China’s solar and windfarms would no longer be guaranteed sales at a fixed price linked to coal benchmarks, under a new policy released by the central government.
The policy asks local governments to shift new wind and solar projects to a more market-based pricing system by the end of 2025.
Said local governments will determine the details of the proposed “sustainable new-energy pricing mechanism” (新能源可持续发展价格结算机制).
In broad terms, however, the idea is that new wind and solar schemes would be paid a fixed price determined at auction in a system that resembles the UK’s “contract for difference” mechanism.
The move is part of wider efforts to shift the operation of China’s giant electricity system towards more market-based signals, rather than administratively set prices.
It also reflects a growing need to manage the integration of renewables into the system, with record wind and solar capacity added last year creating “conflict” with coal power.
While existing projects would continue to be paid under the old system, new wind and solar schemes will face a more uncertain business outlook, analysts tell Carbon Brief.
However, they say that, in the long run and with the right implementation strategies, the new mechanism could make renewables more innovative and even more cost-effective for power consumers, compared to coal.
More ‘market-oriented’
From 2026, China has announced that the price of electricity generated from solar and wind schemes will be determined according to competitive auctions.
This will replace the existing fixed rates solar and wind received for their power, which was pegged to benchmarks for coal-fired power, with the new mechanism likely making prices for renewables much cheaper than coal.
The new system resembles the two-way “contract for difference” (CfD) mechanism used in the UK and elsewhere. Under this type of mechanism, power generators are paid a fixed “strike price” for each unit of electricity they produce.
If market prices for power fall below this level, generators receive the difference as a top-up payment, but they must pay back the difference if prices rise above it instead.
This setup would allow developers to have “reasonable and stable expectations” for revenue, which will support a “healthy” industry and China’s energy transition, representatives of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planning body, and National Energy Agency (NEA) say in an official Q&A on the policy.
Despite some reporting to the contrary, the move does not constitute a rollback of subsidies for renewables, as grid operators have paid the same price for coal-fired power and wind and solar power since 2021.
Bringing prices up to date
The change to the rules has been attributed to the sharp reduction in the cost of building new solar and windfarms, prompting questions around whether renewable generators should be paid the same amount as infrastructure-heavy coal plants.
“The coal-fired grid benchmark rate was last updated in 2017 and actually has no relationship to the generation cost of renewables,” David Fishman, senior manager at the energy consultancy Lantau Group, tells Carbon Brief, adding the price was effectively “arbitrary”.
The NDRC and NEA Q&A argues that renewable energy schemes operating on a fixed tariff “cannot fully reflect market supply and demand” and do not “fairly [distribute] responsibility for power system flexibility”.
Fishman adds that the timing of the announcement may have been linked to the situation China experienced late last year, which saw unusually high curtailment of renewable energy at a time when analysts expected low-carbon power to cover new demand growth.
An analysis written in summer 2024 by Shi Jingli, a researcher from the NDRC-affiliated Energy Research Institute (ERI), argued that the UK’s CfD system “significantly reduced renewable energy tariffs and the government’s overall expenditure on renewable energy projects”, which also indicates that cost may be a driving factor behind the change.
Other changes
The new rules will only apply to projects developed from June 2025 onwards. They will apply to all sources of wind and solar power, from huge clean-energy “bases” to distributed generators such as solar rooftops.
In order to facilitate the increasingly market-based operation of the electricity system, the new notice encourages local governments to “improve spot market trading rules” and “accelerate” voluntary participation in day-ahead trading.
It also encourages the increased use of multi-year power purchase agreements (PPAs) and other forms of medium- and long-term contracts, among both renewable projects developed before the June 2025 cut-off date (called stock, 存量) and new schemes (called incremental, 增量).
Meanwhile, energy storage requirements for new wind and solar projects have been revoked, in a move that economic news outlet Jiemian says “will have a huge impact on the energy storage industry”.
The policy also notes that local authorities could consider implementing similar systems for biomass, geothermal and other power generators.
No pain, no gain
The exact impact that this will have on renewable developers will depend on the implementing rules adopted by local governments, according to Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA).
