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More than 70% of European cities are not adapting to climate change in a consistent and coherent way.

That is the headline finding of our new study, published in Nature Climate Change, on how European cities are – or are not – preparing for a warming world.

We find that nearly half of the 327 cities that we assess have not published an adaptation plan, leaving us unsure as to whether or how they are trying to reduce climate threats.

For the 167 cities that do have adaptation plans – ranging from Alborg and Aarhus in Denmark through to Zilona Gorá in Poland and Zaragoza in Spain – we find that the climate-related measures within them are often inconsistent.

In other words, their climate risk assessments, policy goals, adaptation measures and monitoring programmes are not aligned.

For example, 81 plans identified the increased risk of storms and winds from climate change, but only 23 of these plans (28%) mentioned increasing resilience to such severe weather events as a specific policy goal.

These inconsistencies contribute to a “gap” that the UN has identified between the adaptation goals that societies have adopted and the measures they have implemented to try and meet them.

Our study finds that Nuremberg in Germany has the largest gap in its adaptation plan, with Stuttgart and Schwerin in Germany and Birmingham in the UK close behind. 

The gap is particularly alarming because Europe is warming twice as fast as any other continent – and it is a continent that has had considerable financial and institutional support for adaptation for decades.

Consistent and coherent

Much of the existing research into the “adaptation gap” focuses on the difference between the climate measures a city needs and what action has actually been taken.

But there is another key part of the adaptation gap – whether the policies and measures are actually internally consistent.

Ideally, we would expect adaptation efforts to be “joined-up” along the policy chain.

For example, where climate risk assessments suggest that a city faces specific threats from storms, flash flooding, heatwaves, forest fires or drought, these vulnerabilities should be linked directly to the municipality’s adaptation goals, policies and the monitoring and evaluation processes.

Additionally, we might hope that city governments would involve those at risk from severe climate impacts, such as vulnerable population groups, industries and sectors of the economy, in decisions as to how they will be protected.

If these different phases of adaptation management are misaligned and inconsistent, we can see how cities and societies are less likely to deal with the impact of severe weather events effectively.

‘Consistency checks’

We developed a series of “consistency checks” to identify the extent to which different stages of the adaptation management process are aligned.

These include:

  1. Consistency between hazards identified in a risk assessment and a city’s adaptation goals.
  2. Consistency between the risks to specific sectors and detailed policy measures.
  3. Consistency between the risks faced by vulnerable groups and detailed policy measures.
  4. Consistency between the policy measures targeted at vulnerable groups and monitoring and evaluation processes to ensure they are being implemented.
  5. Consistency between the risks faced by vulnerable groups and their involvement in decision-making.

We use these checks to assess the adaptation strategies of European cities. For this, we use an existing dataset of the local adaptation plans of more than 300 cities.

(The dataset covers the 27 member countries of the EU, plus the UK. It aims to cover around 20% of the population of each country and include national and regional capitals where possible. In general, it covers large cities with more than 250,000 people and medium-size urban areas with more than 50,000 people.)

We find that nearly half (49%) of the plans do align climate risks with climate goals. Slightly more than half (52%) align identified sectoral risks with respective measures, but only regarding specific economic sectors and industries.

For example, 68 cities (77%) identify particular risks for buildings, while 70 cities (80%) highlight risks to the water industry and include details of measures to protect these sectors.

However, identified risks for vulnerable groups, such as risks for older people, those on low-incomes and ethnic minorities, were only followed-up with consistent measures in 43% of the plans.

Also, only 4% of cities consider or involve vulnerable groups in monitoring and evaluation (if they identified these groups at risk) – and only 1% of cities were effectively engaging vulnerable communities in plan development.

Given that the least powerful members of society are often the most vulnerable to climate change, there is a real risk that they will be further exposed to severe weather events.

Overall, when assessing each of the five consistency checks in all 167 plans, we find inconsistencies in more than two-thirds (70%). This is despite the fact that adaptation planning in Europe has improved over time – as we highlighted in a previous Carbon Brief article.

The findings are illustrated in the map below, which shows the 167 cities with adaptation plans. The coloured dots indicate the extent to which each city’s plan is inconsistent (indicating a potential adaptation gap) – taken as an average across the five checks set out in our study.

Green dots indicate plans that are fully consistent, with a sliding scale of inconsistency through yellow, orange and red. The maximum inconsistency identified in the study is an adaptation gap of 79.6% – found in Nuremberg, Germany. But Stuttgart and Schwerin in Germany and Birmingham in the UK are close behind, with an average “gap” score of more than 78%.

