At the start of 2024, China introduced a new system of “capacity payments” designed to help coal-fired power stations shift into a supporting role, alongside low-carbon sources.
In theory, the payments should make it financially viable for coal plants to operate less frequently, switching off unless there is insufficient output from renewables and nuclear.
However, new Global Energy Monitor (GEM) analysis finds that, despite channeling 107bn yuan ($14.9bn) to China’s coal-plant owners during its first year, there is no clear evidence that the scheme has reduced the amount of hours during which coal plants are operating.
Moreover, the analysis shows that some 70-100% of China’s coal plants received payments, depending on the province, boosting their revenues by around 5-8%.
As such, the way the mechanism has been implemented continues to raise questions about its effectiveness in supporting renewable growth and China’s wider energy-transition targets.
Rather than encouraging operators to reduce operating hours and emissions, the loose application of eligibility “guardrails” means it could be prolonging coal-plant lifetimes instead.
A ‘supporting’ role for coal
Like many other countries, China faces the complex challenge of how to decarbonise its power sector while keeping the electricity grid reliable.
Following widespread power outages in 2021 and ongoing debates over how to manage the transition, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s powerful central planner, announced a new coal capacity payment mechanism in late 2023.

The policy, which took effect in January 2024, aims to maintain grid reliability, while supporting coal-fired power plants as they shift from a primary electricity source to a “regulating and supporting” role in China’s power mix, according to Han Xue, associate researcher at China Development Research Centre of the State Council.
The mechanism provides what is essentially a monthly “standby” payment to eligible public coal plants (see below). The payments are designed to help cover fixed operating costs during periods when coal plants’ output is low, often as a result of high renewable generation. They are also intended to ensure that coal plants are available to switch on during peak demand periods.
The national framework sets payment levels at either 30% or 50% of a benchmark coal plant’s total fixed costs, which the NDRC determined to be 330 yuan ($45.8) per kilowatt (kW).
The higher 50% rate applies in provinces where the role of coal power supply is transitioning rapidly, such as Chongqing and Sichuan in southwest China as well as Hunan in the south. However, from 2026 the rate will increase to at least 50% of the fixed costs nationwide.
To illustrate the mechanism’s impact, consider a 600 megawatt (MW) coal plant running at China’s 2024 average rates. It would be operating for 4,628 hours a year and selling electricity at 0.452 yuan ($0.063) per kilowatt-hour (kWh). This plant’s annual revenue would stand at about 1.2bn ($174m) yuan.
If it receives a 30% capacity payment, roughly 59.4m yuan ($8.2m) would be added to its bank account, driving up the revenue by 4.7%. If the rate is at the 50% level, the bump rises to 7.9%.
Capacity market criticism
From the outset, the policy drew questions and criticisms. Capacity markets in other countries have also sparked debate, including in the UK, Chile and Spain.
Early in the first year of implementation of China’s capacity payments, energy media outlet China Energy News quoted experts saying that the mechanism would gradually change the coal producers’ mindset of “the more they generate, the more they earn”.
However, other “restrictions” of the mechanism, such as the 330 yuan pay rate being “too low”, would “limit” its “effect” on transition, according to the outlet.
-
Sign up to Carbon Brief’s free “China Briefing” email newsletter. All you need to know about the latest developments relating to China and climate change. Sent to your inbox every Thursday.
Energy research institute the Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) had pointed out that the mechanism is restricted to coal, excluding the “participation of alternative resources” able to offer similar services, such as energy storage or demand response.
Issues with the policy meant that it could encourage older coal plants to remain online, as well as potentially “exacerbating” the continued construction of new capacity, according to RAP.
After one year of China’s programme, GEM’s analysis finds that, while the policy has contributed to coal power plant revenue, there is still little definitive evidence to show that it is shifting coal to a “supporting” role, as intended.
This raises continued questions about the mechanism’s design, its implementation and whether it aligns with China’s long-term climate and energy objectives such as the “dual-carbon” goals.
Adding to the complexity, Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at thinktank the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, highlights a regional divide in China’s power mix from 2020 to 2024 in an article for Dialogue Earth.
He says that northern provinces have made more progress towards integrating clean energy than the southern regions, which have been “complacent” due to rich hydro resources. In contrast, others have invested more in wind and solar capacity, as well as in coordinating grid operation with neighbouring areas so as to better manage variable renewable output.
These regional disparities complicate any assessment of the capacity mechanism’s impacts.
