In 2024, the world is facing one of the most volatile geopolitical outlooks in decades.
More than 50 countries, accounting for half of the global population, are going to the polls, with high levels of political uncertainty across many of the world’s largest economies.
Additionally, ongoing conflicts, extreme weather events, trade disputes and resource competition are contributing to geopolitical volatility.
With the world nearly half way through a “critical decade” for climate action, overcoming geopolitical risks in order to start rapidly cutting emissions is paramount to limiting global warming.
Carbon Brief has asked a range of scientists, policy experts and campaigners from around the world what they think the biggest geopolitical risks to climate action will be in 2024.
These are their responses, first as sample quotes, then, below, in full:
- Prof Jason Bordoff: “We are currently at risk of a troubling downward spiral, in which today’s geopolitical conflicts are complicating and slowing the energy transition.”
- Olivia Lazard: “Structural and dynamic risks lead to grievances ripe for an economic, political and/or geo-politicised backlash against or away from climate action.”
- Faten Aggad: “From an African perspective, the key challenge is that the geopolitical tension between China and the US/EU will be used as an excuse this year to argue for a limited increase in climate finance.”
- Jennie King: Many are using “climate issue… as a gateway to undermine democratic life and norms.”
- Iskander Erzini Vernoit: “Development assistance and aid budgets are at risk of being slashed by shortsighted politicians.”
- Dr Dhanasree Jayaram: “The India-China conflict poses immense risks to transboundary climate and water cooperation.”
- Anna Ackermann: “Right-wing populism gaining visibility and votes in democracies means there is a risk of rising anti-climate sentiments.”
- Juan Pablo Medina Bickel: “The global discussion to protect the Amazonian rainforest requires incorporating a security angle.”
- Prof Sophia Kalantzakos: “The road to net-zero and global digitalisation have been subsumed by … power struggles, driven by Sino-American hyper-competition exacerbated further by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”
- Kate Logan: “Concerns over China’s [clean-tech] dominance have further entrenched protectionist policies in the US and EU especially, where climate action is increasingly intertwined with economic competitiveness and political support from domestic industrial bases.”
Jason Bordoff
Founding director
Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs
Today’s increasingly volatile and unstable geopolitical environment is one of the most powerful forces shaping the global energy transition and climate action. We are currently at risk of a troubling downward spiral, in which today’s geopolitical conflicts are complicating and slowing the energy transition, while the risks of a disorderly transition risk exacerbating some of today’s most troublesome geopolitical trends.
Increasingly fraught global conflicts are sapping resources and political will to address the climate crisis, from the Middle East to Russia’s unjustified aggression against Ukraine. Most recently, strikes by Israel and Iran directly against one another have inflamed tensions, escalating risks in a region critical to climate action that may also have ripple effects globally.
Additionally, great power competition between many of the countries needed to lead on climate action, notably the US and China, is rewriting the rules of the international economic order and complicating climate action further. The urgency of accelerating the deployment of clean energy technologies far more rapidly than is the case today risks being hampered by concerns about national security, economic competitiveness fueled by the rise of industrial policy, and supply chain resilience that could raise the costs of those technologies. A recent example of this concern was the Biden administration’s launching of a national security investigation into the risks posed by imported Chinese electric vehicles.
While there are real policy concerns to address with regard to China’s dominance in clean energy supply chains, there is also a real tension between limiting China’s market access and scaling clean energy technologies at the speed and scale needed for climate action.
Finally, there are signs of growing resentment and backlash by emerging and developing economies at the perceived unfairness in how the energy transition is unfolding. Leaders in the global south increasingly point to the inability of countries responsible for most of the cumulative emissions to mobilise capital for the transition in lower income countries, or what they see as hypocrisy in how wealthier countries approach fossil fuel investment at home versus in energy-poor countries, among other concerns. As a significant share of future emissions growth will come from emerging and developing economies and more than half of investment is needed in those countries by the early 2030s, ensuring they see the transition as proceeding in a just and equitable way is essential.
Olivia Lazard
Fellow
Carnegie Europe
The list is long! It is a year when a third of the world is going to the election polls, including in the EU and in the US. Needless to say, a radical right wave in the west would be disastrous for the coherence of climate trajectories. It would undermine the key message that democracies can deliver on social contracts and inter-generational stakes. In Europe, the radical right has been making progress on the back of economic and societal issues, but one should not underestimate two other factors that magnify the risks.
The first one is disinformation and misinformation, especially the kinds piloted from Russia. The latter has perfected the art of fragmentation weaponisation in all its forms, including on the information and policy debate. Its tactics are both diffuse – via social media and digitalisation – and direct – co-opting and/or influencing political actors in Europe to serve its own interests.
The second one is Europe’s own geopolitical blindspots, lack of foresight and, therefore, lack of strategic communication to European citizens. As opposed to what [European Commission] president [Ursula] von der Leyen said, the world is not going through a series of “crises”, which require weathering through. The world is in a state of biospheric, economic and power transitions, which require adaptation and transformation. Europe did not anticipate the paradigm shifts which are now unfolding. Political extremes are, however, riding the wave of this lack of anticipation to come to power and cement a more protectionist approach. The latter will break trust that Europe needs to deliver legally-binding climate action, and more largely, that Europe needs to exist.
Underpinning election-related risks is inflation. 2023 was indeed a record-breaking year from a climate perspective. Global temperature average overshot past the 1.5C threshold compared to pre-industrial levels on a few occasions. Marine and pole temperatures broke records that indicate tipping points may activate sooner than later. El Nino contributed to dramatic impacts on various forms of agriculture. These global trends may seem abstract, but they indicate that the world is indeed headed towards more impactful forms of “natural” hazards – which translate in economic shocks at various levels – combined with more structural forms of scarcity and shortages, particularly with regards to water and food.
These combined dynamic forms of economic stress will have different effects: disruption of agricultural and industrial, energy sources and trade passage points; inflation levels will remain a growing concern in the global economic system. This will have direct purchasing power impacts on vulnerable populations in all countries alike, with potential for active breakdown of social contracts in some countries, and change in political tides in others – including pushing a swell of radical parties in Europe. On a more macro-economic level, it will keep straining relationships between countries of the global north and global south, with detrimental effects on debt-relief conversations. Yet, the latter are absolutely crucial to enhance global adaptation and [emissions] mitigation capacity.
All of these structural and dynamic risks lead to grievances ripe for an economic, political and/or geo-politicised backlash against or away from climate action. Considering that we’re in the pivot years towards a world past the 1.5C threshold, to say that this would be disastrous is an understatement.