Map showing average consistency per adaptation plan and city. Full consistency is shown by the green dots. Degrees of inconsistency are shown in shades from green to red, with a maximum inconsistency of 79.6%, the highest score across individual cities. Source: Reckien et al. (2025)
Map showing average consistency per adaptation plan and city. Full consistency is shown by the green dots. Degrees of inconsistency are shown in shades from green to red, with a maximum inconsistency of 79.6%, the highest score across individual cities. Source: Reckien et al. (2025).

Lack of adaptation plans

Significantly, our research finds that only 167 of the 327 cities – just over half of those in the database – had even produced a climate adaptation plan by the study’s cut-off date of December 2020.

As such, we were unable to assess how a huge number of places across Europe are planning to deal with climate threats – regardless of whether their activities are misaligned or not.

(Although many cities will have published adaptation plans since this date, it is not clear how coherent their activities are likely to be, nor whether they take sufficient account of the needs of vulnerable groups.)

Overall, our research suggests a greater need for city and national governments to base their adaptation policies on robust risk assessments and to monitor progress accordingly – particularly with the most vulnerable social groups in society in mind.

Our findings highlight the importance of focusing on those who are most vulnerable to climate change, by involving them in decision-making and targeting specific measures at these groups.

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Mottley’s “legally binding” methane pact faces barriers, but smaller steps possible

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With voluntary commitments to cut methane pollution floundering, the prime minister of Barbados urged fellow leaders at the United Nations last month to draw up a “legally binding global agreement” to reduce emissions of the particularly potent greenhouse gas.

Mia Mottley told the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit in New York that voluntary efforts like the UAE-led Oil and Gas Decarbonisation Charter – signed by over 50 oil and gas companies – were “not enough” to rein in methane. She said governments should urgently discuss a “no more than two-or-three page agreement on the reduction of methane as a matter of legally binding obligations”.

The Barbadian leader – who has a global reputation for proposing new ideas on climate action and finance – said governments “do not need to reinvent the wheel”. She suggested replicating the 1987 Montreal Protocol that has phased out the production and use of CFC and other gases found in fridges and air conditioners that were responsible for opening a hole in the Earth’s ozone layer.

That protocol put in place legally binding reduction targets for these chemicals, many of which are also greenhouse gases, incentivising government policies to make companies redesign their appliances.

Emissions of ozone-depleting substances have since dropped by almost 100%, and the ozone layer is closing, with Mottley calling it “the most successful climate agreement in history”.

Why focus on methane?

Methane is a short-lived greenhouse gas that is more than 80 times more potent than carbon dioxide (CO2). Experts say cutting methane emissions is a “low-hanging fruit” for tackling global warming, as it would make a big difference with relatively small actions.

Methane emissions come mainly from the agriculture sector (40%), the oil and gas industry (35%) and waste (20%).

Since COP26 in Glasgow, 111 countries have signed up to the Global Methane Pledge – which aims to cut methane emissions by 30% by 2030, compared to 2020 levels. 

But, in its latest global tracking update in May, the International Energy Agency said methane emissions from fossil fuels remain at stubbornly high levels. Commitments like the pledge have boosted target-setting and momentum, it added, but so far “few countries or companies have formulated real implementation plans for these commitments, and even fewer have demonstrated verifiable emissions reductions”.

Russia justifies fossil gas use by citing contentious COP28 loophole

Mottley told the summit at UN headquarters that tightening regulation on methane emissions made sense for the planet, fossil fuel firms and farmers – and would help buy time in the short-term as countries roll out their national climate plans to cut greenhouse gases across the board.

Her call was backed by French President Emmanuel Macron and Tuvalu’s Prime Minister Feleti Teo, who both said in their speeches that a “binding commitment” on methane is needed. “We know that this is a reachable goal,” Macron said, adding that methane reduction would be a priority when France chairs the G7 next year.

A more difficult challenge than ozone?

But replicating the Montreal Protocol for methane will be challenging. The vast majority of ozone-depleting gases come from a relatively small number of appliances and so could be reduced relatively easily. On the other hand, methane escapes into the atmosphere from a wide variety of sources including belching cows, rice paddies, landfills, leaking gas pipelines, coal mines and oil production facilities.

While some emissions can be prevented cheaply or even profitably – particularly in oil and gas production – others, like those from cows, are more expensive and politically controversial to avoid.