Capacity payments ‘top 100bn yuan’
Only 12 provincial governments have released lists of qualifying plants, providing rare insight into how the capacity payment policy is being implemented.
These provinces represent just 38% of the country’s total operating coal capacity, meaning most of the national implementation remains undocumented in the public domain.
This partial picture makes it difficult to assess the policy’s broader outcomes, particularly as provinces appear to apply eligibility and enforcement criteria differently.
Based on the national policy’s payment levels and the 12 provincial recipient lists, the capacity payments in these provinces alone was more than 40bn yuan ($5.5bn) in the first year of the scheme, as shown in the figure below.
Combining the total operating capacity and payment numbers from the 12 provinces that have published data with GEM’s most recent national capacity figures, our analysis estimates that the total national payout in 2024 was approximately 107bn yuan ($14.8bn).
(This figure is uncertain. Greater transparency would help clarify how the mechanism is functioning and its role in shaping the future of coal in China’s power system.)

As shown in the figure above, capacity payments vary significantly across provinces. Of those 12 provinces with detailed published data, Henan in central China received the largest share, totaling approximately 9.4bn yuan ($1.3bn), driven by both its large eligible capacity of 56.9 gigawatts (GW) and the high payment rate (50% level).
Among the 12 provinces, Guangxi (20.5GW) and Yunnan (11.2GW) in southwest China, as well as Qinghai (2.9GW) in northwest China also applied the 50% payment rate, but their smaller eligible coal capacity resulted in comparatively lower total payments.
Broadly, the rankings of total capacity payments align with those of total operating coal capacity by province, which is expected given the direct link between capacity and payment eligibility.
However, the alignment is not exact. Yunnan, for example, ranks 11th out of 12 provinces in terms of operating capacity but 8th in total capacity payments.
This reflects how provincial differences in payment rates and eligibility shares, not just installed capacity, are shaping the financial impact of the policy.
Despite restrictions, most coal capacity is eligible
By cross-referencing provincial recipient lists with GEM’s Global Coal Plant Tracker (GCPT), it is possible to estimate the share of each province’s coal capacity receiving payments.
In almost all of the 12 provinces that published recipient lists, a large majority of coal capacity is eligible for payments, as shown in the figure below.

The NDRC national guidelines published alongside the policy announcement stipulate that only “compliant, public operating coal units” are eligible for the capacity payments. The guidelines identify three categories of coal-fired power plant units that are excluded:
- “Captive” units, which exclusively serve specific industrial or commercial entities and operate independently from the public power grid;
- Units failing to meet energy efficiency, environmental performance, or operational flexibility standards;
- Units not compliant with the broader “national plan”, a criterion that is not further clarified in the guidelines.
Despite these restrictions, most provinces with available data include between 70% and 100% of their total coal capacity under the mechanism, as the chart above shows.
In some cases, this appears inconsistent with the eligibility criteria. For example, the Mancheng Mill power station in Hebei in northern China has two 35MW combined heat and power (CHP) units, which started operating in 2018 to provide heat and power exclusively to a pulp and paper industrial park. This appears inconsistent with the “captive unit” exclusion.
In line with concerns raised by RAP, some newly built coal power plants were included in the initial provincial recipient lists, or added at a later date. For example, Beihai Bebuwan power station Unit 4 in Guangxi began operating in March 2024 and was added to the recipient list in September 2024. The inclusion of such projects could be interpreted as an incentive for new coal capacity, under the banner of grid reliability.
Although plant age is not explicitly disqualifying, coal power plants in China generally have a 30-year design lifespan. Yet older units are included in recipient lists in multiple provinces.
Shenhua Panshan power station Units 1 and 2 in Tianjin in northern China, for instance, began operating in 1994 and were retrofitted in 2023. Their continued inclusion raises questions about whether the policy supports transition, or extends the operational life of ageing assets.
It also highlights uncertainty around how retrofits will be treated, if undertaken after the policy entered force at the start of 2024, and whether such units will be firmly excluded from eligibility.
Finally, several provincial lists include smaller units, which may have limited ability to contribute to peak demand management. For example, five 57MW units from Shaoxing Binhai power station in Zhejiang, southeast China, built to provide heat demand for local dyeing and printing industries, were accredited for capacity payments.
Their actual contribution to evening peak load, when generation from solar and wind is low, is unclear from the list or other available provincial assessments.
More questions than answers?