Faten Aggad
CEO
African Future Policies Hub
All eyes are on the US presidential election and what [candidate Donald] Trump will do.
From an African perspective, the key challenge is that the geopolitical tension between China and the US/EU will be used as an excuse this year to argue for a limited increase in climate finance. We are likely to see this play out during COP29 [in Baku] when the discussion on the new financing goal is due to be discussed – [including the] insistence of western countries on a contributor base that includes China – as well as the replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA).
The insistence on financing through specific frameworks – rather than net flows to developing countries – is not constructive and risks poisoning discussions around international commitments for climate finance.
While it is clear that the quantum needs to be increased and that contributions need to come from all high polluters, any attempts to capture the discussion by adding these geopolitical tensions will be seen as a lack of commitment by developing countries. Understandably, these countries can only commit to decarbonisation – and to more ambitious NDCs next year – if they have a sense that there is serious consideration for their argument on financial flows.
Also, internationally, the major risk is emission increase due to the issues on the Red Sea shipping route (estimated at [being an increase in emissions up to] 11%), as well as announced increase in weapon manufacturing due to increased demands. Considering that the defence sector estimated carbon footprint stands at 5.5% of global emissions, this is concerning.
Jennie King
Director of climate research and policy
Institute for Strategic Dialogue
It’s generally assumed that mis- and disinformation in this space has a clear policy goal: weaken the public mandate for action, slow down the legislative process and, ultimately, maintain the status quo of the carbon economy. By confusing the public, actors can delay progress and prevent us from achieving a sustainable, decarbonised future.
That remains true in many cases, but I think there is a bigger or parallel game at play: climate issues are also being used as a gateway to undermine democratic life and norms. Nowadays, the aim of much content is not just to delay net-zero, but rather weaken trust in political systems and institutions writ large. Framing climate action as an elite conspiracy or inherently undemocratic, and feeding into wider anti-establishment sentiment, has proven very successful.
Climate is by no means the only victim of that trend, which has also impacted issues like racial justice, sexual and reproductive health, civil rights and electoral integrity. But I think what makes it uniquely vulnerable is how holistic the problem is and how every pocket of society has to be involved in the transition moving forward.
By its very nature, climate is a problem that requires not only big government solutions, but multilateral cooperation. We are living in a time where people have lost faith or patience in either of those things. Citizens are suspicious of government and sceptical that policymaking can actually yield results. At the same time, nativism and isolationism are on the rise. That means the idea of doing things collaboratively with other countries – potentially even hostile states – and the global community rallying together around a shared crisis is an easy one to exploit and turn people against.
When we think about the problem in this huge election year – the so-called “year of democracy” – and beyond, I see those as the two parallel challenges: one, ongoing and coordinated efforts to thwart climate action, often funded by billions of corporate dollars; second, the way that climate is being weaponised to increase social division and embed the idea that democracy doesn’t work. We cannot address one without the other.
Iskander Erzini Vernoit
Director
IMAL Initiative for Climate & Development
The most significant question to be addressed within the multilateral climate regime – in 2024 – is that of international climate finance. The new collective quantified goal (“NCQG”) on climate finance in the UNFCCC, mandated [as part of the Paris Agreement] to be agreed before 2025, is to exceed and replace the goal of $100bn per year originally agreed in Copenhagen.
This will be enormously consequential to the future of climate action, as a time-limited window for governments to start, essentially for the first time, having responsible conversations about the magnitude of climate finance required to deliver the Paris Agreement. Climate change mitigation, including but not limited to energy transition, adaptation and loss and damage entail financing needs for poorer countries in the trillions of dollars per annum (in terms of overall nominal public/private sums required), of which at least hundreds of billions are needed in public finance support (in grant-equivalent terms).
One great risk in 2024 is that geopolitical rivalries between the so-called superpowers distract from the urgent need to scale up finance from the world’s richer countries to the world’s poorer countries, amid widespread sovereign debt distress and a shrinking window to deliver the Paris Agreement and UN Sustainable Development Goals.
Despite the historical examples of the highest peaks in development spending being motivated by geopolitical rivalries, development assistance and aid budgets are at risk of being slashed by shortsighted politicians precisely when an increase is needed.
Dr Dhanasree Jayaram
Assistant professor at the department of geopolitics and international relations, and co-coordinator of Centre for Climate Studies (CCS)
Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Karnataka, India
South Asia is fraught with multiple crises, including political instability, socio-economic uncertainty, ecological fragility and resource inaccessibility. Both internal and transboundary challenges impede much-needed climate action to protect the most vulnerable populations in the region. The region is not immune to global developments such as the wars in Ukraine and Middle East either, as they have had adverse impacts on the countries’ energy and food security – making them less climate-resilient.
The governance gap is exacerbated by regional geopolitical tensions too. For example, the India-China conflict poses immense risks to transboundary climate and water cooperation. In fact, border infrastructure expansion and troop buildup could increase fossil fuel dependencies and socio-ecological vulnerabilities, especially in the Hindu Kush Himalayan region that sustains major ecosystems and river basins of South Asia.
More importantly, the lack of trust and robust institutional arrangements, despite common/shared challenges, hampers regional cooperation. While many transboundary ecological concerns in the region such as climate migration, fisheries management and air pollution lack governance mechanisms, many mutually beneficial opportunities are not being capitalised on, such as cross-border renewable energy trade.
Anna Ackermann
Policy analyst at the International Institute for Sustainable Development
Board member at the Centre for Environmental Initiatives “Ecoaction”
Global movement to advance climate action requires sustainable peace, opportunities for development of the green economy around the world and a fair contribution from all countries responsible for historically high shares of greenhouse gas emissions. More people should be living in democracies to ensure their rights are protected, including the right to a clean environment and climate protection. Unfortunately, the world is becoming more complicated, with higher geopolitical risks and many uncertainties.
The ongoing military conflicts are likely to continue or escalate. Having moved from authoritarianism to totalitarianism, Russia keeps running the economy and financing its war against Ukraine – the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II – with fossil fuels. Russia is gaining billions of dollars weekly from its oil and gas exports, while increasing military spending to the record $110bn this year. As Ukraine struggles to protect itself without sufficient international support and an unstable situation with the upcoming US elections, European countries boost their defence preparedness. This sets security on top of the agenda both on national level and globally – during most world leader meetings.