Durwood Zaelke, president of the Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development, has previously campaigned against ozone-depleting substances and is now pushing for methane cuts. He spoke alongside Mottley and Macron at a high-profile meeting on methane in New York in late September.

He told Climate Home News that getting a “coalition of the willing” to agree on methane targets is more likely than persuading all the world’s governments to sign up to an agreement. Countries could make their targets legally binding through their own domestic law, he said.

    An international agreement is possible, he added, “but it also can start from the bottom up” if other governments – including sub-national ones like California and Punjab – adopted similar rules to the European Union’s methane regulation.

    The EU requires oil and gas companies to detect and repair methane leaks and bans them from burning gas as a waste product in a process known as flaring. It is also imposing increasingly stringent methane intensity standards – opposed by the Trump administration in the US – on imported fossil fuels.

    Zaelke said the next step was for Barbados to try and get the rest of the Climate Vulnerable Forum – a group of around 70 Global South countries which it now chairs – and other small island states on board with the idea.

    He predicted that methane would have its “moment” at the COP30 climate summit in Brazil, as reduction of non-CO2 gases is one of the 30 objectives of the COP30 presidency’s “action agenda”.

    Mottley’s proposal is expected to be discussed at the pre-COP gathering in Brasilia on October 13-14, although opposition from some countries will likely make reaching global consensus very difficult.

    Citing comments by UN chief Antonio Guterres that we are on “the highway to climate hell”, Zaelke said: “We’ve got a methane emergency brake. If you pull it and turn the wheel, you can reverse course and slow warming in the near term more than any other way. I think this is becoming clear and so we’ll see the drumbeat for mandatory pick-up.”

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    Global renewables goal slips off course after Trump, China moves

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    The International Energy Agency (IEA) expects countries to fall even further short of a 2030 goal to triple renewable energy capacity due to policy changes by the Trump administration and China over the last year, a report by the Paris-based body showed on Tuesday.

    At COP28 in Dubai two years ago, all the signatory governments of the Paris Agreement agreed to call on each other to contribute to tripling global renewable energy capacity by 2030 on 2022 levels as part of their efforts to limit global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.

    In last year’s renewables report, IEA analysts said the world was on course to increase capacity 2.7 times in this period. But this year’s version, published on Tuesday, cut that forecast to 2.6 times.

    IEA head Fatih Birol told a press conference the agency’s analysts have lowered their forecast for 2025-2030 renewables growth by 5% “mainly as a result of policy changes in the United States and in China”.

    The IEA has reduced its forecast for 2025-2030 renewables growth in the US and China from last year (Graph: IEA)

    He said, however, the target to triple capacity was “still within reach”, urging governments to invest more in electricity grid infrastructure, speed up the permitting of new projects, de-risk renewable finance and invest in flexible electricity generation solutions such as batteries, hydropower and geothermal energy.

    Trump’s tax credit cuts

    The IEA slashed its forecast for US renewable growth over the next five years by nearly half, mainly because of President Donald Trump‘s cuts to tax credits for renewables, increased tariffs on some solar panel imports and pausing of approvals for renewables projects on federal lands and waters.

    Both solar and wind capacity is still expected to grow every year in the US, but at a slower rate than had been expected prior to Trump’s policy changes.

    US solar and wind capacities (black lines) are expected to keep growing under Trump (Graph: IEA)

    The IEA cut its forecast for China‘s 2025-2030 renewables growth by 5% from last year’s report. While much smaller than the forecast for the US decline, the reduction has a big impact on the global target because China’s renewables growth is expected to be far higher than any other nation.

    Birol said the downgrade stemmed from a planned change in the way Chinese authorities pay companies to provide electricity. In October 2024, the Chinese government announced it would stop offering fixed-price remuneration for renewable electricity, switching instead to market-based auctions.

    “That’s why the profitability of the renewables projects – especially solar and wind – is expected to decline between 10% and 15% with the new policy. So with this, there will obviously be less interest, especially for technologies that are more expensive, such as offshore wind,” Birol said.

    Bright spots for solar

    Despite the overall decline, the IEA’s renewables growth forecasts for some countries improved, with Birol singling out Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand. Forecasts for India and the EU have also been revised upwards.

      A separate report published on Tuesday by energy think-tank Ember found that renewables overtook coal as the biggest source of electricity generation in the first half of this year, and that – partially as a result – global emissions from the power sector fell 0.2%.

      Ember’s Global Programme Director Raul Miranda said “the renewables revolution is unstoppable”.