There was only two months between the announcement of coal capacity payments and their implementation, leaving no time for pilot programmes or detailed feedback. This may help explain the ambiguities that have emerged during the provincial execution process.
Our analysis of the first year of the scheme suggests that provincial discretion has played a major role, with national criteria loosely applied in practice.
Moreover, there is no clear evidence to date that the mechanism has led to reduced coal utilisation hours, or significantly increased solar and wind generation.
While electricity generation from coal decreased in northern provinces during 2024, our analysis found that this was not the case in southern regions.
Different factors contribute to these regional differences, such as power demand and clean-energy resources. With only one year of data from the capacity payment scheme, it is not possible to attribute these changes solely to the capacity payment scheme.
To better align the mechanism with its stated goals, future adjustments could consider specifying coal-plant eligibility criteria more clearly and transparently.
Expanding the scheme to non-coal resources, such as energy storage, demand response or energy efficiency, could help it contribute to wider system flexibility and transition objectives.
Finally, ongoing monitoring of provincial implementation and energy trends will allow for a clearer assessment of how the policy evolves in the coming years.
The post Guest post: China’s ‘capacity payments’ boosted coal-plant revenue by up to 8% appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: China’s ‘capacity payments’ boosted coal-plant revenue by up to 8%
Climate Change
Pawa in Palau
This week our powerful Pacific team is in Palau for the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting. This is a major moment in our campaigns for Pacific climate justice and to stop deep sea mining. So what’s it all about, what can we expect over the coming days, and why is this year’s meeting in particular so important? Read on to find out!
*Pawa is Melanesian word meaning collective power.
Meet Moemoana Schwenke, our Pacific Climate Campaigner
“When you love something deeply, you do everything you can to protect it.”
What is the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)?
The Pacific Islands Forum, or ‘PIF’, is our region’s most important political organisation. It is where countries of the Pacific — including Australia and New Zealand — come together to collaborate on shared challenges and to set collective goals.
The PIF Leaders Meeting is an annual weeklong event that includes a dedicated meeting of the Pacific’s small island developing states (PSIDS), many special side events organised by Pacific civil society, the leaders’ meeting itself, and more. At the end of the week, leaders issue a Forum Communiqué, capturing what they have agreed on, their shared priorities and the actions they will take together.
This year’s meeting is being held in the beautiful northern Pacific nation of Palau, the same place our Pacific team gathered back in January to plan for the year.

What’s at stake this year?
Climate change has dominated the PIF for decades. Pacific leaders have been crystal clear it is their number one priority, and the annual gathering is the moment they can exert maximum pressure on Australia over its fossil fuel record.
The voyage to COP31
This year’s meeting comes less than three months before COP31, where Australia will take on the role of President of Negotiations — a role it has committed to undertaking in partnership with the Pacific — and less than a month before the ‘Pacific Pre-COP’, to be held in Fiji and Tuvalu.
Following a fraught round of mid-year negotiations in Bonn, PIF leaders will need to set out a clear vision and priorities for COP31. These include accelerating a just global transition away from fossil fuels, defending science as the foundation of international climate cooperation, and increasing the availability and accessibility of finance for renewable energy and climate adaptation.

Accountability for Australian fossil fuel exports
Since the last PIF Leaders Meeting, Australia has signed the Belém Declaration on the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels. The declaration reaffirmed the legally binding commitment to help limit global warming to 1.5°C and recognised that this is incompatible with new fossil fuel production. Yet, Australia has continued to approve new coal and gas projects, including at least five since the last PIF Leaders Meeting.

What is Greenpeace doing?
We’re going big this year, taking six members of our team to Palau to support Pacific leaders to hold the line, hold Australia accountable, and show the world what’s at stake. We’ll lobby leaders, hold press conferences, share our messages with the world, and support our incredible local partners in Palau.

How can you get involved?
PIF is the first in a drumbeat of major moments where we’ll be carrying the voices of the Pacific to the world. Come October we’ll be voyaging to Fiji on our ship Oceania for the Pacific Pre-COP, and in November we’ll be off to Antalya for the world’s climate negotiations (COP31).
Learn more about the Pacific way to a fossil fuel free future by checking out our report and exhibition.
Follow our journey, and check back here for more ways to join the movement for climate justice. Together we have the pawa!
Climate Change
From firefighting to future-proofing: Preventing wildfires must be the priority
Gill Einhorn is head of the Forest Future Alliance and Natalie Çilem is community lead of the Global Wildfire Leadership Network.
