to the Uranium Cartels actions. In fact, New York state alone paid over $1Billion in electricity prices shortly after the Yellow Cartel activities.

On October 15, 1976, Westinghouse took matters into its own hands. It filed for conspiracy, in violation of United States anti-trust laws against the 29 producing uranium companies that made up the International Uranium Cartel estimating damages between $4-6 Billion.

Uranium continued to soar after 1976, surpassing $100 per pound throughout the late seventies.

Around that time, people called for the end of the energy transition citing the negative impact caused by the Uranium Cartel. This was just one of many attacks survived by the uranium industry. In fact, the nuclear sector not only survived the Uranium Cartel fiasco, but Chernobyl, Fukushima and countless other project and sector setbacks over the years.

Right now, we are in the greatest energy transition in human history. Tens of trillions of dollars will be spent worldwide on energy transition and decarbonization. Nuclear is a big part of the solution.

In fact, without uranium, there is no clean, long term base load nuclear power. Which is why we are currently in one of the greatest uranium bull markets of all time.

There are three uranium giants in global uranium production. The largest global producer came out of the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazatomprom. The third largest global uranium producer, as described above, was the result of the Canadian Government merging two state owned enterprises and created Cameco.

But do you know who the second largest producer of uranium globally is?

And the major moves this company is making after almost blowing itself up?

In an upcoming feature article, we will bring to the forefront the under the radar moves that the second largest producer of uranium is doing and how investors can benefit.

The post Has the Energy Transition Failed and is it Over? appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Want a simpler way to buy carbon credits? Discover our carbon marketplace

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Most businesses that decide to act on their net-zero targets reach the same point of friction. Buying carbon credits has meant tracking down brokers, sitting through sales calls, and requesting a quote just to learn a price, sometimes with limited proof of what you are buying.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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