Over the weekend the Washington Spectator published my essay, Diary of a Transit Miracle, recounting the arduous march of NYC congestion pricing from a gleam in a trio of prominent New Yorkers’ eyes, to the verge of startup at the stroke of midnight June 30, the startup time announced by the MTA last Friday.
I’m cross-posting it here — the third post on the subject in this space in the past 12 months (following this in December and this post last June) — because the advent of congestion pricing in the U.S. is “a really big deal,” as a number of friends and colleagues have told me in recent weeks. As my new essay makes clear, charging motorists to drive into the heart of Manhattan isn’t just a rejection of unconstrained motordom, it’s a new beachhead in “externality pricing” — social-cost surcharging — of which carbon taxes are the ultimate form.
The essay features two governors, two mayors — one of whom I served a half-century ago as a lowly but admiring data cruncher — a civic “Walter Cronkite,” a Nobel economist, raucous transit activists, a gridlock guru and yours truly, plus a cameo appearance by Robert Moses. It includes footage of the historic 1969 press conference in which Mayor John Lindsay and two distinguished associates enunciated the core idea of using externality pricing to better balance automobiles and mass transit that animated the arduous but ultimately triumphant congestion pricing campaign.
— C.K., April 29, 2024
Diary of a Transit Miracle
A miracle is coming to New York City. Beginning on July 1, and barring a last-minute hitch, motorists will soon pay a hefty $15 to enter the southern half of Manhattan — the area bounded by the Hudson River, the East River and 60th Street.
An anticipated 15 percent or so of drivers will switch to transit, unsnarling roads within the “congestion zone” and routes leading to it. The other 80 or 90 percent will grumble but continue driving. That is by design. The toll bounty, a billion dollars a year, will finance subway enhancements like station elevators and digital signals that will increase train throughput and lure more car trips onto trains.
The result will be faster, smoother commutes, especially for car drivers and taxicab and Uber passengers, who will pay a modest surcharge of $1.25 to $2.50 per trip. Drivers of for-hire vehicles will benefit as well, as lesser gridlock leads to more fares.1
The miracle is three-fold: Winners will vastly outnumber losers; New York will be made healthier, calmer and more prosperous; and that this salutary measure is happening at all, after a half-century of setbacks.
Obstacles to congestion pricing
Congestion pricing, as the policy is known, faced formidable obstacles even beyond the difficulty inherent in asking a group of people to start forking over a billion dollars a year for something that’s always been free.
Congestion pricing also had to contend with: an ingrained pro-motoring ideology that casts any restraint on driving as a betrayal of the American Dream; a general aversion to social-cost surcharges (what economists call “externality pricing”); exasperation over the region’s balkanized and convoluted toll and transit regimes; and, of late, a decline in social solidarity and appeals to the common good.
The advent of congestion pricing in New York is, thus, cause not just for celebration but wonderment. How did this wonky yet radical idea advance to the verge of enactment?
Origins
The trail begins in the waning days of 1969, when newly re-elected mayor John Lindsay recruited two well-regarded New Yorkers to devise a plan to fend off a 50 percent rise in subway and bus fares.
William Vickrey, a Canadian transplant teaching at Columbia and a future Nobel economics laureate, was a protean theorist of externality pricing. New York-bred mediator Theodore Kheel was admired as a civic Walter Cronkite for his plain-spoken common sense.
Lindsay, too often dismissed as a lightweight, understood mass transit as key to loosening automobiles’ spreading chokehold over the city. He had made combating air pollution a pillar of his first term and was fast becoming an exemplar of urban environmentalism. From his municipal engineers, Lindsay knew that technology to clean up tailpipes still lay in the future. A transit fare hike that would add yet more vehicles to city streets imperiled his clean-air agenda.
The triumvirate proposed a suite of motorist fees to preserve the fare. Their program ― higher registration fees and gasoline taxes, a parking garage tax, doubled tolls ― though mild in today’s terms, threatened powerful bureaucracies and their auto allies. Newly dethroned “master-builder” Robert Moses opined that Kheel, in his zeal to save the fare, had “gone berserk over bridge and tunnel tolls.”2 The program went nowhere.