In the short-term, these companies will be hit by the loss of the guaranteed demand and the need to adapt to the low prices and fierce competition of the new system, Fishman says.
Many projects initially slated for completion later in 2025 may be rushed through in order to be eligible to stay on the current system, resulting in a spike in added capacity in the second quarter of the year followed by a dip in the third quarter, he tells Carbon Brief.
Companies will also need to pivot to have stronger marketing and sales capabilities, says Wang Jihong, senior counsel at law firm Zhong Lun, as the policy encourages greater uptake of renewable energy through PPAs. In an article published by Lexology she advises companies to focus on “high-efficiency” and “large-capacity” technologies.
This may have an impact on China’s growing distributed solar and wind sectors.
Distributed projects are much more likely to be run by smaller companies who may not have the resources to adapt to the new mechanism, according to Fishman, which could cause opportunities for distributed energy to “dry up”.
At the same time, the new policy may also force renewable energy power companies to innovate – both in terms of technology, and of business models and management practices, says Dr Muyi Yang, senior energy analyst for Asia at the thinktank Ember.
Yang tells Carbon Brief:
“[The new regulations] will help shift the clean energy sector from ‘subsidy-dependency’ to being ‘innovation-driven’ and contributing to innovation-based growth – what is often referred to in China as ‘new quality productive forces’.”
Stronger in the long-term?
The new pricing system may nevertheless give wind and solar the advantage in the long-term. Reform of the power market has long been seen as crucial to increasing uptake of renewables.
The new prices are expected to be much lower than the tariff for coal power. Myllyvirta writes that wind and solar, as the “most affordable” sources of power, should be able to “hold their own in competition if the rules are set right”.
The cost of developing solar and wind power has halved over the past ten years, an expert tells 21st Century Business Herald.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that the pressure of being subjected to the market could make low-carbon energy “more competitive” and “help reduce inefficient investment”, which will be a “critical factor for the long-term transition of China’s energy sector”.
But local governments would need to take steps to maintain investor confidence in the face of low prices, Fishman says. For example, significantly raising provincial renewable consumption targets could provide a strong demand signal, showing wind and solar developers that there is still a “way to make money” through increased volume.
If the government “gets the numbers just a little bit wrong”, he says, the amount of new wind and solar being added to the grid “will drop off a cliff”.
At the same time, coal-fired power plants are continuing to receive policy and financial support, in the form of guaranteed demand from long-term contracts and compensation to keep excess capacity online.
China has ramped up construction of new coal plants, with almost 100 gigawatts of new capacity expected to come online in the next few years, according to recent research by CREA and Global Energy Monitor.
If they are not exposed to competition in the same way that wind and solar farms will be, Myllyvirta argues, then renewables may be “crowded out from the power market by inflexible coal plants”.
Fishman is more sanguine about the future role of coal, however. He tells Carbon Brief that the new policy may give coal plants “a little bit of a boost” in the short-term, but that China’s carbon peaking goal sets a hard deadline for reducing their role in the power system and means they will face “diminishing returns”.
He adds that the real competition for coal plants are other coal plants, as only the “newest, the most efficient [and] the super-critical” plants will have a future as China moves towards carbon neutrality.
The post Explainer: How China’s renewable pricing reforms will affect its climate goals appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Explainer: How China’s renewable pricing reforms will affect its climate goals
June Rubis is a steering group committee member for the Cali Fund, from Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo.
At COP16 in Cali, governments made a significant commitment: at least half of the funding from the new Cali Fund should support the self-identified needs of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, including women and youth. It was a watershed moment for multilateral benefit-sharing.
The challenge now is to translate that commitment into access arrangements that recognise the different institutions, priorities and decision-making processes of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.
For generations, biodiversity and traditional Indigenous knowledge have provided significant value to companies who depend on nature’s genetic diversity to discover new drugs that fight diseases, create products that improve health, and grow crops resilient to extreme heat and flooding events. While some compounds are sampled directly from the source country, increasingly the digital blueprints are held in online public databases which are freely accessible to use for innovation and research.