      “Exponential growth driven by rapidly declining costs has brought renewables to the stage where they are taking the lead role in the electricity system and starting to replace fossil generation at a global scale,” Miranda said.

      As well as reducing emissions, the rise in renewables has saved governments $1.3 trillion since 2010 due to the reduced need to import coal and gas to provide electricity, according to the IEA.

      Next week, the Brazilian presidency of COP30 and the International Renewable Energy Agency will launch their annual report on the goal to triple capacity.

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      Factcheck: What the Climate Change Act does – and does not – mean for the UK

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      The UK’s Climate Change Act is a landmark piece of legislation that guides the nation’s response to global warming and has proved highly influential around the world.

      Increasingly, the law has come under attack from right-wing politicians, who want to scrap the UK’s net-zero target and the policies supporting it.

      Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has announced that her party would “repeal” the Climate Change Act entirely, if her party is able to form the next government.

      The opposition leader said she still believed that “climate change is real”, but offered no replacement for the legislation that the Conservatives have backed since its inception.

      Her proposal drew intense criticism from scientists, business leaders and even senior Conservatives, who argued that abandoning the act would harm the UK economy and drive more climate extremes.

      Meanwhile, the hard-right populist Reform UK party – which is currently leading in the polls – has also rejected climate action and promised to “ditch net-zero”.

      Below, Carbon Brief explains what the Climate Change Act does – and does not – mean for the UK, correcting inaccurate comments as the UK’s political right veers further away from the previous consensus on climate action.

      Why does the UK have the Climate Change Act?

      It is well-known that the Climate Change Act was voted through the UK parliament with near-unanimous cross-party support. In October 2008, some 465 MPs voted in favour, including 263 Labour members, 131 Conservatives, 52 Liberal Democrats. Just five Conservatives voted against.

      Less widely appreciated is the fact that the Labour government only agreed to legislate in the face of huge public and political pressure, including from then-Conservative leader David Cameron.

      Jill Rutter, senior fellow at thinktank the Institute for Government (IfG), tells Carbon Brief that the Conservatives “can also claim significant credit for the Climate Change Act”.

      This is at odds with comments made by Badenoch, who described it as “Labour’s law”, when pledging to repeal it if she were ever elected as prime minister.

      In early 2005, two Friends of the Earth campaigners – Bryony Worthington and Martyn Williams – had drafted a Climate Change Bill, inspired by the “worsening problem of climate change and the inadequacy of the government’s policy response”, according to a 2018 academic paper.

      Worthington tells Carbon Brief they had “decided [the government’s plan] was rubbish and we needed a different approach”, based on five-yearly carbon budgets rather than single-year goals.

      Their draft was introduced into parliament that July, as a private members’ bill, by high-profile backbench MPs from the three main political parties: Labour’s Michael Meacher; the Conservatives’ John Gummer (now Lord Deben); and Norman Baker for the Liberal Democrats.

      This was the centrepiece of Friends of the Earth’s “Big Ask” campaign, gaining huge public support and backing from more than 100 other NGOs, 412 MPs and celebrities such as Radiohead frontman Thom Yorke.

      Then, in December 2005, Cameron was elected Conservative leader, using support for climate action as part of his efforts to “‘decontaminate’ the Tory brand”, according to an IfG retrospective.

      With the Labour government still resisting the idea of new climate change legislation, Cameron made what the IfG called a “really significant political intervention” on 1 September 2006, throwing his weight behind the “Big Ask” and publishing his own draft bill, on green recycled paper.

      Former UK conservative leader David Cameron and his wife Samantha at Friends of the Earth's "Big Ask" Benefit Concert, 2006.
      Former UK conservative leader David Cameron and his wife Samantha at Friends of the Earth’s “Big Ask” Benefit Concert, 2006.
      Credit: PA Images / Alamy Stock Photo

      As the Guardian reported at the time, a letter from Cameron and others “call[ed] on the government to enshrine annual targets for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions into a bill, to be introduced in the next Queen’s speech…the government believes a bill is unnecessary”.

      At prime minister’s questions on 25 October 2006, Cameron continued to press Labour prime minister Tony Blair, who was still not committed to legislation.

      Cameron went beyond the “Big Ask” draft by calling for an independent commission with executive powers, able to adjust the UK’s climate goals. Cameron asked Blair:

      “Are we getting a bill: yes or no?…Will it include the two things that really matter: annual targets and an independent body that can measure and adjust them in the light of circumstances?”