Wildfires have devastated communities across the world this summer, claiming lives, displacing thousands of people and leaving billions in economic damage in their wake. In Europe alone, wildfires have already caused an estimated €19 billion in losses this year.
They are an economic, financial and public health challenge that is growing faster than many governments and markets are prepared for – and exposing the real costs of poor land management.
A system built for recovery, not resilience
Far more money is currently spent responding to the disastrous effects of wildfires than preventing them in the first place. The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that more than half of wildfire-related spending goes towards response, while planning receives only around 0.2 percent. This problem is not limited to wildfires; over 95 percent of disaster aid between 2005 and 2017 was allocated to response, and less than 4 percent was directed towards prevention or preparedness.
Forests are critical, but without investment in how land is managed and protected, their value is neither stable nor guaranteed. Protecting forests requires investing not only in conservation, but in the conditions that keep forests standing.
Each dollar invested in wildfire-resistant construction could save around $210 in avoided future economic losses, according to a report by the World Economic Forum and Forest Future Alliance. Despite this evidence that prevention can significantly reduce future costs, wildfire resilience remains chronically underfunded.
This spending discrepancy is creating significant challenges for insurers, asset owners and financial institutions. Global insured losses from natural catastrophes reached $107 billion in 2025, with wildfires, floods and storms accounting for 92 percent of claims.
In this context, insurers are reassessing where and how they are willing to underwrite risk. Around 56 percent of global wildfire losses between 2000 and 2023 were uninsured. In some high-risk areas, insurers are scaling back coverage altogether, leaving homeowners, businesses and governments to shoulder a growing share of the costs – making it increasingly difficult to break even.
Proven solutions are already paying off
In many regions, wildfires are driven not by natural causes but by the deliberate clearing of land for agriculture. Degraded landscapes are becoming drier, more flammable and increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic loss, creating a vicious cycle of deforestation, economic damage and rising emissions.
The answer is not simply stronger firefighting capacity. Governments, investors and businesses must work together to shift capital upstream into prevention, resilience and long-term landscape stewardship of healthy forests. That means planting appropriately, investing in heat-resistant species, exploring approaches that minimise fire footprints through active management, and exploring the AI and technology solutions that are burgeoning.


Solutions to this already exist and are proven to have an impact. Following devastating wildfires year-on-year, Portugal shifted its approach to wildfire management, increasing prevention spending within its national rural fire management system from around 20 percent in 2017 to approximately 60 percent in 2022. While many countries remain locked in a reactive cycle of disaster response, public policy can shift investment upstream and make resilience a priority before fires occur.
Indigenous communities have long used proactive land stewardship to reduce wildfire risk while supporting healthy and productive landscapes. For example, the Cheslatta Carrier Nation in British Columbia traditionally managed fuels through cultural fire practices but now implements mechanised fuel removal methods under commercial agreements. By combining Indigenous stewardship with sustainable forest management, Cheslatta is generating community benefits while also boosting wildfire prevention.
Resilience can also be strengthened through finance and technology. FireSat, a partnership led by Earth Fire Alliance with Google.org, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and Muon, is a satellite constellation designed for rapid wildfire detection. Scanning every 20 minutes, it can detect fires 400 times smaller than current systems and track them through smoke and darkness in almost real time. In California alone, FireSat could prevent up to 350,000 acres from burning each year. It has recently received significant new investments allowing it to expand towards a constellation of more than 50 satellites that will monitor every point on Earth every 20 minutes or less.
In Brazil’s Pantanal, the Embrace the Forest initiative uses AI-powered detection towers across 2.5 million hectares to support earlier intervention and faster response. During the severe 2024 fire season, the initiative contributed to a 40 percent reduction in burned area compared to 2020.


These examples illustrate what is possible when resilience is treated as an investment priority rather than a recovery cost. But we must ensure funding for these measures is scaled before disaster strikes. Initiatives like the Global Wildfire Leadership Network (GWLN) are key, bringing together corporate decision-makers, investors, insurers, governments and Indigenous leaders to direct investment towards prevention and align finance, technology and stewardship to protect nature, safeguard communities and strengthen future economic stability. With a goal of doing more together than the sum of our parts, the network focuses on Forest Future Alliance GWLN Solutions Labs – where partners sign up with the intent to collaborate.