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The Cali Fund was established at COP16 to encourage commercial users of Digital Sequence Information, or DSI, to share benefits arising from its use. Estimates suggest it could generate over $3.5 billion a year – a stark contrast to the modest $10,656 currently committed to the fund from just five SMEs, underlining how much progress must be made at COP17 over the next two weeks.
The COP16 decision that set up the fund offers two routes for money to reach Indigenous Peoples and local communities: through government authorities, and through direct payments to institutions identified by Indigenous Peoples and local communities themselves.
Varied ways of organising
Indigenous Peoples and local communities organise through a wide range of institutions. Some have national or regional organisations experienced in managing international grants. Others work through territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations, cooperatives or networks. Some have professional finance teams and audited accounts; others have extensive experience governing territories, collective resources or conservation work without having been organised around international funding requirements.
For direct access, some questions are already apparent. Which institutions should be able to receive funds? How should they be identified? What fiduciary standards should apply? How should safeguards and accountability work where institutional capacities differ? What support may be needed where institutions have strong community mandates but less experience with international finance?
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If access is designed mainly around institutions that already meet the expectations of large international finance mechanisms, early funding will tend to favour those already familiar to funders. They will gain further experience and become better positioned for future funding, while institutions with less administrative capacity may remain outside the system despite strong community mandates and long histories of stewardship.
These first decisions matter most, because they set the terms for everyone who follows.
The role of intermediaries requires care. Some Indigenous organisations may want a fiscal host to hold and manage funds on their behalf. Communities may choose to work through an NGO they trust. Government-facilitated arrangements may work well in particular national contexts.
What matters is the function an intermediary performs and the authority that comes with it. Providing administrative support is different from deciding which Indigenous organisations qualify, which priorities can receive support, or how success will be assessed. Direct access means communities keep that decision-making authority.
Decision-making power
The COP16 decision refers to institutions that Indigenous Peoples and local communities identify. But authority among Indigenous Peoples does not sit in one kind of body. It may sit with territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations or combinations of these. Legal recognition and customary authority do not always align neatly.
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An important feature of the Cali Fund’s governance is that Indigenous Peoples and local communities participate as full members of the Steering Committee, rather than as observers. Seven Indigenous Peoples and local community representatives, one from each of the seven socio-cultural regions, participate in consensus-based decision-making alongside representatives of governments and UN entities. Six additional representatives from civil society, scientific institutions and the private sector participate as observers.
That representation carries responsibility. Institutional legitimacy, access and representation take different forms across the seven socio-cultural regions. Indigenous Peoples and local communities members therefore have an important role in bringing those differences into the Fund’s governance and in ensuring that arrangements developed for one context do not become the assumed model for everyone else.
Safeguards and clear responsibilities
COP17 can establish the core principles and direction, while allowing operational pathways to develop in ways that respond to different regional contexts. The decisions countries take in Yerevan will shape how that flexibility is realised in practice.
The choices made around access will influence which institutions are able to participate, which routes become established and which forms of authority are recognised within the funding architecture. The aim should be an architecture with enough structure to maintain confidence while allowing for different forms of Indigenous and community governance.
A credible direct-access pathway will need safeguards, financial oversight and clear responsibilities. This would give the 50% commitment a stronger institutional foundation.
The Cali Fund’s importance will ultimately depend not only on how much funding reaches Indigenous Peoples and local communities, but on whether they are able to determine how the money is accessed, governed and used. This requires access pathways that recognise their institutions, priorities and decision-making processes, rather than requiring them to conform to a single predetermined model.
The post COP17 must settle who decides how Cali Fund money is disbursed appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP17 must settle who decides how Cali Fund money is disbursed
The UK government has approved extraction at the Jackdaw gas field in the North Sea, despite acknowledging that this decision could make it harder for Britain to convince other countries to move away from fossil fuel production.