L to R: Kheel, Lindsay, Vickrey. Click arrow to view (please excuse two brief garbled passages toward end).
Moses was right to be alarmed. From a City Hall podium on Dec. 16, 1969, Mayor Lindsay showcased Kheel’s and Vickrey’s respective reports, “A Balanced System of Transportation is a Must” and “A Transit Fare Increase is Costly Revenue.” (Click link in still photo above to view 27-minute video.) The trio propounded a new urban doctrine rebalancing automobiles and public transportation: “Automobiles are strangling our cities… Starving mass transit imposes costs that are difficult to measure, yet real… Correcting the fiscal imbalance between transit and the automobile is key to enhancing our environment and quality of life…”
Their remarks set generations of urbanists on course toward congestion pricing.
Setbacks
Quantifying those precepts became my research agenda 40 years later. In the interim, two creditable attempts to enact congestion pricing crashed and burned.
The central element of Lindsay’s 1973 “transportation control plan” was tolls on the city’s East River bridges, a measure designed to eliminate enough traffic to satisfy federal clean-air standards. Though the plan’s formal demise didn’t come until 1977, in legislation written by liberal lawmakers from Brooklyn and Queens, the toll idea never stood a chance. Electronic tolling was 20 years away, and adding stop-and-go toll booths seemed more likely to compound vehicular exhaust than to cut it.
Three decades later, in 2007, Mayor Michael Bloomberg asked Albany to toll not just the same East River bridges but also the more-trafficked 60th Street “portal” to mid-Manhattan. Predictably, faux-populist legislators saw Bloomberg’s billionaire wealth as an invitation to denounce the congestion fee as an affront to the little guy.
The mayor may have hurt his cause by presenting congestion pricing primarily as a climate and pollution measure. The pollution rationale was no longer compelling in the way it had been in Lindsay’s day, as automotive engineers had slashed rates of toxic vehicle exhaust ten-fold. Appeals tied to global warming also fell flat; remember, congestion pricing contemplated that most drivers would stay in their fossil-fuel burning cars.
This isn’t to say that congestion pricing confers no climate benefits. Rather, the benefits are subtler ones that can be hard to convey to voters, such as making climate-friendly urban living more attractive. A further benefit may come as congestion pricing demonstrates the unique power of externality pricing, as explained below.
From the Rubble
Even as Bloomberg’s toll plan was faltering in Albany, new loci of support were germinating in the city.
Changing times demanded not just the intellectual leadership of think-tanks like the Regional Plan Association and the good-government Straphangers Campaign, but gritty, grassroots transit organizing. Enter the newly-minted Riders Alliance.
2017 subway handbill exemplified new militancy targeting Gov. Andrew Cuomo for failing transit.
As subway service began cratering in 2015, the inevitable result of budget-raiding by a skein of governors, the Alliance posted crowd-sourced photos of stalled trains and jammed platforms alongside demands for improved service from “#CuomosMTA.” Before long, the papers were pointing the finger at the governor not just in “Why Your Commute Is Bad” explainers but in tear-jerkers like the Times’ May 2017 classic, “Money Out of Your Pocket”: New Yorkers Tell of Subway Delay Woes.
The drumbeat was deafening. Cuomo finally blinked. On a Sunday in August 2017, he phoned the Times’ Albany bureau chief and handed him a scoop for the next day’s front page: Cuomo Calls Manhattan Traffic Plan an Idea ‘Whose Time Has Come’.
The “traffic plan” was congestion pricing.
Data Cruncher
Two months later, Cuomo’s staff summoned me to the midtown office of the consulting firm they had retained to “scope” congestion pricing ― essentially, to compute how much revenue tolls could generate. They wanted to see if an Excel spreadsheet model I had constructed and refined over the prior decade could aid their scoping process.
The model was called the Balanced Transportation Analyzer, a name bestowed in 2007 by Ted Kheel.