Rewarding prevention
Financial incentives must be created that reward prevention. This can be done by scaling public-private partnerships, supporting long-term landscape stewardship, investing in community capacity including Indigenous wisdom and technology. Ultimately, our terrestrial natural reserves are critical infrastructure that support resilient economies and thriving communities.
One in three people are dependent on forest services, goods and economic opportunities for survival, so it’s in all our interests to protect what we have. Forests support cooling, water and food security – and are a very cost-effective way of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, where done appropriately.
UN chief warns climate crisis “in overdrive” as El Niño threatens to fuel the fire
No sector can solve this challenge alone. The benefits of wildfire resilience are shared across communities, governments, insurers, investors, utilities and businesses. A single intervention can protect homes and livelihoods, reduce insurance claims, secure water supplies and lower future public costs. Because the benefits are shared, the solutions must be too. Coalitions of actors can take proven approaches further than any one individual or organisation could alone.
As wildfires continue to burn at an unprecedented scale, the opportunity now is to roll out solutions, shift investment upstream and build a future where resilience, rather than recovery, becomes the foundation of thriving economies.
The post From firefighting to future-proofing: Preventing wildfires must be the priority appeared first on Climate Home News.
From firefighting to future-proofing: Preventing wildfires must be the priority
Climate Change
Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C
Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas and the second-largest contributor to global warming after carbon dioxide (CO2).
Methane traps heat in the atmosphere more efficiently than CO2, but has a significantly shorter lifespan, fading after just a few decades.
Therefore, reducing emissions of methane – a gas primarily produced by agriculture, fossil fuels and waste management – is a powerful option for limiting global warming in the near-term.
Yet climate strategies and models often only focus on CO2, or combine all greenhouse gases into one metric known as “CO2 equivalent”.
The latter approach makes reducing methane emissions dependent on modelling choices and assumptions about the “equivalence” of methane and CO2.
It hides the opportunities and challenges linked to methane’s high warming and short lifetime.
In a new study, published in Communications Earth & Environment, we offer a different perspective that “decouples” CO2 and methane reduction and takes global warming limits as a starting point for determining the required level of methane cuts.
We show that, even under the most ambitious existing national net-zero targets, an absence of methane reduction leads to peak warming that exceeds 1.85C above pre-industrial levels.
The study highlights that, to limit peak warming to well-below 2C, net-zero CO2 targets must be complemented by stringent methane emissions cuts.
CO2 equivalent
How much methane corresponds to one tonne of CO2?
The question is as difficult to answer as: ‘how much spaghetti equals a chicken?’ You could compare the two meals according to their calories, protein content or cost. Each metric can be convenient, but is only valid for that specific comparison – no amount of spaghetti is the same as a chicken.
The same is true for the conversion of emissions of methane and other gases to CO2-equivalent emissions. It can be convenient, as it allows different gases to be compared or combined into a single number. This is why the metric is used in climate targets or evaluating the effectiveness of different mitigation options.
But, because methane and CO2 have different atmospheric lifetimes and warming properties, any conversion is only valid for a chosen time horizon and a chosen baseline.
Depending on the assumptions baked into calculations, methane mitigation can either appear as an immediate priority or framed as almost unnecessary.
There are a number of metrics that scientists use to convert greenhouse gases – whether methane, hydrofluorocarbons or nitrous oxide – into CO2-equivalent emissions:
- “GWP20” measures how much heat a greenhouse gas traps in the atmosphere over a 20-year period, relative to CO2. It emphasises urgent methane mitigation but has been criticised for its implicit discounting of future damages.
- “GWP100” looks at a 100-year timeline. It gives more weight to long-term warming and is used in “integrated assessment models” (IAMs) used by scientists, national emission reporting to the UN and by the GHG Protocol used by companies.
- “GWP*” considers the rate of emissions, rather than warming over a fixed time horizon. Under GWP*, very limited methane reductions bring CO2-equivalent emissions to zero, meaning remaining methane emissions can be designated as causing “no additional warming”. (This interpretation remains controversial as it assumes the continuation of historical levels of warming.)
IAMs are the tools used to generate future emissions scenarios. Because they combine CO2 and methane emissions, the impact of methane emission cuts alone is difficult to isolate in existing emission scenarios.
IAM-generated scenarios also assume mitigation decisions driven by costs. Combinations of CO2 and methane emission pathways that are not purely cost-effective are, therefore, not represented, even though climate policy is messy and emission pathways are rarely cost-effective in the real world.