As half of the world will be voting in 2024, we see worrying trends of democratic backsliding and autocratisation of countries around the globe. We tend to focus criticism for the lack of climate action on democracies (often fairly enough). Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes do not allow criticism as such, preferring civil society’s silence or absence, and use of harmful disinformation tactics at home and abroad. Right-wing populism gaining visibility and votes in democracies means there is a risk of rising anti-climate sentiments. As we saw in recent years, this may well translate into shockwaves to international climate policies and COP outcomes.
Juan Pablo Medina Bickel
Research associate
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Tackling deforestation in the Amazonian rainforest, the world’s largest tropical forest, also known as the planet’s lungs for its carbon-sinking characteristics, is key for the global climate action agenda.
The protection of this rainforest requires addressing multiple drivers of forest loss, including the expansion of transnational drug trafficking and related environmental crime linked to illegal mining, logging and cattle ranching. Yet, the discussion of security and armed conflict risks across the Amazon in global fora is limited. The current international security agenda is largely focused on the Russian-Ukraine war, the Israel-Palestinian Territories armed conflict, and the Red Sea crisis. Moreover, the Venezuelan displacement emergency with over seven million refugees and migrants, the worst humanitarian crisis in the western hemisphere in decades, has taken centre stage in diplomatic, developmental assistance and security cooperation talks in the Americas. In particular, the record level of irregular Venezuelan migration into the US across the Mexican border has become a priority for US foreign relations with the region.
All in all, in 2024 the global discussion to protect the Amazonian rainforest requires incorporating a security angle.
Prof Sophia Kalantzakos
Global distinguished professor, environmental studies and public policy
New York University Abu Dhabi
The road to net-zero and global digitalisation have been subsumed by realist power struggles, driven by Sino-American hyper-competition exacerbated further by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Supply chains and the fourth industrial revolution have become securitised, and a world of “clubs” and “fences” has emerged undermining ties of interdependence. Moreover, the race for critical minerals and the chip wars raise fears of a scramble: for inputs, “geopolitically engineered” supply chains and the building up of tech and knowledge barriers that produce new exclusions and inequities.
This is why I have argued that global climate leadership should not be driven by the US and China. Their relationship is unstable and acrimonious and has proven that climate is readily sacrificed on the altar of their wider rivalries. While ideologically framed as a fight between democracy and autocracy, they struggle to ensure primacy in the green energy and industrial shifts – and more importantly to control the “tech imperium”. To add to the current instability, a Trump victory in November 2024 will pull the US out of the [global] climate regime. While the Biden administration has made extraordinary efforts to transform the US economy, a Trump White House will wreak further havoc in the global order and undermine climate resolve.
Kate Logan
Associate director of climate
Asia Society Policy Institute, Asia Society
With major armed conflicts continuing to divert attention and financial flows, there is no shortage of geopolitical risk to climate action in 2024. From a mitigation perspective especially, the role of China – as both the world’s largest emitter, and the largest producer of decarbonisation technologies – looms large over prospects for progress.
China’s large-scale production of clean energy technologies, such as solar panels, electric vehicles and batteries has brought down the cost of these critical products and spurred their uptake. But concerns over China’s dominance have further entrenched protectionist policies in the US and EU, especially, where climate action is increasingly intertwined with economic competitiveness and political support from domestic industrial bases.
Analysis by Wood Mackenzie indicates that excluding Chinese cleantech from global markets would raise the cost of the energy transition 20% by 2050, or $6tn. While supply chain diversification is important, how the world navigates these tensions will pose major implications for the speed and cost of emissions reductions – including in developing countries that don’t necessarily want to choose between the US and China.
Domestically in China, political support for new coal power continues in the name of energy security. How soon the country can peak its emissions and bring them into structural decline will largely depend on power sector reforms and whether massive deployment of renewables can dampen coal power utilisation.
The entire world is also watching the US presidential election. A Trump victory would remove US pressure on China and other major emitters to cut their domestic emissions faster and introduce a new source of instability that may push countries to further prioritise security. Regardless, under either administration, trade tensions threaten to persist, with proposed legislation on carbon border adjustments receiving bipartisan support in the US Congress.
The post Experts: What are the biggest geopolitical risks to climate action in 2024? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Experts: What are the biggest geopolitical risks to climate action in 2024?
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 23 January 2026: Trump’s Davos tirade; EU wind and solar milestone; High seas hope
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Trump vs world
TILTING AT ‘WINDMILLS’: At the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Donald Trump was quoted by Reuters as saying – falsely – that China makes almost all of the world’s “windmills”, but he had not “been able to find any windfarms in China”, calling China’s buyers “stupid”. The newswire added that China “defended its wind power development” at Davos, with spokesperson Guo Jiakun saying the country’s efforts to tackle climate change and promote renewable energy in the world are “obvious to all”.
SPEECH FACTCHECKED: The Guardian factchecked Trump’s speech, noting China has more wind capacity than any other country, with 40% of global wind generation in 2024 in China. See Carbon Brief’s chart on this topic, posted on BlueSky by Dr Simon Evans.
GREENLAND GRAB: Trump “abruptly stepped back” from threats to seize Greenland with the use of force or leveraging tariffs, downplaying the dispute as a “small ask” for a “piece of ice”, reported Reuters. The Washington Post noted that, while Trump calls climate change “a hoax”, Greenland’s described value is partly due to Arctic environmental shifts opening up new sea routes. French president Macron slammed the White House’s “new colonial approach”, emphasising that climate and energy security remain European “top priorities”, according to BusinessGreen.
Around the world
- EU MILESTONE: For the first time, wind and solar generated more electricity than fossil fuels in the EU last year, reported Reuters. Wind and solar generated 30% of the EU’s electricity in 2025, just above 29% from plants running on coal, gas and oil, according to data from the thinktank Ember covered by the newswire.
- WARM HOMES: The UK government announced a £15bn plan for rolling out low-carbon technology in homes, such as rooftop solar and heat pumps. Carbon Brief’s newly published analysis has all the details.
- BIG THAW: Braving weather delays that nearly “derail[ed] their mission”, scientists finally set up camp on Antarctica’s thawing Thwaites glacier, reported the New York Times. Over the next few weeks, they will deploy equipment to understand “how this gargantuan glacier is being corroded” by warming ocean waters.
- EVS WELCOME: Germany re-introduced electric vehicle subsidies, open to all manufacturers, including those in China, reported the Financial Times. Tesla and Volvo could be the first to benefit from Canada’s “move to slash import tariffs on made-in-China” EVs, said Bloomberg.
- SOUTHERN AFRICA FLOODS: The death toll from floods in Mozambique went up to 112, reported the African Press Agency on Thursday. Officials cited the “scale of rainfall” – 250mm in 24 hours – as a key driver, it added. Frontline quoted South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, who linked the crisis to climate change.
$307bn
The amount of drought-related damages worldwide per year – intensified by land degradation, groundwater depletion and climate change – according to a new UN “water bankruptcy” report.
Latest climate research
- A researcher examined whether the “ultra rich” could and should pay for climate finance | Climatic Change
- Global deforestation-driven surface warming increased by the “size of Spain” between 1988 and 2016 | One Earth
- Increasing per-capita meat consumption by just one kilogram a year is “linked” to a nearly 2% increase in embedded deforestation elsewhere | Environmental Research Letters
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
For the first time since monitoring began 15 years ago, there were more UK newspaper editorials published in 2025 opposing climate action than those supporting it, Carbon Brief analysis found. The chart shows the number of editorials arguing for more (blue) and less (red) climate action between 2011-2025. Editorials that took a “balanced” view are not represented in the chart. All 98 editorials opposing climate action were in right-leaning outlets, while nearly all 46 in support were in left-leaning and centrist publications. The trend reveals the scale of the net-zero backlash in the UK’s right-leaning press, highlighting the rapid shift away from a political consensus.
Spotlight
Do the oceans hold hope for international law?
This week, Carbon Brief unpacks what a landmark oceans treaty “entering into force” means and, at a time of backtracking and breach, speaks to experts on the future of international law.
As the world tries to digest the US retreat from international environmental law, historic new protections for the ocean were quietly passed without the US on Saturday.
With little fanfare besides a video message from UN chief Antonio Guterres, a binding UN treaty to protect biodiversity in two-thirds of the Earth’s oceans “entered into force”.
What does the treaty mean and do?
The High Seas Treaty – formally known as the “biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction”, or “BBNJ” agreement – obliges countries to act in the “common heritage of humankind”, setting aside self-interest to protect biodiversity in international waters. (See Carbon Brief’s in-depth explainer on what the treaty means for climate change).
Agreed in 2023, it requires states to undertake rigorous impact assessments to rein in pollution and share benefits from marine genetic resources with coastal communities and countries. States can also propose marine protected areas to help the ocean – and life within it – become more resilient to “stressors”, such as climate change and ocean acidification.
“It’s a beacon of hope in a very dark place,” Dr Siva Thambisetty, an intellectual property expert at the London School of Economics and an adviser to developing countries at UN environmental negotiations, told Carbon Brief.
Who has signed the agreement?
Buoyed by a wave of commitments at last year’s UN Oceans conference in France, the High Seas treaty has been signed by 145 states, with 84 nations ratifying it into domestic law.
“The speed at which [BBNJ] went from treaty adoption to entering into force is remarkable for an agreement of its scope and impact,” said Nichola Clark, from the NGO Pew Trusts, when ratification crossed the 60-country threshold for it to enter into force last September.
For a legally binding treaty, two years to enter into force is quick. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol – which the US rejected in 2001 – took eight years.
While many operative parts of the BBNJ underline respect for “national sovereignty”, experts say it applies to an area outside national borders, giving territorial states a reason to get on board, even if it has implications for the rest of the oceans.
What is US involvement with the treaty?
The US is not a party to the BBNJ’s parent Law of the Sea, or a member of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) overseeing deep-sea mining.
This has meant that it cannot bid for permits to scour the ocean floor for critical minerals. China and Russia still lead the world in the number of deep-sea exploration contracts. (See Carbon Brief’s explainer on deep-sea mining).
In April 2025, the Biden administration issued an executive order to “unleash America’s offshore critical minerals and resources”, drawing a warning from the ISA.
This Tuesday, the Trump administration published a new rule to “fast-track deep-sea mining” outside its territorial waters without “environmental oversight”, reported Agence France-Presse.
Prof Lavanya Rajamani, an expert in international environmental law at the University of Oxford, told Carbon Brief that, while dealing with US unilateralism and “self-interest” is not new to the environmental movement, the way “in which they’re pursuing that self-interest – this time on their own, without any legal justification” has changed. She continued:
“We have to see this not as a remaking of international law, but as a flagrant breach of international law.”
While this is a “testing moment”, Rajamani believes that other states contending with a “powerful, idiosyncratic and unpredictable actor” are not “giving up on decades of multilateralism…they just asking how they might address this moment without fundamentally destabilising” the international legal order.
What next for the treaty?
Last Friday, China announced its bid to host the BBNJ treaty’s secretariat in Xiamen – “a coastal hub that sits on the Taiwan Strait”, reported the South China Morning Post.
China and Brussels currently vie as the strongest contenders for the seat of global ocean governance, given that Chile made its hosting offer days before the country elected a far-right president.
To Thambisetty, preparatory BBNJ meetings in March can serve as an important “pocket of sanity” in a turbulent world. She concluded:
“The rest of us have to find a way to navigate the international order. We have to work towards better times.”
Watch, read, listen
OWN GOAL: For Backchannel, Zimbabwean climate campaigner Trust Chikodzo called for Total Energies to end its “image laundering” at the Africa Cup of Nations.
MATERIAL WORLD: In a book review for the Baffler, Thea Riofrancos followed the “unexpected genealogy” of the “energy transition” outlined in Jean-Baptiste Fressoz’s More and More and More: An All-Consuming History.
REALTY BITES: Inside Climate News profiled Californian climate policy expert Neil Matouka, who built a plugin to display climate risk data that real-estate site Zillow removed from home listings.
Coming up
- 26 January: International day of clean energy
- 27 January: India-EU summit, New Delhi
- 31 January: Submit inputs on food systems and climate change for a report by the UN special rapporteur on climate change
- 1 February: Costa Rica elections
Pick of the jobs
- British Antarctic Survey, boating officer | Salary: £31,183. Location: UK and Antarctica
- National Centre for Climate Research at the Danish Meteorological Institute, climate science leader | Salary: NA. Location: Copenhagen, with possible travel to Skrydstrup, Karup and Nuuk
- Mongabay, journalism fellows | Stipend: $500 per month for 6 months. Location: Remote
- Climate Change Committee, carbon budgets analyst | Salary: £47,007-£51,642. Location: London
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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The post DeBriefed 23 January 2026: Trump’s Davos tirade; EU wind and solar milestone; High seas hope appeared first on Carbon Brief.
DeBriefed 23 January 2026: Trump’s Davos tirade; EU wind and solar milestone; High seas hope
The UK government has released its long-awaited “warm homes plan”, detailing support to help people install electric heat pumps, rooftop solar panels and insulation in their homes.
It says up to 5m households could benefit from £15bn of grants and loans earmarked by the government for these upgrades by 2030.
Electrified heating and energy-efficient homes are vital for the UK’s net-zero goals, but the plan also stresses that these measures will cut people’s bills by “hundreds of pounds” a year.
The plan shifts efforts to tackle fuel poverty away from a “fabric-first” approach that starts with insulation, towards the use of electric technologies to lower bills and emissions.
Much of the funding will support people buying heat pumps, but the government has still significantly scaled back its expectations for heat-pump installations in the coming years.
Beyond new funding, there are also new efficiency standards for landlords that could result in nearly 3m rental properties being upgraded over the next four years.
In addition, the government has set out its ambition for scaling up “heat networks”, where many homes and offices are served by communal heating systems.
Carbon Brief has identified the key policies laid out in the warm homes plan, as well as what they mean for the UK’s climate targets and energy bills.
- Why do homes matter for UK climate goals?
- What is the warm homes plan?
- What is included in the warm homes plan?
- What does the warm homes plan mean for energy bills?
- What has been the reaction to the plan?
Why do homes matter for UK climate goals?
Buildings are the second-largest source of emissions in the UK, after transport. This is largely due to the gas boilers that keep around 85% of UK homes warm.
Residential buildings produced 52.8m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2024, around 14% of the nation’s total, according to the latest government figures.
Fossil-fuel heating is by far the largest contributor to building emissions. There are roughly 24m gas boilers and 1.4m oil boilers on the island of Great Britain, according to the National Energy System Operator (NESO).
This has left the UK particularly exposed – along with its gas-reliant power system – to the impact of the global energy crisis, which caused gas prices – and energy bills – to soar.
At the same time, the UK’s old housing stock is often described as among the least energy efficient in Europe. A third of UK households live in “poorly insulated homes” and cannot afford to make improvements, according to University College London research.
This situation leads to more energy being wasted, meaning higher bills and more emissions.
Given their contribution to UK emissions, buildings are “expected to be central” in the nation’s near-term climate goals, delivering 20% of the cuts required to achieve the UK’s 2030 target, according to government adviser the Climate Change Committee (CCC).
(Residential buildings account for roughly 70% of the emissions in the buildings sector, with the rest coming from commercial and public-sector buildings.)
Over recent years, Conservative and Labour governments have announced various measures to cut emissions from homes, including schemes to support people buying electric heat pumps and retrofitting their homes.
However, implementation has been slow. While heat-pump installations have increased, they are not on track to meet the target set by the previous government of 600,000 a year by 2028.
Meanwhile, successive schemes to help households install loft and wall insulation have been launched and then abandoned, meaning installation rates have been slow.
At the same time, the main government-backed scheme designed to lift homes out of fuel poverty, the “energy company obligation” (ECO), has been mired in controversy over low standards, botched installations and – according to a parliamentary inquiry – even fraud.
(The government announced at the latest budget that it was scrapping ECO.)
The CCC noted in its most recent progress report to parliament that “falling behind on buildings decarbonisation will have severe implications for longer-term decarbonisation”.
What is the warm homes plan?
The warm homes plan was part of the Labour party’s election-winning manifesto in 2024, sold at the time as a way to “cut bills for families” through insulation, solar and heat pumps, while creating “tens of thousands of good jobs” and lifting “millions out of fuel poverty”.
It replaces ECO, introduces new support for clean technologies and wraps together various other ongoing policies, such as the “boiler upgrade scheme” (BUS) grants for heat pumps.
The warm homes plan was officially announced by the government in November 2024, stating that up to 300,000 households would benefit from home upgrades in the coming year. However, the plan itself was repeatedly delayed.
In the spending review in June 2025, the government confirmed the £13.2bn in funding for the scheme pledged in the Labour manifesto, covering spending between 2025-26 and 2029-30.
The government said this investment would help cut bills by up to £600 per household through efficiency measures and clean technologies such as heat pumps, solar panels and batteries.
After scrapping ECO at the 2025 budget, the treasury earmarked an extra £1.5bn of funding for the warm homes plan over five years. This is less than the £1bn annual budget for ECO, which was funded via energy bills, but is expected to have lower administrative overheads.
In the foreword to the new plan, secretary of state Ed Miliband says that it will deliver the “biggest public investment in home upgrades in British history”. He adds:
“The warm homes plan [will]…cut bills, tackle fuel poverty, create good jobs and get us off the rollercoaster of international fossil fuel markets.”
Miliband argues in his foreword that the plan will “spread the benefits” of technologies such as solar to households that would otherwise be unable to afford them. He writes: “This historic investment will help millions seize the benefits of electrification.” Miliband concludes:
“This is a landmark plan to make the British people better off, secure our energy independence and tackle the climate crisis.”
What is included in the warm homes plan?
The warm homes plan sets out £15bn of investment over the course of the current parliament to drive uptake of low-carbon technologies and upgrade “up to” 5m homes.
A key focus of the plan is energy security and cost savings for UK households.
The government says its plan will “prioritise” investment in electrification measures, such as heat pumps, solar panels and battery storage. This is where most of the funding is targeted.
However, it also includes new energy-efficiency standards to encourage landlords to improve conditions for renters.
Some policies were notable due to their absence, such as the lack of a target to end gas boiler sales. The plan also states that, while it will consult on the use of hydrogen in heating homes, this is “not yet a proven technology” and therefore any future role would be “limited”.
New funding
Technologies such as heat pumps and rooftop solar panels are essential for the UK to achieve its net-zero goals, but they carry significant up-front costs for households. Plans for expanding their uptake therefore rely on government support.
Following the end of ECO in March, the warm homes plan will help fill the gap in funding for energy-efficiency measures that it is expected to leave.
As the chart below shows, a range of new measures under the warm homes plan – including a mix of grants and loans – as well as more funding for existing schemes, leads to an increase in support out to 2030.
One third of the total funding – £5bn in total – is aimed at low-income households, including social housing tenants. This money will be delivered in the form of grants that could cover the full cost of upgrades.
The plan highlights solar panels, batteries and “cost-effective insulation” for the least energy-efficient homes as priority measures for this funding, with a view to lowering bills.
There is also £2.7bn for the existing boiler upgrade scheme, which will see its annual allocation increase gradually from £295m in 2025-26 to £709m in 2029-30.
This is the government’s measure to encourage better-off “able to pay” households to buy heat pumps, with grants of £7,500 towards the cost of replacing a gas or oil-fired boiler. For the first time, there will also be new £2,500 grants from the scheme for air-to-air heat pumps (See: Heat pumps.)
A key new measure in the plan is £2bn for low- and zero-interest consumer loans, to help with the cost of various home upgrades, including solar panels, batteries and heat pumps.
Previous efforts to support home upgrades with loans have not been successful. However, innovation agency Nesta says the government’s new scheme could play a central role, with the potential for households buying heat pumps to save hundreds of pounds a year, compared to purchases made using regular loans.
The remaining funding over the next four years includes money assigned to heat networks and devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which are responsible for their own plans to tackle fuel poverty and household emissions.
Heat pumps
Heat pumps are described in the plan as the “best and cheapest form of electrified heating for the majority of our homes”.
The government’s goal is for heat pumps to “increasingly become the desirable and natural choice” for those replacing old boilers. At the same time, it says that new home standards will ensure that new-build homes have low-carbon heating systems installed by default.
Despite this, the warm homes plan scales back the previous government’s target for heat-pump installations in the coming years, reflecting the relatively slow increase in heat-pump sales. It also does not include a set date to end the sale of gas boilers.
The plan’s central target is for 450,000 heat pumps to be installed annually by 2030, including 200,000 in new-build homes and 250,000 in existing homes.
This is significantly lower than the previous target – originally set in 2021 under Boris Johnson’s Conservative government – to install 600,000 heat pumps annually by 2028.
Meeting that target would have meant installations increasing seven-fold in just four years, between 2024 and 2028. Now, installations only need to increase five-fold in six years.
As the chart below shows, the new target is also considerably lower than the heat-pump installation rate set out in the CCC’s central net-zero pathway. That involved 450,000 installations in existing homes alone by 2030 – excluding new-build properties.
Some experts and campaigners questioned how the UK would remain on track for its legally binding climate goals given this scaled-back rate of heat-pump installations.
Additionally, Adam Bell, policy director at the thinktank Stonehaven, writes on LinkedIn that the “headline numbers for heat pump installs do not stack up”.
Heat pumps in existing homes are set to be supported primarily via the boiler upgrade scheme and – according to Bell – there is not enough funding for the 250,000 installations that are planned, despite an increased budget.
The government’s plan relies in part on the up-front costs of heat pump installation “fall[ing] significantly”. According to Bell, it may be that the government will reduce the size of boiler upgrade scheme grants in the future, hoping that costs will fall sufficiently.
Alternatively, the government may rely on driving uptake through its planned low-cost loans and the clean heat market mechanism, which requires heating-system suppliers to sell a growing share of heat pumps.
Rooftop solar
Rooftop solar panels are highlighted in the plan as “central to cutting energy bills”, by allowing households to generate their own electricity to power their homes and sell it back to the grid.
At the same time, rooftop solar is expected to make a “significant contribution” to the government’s target of hitting 45-47 gigawatts (GW) of solar capacity by 2030.
As it stands, there is roughly 5.2GW of solar capacity on residential rooftops.
Taken together, the government says the grants and loans set out in the warm homes plan could triple the number of homes with rooftop solar from 1.6m to 4.6m by 2030.
It says that this is “in addition” to homes that decide to install rooftop solar independently.
Efficiency standards
The warm homes plan says that the government will publish its “future homes standard” for new-build properties, alongside necessary regulations, in the first quarter of 2026.
On the same day, the government also published its intention to reform “energy performance certificates” (EPCs), the ratings that are supposed to inform prospective buyers and renters about how much their new homes will cost to keep warm.
The current approach to measuring performance for EPCs is “unreliable” and thought to inadvertently discourage heat pumps. It has faced long-standing calls for reform.
As well as funding low-carbon technologies, the warm homes plan says it is “standing up for renters” with new energy-efficiency standards for privately and socially rented homes.
Currently, private renters – who rely on landlords to invest in home improvements – are the most likely to experience fuel poverty and to live in cold, damp homes.
Landlords will now need to upgrade their properties to meet EPC ratings B and C across two new-style EPC metrics by October 2030. There are “reasonable exemptions” to this rule that will limit the amount landlords have to spend per property to £10,000.
In total, the government expects “up to” 1.6m homes in the private-rental sector to benefit from these improvements and “up to” 1.3m social-rent homes.
These new efficiency standards therefore cover three-fifths of the “up to” 5m homes helped by the plan.
The government also published a separate fuel poverty strategy for England.
Heat networks
The warm homes plan sets out a new target to more than double the amount of heating provided using low-carbon heat networks – up to 7% of England’s heating demand by 2035 and a fifth by 2050.
This involves an injection of £1.1bn for heat networks, including £195m per year out to 2030 via the green heat network fund, as well as “mobilising” the National Wealth Fund.
The plan explains that this will primarily benefit urban centres, noting that heat networks are “well suited” to serving large, multi-occupancy buildings and those with limited space.
Alongside the plan, the government published a series of technical standards for heat networks, including for consumer protection.
What does the warm homes plan mean for energy bills?
The warm homes plan could save households “hundreds on energy bills” for those whose homes are upgraded, according to the UK government.
This is in addition to two changes announced in the budget in 2025, which are expected to cut energy bills for all homes by an average of £150 a year.
This included the decisions to bring ECO to an end when the current programme of work wraps up at the end of the financial year and for the treasury to cover three-quarters of the cost of the “renewables obligation” (RO) for three years from April 2026.
Beyond this, households that take advantage of the measures outlined in the plan can expect their energy bills to fall by varying amounts, the government says.
The warm homes plan includes a number of case studies that detail how upgrades could impact energy bills for a range of households. For example, it notes that a social-rented two-bedroom semi-detached home that got insulation and solar panels could save £350 annually.
An owner-occupier three-bedroom home could save £450 annually if it gets solar panels and a battery through consumer loans offered under the warm homes plan, it adds.
Similar analysis published by Nesta says that a typical household that invests in home upgrades under the plan could save £1,000 a year on its energy bill.
It finds that a household with a heat pump, solar panels and a battery, which uses a solar and “time of use tariff”, could see its annual energy bill fall by as much as £1,000 compared with continuing to use a gas boiler, from around £1,670 per year to £670, as shown in the chart below.
Ahead of the plan being published, there were rumours of further “rebalancing” energy bills to bring down the cost of electricity relative to gas. However, this idea failed to come to fruition in the warm homes plan.
This would have involved reducing or removing some or all of the policy costs currently funded via electricity bills, by shifting them onto gas bills or into general taxation.
This would have made it relatively cheaper to use electric technologies such as heat pumps, acting as a further incentive to adopt them.
Nesta highlights that in the absence of further action with regard to policy costs, the electricity-to-gas price ratio is likely to stay at around 4.1 from April 2026.
What has been the reaction to the plan?
Many of the commitments in the warm homes plan were welcomed by a broad range of energy industry experts, union representatives and thinktanks.
Greg Jackson, the founder of Octopus Energy, described it as a “really important step forward”, adding:
“Electrifying homes is the best way to cut bills for good and escape the yoyo of fossil fuel costs.”
Dhara Vyas, chief executive of the trade body Energy UK, said the government’s commitment to spend £15bn on upgrading home heating was “substantial” and would “provide certainty to investors and businesses in the energy market”.
On LinkedIn, Camilla Born, head of the campaign group Electrify Britain, said the plan was a “good step towards backing electrification as the future of Britain, but it must go hand in hand with bringing down the costs of electricity”.
However, right-leaning publications and politicians were critical of the plan, focusing on how a proportion of solar panels sold in the UK are manufactured in China.
According to BBC News, two-thirds (68%) of the solar panels imported to the UK came from China in 2024.
In an analysis of the plan, the Guardian’s environment editor Fiona Harvey and energy correspondent Jillian Ambrose argued that the strategy is “all carrot and no stick”, given that the “longstanding proposal” to ban the installation of gas boilers beyond 2035 has been “quietly dropped”.
Christopher Hammond, chief executive of UK100, a cross-party network of more than 120 local authorities, welcomed the plan, but urged the government to extend it to include public buildings.
The government’s £3.5bn public sector decarbonisation scheme, which aimed to electrify schools, hospitals and council buildings, ended in June 2025 and no replacement has been announced, according to the network.
The post Q&A: What UK’s ‘warm homes plan’ means for climate change and energy bills appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What UK’s ‘warm homes plan’ means for climate change and energy bills
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.
China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
Tasks for 2026
‘GREEN RESOLVE’: The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) said at its annual national conference that it is “essential” to “maintain strategic resolve” on building a “beautiful China”, reported energy news outlet BJX News. Officials called for “accelerating green transformation” and “strengthening driving forces” for the low-carbon transition in 2026, it added. The meeting also underscored the need for “continued reduction in total emissions of major pollutants”, it said, as well as for “advancing source control through carbon peaking and a low-carbon transition”. The MEE listed seven key tasks for 2026 at the meeting, said business news outlet 21st Century Business Herald, including promoting development of “green productive forces”, focusing on “regional strategies” to build “green development hubs” and “actively responding” to climate change.
CARBON ‘PRESSURE’: China’s carbon emissions reduction strategy will move from the “preparatory stages” into a phase of “substantive” efforts in 2026, reported Shanghai-based news outlet the Paper, with local governments beginning to “feel the pressure” due to facing “formal carbon assessments for the first time” this year. Business news outlet 36Kr said that an “increasing number of industry participants” will have to begin finalising decarbonisation plans this year. The entry into force of the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism means China’s steelmakers will face a “critical test of cost, data and compliance”, reported finance news outlet Caixin. Carbon Brief asked several experts, including the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Li Shuo, what energy and climate developments they will be watching in 2026.
COAL DECLINE: New data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed China’s “mostly coal-based thermal power generation fell in 2025” for the first time in a decade, reported Reuters, to 6,290 terawatt-hours (TWh). The data confirmed earlier analysis for Carbon Brief that “coal power generation fell in both China and India in 2025”, marking the first simultaneous drop in 50 years. Energy news outlet International Energy Net noted that wind generation rose 10% to 1,053TWh and solar by 24% to 1,573TWh.
EV agreement reached
‘NORMALISED COMPETITION’?: The EU will remove tariffs on imports of electric vehicles (EV) made in China if the manufacturers follow “guidelines on minimum pricing” issued by the bloc, reported the Associated Press. China’s commerce ministry stated that the new guidelines will “enable Chinese exporters to address the EU’s anti-subsidy case concerning Chinese EVs in a way that is more practical, targeted and consistent with [World Trade Organization] rules”, according to the state-run China Daily. An editorial by the state-supporting Global Times argued that the agreement symbolised a “new phase” in China-EU economic and trade relations in which “normalised competition” is stabilised by a “solid cooperative foundation”.
SOLAR REBATES: China will “eliminate” export rebates for solar products from April 2026 and phase rebates for batteries out by 2027, said Caixin. Solar news outlet Solar Headlines said that the removal of rebates would “directly test” solar companies’ profitability and “fundamentally reshape the entire industry’s growth logic”. Meanwhile, China imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of “solar-grade polysilicon” from the US and Korea, said state news agency Xinhua.
OVERCAPACITY MEETINGS: The Chinese government “warned several producers of polysilicon…about monopoly risks” and cautioned them not to “coordinate on production capacity, sales volume and prices”, said Bloomberg. Reuters and China Daily covered similar government meetings on “mitigat[ing] risks of overcapacity” with the battery and EV industries, respectively. A widely republished article in the state-run Economic Daily said that to counter overcapacity, companies would need to reverse their “misaligned development logic” and shift from competing on “price and scale” to competing on “technology”.
High prices undermined home coal-to-gas heating policy
SWITCHING SHOCK: A video commentary by Xinhua reporter Liu Chang covered “reports of soaring [home] heating costs following coal-to-gas switching [policies] in some rural areas of north China”. Liu added that switching from coal to gas “must lead not only to blue skies, but also to warmth”. Bloomberg said that the “issue isn’t a lack of gas”, but the “result of a complex series of factors including price regulations, global energy shocks and strained local finances”.
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HEATED DEBATE: Discussions of the story in China became a “domestically resonant – and politically awkward – debate”, noted the current affairs newsletter Pekingnology. It translated a report by Chinese outlet Economic Observer that many villagers in Hebei struggled with no access to affordable heating, with some turning back to coal. “Local authorities are steadily advancing energy supply,” People’s Daily said of the issue, noting that gas is “increasingly becoming a vital heating energy source” as part of China’s energy transition. Another People’s Daily article quoted one villager saying: “Coal-to-gas conversion is a beneficial initiative for both the nation and its people…Yet the heating costs are simply too high.”
DEJA-VU: This is not the first time coal-to-gas switching has encountered challenges, according to research by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, with nearby Shanxi province experiencing a similar situation. In Shanxi, a “lack of planning, poor coordination and hasty implementation” led to demand outstripping supply, while some households had their coal-based heating systems removed with no replacement secured. Others were “deterred” from using gas-based systems due to higher prices, it said.
More China news
- LOFTY WORDS: At Davos, vice-premier He Lifeng reaffirmed commitments to China’s “dual-carbon” goals and called for greater “global cooperation on climate change”, reported Caixin.
- NOT LOOKING: US president Donald Trump, also at Davos, said he was not “able to find any windfarms in China”, adding China sells them to “stupid” consumers, reported Euronews. China installed wind capacity has ranked first globally “for 15 years consecutively”, said a government official, according to CGTN.
- ‘GREEN’ FACTORIES: China issued “new guidelines to promote green [industrial] microgrids” including targets for on-site renewable use, said Xinhua. The country “pledged to advance zero-carbon factory development” from 2026, said another Xinhua report.
- JET-FUEL MERGER: A merger of oil giant Sinopec with the country’s main jet-fuel producer could “aid the aviation industry’s carbon reduction goals”, reported Yicai Global. However, Caixin noted that the move could “stifl[e] innovation” in the sustainable air fuel sector.
- NEW TARGETS: Chinese government investment funds will now be evaluated on the “annual carbon reduction rates” achieved by the enterprises or projects they support, reported BJX News.
- HOLIDAY CATCH-UP: Since the previous edition of China Briefing in December, Beijing released policies on provincial greenhouse gas inventories, the “two new” programme, clean coal benchmarks, corporate climate reporting, “green consumption” and hydrogen carbon credits. The National Energy Administration also held its annual work conference.
Spotlight
Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy
While gas is seen in some countries as an important “bridging” fuel to move away from coal use, rapid electrification, uncompetitiveness and supply concerns have suppressed its share in China’s energy mix.
Carbon Brief explores the current role of gas in China and how this could change in the future. The full article is available on Carbon Brief’s website.
The current share of gas in China’s primary energy demand is small, at around 8-9%.
It also comprises 7% of China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fuel combustion, adding 755m tonnes of CO2 in 2023 – twice the total CO2 emissions of the UK.
Gas consumption is continuing to grow in line with an overall uptick in total energy demand, but has slowed slightly from the 9% average annual rise in gas demand over the past decade – during which time consumption more than doubled.
The state-run oil and gas company China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) forecast in 2025 that demand growth for the year may slow further to just over 6%.
Chinese government officials frequently note that China is “rich in coal” and “short of gas”. Concerns of import dependence underpin China’s focus on coal for energy security.
However, Beijing sees electrification as a “clear energy security strategy” to both decarbonise and “reduce exposure to global fossil fuel markets”, said Michal Meidan, China energy research programme head at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
A dim future?
Beijing initially aimed for gas to displace coal as part of a broader policy to tackle air pollution.
Its “blue-sky campaign” helped to accelerate gas use in the industrial and residential sectors. Several cities were mandated to curtail coal usage and switch to gas.
(January 2026 saw widespread reports of households choosing not to use gas heating installed during this campaign despite freezing temperatures, due to high prices.)
Industry remains the largest gas user in China, with “city gas” second. Power generation is a distant third.
The share of gas in power generation remains at 4%, while wind and solar’s share has soared to 22%, Yu Aiqun, research analyst at the thinktank Global Energy Monitor, told Carbon Brief. She added:
“With the rapid expansion of renewables and ongoing geopolitical uncertainties, I don’t foresee a bright future for gas power.”
However, gas capacity may still rise from 150 gigawatts (GW) in 2025 to 200GW by 2030. A government report noted that gas will continue to play a “critical role” in “peak shaving”.
But China’s current gas storage capacity is “insufficient”, according to CNPC, limiting its ability to meet peak-shaving demand.
Transport and industry
Gas instead may play a bigger role in the displacement of diesel in the transport sector, due to the higher cost competitiveness of LNG – particularly for trucking.
CNPC forecast that LNG displaced around 28-30m tonnes of diesel in the trucking sector in 2025, accounting for 15% of total diesel demand in China.
However, gas is not necessarily a better option for heavy-duty, long-haul transportation, due to poorer fuel efficiency compared with electric vehicles.
In fact, “new-energy vehicles” are displacing both LNG-fueled trucks and diesel heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs).
Meanwhile, gas could play a “more significant” role in industrial decarbonisation, Meidan told Carbon Brief, if prices fall substantially.
Growth in gas demand has been decelerating in some industries, but China may adopt policies more favourable to gas, she added.
An energy transition roadmap developed by a Chinese government thinktank found gas will only begin to play a greater role than coal in China by 2050 at the earliest.
Both will be significantly less important than clean-energy sources at that point.
This spotlight was written by freelance climate journalist Karen Teo for Carbon Brief.
Watch, read, listen
EV OUTLOOK: Tu Le, managing director of consultancy Sino Auto Insights, spoke on the High Capacity podcast about his outlook for China’s EV industry in 2026.
‘RUNAWAY TRAIN’: John Hopkins professor Jeremy Wallace argued in Wired that China’s strength in cleantech is due to a “runaway train of competition” that “no one – least of all [a monolithic ‘China’] – knows how to deal with”.
‘DIRTIEST AND GREENEST’: China’s energy engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative was simultaneously the “dirtiest and greenest” it has ever been in 2025, according to a new report by the Green Finance & Development Center.
INDUSTRY VOICE: Zhong Baoshen, chairman of solar manufacturer LONGi, spoke with Xinhua about how innovation, “supporting the strongest performers”, standards-setting and self-regulation could alleviate overcapacity in the industry.
$574bn
The amount of money State Grid, China’s main grid operator, plans to invest between 2026-30, according to Jiemian. The outlet adds that much of this investment will “support the development and transmission of clean energy” from large-scale clean-energy bases and hydropower plants.
New science
- The combination of long-term climate change and extremes in rainfall and heat have contributed to an increase in winter wheat yield of 1% in Xinjiang province between 1989-2023 | Climate Dynamics
- More than 70% of the “observed changes” in temperature extremes in China over 1901-2020 are “attributed to greenhouse gas forcing” | Environmental Research Letters
China Briefing is written by Anika Patel and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
The post China Briefing 22 January 2026: 2026 priorities; EV agreement; How China uses gas appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China Briefing 22 January 2026: 2026 priorities; EV agreement; How China uses gas
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