Ted, in his nineties, had recruited me to determine whether a large enough congestion toll could pay to make city transit free. The idea worked on paper but foundered politically. Nevertheless, Ted saw in my Excel modeling a way to capture phenomena like “rebound effects” (motorists driving more as road space frees up) and “mode switching” between cars, trains, buses and taxicabs, that he and Prof. Vickrey had identified in their 1969 work but lacked the computing ability to quantify.
Ted’s philanthropy enabled me over the next decade to expand, test and update my transportation modeling. With a hundred “tabs” and 160,000 equations, the “BTA” can instantly answer almost any conceivable question about New York congestion pricing, as well as these two central ones: how much revenue it will yield, and how much time will travelers save in lightened traffic and better transit.3
The BTA model aced its 2017 audition and became the computational engine for the congestion pricing legislation the governor’s team enacted into law in 2019. Its impact has been even broader.4 “Having the model helped make the case with the public, journalists, elected officials and others,” Eric McClure, director of the livable-streets advocacy group StreetsPAC, wrote recently, in part by helping congestion pricing proponents push back on opponents’ exaggerated claims of disastrous outcomes and their incessant demands for special treatment. The model may also have influenced the detailed toll design adopted by the MTA board earlier this year, which hewed close to the toll design I had recommended last summer.5
The BTA also provided sustenance during congestion pricing’s seven lean years ― the 2009-2016 period in which the torch was kept lit by a new triumvirate known as “Move NY” ― traffic guru “Gridlock” Sam Schwartz, the very able campaign strategist Alex Matthiessen, and myself. The model helped our team evangelize congestion pricing’s transformative benefits to elected officials and the public. This, I believe, was a key element in mustering the critical mass of support that ultimately swayed not one but two governors.
The Hochul Factor
New York Lieutenant Governor Kathy Hochul’s ascension to governor in August 2021 could have been congestion pricing’s death knell. The toll plan was adrift in the federal bureaucracy, and its latter-day champion Andrew Cuomo had exited in “me-too” disgrace. His successor, from distant Buffalo, wasn’t beholden to New York or congestion pricing.
Hochul, who as governor controls city and regional transit, could have disowned congestion pricing as convoluted, bureaucratic and tainted. Instead, she became a resolute and enthusiastic backer. Her spirited support, both in public and behind the scenes, became the decisive ingredient in shepherding congestion pricing to safety.
Why the new governor went all-in on congestion pricing awaits a future journalist or historian. Had she spurned it, the opprobrium from downstate transit advocates would have been intense; but there doubtless would have been cries of “good riddance” as well. Vickrey, Kheel and Riders Alliance notwithstanding, it’s not clear how closely New Yorkers — including transit users — connect congestion tolls to improved travel and a better city.
What makes Hochul’s embrace especially impressive is that congestion pricing is, in a real sense, an attack on a jealously guarded entitlement: the right to inconvenience others by usurping public space for one’s vehicle. The classic lament about entitlements’ iron grip is that “losers cry louder than winners sing.”6 Yet in this case, it seems, potential losers — actual and aspiring zone-bound drivers — are being out-sung by transit interests seeking, in Kheel’s 1969 words, a better balance between public transportation and automobiles.
Credits and Prospects
Let us now praise Andrew Cuomo’s crafting of the legislation that teed up congestion pricing’s successful run.
Rather than specifying a dollar price for the tolls, or a precise traffic reduction, his 2019 bill established a revenue target: sufficient earnings to bond $15 billion in transit investment — which equates to $1 billion a year to cover debt service. This device trained the public’s focus on the gain from congestion pricing (better transit) instead of the pain (the toll). Equally important, with this deft stroke, any toll exemption that a vocal minority might seek would mathematically trigger higher tolls for everyone else. The effect was vastly heightened scrutiny of requests for carve-outs.
Which cities will follow on New York’s heels? No U.S. urban area comes close to our trifecta of gridlock, transit and wealth. Sprawling Los Angeles or Houston, or even Chicago for that matter, might be better served by more granulated traffic tolls than New York’s all-or-none model.
Perhaps Asia’s megalopolises will be swept up in our wake. In the meantime, my focus will be on the holy grail of externality pricing: taxing carbon emissions. Every economist knows that the surest and fastest way to cut down on a “bad” is by taxing it rather than subsidizing possible alternatives. Yet that approach remains counter-intuitive and even anathema to nearly everyone else.
A huge and important legacy that New York congestion pricing could provide is to prove that intelligently taxing societal harms need not be electoral suicide. This proof could help unlock a treasure-trove of prosperity-enhancing pricing reforms including, most prominently, robust carbon taxing.
The author, a policy analyst based in New York City, worked in Mayor Lindsay’s Environmental Protection Administration in 1972-1974. He met Bill Vickrey in 1991 and worked closely with Ted Kheel from 2007 to 2010.
Endnotes
- The new passenger surcharges of $1.25 for taxicabs and $2.50 for “ride-hails” (principally Ubers) apply to trips touching the congestion zone. These will be partially offset by lower fares owing to shorter wait-time charges due to faster travel speeds.
- Quote is from Moses’ August 23, 1969 guest essay in Newsday, “Is Rubber to Pay for Rails?” (not digitally available).
- The current version of the BTA is publicly available at this link: (18 MB Excel file).
- See Fix NYC Advisory Panel Report, Appendix B, 2019.
- A Congestion Toll New York Can Live With, July 2023, by Charles Komanoff, co-authored with Columbia Business School economist Gernot Wagner.
- As pronounced by University of Michigan economist Joel Slemrod, in Goodbye, My Sweet Deduction, New York Times, by Eduardo Porter and David Leonhardt, Nov. 3, 2005.
Key takeaways
- SBTi is the default reference point for corporate climate action: 51% of Fortune Global 500 companies now hold net-zero targets, up from 8% in 2020, and over 11,000 organizations worldwide have SBTi-validated targets.
- Net Zero Standard V2 redefines climate leadership as reducing emissions and mitigating ongoing emissions, not reduction alone.
- The new standard adds flexibility through five-year cycles, a “best efforts” standard, and an Asset Transition Method for companies whose path to net-zero doesn’t fit a straight-line trajectory.
- Voluntary carbon credits are formally recognized for the first time, with reduction and removal credits accepted from 2027, and removals required from 2035.
- Companies with 2030 targets keep using V1 for their current cycle and move to V2 in 2028; companies without targets can start using V2 on February 1, 2027.
Why every business needs to understand the SBTi Net-Zero Standard revision
The Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) has become the default reference point for credible corporate climate action. Net-zero targets are now held by 51% of Fortune Global 500 (FG500) companies, up dramatically from just 8% in 2020, and more than 11,000 organizations worldwide have set SBTi-validated targets.
However, SBTi’s influence extends well beyond the companies formally participating in the program. Every business in the value chain of an SBTi participant will have to reduce its own carbon emissions, and businesses that aren’t SBTi participants themselves still look to the program for guidance on climate action.
In short, SBTi gives every business a credible blueprint for climate action, and companies that follow its principles can pursue climate action with confidence, whether or not they’re formally part of the program.
How will the Net Zero Standard revision affect business climate action?
SBTi participation is expected to grow. Despite strong target-setting participation among the F500, only 17% of companies use the SBTi Net Zero Standard V1 beyond target setting, largely because its rules have been seen as too rigid to apply in practice. Much of the Net Zero Standard revision has focused on creating more flexibility to enable higher participation. Medium and small businesses will also increasingly feel pressure for climate action, since SBTi mandates that its participants reduce carbon emissions across their value chains.
Net Zero Standard V2 also redefines climate leadership: leading climate action now means reducing emissions and mitigating ongoing emissions. Reducing your own emissions while ignoring the emissions you continue to release along the way is no longer considered leadership. Supporting voluntary carbon projects with high-integrity carbon credits is now backed by the leading authority on corporate climate action.
What lessons shaped the Net Zero Standard V2 revision?
The revision reflects a few learnings about what actually drives climate progress, and how SBTi built those lessons into the new standard.
| Net Zero Standard V1 Learnings | Net Zero Standard V2 Implementation |
|---|---|
| Making real short-term progress is more important and more difficult than making big long-term promises | Focus on short-term climate progress |
| Every company has a different path to net zero that doesn’t always fit generalized net-zero rules | Create asset transition plans based on each company’s unique asset lifecycles and capital planning |
| We need to mitigate our ongoing emissions to keep global carbon emissions in check | Reduce global carbon emissions by financing voluntary carbon projects with high-integrity carbon credits |
What are the key changes between the old and new Net Zero Standard?
Both versions of the standard are grounded in net-zero by 2050. However, the old standard treated climate leadership as simply reducing emissions, expected a long-term commitment to net zero, based emission reduction targets on generalized net-zero goals, revoked status from companies that fell behind on targets, and ignored voluntary carbon projects entirely.
The new standard treats climate leadership as reducing emissions and mitigating ongoing emissions. It shifts the focus to short-term progress through five-year cycles, and it bases emission reduction targets on both the net-zero goal and a company’s own asset decarbonization plan. A new Asset Transition Method lets companies set decarbonization targets through asset plans with committed, verifiable steps; an ambitious but achievable path based on a company’s starting point, financial resources, and technology, with multiple pathways to reflect the unique opportunities and constraints of different industries and companies.
Crucially, the new standard moves to a “best efforts” basis that creates real flexibility on progress against targets. Businesses that miss their targets can keep their status if they’ve used “every lever” within their control, and minimum progress rules will be set out in the SBTi Assurance Manual.
Finally, the new standard formally uses voluntary carbon projects to mitigate ongoing emissions. From 2027 through 2034, this mitigation is recognized, and both carbon reduction and removal credits are accepted. From 2035 forward, mitigation with carbon removal credits becomes required, with durability matching between the removal and the emission it offsets.
| Old Net Zero Standard | New Net Zero Standard |
|---|---|
| Grounded in net-zero by 2050 | Grounded in net-zero by 2050 |
| Climate leadership is reducing emissions | Climate leadership is reducing emissions and mitigating ongoing emissions |
| Make a long-term commitment to net-zero | Focus on short-term progress in 5-year cycles |
| Emission reduction targets are based on net-zero goal |
|
| Businesses who fall behind targets lose status |
|
| Ignores voluntary carbon projects |
|
When does the new Net Zero Standard take effect?
Companies with existing 2030 targets should continue using the old Net Zero Standard for their current cycle, and start using the new Net Zero Standard in 2028 to set targets for the next cycle (2030–2035).
Companies that don’t yet have targets can use the new Net Zero Standard starting February 1, 2027.
What are SBTi’s Category A and Category B companies?
The new Net Zero Standard splits companies into two categories, with different requirements attached to each.
Category A covers large companies from all countries and medium-sized companies from high-income countries. A company from any country qualifies if it meets at least one of: net turnover of €450 million or more, or 1,000 or more full-time employees. A company from a high-income country qualifies if its Scope 1 and 2 emissions are 10,000 tCO2e or more, or if it meets at least two of: balance sheet of €25 million or more, net turnover of €50 million or more, or 250 or more full-time employees.
Category B covers small companies from all countries and medium-sized companies from lower-income countries.
How do Scope 1 targets work under Net Zero Standard V2?
Scope 1 targets aim to transition companies to net-zero direct emissions by 2050 or sooner, and companies can choose from three approaches.
- Absolute emissions reduction follows a straight-line emissions trajectory from the target base year to the net-zero year.
- Emissions intensity reduction lets companies follow sector-specific pathways designed to reflect the reduction opportunities available in sectors like steel, cement, or chemicals.
- Asset transition is designed for companies whose capital stock turnover doesn’t follow a linear or sector pathway. These companies design a transition plan to operate existing assets efficiently and replace them with low-carbon assets, using predetermined milestones.
How do Scope 2 targets work under Net Zero Standard V2?
Scope 2 targets address emissions from purchased electricity through three pathways:
- Reducing electricity consumption,
- Reducing grid consumption by installing onsite or direct-line offsite clean energy generation, and
- Cleaning up the regional grid using market-based tools like PPAs, RECs, and GOs that drive clean energy development.
V2 introduces a dual Scope 2 framework requiring two separate targets, with an overall goal of 100% low-carbon electricity by 2040.
The location-based target addresses the carbon intensity of a company’s physical power use, and requires companies to show that their grid consumption is falling and/or that their physical grid use is getting cleaner; in other words, that their market-based solutions are actually making the grid cleaner.
The market-based (or zero-carbon electricity) target tracks a company’s use of low-carbon power generation contracts and Energy Attribute Certificates. It requires geographical matching of these certificates with electricity consumption based on deliverability regions (grid regions); annual matching is allowed, though hourly matching is encouraged. Category A companies with large electricity loads must report the percentage of their Scope 2 electricity consumption matched with low-carbon attributes on an hourly basis, and there’s an optional recognition framework for companies that meet hourly matching thresholds.
How do Scope 3 targets work under Net Zero Standard V2?
Scope 3 targets share the same 2050-or-sooner net-zero goal, but companies set near-term targets only for material emissions sources in their value chain and areas where they have real influence. Long-term Scope 3 targets are generally not required.
Limited, justified exclusions are allowed for near-term targets, including categories that individually account for less than 5% of total Scope 3 emissions, and activities where a company lacks practical influence, like leased assets it doesn’t operationally control, or the processing of sold products. Optional exclusions are also available in specific categories.
Companies can choose from three approaches to near-term Scope 3 targets:
- An overarching emissions reduction target, which follows a linear contraction of emissions from the base year to residual emissions of 10% or less by 2050 or sooner;
- An overarching supplier/customer alignment target, benchmarked against a growing share of tier 1 suppliers and customers reaching net-zero by 2050 or sooner; or
- A category- or activity-specific target, tailored for companies with concentrated emissions in particular Scope 3 categories or high-emitting activities.
What is “ongoing emissions mitigation” under the new SBTi standard?
This is one of the most significant additions in Net Zero Standard V2. Accelerated climate contributions are needed to help the world achieve climate objectives, limit temperature overshoot, mitigate transition risks, and support the scale-up of climate solutions, and V2 formally recognizes that. Ongoing emissions mitigation runs as a parallel track to companies also reducing their own emissions.
The framework is initially voluntary, with recognition available at three contribution levels to encourage early action.
- Engaged companies address more than 1% of total Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions.
- Advanced companies address more than 10% of total Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions, including 100% of Scope 1 and 2 emissions.
- Leadership companies address 100% of total Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions with a contribution budget of $80/tCO2e.
Carbon credits used for this purpose have to meet certain quality standards. They must be ex-post (issued after the mitigation has actually occurred), independently third-party-assured, emissions reductions or removals, measured in tCO2e, that occur within five years prior to the reporting year. They must be sourced from outside the company’s own value chain. Further minimum criteria will be set to align with high-integrity frameworks, with additional details on the recognition program expected in the second half of 2026.
Starting in 2035, carbon removals become mandatory for Category A companies. From that point, the carbon removal coverage requirement rises linearly from 1% of Scope 1–3 emissions to 100% by a company’s net-zero year. Within that, 10% of long-lived GHG emissions must specifically be covered by durable removals, also rising linearly to 100% by the net-zero year.
How must companies neutralize residual emissions?
At a company’s net-zero target year and thereafter, it must reduce its Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions to zero or to residual levels, and neutralize all residual emissions using eligible carbon removals. Those removals have to meet two conditions: they must occur within the same reporting period as the residual emissions they’re neutralizing, and long-lived GHGs must be neutralized with long-lived removals, matching the durability of the removal to the atmospheric lifetime of the emission being addressed.
What is the SBTi implementation hierarchy?
Net Zero Standard V2 also lays out how companies should prioritize their actions for credible target delivery, in three tiers.
- Direct actions, at the activity level, are actions that reduce emissions at the source within a company’s own operations and value chain; things like efficiency improvements, fuel switching, and engaging suppliers and customers to reduce their emissions.
- Actions within shared systems, or activity pools that reduce the emissions of shared systems like electricity or gas grids. This includes market instruments that convey low-carbon attributes, such as PPAs, RECs, and GOs, all of which must meet minimum integrity criteria that SBTi will elaborate on in future guidance.
- Sector-level actions relate to the same type of activity occurring in a relevant geography or system, in a way that meaningfully reduces the emissions a company is responsible for.
How Terrapass helps businesses meet the new SBTi standard
As the rules around carbon credits become more rigorous, the quality of the credits behind them matters more than ever. Terrapass has expanded our global network of carbon projects: more project types, locations, prices, ICVCM CCPs, and UN SDGs, spanning super-pollutant destruction, nature-based solutions, and durable removals. We offer Green-e® Climate Certification and we only source from third-party-verified projects on ICVCM-Eligible registries.
We also help clients with impact beyond carbon: EACs, RECs, and GOs including Green-e® Certified credits that support leading renewable energy projects; water credits that support water restoration projects; and custom environmental product needs like RNG and SAF. Wherever your organization is on its sustainability journey, we help clients around the world address climate risk, advance their environmental and social goals, and get the most out of their sustainability budgets.
FAQ: SBTi Net-Zero Standard revision
What is the SBTi Net-Zero Standard?
It’s the framework the Science Based Targets initiative publishes for companies that want validated, credible net-zero targets tied to limiting global warming.
What is changing in the SBTi Net Zero Standard V2 revision?
The biggest changes are more flexibility (five-year cycles and a “best efforts” standard), a new Asset Transition Method for companies whose emissions don’t follow a straight-line path, and formal recognition of voluntary carbon credits for mitigating ongoing emissions.
When do companies need to switch to the new SBTi standard?
If your company already has 2030 targets, you keep using V1 for your current cycle and move to V2 in 2028. If you don’t have targets yet, you can start using V2 as of February 1, 2027.
Can companies use carbon credits to meet SBTi targets?
They can. Under V2, high-integrity carbon reduction and removal credits count toward mitigating ongoing emissions from 2027 through 2034. Starting in 2035, only removal credits count, and they need to be durability-matched to the emissions they offset.
What’s the difference between Category A and Category B companies under SBTi?
Category A is large companies everywhere plus medium-sized companies in high-income countries, based on thresholds like revenue, headcount, or emissions. Category B is small companies everywhere and medium-sized companies in lower-income countries.
What happens if a company misses its SBTi target?
Under the old standard, falling behind could cost a company its SBTi status. Under V2’s “best efforts” approach, a company can hold onto its status as long as it’s used every lever within its control, with minimum progress rules coming in the SBTi Assurance Manual.
Sources: This post is based on Terrapass’s internal analysis of the SBTi Corporate Net-Zero Standard V2.0. Facts and figures were checked against SBTi’s official V2.0 announcement, SBTi’s Corporate Net-Zero Standard V2.0 — Chapter 6: Ongoing Emissions Responsibility, Trellis’s coverage of the standard, Trellis’s reporting on Ongoing Emissions Recognition costs, Sylvera’s analysis of what comes next, Anthesis Group’s Fortune 500 net-zero commitments research, and Climate Impact Partners’ seventh annual FG500 analysis, as reported by CarbonUnits.com.
The post SBTi Net-Zero Standard V2: What the Revision Means for Every Business appeared first on Terrapass.
For most businesses, the emissions that matter most sit outside their own walls. Scope 3 emissions, everything generated across your value chain, from the suppliers who make your inputs to the customers who use your products, typically make up the majority of a company’s total carbon footprint. Under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), those value-chain emissions now have to be measured and disclosed with a rigour that spend-based estimates alone struggle to satisfy. This guide sets out how to improve Scope 3 data accuracy for CSRD: the calculation methods open to you, how to move from estimates to verified supplier data, and how to govern that data so it holds up to audit.
A carbon credit is a commitment that extends well into the future. The tonne of CO₂ compensated for today from a nature-based carbon project must remain out of the atmosphere for good, which means the forest behind the credit has to remain standing long after the transaction is complete. For any buyer, this raises a defining question: What ensures that the forest endures?
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