UK energy secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh approved the drilling on Wednesday after months of high-profile debate, fuelled in part by interventions from US President Donald Trump. She argued that the project would boost energy security in the wake of the Middle East fossil fuel crisis, protect hundreds of jobs and add £2.9 billion ($3.88bn) to the UK economy.
She said Jackdaw’s gas would be cleaner than imported gas and would not prevent the UK from meeting its legally-binding carbon targets and its goal of net zero by 2050. As the field is already licensed, she said extraction was consistent with the Labour Party’s 2024 manifesto promise not to issue any new oil and gas licenses.
The same morning, the government announced a new Energy Wealth Fund to reinvest oil and gas revenues in the climate transition. It will start with £2 billion ($2.67bn) from the government and be topped up over time with tax revenues from offshore oil and gas production.
Climate campaigners in the UK and abroad were quick to condemn the decision, while a leading legal expert told Climate Home News it goes against the advice of the International Court of Justice. Meanwhile, the government’s own documents reveal that it recognises the drilling could damage the UK’s reputation and its ability to push forward the global transition away from fossil fuels.
“Climate leadership” blow
The 92-page decision document says Fahnbulleh “acknowledges that international standing on climate is important and accepts that a decision to grant consent may not further the UK’s international climate leadership.”
It adds: “She acknowledges concerns about the potential implications for the UK’s credibility and influence – including the difficulty inherent in encouraging other states to move away from fossil fuel production while the UK continues, in a limited and transitional way, to draw on its own domestic resources.”
While noting that Jackdaw has not been issued with a new license – just permission to extract gas – the document says Fahnbulleh “accepts this does not fully resolve the underlying tension in the UK’s position” but “considers this alongside the substance of the UK’s wider record [on emissions reduction], which remains significant”.
It continues that she accepts these concerns are “legitimate” and weigh against approving gas extraction, but only gives this argument a “moderate negative weight” set against the benefits of gas production.
“Huge” wrong signal
In international climate talks, the UK has long supported the transition away from fossil fuels and is one of very few major oil and gas producers to ban new licenses. Across the North Sea, the Norwegian government continues to make offshore areas available for oil and gas exploration through annual licensing rounds.
Climate experts and campaigners shared the concern, acknowledged in the decision document, that approving Jackdaw could set a precedent for fossil fuel production elsewhere. Sam Fankhauser, professor of climate change economics at Oxford University, said the direct climate impact of Jackdaw is “much smaller than the debate around it would suggest” but the “wrong signal it sends, however, is huge”.
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Bob Ward, policy and communications director at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change, said that while Jackdaw’s output will be very small, “it will signal to other fossil fuel producers that they too should carry on with business as usual, less than a month before the COP31”.
Kenyan campaigner Mohamed Adow, director of Power Shift Africa, called the decision “a serious blow to Britain’s international climate credibility” as “the UK cannot expect developing countries to move away from fossil fuels while giving the green light to new drilling in its own backyard”.
International Court of Justice
In July 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advised that government failure to take appropriate climate action “including through fossil fuel production” may amount to an internationally wrongful act.
The UK voted in favour of a United Nations resolution welcoming the advisory opinion. Yet, in its Jackdaw decision document, it notes that the ICJ opinion is not legally binding and says the UK does not accept the court’s opinion that the customary international law duty to prevent significant harm to the environment applies to climate change.
Fahnbulleh concludes that, although it will have “significant effect on the environment”, gas drilling in Jackdaw “would not lead to significant harm to the environment” – and so does not breach any duty to prevent such harm. Instead, the government document says the duty should be considered “as a matter of policy rather than legal obligation”.
Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh, who led Vanuatu’s legal team pushing for the ICJ’s advisory opinion, told Climate Home News that treating the duty as a matter of policy rather than legal obligation is “not how international law works”. “An advisory opinion is not a judgement,” she said, “but it states the law as it stands, and that law binds the UK whether or not it accepts it.”
“Even as a matter of policy,” she added, “the decision asks the wrong question: whether Jackdaw on its own would cause significant harm. The Court found that accumulated emissions are already causing significant harm. What matters is whether approving new production is consistent with the stringent due diligence the duty requires.”