      The IfG says a former aide to David Miliband, who was then environment secretary, “remembers him commenting that Labour could not get into the position of being the only major party not in favour of the proposed bill”.

      Finally, in November 2006, the Labour government confirmed in the Queen’s speech that it would introduce a new climate change bill.

      Emphasising the cross-party consensus, Lord Deben tells Carbon Brief: “It was the Tories who wrote it and it was the Labour Party who accepted it – and all parties supported it.” He adds:

      “It’s not just that every Tory leader since [then] has supported climate change, the Climate Change Act [and the] Climate Change Committee, but it’s simply that, actually, they ought to, because they invented it.”

      The Labour government published its own draft climate change bill in March 2007 and this, after lengthy negotiation, went on to become the 2008 act.

      Cameron continued to campaign for “independent experts, not partisan…ministers” to set the UK’s statutory climate targets, but this responsibility was, ultimately, left to the government.

      Rutter tells Carbon Brief that, in pledging to repeal the 2008 act, Badenoch is “rejecting” a Conservative “inheritance” on climate change that runs back to Margaret Thatcher. She says:

      “One of the defining features of climate policy to date in the UK has been the political consensus that has underpinned it. That may have been because Margaret Thatcher was the first leading world politician to draw attention to climate change in 1989 [via a speech at the UN in New York].”

      Rutter adds that David Miliband had only been able to convince then-chancellor Gordon Brown to accept legally binding targets as a result of Cameron’s enthusiasm for the cause. She says:

      “Although it was Labour legislation, brought forward by David Miliband (though implemented by brother Ed), the reason Miliband was…able to convince a sceptical Gordon Brown at the Treasury that the UK should set legally binding targets, was the enthusiasm with which new Conservative leader David Cameron embraced the Friends of the Earth ‘Big Ask’ campaign as part of his moves to detoxify the Conservative party after its 2005 defeat. Theresa May then increased the target [in 2019] from 80% to net-zero as part of her legacy. It is that long Conservative inheritance on climate action that Badenoch is now rejecting.”

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      What does the Climate Change Act require?

      The Climate Change Act sets out an overall “framework” for both cutting the UK’s emissions and preparing the country for the impacts of climate change.

      At its heart is a legally binding goal for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Originally envisaged as a 60% reduction on 1990 levels, this was quickly increased to 80%.

      In 2019, amid a surge in concern about climate change, the then-Conservative government strengthened the target again to a reduction to “at least 100%” below 1990 levels, more commonly referred to as net-zero.

      The target for 2050: (1) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least [F1100%] lower than the 1990 baseline. (2)“The 1990 baseline” means the aggregate amount of— (a)net UK emissions of carbon dioxide for that year, and (b)net UK emissions of each of the other targeted greenhouse gases for the year that is the base year for that gas.
      Section 1 of the Climate Change Act. Source: UK government.

      On the pathway to this long-term goal, the act also requires the government to set legally binding interim targets known as ”carbon budgets”. These must be set 12 years in advance, to allow time for the government and the rest of the economy to plan ahead.

      The carbon budgets set limits on emissions over five-year periods, providing greater flexibility than annual goals, while tackling the cumulative emissions that determine global warming.

      Section 13 of the act specifies that the government has a “duty to prepare proposals and policies for meeting carbon budgets”. There is also a requirement for the government to explain how its actions will achieve its climate goals.

      (In addition, the act requires the government to set out a programme of measures for climate adaptation and how it intends to meet them.)

      The final key pillar of the act is the creation of the Climate Change Committee (CCC), an independent advisory body. The CCC advises – but does not decide – on the level at which carbon budgets should be set and the climate-related risks facing the UK.

      The committee also produces annual assessments of “progress” and recommendations for going further, which the government is obliged to respond to, but not to accept.

      Each time the secretary of state sets out their plan for a new carbon budget – taking the CCC’s advice into account – or responds to a progress report from the committee, parliament scrutinises the government’s activities.

      Contrary to recent criticisms from the opposition Conservatives and the hard-right populist Reform UK, however, the act says nothing at all about how the government should meet its targets.

      The only requirement is that the government’s plan should be capable of meeting its targets.

      Moreover, it was the Conservatives under Cameron that had wanted to give the CCC executive and target-setting powers. This was opposed at the time by the then-Labour government.

      Rachel Solomon Williams, executive director of the Aldersgate Group, notes on LinkedIn that this was a “closely debated” issue, but that, ultimately, the act puts the government “in control”:

      “A closely debated aspect of the bill at the time was whether the CCC should have an executive or an advisory function. In the end, it was appointed as an expert advisory committee and the government remains entirely in control of delivery choices.”

      The Conservative press release announcing Badenoch’s plan to “repeal” the act is, therefore, incorrect to state that the legislation “force[s]” governments to introduce specific policies.

      (Speaking at the 2025 Conservative party conference, shadow energy secretary Claire Coutinho caricatured what she called “Ed Miliband’s…act” as requiring “1970s”-style “central planning” that “dictate[s] what products people must buy, and when”.

      Just 18 months earlier, she, as energy secretary, had written of her “government’s unwavering commitment to meeting our ambitious emissions targets, including the legislated carbon budgets and the net-zero by 2050 target”.)

      The press release also falsely describes the targets set under the act as “arbitrary” and falsely suggests they were set without consideration for the impact on jobs, households and the economy.

      (In 2021, Badenoch herself, then a government minister, told parliament: “We will put affordability and fairness at the heart of our reforms to reach net-zero.”)

      Specifically, section 10 of the act lists “matters to be taken into account” when setting carbon budgets, including the latest climate science, available technologies, “economic circumstances”, “fiscal circumstances” and the impact of any decisions on fuel poverty.

      As for the net-zero target, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that reducing emissions to net-zero is the only way to stop global warming. The target was set on this basis, following detailed advice from the CCC that took climate science, economic and social factors into account.

      The Conservatives have also taken aim at the CCC itself as part of their rejection of the Climate Change Act, highlighting the committee’s advice on meat consumption and flying.

      In an echo of widely circulated conspiracy theories, Badenoch even told the Spectator that the CCC “wants us to eat insects”. This is not true.

      Despite the framing by right-leaning media and politicians, the CCC’s recommendations for contentious topics such as meat consumption and reductions in flight numbers are modest.

      The committee notes that “meat consumption has been falling” without policy interventions and says this will help to free up land for tree-planting. It says “demand management measures” to curb flight numbers “may” be needed, but only if other efforts to decarbonise aviation fail.

      More importantly, the government decides how to meet the carbon budgets. It can – and often does – ignore recommendations from the CCC, including those on diets and airport expansion.

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      The costs and benefits of the Climate Change Act

      The debate over whether to tackle climate change, how quickly and to what extent has almost invariably centred on the costs and benefits of doing so.

      Those opposed to climate action have, in general, sought to exaggerate the supposed costs, while playing down the losses and damages already being caused by global warming.

      Yet serious efforts to weigh up the costs and the benefits have concluded – again and again and again – that it would be cheaper to cut emissions than to face the consequences of inaction.

      Indeed, this was precisely the conclusion of the landmark 2006 Stern Review, to which the 2008 Climate Change Act partly owes its existence. The review said:

      “[T]he evidence gathered by the review leads to a simple conclusion: the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting.”

      More specifically, it said that the cost of action “can be limited to around 1% of global GDP [gross domestic product]”, whereas the damages from climate change would cost 5% – and as much as 20% of GDP.

      When the act was passed in 2008, it was again estimated that the UK would need to invest around 1% of GDP in meeting its target of cutting emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.

      Since then, estimates of the cost of cutting emissions have fallen, as the decline in low-carbon technology costs has outperformed expectations. At the same time, estimates of the economic losses due to rising temperatures have tended to keep going up.

      (Some years after the review’s publication, Stern said he had “got it wrong on climate change – it’s far, far worse…Looking back, I underestimated the risks.”)

      When it recommended the target of net-zero by 2050, the CCC estimated that the UK would need to invest 1-2% of GDP to hit this goal. It later revised this down to less than 1% of GDP.

      Most recently, the CCC revised its estimates down once again, putting the net cost of reaching net-zero at £116bn over 25 years – roughly £70 per person per year – or just 0.2% of GDP.

      In July 2025, the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) went on to estimate that the UK could take an 8% hit to its economy by the early 2070s, if the world warms by 3C.

      It concluded that while there were potentially significant costs to the government from reaching net-zero, these would be far lower than the costs of failing to limit warming.

      Despite all this, Conservative leader Badenoch has falsely argued that the UK’s net-zero target will be “impossible” to meet without “bankrupting” the country and that the the Climate Change Act has “loaded us with costs”.

      Her party has also pledged to “axe the carbon tax” on electricity generation – a significant source of government revenue – claiming that this “just adds extra costs to our bills for no reason”.

      Prof Jim Watson, director of the UCL Institute for Sustainable Resources, tells Carbon Brief that the costs of climate policies are “sometimes exaggerated” and are not the main reason for high bills:

      “Policies that are in place to meet the UK’s carbon targets have costs, but these costs are sometimes exaggerated. These policies are not the primary cause of the energy price shock businesses and households have experienced over the past three years.”

      Watson says that high gas prices were the “main driver” of high bills and adds that shifting away from fossil fuels “will also reduce the UK’s exposure to future fossil-fuel price shocks”.

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      How nearly 70 countries followed the UK’s Climate Change Act

      In the interview announcing her ambition to scrap the Climate Change Act, Badenoch falsely told the Spectator that the UK was “tackl[ing] climate change…alone”. She said:

      “We need to do what we can sensibly to tackle climate change, but we cannot do it alone. If other countries aren’t doing it, then us being the goody-two-shoes of the world is not actually encouraging anyone to improve.”

      This is a common claim among climate-sceptic politicians and commentators, who argue that the UK has gone further than other nations and that this is unfair. Badenoch’s predecessor, Rishi Sunak, used similar reasoning to justify net-zero policy rollbacks.

      The UK has indeed been a leader in passing climate legislation, but it is far from the only country taking action to tackle climate change.

      The Climate Change Act was among the first comprehensive national climate laws and the first to include legally binding emissions targets.

      It has inspired legislation around the world, with laws in New Zealand, Canada and Nigeria among those explicitly based on the UK model.

      Indeed, 69 countries have now passed “framework” climate laws similar to the UK’s Climate Change Act, as the chart below shows. This is up from just four when the act was legislated in 2008. Of these, 14 are explicitly titled the “climate change act”.

      Chart showing that nearly 70 countries have passed comprehensive climate laws since 2008 – with some inspired directly by the UK
      Cumulative number of countries with “climate change framework laws”, as defined by the Climate Change Laws of the World database. When countries have updated laws or introduced additional framework legislation, duplicates have been removed. Source: Climate Change Laws of the World.

      The UK was also the first major economy to legislate a net-zero target in 2019, but since then virtually every major emitter in the world has announced the target. (Not all of these targets have been put into law, as the UK’s has.)

      When the UK announced its target in June 2019, around 1% of global emissions were covered by net-zero targets. By the end of that year, France and Germany brought this up to nearly 4%.

      Over the following years, major economies including China and India announced net-zero targets, meaning that around three-quarters of global emissions are now covered by such goals, as the chart below shows.

      (This figure would be even higher if the Trump administration in the US, which accounts for around a tenth of annual global emissions, had not abandoned the nation’s net-zero target.)

      Chart showing that three quarters of global emissions are now covered by national net-zero targets – up from 1% when the UK legislated its target
      Global greenhouse gas emissions covered by national net-zero targets (dark blue) and those that remain uncovered (light blue). Shares of emissions are derived from a 2024 dataset that includes both fossil-fuel and land-use emissions. Source: Net Zero Tracker, Jones et al (2024).

      While it is true that the UK is “only responsible for 1% of global emissions”, as Badenoch has also noted, this does not mean its actions are inconsequential. Around a third of global emissions come from countries that are each responsible for 1% of global emissions or less.

      Moreover, as a relatively wealthy country that is responsible for a large share of historical emissions, many argue that the UK also has a moral responsibility to lead on climate action.

      This historical responsibility is implicitly invoked by the Paris Agreement, which recognises countries’ “common but differentiated responsibilities” for current climate change.

      Finally, Badenoch’s position diverges from that of recent Conservative leaders.

      Theresa May and Boris Johnson spoke positively of the UK “leading the world” in low-carbon technology and expressed pride about the nation’s climate record.

      They framed the UK’s success in tackling climate change as a good reason to do more, rather than less. “Green” Conservatives also argue that the UK should race to gain a competitive advantage in producing low-carbon technologies domestically.

      Responding to Badenoch’s plan to scrap the act, May issued a statement criticising the “retrograde step” following nearly two decades of the UK “[leading] the way in tackling climate change”.

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      What comes next under the Climate Change Act?

      The debate over the future of the Climate Change Act, triggered by the Conservative pledge to repeal it, comes ahead of two key moments for the legislation.

      First, the government has until the end of October 2025 to publish a new plan for meeting the sixth carbon budget (CB6), covering the five-year period from 2033-2037.

      In 2021, the then-Conservative government passed legislation to cut emissions to 78% below 1990 levels during the sixth carbon budget period, centred on 2035. The government set out its “carbon budget delivery plan” for CB6 in October 2021, as part of a wider net-zero strategy.

      In July 2022, however, this plan was ruled unlawful by the High Court for failing to publish sufficient details on exactly how the target would be met. The revised plan, published in March 2023, was once again found unlawful by the High Court in May 2024.

      The High Court then gave the government a deadline of May 2025 to publish another version, later extended to October 2025 as a result of last year’s general election.

      Second, the government has until June 2026 to legislate for the seventh carbon budget, covering the period 2037 to 2042. This legislation will be subject to a vote in parliament.

      In February 2025, the CCC advised the government to set this budget at 87% below 1990 levels, in order to stay on track for the goal of net-zero by 2050, as shown in the chart below.

      Chart showing that the CCC has recommended an 87% emissions cut by 2040 as the UK's next climate target
      UK greenhouse gas emissions, including international aviation and shipping (IAS), MtCO2e. Lines show historical emissions (black) and the CCC’s “balanced pathway” to reaching net-zero. Legislated carbon budgets levels are shown as grey steps. The first five budgets did not include IAS, but “headroom” was left to allow for these emissions (darker grey wedges). Source: CCC.

      Both the CB6 delivery plan this October and the parliamentary vote over CB7 next June are likely to be hotly contested, with the Conservatives and Reform having come out against climate action.

      After publishing two unlawful carbon budget delivery plans and ahead of a widely anticipated election loss, the Conservatives began calling for greater scrutiny around carbon budgets in 2023.

      Then-prime minister Rishi Sunak said in September of that year that parliament should be able to debate plans to meet the next carbon budget, before voting on the target. He said:

      “So, when parliament votes on carbon budgets in the future, I want to see it consider the plans to meet that budget, at the same time.”

      Then-secretary of state Coutinho subsequently wrote that a draft delivery plan for CB7 should be published alongside draft legislation setting the level of the carbon budget. She also argued that CB7 be debated on the floor of the House, rather than in the “delegated legislation committee”.

      In response, the current government has pledged to provide “further information” to parliament, ahead of the vote on CB7. In a July 2025 letter to the chair of the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (EAC), energy secretary Ed Miliband wrote:

      “Prior to parliament’s vote, we will publish an impact assessment which will clearly articulate the full range of benefits and costs of the government’s chosen CB7 target and the cross-economy pathway to deliver it.”

      However, Miliband said the government would not publish a CB7 delivery plan until “as soon as reasonably practicable after” the parliamentary vote on the level of the budget.

      The EAC itself is holding an inquiry on the seventh carbon budget and how the “costs of delivering it will filter through to households and businesses”. It is likely to report back in February 2026.

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      What would happen if the Climate Change Act was repealed?

      If any future government wanted to repeal the Climate Change Act and its legally binding net-zero goal, it would not be a straightforward process.

      The government would need to introduce a new bill in parliament just to repeal the act.

      This process would involve seeking approval from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords before receiving Royal Assent to become law. Within the make-up of the current UK parliament, it is likely that such a bill would face significant challenges.

      Any new law repealing the Climate Change Act would need to introduce new climate commitments of a similar nature – or else the UK would be in breach of several international laws and treaties, explains Estelle Dehon KC, a barrister specialising in climate change. She tells Carbon Brief:

      “In short, repeal of the Climate Change Act without any replacement commitments of a similar type would be in breach of the UK’s international obligations under: the climate change treaties (so UNFCCC, Kyoto and Paris); international human rights law and customary international law, as well as specific sources like UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

      Under the Paris Agreement, the UK has made pledges to cut its emissions by 2030 and 2035, known as “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs).

      The UK’s NDCs are directly informed by its domestic emissions-cutting targets, known as carbon budgets. The act specifies that the government has a “duty to prepare proposals and policies for meeting carbon budgets”.

      Any move in breach of international laws and treaties could be vulnerable to legal challenges, particularly in light of a recent opinion on climate change by the International Court of Justice.

      Repealing the Climate Change Act could also put the UK in opposition with its international trade agreements.

      The most recent trade agreement between the UK and the EU states that each party “reaffirms its ambition of achieving economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050”.

      It also contains rules on “non-regression” in relation to climate protection.

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      The post Factcheck: What the Climate Change Act does – and does not – mean for the UK appeared first on Carbon Brief.

      Factcheck: What the Climate Change Act does – and does not – mean for the UK

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