Only a few countries – including Japan, Mexico and South Korea – specify methane mitigation targets.
A different approach
In our study, we separate CO2 and methane emissions and treat them as independent.
Instead of choosing a conversion method, we suggest that states and organisations set a limit on peak global warming first, then, based on their existing net-zero targets, determine the minimum compatible methane reduction target.
Companies and countries around the world have set net-zero targets focused on CO2, as well as those that include all greenhouse gases. As a result, our research looks at the necessary methane reductions for both types of goal. We consider scenarios where companies or countries deliver linear – in other words, steady – emissions reductions to reach net-zero.
Using a simple climate model, we systematically combined methane and CO2 (or greenhouse gas) mitigation pathways starting in 2025 and calculated peak warming.
The figure below shows how peak warming depends on both the year of reaching net-zero CO2 and the level of methane cuts.
The blue arrows in the figure show that to limit warming to 1.7C under a 2050 net-zero CO2 scenario, methane emissions would need to fall by at least 69% by 2050, relative to 2020.
Our research also finds that, if an organisation or country’s 2050 net zero-target covers all greenhouse gases, its methane emissions would need to fall by 63% instead.
However, under current policies, methane emissions are expected to increase by around 20% by 2050, relative to 2020. We find that this pathway would result in peak warming above 2C by 2050 – even if global CO2 emissions were to reach net-zero by that date (see purple bar on the right-hand side of the figure above).
The figure also shows how, if methane emissions remained at 2020 levels and net-zero CO2 was delivered by 2040 or later, warming would exceed 1.85C. This level of warming is above what has been argued as consistent with the Paris Agreement’s “well-below” 2C limit.
Conversely, cutting methane emissions by around one-third – in line with the Global Methane Pledge target for 2030 – could reduce peak warming by 0.15C, of which 0.05C could be delivered by interventions that come at no net cost. These are shown by the orange and red bars, respectively, on the figure above.
The table below highlights the minimum compatible methane cuts for three different peak warming levels and net-zero CO2 or greenhouse-gas emission targets.
| Peak warming | Year of net-zero CO2 emissions | Year of net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions | ||||
| 2050 | 2060 | 2100 | 2050 | 2060 | 2100 | |
| 1.7C | -69% | – | – | -63% | – | – |
| 1.8C | -32% | -56% | – | -11% | -47% | – |
| 2C | +8% | -8% | -83% | >50% | +33% | -78% |
Minimum methane emission reductions between 2020 and the year of net-zero emissions, consistent with peak warming of 1.7C, 1.8C, and 2.0C at 50% likelihood, assuming linear emission trajectories. For some net-zero targets and peak warming levels, there are no compatible methane mitigation targets (indicated by “–”).
Remaining carbon budget
The global carbon budget refers to the amount of cumulative CO2 emissions allowable while still meeting a particular global warming threshold.
The 2021 climate science report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a 2023 Nature study estimated that, by 2025, the remaining carbon budget for holding warming to 2C would be around 1,000-1,150bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2).
We find that these estimates are founded on the assumption of methane reductions of 27-35% by 2050, relative to a 2020 baseline. (A 2024 Communications Earth & Environment study reached similar conclusions.)
Under the GWP* metric, where methane emissions are only cut to maintain “no additional warming”, the remaining carbon budget would be constrained. The best estimate of a 2C budget shrinks by around 30% to approximately 750GtCO2.
Finally, if methane emissions are not cut at all in the future, our findings suggest that the remaining carbon budget for 1.7C of global warming has, in effect, already been exhausted.
Our analysis shows how peak warming depends on both CO2 and methane reduction – and how methane-specific targets can help refine existing net-zero targets.
Crucially, we show that complementing net-zero CO2 targets with stringent methane cuts is necessary to limit peak warming to well-below 2C.
Weber, K. et al. (2026) Limiting warming by CO2 and methane mitigation in an expanded scenario space, Communications Earth & Environment, doi:10.1038/s43247-026-03832-1
related
Guest post: France’s June heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths
Guest post: Climate change has caused one-fifth of Pine Island glacier retreat
Q&A: What change of power in Colombia could mean for world’s fossil-fuel transition
Guest post: How US renewable-energy growth persists despite federal policy uncertainty
The post Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C
-
Climate Change1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Renewable Energy10 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
嘉宾来稿:探究火山喷发如何影响气候预测
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits




