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Wealthy nations have committed to providing billions of dollars of “climate finance” to developing countries, as part of the global effort to tackle climate change.

At the COP29 climate summit, nations must decide on a new global goal to replace the existing target of $100bn each year.

Delivering this money is widely viewed as important for helping vulnerable nations in the global south and maintaining trust between countries in UN climate talks. 

Yet, for decades, climate finance has been plagued by accusations of exaggerated numbers, poor transparency and money going to “questionable” places. Much of this stems from a lack of consensus on what counts as “climate finance”. 

Most climate finance comes from the aid budgets of a handful of developed states, including western Europe, the US and Japan. Governments use their own criteria to assess “climate finance”, often prompting criticism from civil society groups and developing countries.

Most climate finance goes towards legitimate causes. However, analysis of the available data reveals examples of countries reporting funds going to, say, fossil fuels and airports. Some donors report finance that may never be spent and others hand out loans that, ultimately, see them making a profit.

These activities are all allowed under the UN climate finance system.

As countries gather to negotiate a new climate-finance target at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, Carbon Brief – in no particular order – explores six of the issues that make climate finance such a “wild west”.

  1. There is no agreed definition of what counts as ‘climate finance’
  2. Climate-finance accounting is not consistent or transparent
  3. Some climate finance is not helping to tackle climate change
  4. Reliance on loans ‘overstates’ climate finance flows
  5. Countries are reporting money that may never get spent
  6. Climate finance is used to boost donors’ economic interests

1. There is no agreed definition of what counts as ‘climate finance’

There is no universal agreement on what should, or should not, count towards the international “climate finance” provided by developed countries to developing countries.

Unofficial definitions, including those of the UN Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), broadly agree that climate finance should support activities that cut emissions or help adapt to climate change.

As for the types of finance that should count, nations decided that the $100bn target would cover “a wide variety of sources”, including public money, support via multilateral development banks (MDBs) and private investment spurred by public spending.

However, the kinds of activities and finance streams falling into these broad categories are open to interpretation. In practice, governments of developed countries use their own methodologies and set their own rules when reporting climate finance. 

Developed countries also pledged to provide climate finance that is “new and additional” – a term often taken to mean extra funding on top of other aid programmes. However, this framing is contested and, in practice, much of the reported climate finance comes from existing development budgets. 

Prof Romain Weikmans, an international climate-finance researcher at the Free University of Brussels, tells Carbon Brief that developed countries have “diverging understandings on what should count as climate finance and on how to count it”. He adds that reporting requirements negotiated at the UN “allow countries to remain vague”.

Many expert analyses have concluded that self-reporting by governments, facing political pressure to act on climate change, contributes to an “overestimation” of total climate finance. 

While it was widely reported that, based on OECD data, developed countries met the $100bn target two years late in 2022, Weikmans says the lack of a universal definition “makes it impossible to assess whether the $100bn has been met or not”. 

The chart below shows how different assumptions about “climate finance” by key financial organisations lead to divergent estimates of how much has been provided.

Different interpretations of 'climate finance' yield very different numbers
Estimates of climate finance, $bn, by channel of provision, from different organisations. Oxfam’s figures present its figures as an average of the years 2019 and 2020, and the Indian Ministry of Finance only conducted its assessment on a one-off basis in 2015. Source: Figures compiled by UNFCCC SCF, Oxfam.

Igor Shishlov, head of climate finance at Perspectives Climate Group, tells Carbon Brief that the lack of clarity contributes to an “erosion of trust” in climate negotiations between developed and developing countries.

These tensions have existed since the start of UN climate negotiations in the 1990s. An attempt by COP presidencies in 2015 to “reassure” nations about progress towards the $100bn goal with a special OECD report ended up sparking more disputes

(A response at the time from the Indian Ministry of Finance – reflected in the chart above – estimated that climate finance was 26 times smaller than the OECD estimate. This was based on money that had been paid out, rather than pledged, from climate funds deemed “new and additional”.)

Efforts since then to agree on a definition have failed. Joe Thwaites, a senior advocate on international climate finance at NRDC, tells Carbon Brief that both developed and developing countries contribute to this deadlock:

“Developed countries oppose a definition that would restrict climate finance to certain financial instruments, while petrostates oppose a definition that would exclude counting funding for fossil-fuel projects as climate finance.”

As countries negotiate the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) for climate finance at COP29, observers say it is unlikely that nations will make significant progress on a comprehensive definition. 

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2. Climate-finance accounting is not consistent or transparent

The systems for climate-finance accounting have been described as full of “inconsistencies” and “discrepancies”, as well as “prone to huge overestimations”.

Joseph Kraus, senior policy director at the ONE Campaign, which has attempted its own assessment of climate finance based on available data, tells Carbon Brief:

“Climate finance accounting is like the wild west: Every climate finance provider makes its own rules about what to count. Predictably, that makes it virtually impossible to get accurate numbers.”

Governments report their climate-finance contributions to three major international bodies: the OECD; the UNFCCC; and, in the case of EU member states, the European Commission.

Most climate finance is drawn from developed countries’ aid budgets and they register their bilateral contributions in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Officials then mark projects as being related to climate mitigation or adaptation.

This “Rio marker system” was implemented in 1998 to assess whether aid projects align with the three “Rio Conventions” on climate change, biodiversity and desertification.

The tags were never meant to define the amount of “climate finance” counted under the UN system. They have effectively filled the gap left by the lack of official guidance.

Most developed countries use the data submitted to the OECD CRS to guide what they report as “official” climate finance in reports to the UNFCCC. Only a handful, including the UK and the US, assess projects on a more case-by-case basis.

Governments use the Rio Markers to calculate climate finance in different ways. Most say they count 100% of the projects where climate has been marked as a “principal” objective towards their UNFCCC totals.

Projects where climate is deemed “significant”, implying a partial focus on climate, vary a lot more. Countries state that they report between 30% and 50% of these projects as climate finance.

Analysts have warned that the blanket application of fixed percentages is arbitrary and can lead to figures being inflated. They also note that, in practice, UNFCCC and OECD figures are difficult to compare and do not always match up in the ways countries report them.

The figures for bilateral climate finance that developed countries report to the UNFCCC are used as the basis for the OECD’s annual reports of progress towards the $100bn goal. They are combined with the OECD’s figures for MDBs, multilateral funds and the private sector.

(These are generally cited as the definitive figures for $100bn tracking, although they are contested. The OECD does not provide a breakdown of contributors to the target and its reports are released two years in arrears, making real-time scrutiny difficult.)

While the OECD screens projects reported in its system, it has no power to amend those that have been marked “incorrectly”. Analysis by Development Initiatives of climate-related aid projects found countries, such as France, Japan and Australia, frequently tagged projects that “deviated” from OECD guidance – those that include fossil fuels, for example. 

Independent audits in Denmark, the Netherlands and the EU have all found significant evidence of “climate” projects being mislabelled, or their relevance overstated. 

Reflecting on the wider state of climate-finance accounting, Thwaites tells Carbon Brief:

“I think understanding of climate finance is getting better, both through improvements in official reporting and through greater scrutiny from journalists and civil society. But as those third-party audits have shown, there is much room for improvement.”

All of this is further complicated by the lack of transparency from governments, when reporting their official climate-finance contributions to the UNFCCC. The lack of detail in submissions makes it difficult to assess the relevance of each project for tackling climate change.

For example, NGO FragDenStaat has documented its difficulties evaluating the German government’s claim that its climate finance reached a “record level” in 2022.

Poor transparency makes it difficult for those in developing countries as well. Turkish banks have received millions of dollars in climate finance from Germany and France, but there is little information provided either by the banks or the donors on how it is used.

“Citizens have no access to any information about these public funds,” Özgür Gürbüz, campaign director of the Turkish NGO Ekosfer, tells Carbon Brief.

Sehr Raheja, a programme officer specialising in climate finance at the Centre for Science and Environment in India, tells Carbon Brief:

“Implications…include the inability to clearly hold actors accountable, or even first understand the complete reality of the situation of climate finance for developing countries.”

Such scrutiny is important. The UK has traditionally been viewed as one of the more rigorous climate-finance reporters, but the government loosened its accounting system in 2023 to bring it more in line with those of less strict donors. 

In doing so, an independent audit found that the UK added an extra £1.7bn ($2.2bn) to its projected climate finance spending without contributing any new funds, as the chart below shows. 

The UK government added an extra $2.2bn to its climate finance forecast by expanding its definition of climate finance
Annual UK international climate finance spending, £bn, by financial year for the period 2011-12 to 2025-26. The red area indicated finance that has been included in the totals following changes to the UK government’s methodology for calculating its climate finance. The blue area indicates climate finance before those methodology changes, with the figures for 2023-24 to 2025-26 representing the average value from a range of forecasts. Source: Carbon Brief analysis, UK government data.

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3. Some climate finance is not helping to tackle climate change

Climate-finance databases contain details of tens of thousands of projects operating in developing countries around the world.

Most of these projects have clear links to tackling climate change. They might, for example, support solar power projects in Kenya, the construction of a train line in India, or improving the climate resilience of drought-prone farms in Guatemala.

However, among them are aid projects that may bring benefits to the target countries, but have little or no relevance for tackling climate change. Some could even undermine such efforts, by supporting fossil fuels and carbon-intensive sectors.

Stacy-ann Robinson, a climate-adaptation finance researcher at Emory University in the US state of Georgia, tells Carbon Brief that some climate finance “has been going to questionable places to support objectives that are clearly not related to…reducing vulnerability or increasing resilience”.

Some assessments indicate that “inaccurately” categorised climate projects are relatively common among the largest donors, notably Japan and France. NGOs have also identified many “troubling and high-emitting projects” reported as climate finance by MDBs.

Over the years, researchers and journalists have unearthed climate finance being used to, for example, buy uniforms for park rangers, support anti-terrorism programmes and fund luxury hotels

However, the overall lack of transparency makes it difficult to ascertain exactly how much money from these “questionable” projects is feeding into the official totals reported to the OECD. 

An investigation by Reuters in 2023 uncovered $3bn of finance reported to the UNFCCC that had gone towards “programmes that do little or nothing to ease the effects of climate change”. However, Reuters noted that its review only covered around 10% of countries’ submissions.

Carbon Brief has identified at least $6.5bn of finance attributed to projects involving coal, oil and gas that has been tagged as climate-related in the OECD’s climate-related aid database, over the decade from 2012-2021. If countries have followed their own guidelines for reporting climate finance, much of this money will have been reported to the UNFCCC.

Japan is frequently cited for labelling fossil-fuel finance as climate finance, including billions of dollars for coal- and gas-fired power plants in places such as Bangladesh and Indonesia.

However, Carbon Brief’s assessment of the data reveals that some European countries have also been reporting smaller amounts of fossil fuel-related “climate finance”.

For example, Sweden counted around €5m for a gas-fired power plant in Mozambique between 2012 and 2015, while Germany supported a gas power plant in the Ivory Coast in 2022. In both cases, the governments have confirmed to Carbon Brief that projects marked in the OECD registry were also reported to the UNFCCC.

Defenders of fossil-fuel finance argue that developing countries need investment in cleaner or more efficient fossil-fuel infrastructure – and that this does, in fact, reduce emissions. Others argue that these funds simply should not be labelled as climate-related.

Another example of questionable climate finance comes from the French development finance institution Proparco, which provided a €20m loan to Cabo Verde Airports in 2023, a subsidiary of French construction company Vinci Group

This project was too recent to have been officially reported to the UNFCCC. However, Proparco has reported that 20% of its financing for the project would lead to “climate co-benefits”, such as “renewable energy investments, the installation of LED lighting and the replacement of air-conditioning systems”.

At the same time, Vinci Group says its other goal is to help Cabo Verde boost tourism through increased traffic at its airports. The company has celebrated “record passenger numbers” at its Cabo Verde airports, where traffic increased by 17% year-on-year in August thanks to rising passenger flows from western Europe.

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4. Reliance on loans ‘overstates’ climate finance flows

Most climate finance is delivered as loans to developing countries and their institutions. This is one of the most contentious issues in international climate-finance reporting.

More than half of the bilateral finance committed by wealthy countries – and around three-quarters of the investments by MDBs – comes in the form of loans, as shown by the red bars in the figure below.

In fact, the nations that consistently rank among the largest climate-finance providers – Japan, France and the US – all provide the majority of their climate finance as loans.

Loans have to be paid back, leading to climate finance returning to contributor countries as profits, through repayments plus interest. This has led to accusations by civil society groups that developed countries “overstate” their climate finance by leaning heavily on loans.

Public climate-finance institutions generally offer loans at lower-than-market “concessional” rates, or else with longer repayment periods.

However, Carbon Brief analysis shows that at least $18bn of official climate finance reported by developed countries between 2015 and 2020 – roughly 10% of the total – was “non-concessional”, as the chart below shows. (While less desirable than loans officially described as “concessional”, these public institution loans are still generally offered at better-than-market rates.)

Developed countries provide more than half of their climate finance as loans – many of them at near-market rates
Bilateral climate finance reported by developing countries to the UNFCCC, broken down by % of “non-concessional” loans (light red), all other loans (dark red), grants (dark blue) and other types of finance, such as export credits (light blue). Source: Carbon Brief analysis, UNFCCC biennial report data compiled by Reuters.

The reliance on loans is especially controversial amid the debt crisis facing many developing countries. 

The world’s least-developed countries and small-island developing states collectively spent twice as much repaying debts in 2022 as they received in climate finance, according to analysis by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

There has been considerable pressure from civil society, researchers, developing countries and even UN climate chief Simon Stiell to increase the “concessionality” of climate finance.

NGOs, such as Oxfam, argue that climate-related loans should be reported as “grant equivalents”, rather than at face value. This is a measure of how much the developed-country government is subsidising the loan.

Since 2018, development aid reported in the OECD’s database has been expressed in grant equivalents in order to better communicate the “financial effort” being made by donors. 

However, when the OECD reports progress towards the $100bn climate-finance goal, drawing from developed countries’ reports to the UNFCCC, it still uses face-value figures for loans. This is one of the key reasons that developing countries have disputed these figures.

Oxfam releases an annual report that drastically downgrades the OECD figures, primarily by using grant equivalent values. Rather than exceeding the $100bn goal in 2022, the NGO argues that developed countries’ true financial effort only amounted to around $28-35bn that year.

From 2024, countries will be able to start reporting loans in grant-equivalent amounts to the UNFCCC in the newly introduced “biennial transparency reports” (BTRs) that all nations must file under the Paris Agreement. However, they are not required to do so, meaning it is unlikely that an “official” total for grant-equivalent loans will be available.

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5. Countries are reporting money that may never get spent

Climate finance only has an impact when it is provided – or “disbursed” – to people and institutions who can use the money.

Yet some countries, including France, Germany and Denmark, choose not to report the amount of climate finance they have actually provided to developing countries.

Instead, they record the amount they have “committed”, or else a mix of committed and provided sums. These numbers feed into the totals reported by national governments and they count towards the $100bn target, even if the money has not left the donor country.

The OECD defines a commitment as a “firm written obligation by a government or official agency”. Over time, the amount of money provided should match the amount committed.

But between a nation committing money and handing it out, all sorts of things can change, as Mattias Söderberg, global climate lead at the NGO DanChurchAid, tells Carbon Brief:

“In some situations, projects are interrupted. Changes in the context or in the projects or within partners, for example, when there was a coup in Mali, means that committed funds may not be disbursed as planned.”

Climate projects could also collapse because a new government in the donor country decides to cancel the project for political or financial reasons. Other issues, such as shifting exchange rates, can also lead to divergences between committed and disbursed funds.

The reliance on commitments to meet climate-finance targets has drawn criticism. In its 2015 critique of progress towards the $100bn target, the Indian government said it needed “actual disbursements” rather than “promises, pledges or multi-year commitments about promised sums in the future”.

An analysis by ONE Campaign of climate-related aid reported to the OECD found that, of $616bn committed since 2013, data was missing for $69bn of disbursements and another $228bn had not yet been disbursed. (This data is not a direct reflection of “climate finance” under the UN, but it is a rough proxy.)

Some lag between commitments and payments is to be expected. Countries tend to commit to big climate-finance projects and then gradually pay out the money over time.

However, civil society groups have highlighted “significant differences” between committed and provided sums.

In recent years, EU member states have had to start reporting both commitments and disbursements. The chart below shows the sizable gap between the money Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy pledge and the amount they provide.

(It is worth noting that there is significant variability. Sweden sometimes provides more finance than it commits, whereas, in two years, France did not report disbursements at all.)

European donors are reporting far less climate finance being provided to developing countries than the amounts they are committing
Total climate finance reported by the top five EU member state donors – Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy – that has been “committed” (blue) or “provided” (red) to developing countries each year. Source: Carbon Brief analysis, EU Governance Regulation data.

Identifying climate-finance projects that have completely failed to pay out is difficult. Governments are not obliged to report to the UNFCCC when they have provided finance and neither do they have to update the record to reflect any cancellations or changes.

Reuters identified three French climate projects between 2016-2018 – collectively worth half a billion dollars – that had been cancelled. This equates to 4% of France’s climate finance over this period.

“Commitments look better, so more effort is put into reporting them than into tracking actual disbursements,” Kraus from ONE Campaign tells Carbon Brief.

Civil society groups argue that all governments should start reporting disbursements to reduce the risk of “over-reporting”.

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6. Climate finance is used to boost donors’ economic interests

Developed nations provide climate finance in a variety of different ways.

In projects that involve building infrastructure, such as windfarms and train lines, companies must be enlisted to work on the engineering and construction. Often, donor governments will work with firms based in their own countries to carry out climate projects.

The French Development Agency (AFD) has reported that the majority of its aid is entrusted to projects involving at least one French “economic actor”, resulting in significant economic benefits for the country.

Meanwhile, one-third of Japanese climate loans are given with the condition that Japanese companies are hired to work on the project, according to Reuters analysis of OECD data.

Stacy-ann Robinson of Emory University notes that this is not a “black-and-white” issue, as sometimes a company from the donor nation will be best placed to carry out the project. However, she notes that it has implications for capacity building in developing countries.

France has committed billions of dollars towards rail infrastructure in developing countries. Given France’s global leadership in the sector, a significant share of these projects have been implemented by French companies.

Project-level data about which companies are awarded contracts is not reported to the UNFCCC. However, one climate-finance project identified by Carbon Brief involves €230m worth of loans provided by AFD for an express regional train in the Senegalese capital, Dakar. This was co-funded with an extra €1bn from development banks.

While the project has clear benefits for the decarbonisation of transport in Dakar, it also helped several French companies expand their activities in the region.

These include Eiffage, which built the infrastructure; Systra, which provided engineering consultancy services; Thales and Engie, which together won a €225m project to design and build the electricity infrastructure for the train; and Alstom, which supplied trains.

Reflecting on this issue, Robinson tells Carbon Brief:

“Perhaps we need regulations around the conditionalities associated with [climate] finance that would reduce the possibility of only French companies, for example, being able to work on these climate-finance projects.”

Another way climate finance might benefit donor nations is through projects that involve hiring consultants and other experts based domestically. One paper notes how such projects can result in money “flowing back to developed countries”.

Previous Carbon Brief analysis found that one-tenth of the climate funds disbursed by the UK between 2010 and 2023 had gone to private consultancies, largely based in the UK.

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This article was developed with the support of Journalismfund Europe. Carbon Brief worked with journalists based in France, Germany, Sweden and Turkey, and they provided input on how different countries have been providing international climate finance.

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COP29: Six key reasons why international climate finance is a ‘wild west’

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The 2026 budget test: Will Australia break free from fossil fuels?

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In 2026, the dangers of fossil fuel dependence have been laid bare like never before. The illegal invasion of Iran has brought pain and destruction to millions across the Middle East and triggered a global energy crisis impacting us all. Communities in the Pacific have been hit especially hard by rising fuel prices, and Australians have seen their cost-of-living woes deepen.

Such moments of crisis and upheaval can lead to positive transformation. But only when leaders act with courage and foresight.

There is no clearer statement of a government’s plans and priorities for the nation than its budget — how it plans to raise money, and what services, communities, and industries it will invest in.

As we count down the days to the 2026-27 Federal Budget, will the Albanese Government deliver a budget for our times? One that starts breaking the shackles of fossil fuels, accelerates the shift to clean energy, protects nature, and sees us work together with other countries towards a safer future for all? Or one that doubles down on coal and gas, locks in more climate chaos, and keeps us beholden to the whims of tyrants and billionaires.

Here’s what we think the moment demands, and what we’ll be looking out for when Treasurer Jim Chalmers steps up to the dispatch box on 12 May.

1. Stop fuelling the fire
2. Make big polluters pay
3. Support everyone to be part of the solution
4. Build the industries of the future
5. Build community resilience
6. Be a better neighbour
7. Protect nature

1. Stop fuelling the fire

Action Calls for a Transition Away From Fossil Fuels in Vanuatu. © Greenpeace
The community in Mele, Vanuatu sent a positive message ahead of the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels. © Greenpeace

In mid-April, Pacific governments and civil society met to redouble their efforts towards a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific. Moving beyond coal, oil and gas is fundamental to limiting warming to 1.5°C — a survival line for vulnerable communities and ecosystems. And as our Head of Pacific, Shiva Gounden, explained, it is “also a path of liberation that frees us from expensive, extractive and polluting fossil fuel imports and uplifts our communities”.

Pacific countries are at the forefront of growing global momentum towards a just transition away from fossil fuels, and it is way past time for Australia to get with the program. It is no longer a question of whether fossil fuel extraction will end, but whether that end will be appropriately managed and see communities supported through the transition, or whether it will be chaotic and disruptive.

So will this budget support the transition away from fossil fuels, or will it continue to prop up coal and gas?

When it comes to sensible moves the government can make right now, one stands out as a genuine low hanging fruit. Mining companies get a full rebate of the excise (or tax) that the rest of us pay on diesel fuel. This lowers their operating costs and acts as a large, ongoing subsidy on fossil fuel production — to the tune of $11 billion a year!

Greenpeace has long called for coal and gas companies to be removed from this outdated scheme, and for the billions in savings to be used to support the clean energy transition and to assist communities with adapting to the impacts of climate change. Will we see the government finally make this long overdue change, or will it once again cave to the fossil fuel lobby?

2. Make big polluters pay

Activists Disrupt Major Gas Conference in Sydney. © Greenpeace
Greenpeace Australia Pacific activists disrupted the Australian Domestic Gas Outlook conference in Sydney with the message ‘Gas execs profit, we pay the price’. © Greenpeace

While our communities continue to suffer the escalating costs of climate-fuelled disasters, our Government continues to support a massive expansion of Australia’s export gas industry. Gas is a dangerous fossil fuel, with every tonne of Australian gas adding to the global heating that endangers us all.

Moreover, companies like Santos and Woodside pay very little tax for the privilege of digging up and selling Australians’ natural endowment of fossil gas. Remarkably, the Government currently raises more tax from beer than from the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) — the main tax on gas profits.

Momentum has been building to replace or supplement the PRRT with a 25% tax on gas exports. This could raise up to $17 billion a year — funds that, like savings from removing the diesel tax rebate for coal and gas companies, could be spent on supporting the clean energy transition and assisting communities with adapting to worsening fires, floods, heatwaves and other impacts of climate change.

As politicians arrive in Canberra for budget week, they will be confronted by billboards calling for a fair tax on gas exports. The push now has the support of dozens of organisations and a growing number of politicians. Let’s hope the Treasurer seizes this rare window for reform.

3. Support everyone to be part of the solution

As the price of petrol and diesel rises, electric vehicles (EVs) are helping people cut fuel use and save money. However, while EV sales have jumped since the invasion of Iran sent fuel prices rising, they still only make up a fraction of total new car sales. This budget should help more Australians switch to electric vehicles and, even more importantly, enable more Australians to get around by bike, on foot, and on public transport. This means maintaining the EV discount, investing in public and active transport, and removing tax breaks for fuel-hungry utes and vans.

Millions of Australians already enjoy the cost-saving benefits of rooftop solar, batteries, and getting off gas. This budget should enable more households, and in particular those on lower incomes, to access these benefits. This means maintaining the Cheaper Home Batteries Program, and building on the Household Energy Upgrades Fund.

4. Build the industries of the future

Protest of Woodside and Drill Rig Valaris at Scarborough Gas Field in Western Australia. © Greenpeace / Jimmy Emms
Crew aboard Greenpeace Australia Pacific’s campaigning vessel the Oceania conducted a peaceful banner protest at the site of the Valaris DPS-1, the drill rig commissioned to build Woodside’s destructive Burrup Hub. © Greenpeace / Jimmy Emms

If we’re to transition away from fossil fuels, we need to be building the clean industries of the future.

No state is more pivotal to Australia’s energy and industrial transformation than Western Australia. The state has unrivaled potential for renewable energy development and for replacing fossil fuel exports with clean exports like green iron. Such industries offer Western Australia the promise of a vibrant economic future, and for Australia to play an outsized positive role in the world’s efforts to reduce emissions.

However, realising this potential will require focussed support from the Federal Government. Among other measures, Greenpeace has recommended establishing the Australasian Green Iron Corporation as a joint venture between the Australian and Western Australian governments, a key trading partner, a major iron ore miner and steel makers. This would unite these central players around the complex task of building a large-scale green iron industry, and unleash Western Australia’s potential as a green industrial powerhouse.

5. Build community resilience

Believe it or not, our Government continues to spend far more on subsidising fossil fuel production — and on clearing up after climate-fuelled disasters — than it does on helping communities and industries reduce disaster costs through practical, proven methods for building their resilience.

Last year, the Government estimated that the cost of recovery from disasters like the devastating 2022 east coast floods on 2019-20 fires will rise to $13.5 billion. For contrast, the Government’s Disaster Ready Fund – the main national source of funding for disaster resilience – invests just $200 million a year in grants to support disaster preparedness and resilience building. This is despite the Government’s own National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) estimating that for every dollar spent on disaster risk reduction, there is a $9.60 return on investment.

By redirecting funds currently spent on subsidising fossil fuel production, the Government can both stop incentivising climate destruction in the first place, and ensure that Australian communities and industries are better protected from worsening climate extremes.

No communities have more to lose from climate damage, or carry more knowledge of practical solutions, than Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The budget should include a dedicated First Nations climate adaptation fund, ensuring First Nations communities can develop solutions on their own terms, and access the support they need with adapting to extreme heat, coastal erosion and other escalating challenges.

6. Be a better neighbour

The global response to climate change depends on the adequate flow of support from developed economies like Australia to lower income nations with shifting to clean energy, adapting to the impacts of climate change, and addressing loss and damage.

Such support is vital to building trust and cooperation, reducing global emissions, and supporting regional and global security by enabling countries to transition away from fossil fuels and build greater resilience.

Despite its central leadership role in this year’s global climate negotiations, our Government is yet to announce its contribution to international climate finance for 2025-2030. Greenpeace recommends a commitment of $11 billion for this five year period, which is aligned with the global goal under the Paris Agreement to triple international climate finance from current levels.
This new commitment should include additional funding to address loss and damage from climate change and a substantial contribution to the Pacific Resilience Facility, ensuring support is accessible to countries and communities that need it most. It should also see Australia get firmly behind the vision of a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific.

7. Protect nature

Rainforest in Tasmania. © Markus Mauthe / Greenpeace
Rainforest of north west Tasmania in the Takayna (Tarkine) region. © Markus Mauthe / Greenpeace

There is no safe planet without protection of the ecosystems and biodiversity that sustain us and regulate our climate.

Last year the Parliament passed important and long overdue reforms to our national environment laws to ensure better protection for our forests and other critical ecosystems. However, the Government will need to provide sufficient funding to ensure the effective implementation of these reforms.

Greenpeace has recommended $500 million over four years to establish the National Environment Agency — the body responsible for enforcing and monitoring the new laws — and a further $50 million to Environment Information Australia for providing critical information and tools.

Further resourcing will also be required to fulfil the crucial goal of fully protecting 30% of Australian land and seas by 2030. This should include $1 billion towards ending deforestation by enabling farmers and loggers to retool away from destructive practices, $2 billion a year for restoring degraded lands, $5 billion for purchasing and creating new protected areas, and $200 million for expanding domestic and international marine protected areas.

Conclusion

This is not the first time that conflict overseas has triggered an energy crisis, or that a budget has been preceded by a summer of extreme weather disasters, highlighting the urgent need to phase out fossil fuels. What’s different in 2026 is the availability of solutions. Renewable energy is now cheaper and more accessible than ever before. Global momentum is firmly behind the transition away from fossil fuels. The Albanese Government, with its overwhelming majority, has the chance to set our nation up for the future, or keep us stranded in the past. Let’s hope it makes some smart choices.

The 2026 budget test: Will Australia break free from fossil fuels?

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What fossil fuels really cost us in a world at war

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Anne Jellema is Executive Director of 350.org.

The war on Iran and Lebanon is a deeply unjust and devastating conflict, killing civilians at home, destroying lives, and at the same time sending shockwaves through the global economy. We, at 350.org, have calculated, drawing on price forecasts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Goldman Sachs, just how much that volatility is costing us. 

Even under the IMF’s baseline scenario – a de facto “best case” scenario with a near-term end to the war and related supply chain disruptions – oil and gas price spikes are projected to cost households and businesses globally more than $600 billion by the end of the year. Under the IMF’s “adverse scenario”, with prolonged conflict and sustained price pressures, we estimate those additional costs could exceed $1 trillion, even after accounting for reduced demand.

Which is why we urgently need a power shift. Governments are under growing pressure to respond to rising fuel and food costs and deepening energy poverty. And it’s becoming clearer to both voters and elected officials that fossil dependence is not only expensive and risky, but unnecessary. 

People who can are voting with their wallets: sales of solar panels and electric vehicles are increasing sharply in many countries. But the working people who have nothing to spare, ironically, are the ones stuck with using oil and gas that is either exorbitantly expensive or simply impossible to get.

Drain on households and economies

In India, street food vendors can’t get cooking gas and in the Philippines, fishermen can’t afford to take their boats to sea. A quarter of British people say that rising energy tariffs will leave them completely unable to pay their bills. This is the moment for a global push to bring abundant and affordable clean energy to all.

In April, we released Out of Pocket, our new research report on how fossil fuels are draining households and economies. We were surprised by the scale of what we found. For decades, governments have reassured people that energy price spikes are unfortunate but unavoidable – the result of distant conflicts, market forces or geopolitical shocks beyond anyone’s control. But the numbers tell a different story. 

    What we are living through today is not an energy crisis. It is a fossil fuel crisis. In just the first 50 days of the Middle East conflict, soaring oil and gas prices have siphoned an estimated $158 billion–$166 billion from households and businesses worldwide. That is money extracted directly from people’s pockets and transferred, almost instantly, into fossil fuel company balance sheets. And this figure only captures the immediate impact of price spikes, not the permanent economic drain of fossil dependence. Fossil fuels don’t just cost us once, they cost us over and over again.

    First, through our bills. Every time there is a war, an embargo or a supply disruption, fossil fuel prices surge. For ordinary people, this means higher costs for energy, transport and food. Many Global South countries have little or no fiscal space to buffer the shock; instead, workers and families pay the price.

    Second, through our taxes. Governments around the world continue to pour vast sums of public money into fossil fuel subsidies. These are often justified as a way to protect the most vulnerable at the petrol pump or in their homes. But in reality, the benefits are overwhelmingly captured by wealthier households and corporations. The poorest 20% receive just a fraction of this support, while public finances are drained.

    Third, through climate impacts. New research across more than 24,000 global locations gives a granular account of the true costs of extreme heat, sea level rise and falling agricultural yields. Using this data to update IMF modelling of the social cost of carbon, we found that fossil fuel impacts on health and livelihoods amount to over $9 trillion a year. This is the biggest subsidy of all, because these massive and mounting costs are not charged to Big Oil – they are paid for by governments and households, with the poorest shouldering the lion’s share. 

    Massive transfer of wealth to fossil fuel industry

    Adding up direct subsidies, tax breaks and the unpaid bill for climate damages, the total transfer of wealth from the public to the fossil fuel industry amounts to $12 trillion even in a “normal” year without a global oil shock. That’s more than 50% higher than the IMF has previously estimated, and equivalent to a staggering $23 million a minute.

    The fossil fuel industry has become extraordinarily adept at profiting from instability. When conflict drives up prices, companies do not lose, they gain. In the current crisis, oil producers and commodity traders are on track to secure tens of billions of dollars in additional windfall profits, even as households face rising bills and governments struggle to manage the fallout.

    Fossil fuel crisis offers chance to speed up energy transition, ministers say

    This growing disconnect is impossible to ignore. Investors are advised to buy into fossil fuel firms precisely because of their ability to generate profits in times of crisis. Meanwhile, ordinary people are told to tighten their belts.

    In 2026, unlike during the oil shocks of the 1970s, clean energy is no longer a distant alternative. Now, even more than when gas prices spiked due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, renewables are often the cheapest option available. Solar and wind can be deployed quickly, at scale, and without the volatility that defines fossil fuel markets.

    How to transition from dirty to clean energy

    The solutions are clear. Governments must implement permanent windfall taxes on fossil fuel companies to ensure that extraordinary profits generated during crises are redirected to support households. These revenues can be used to reduce energy bills, invest in public services, and accelerate the rollout of clean energy.

    Second, we must shift subsidies away from fossil fuels and towards renewable solutions, particularly those that can be deployed quickly and equitably, such as rooftop and community solar. This is not just about cutting emissions. It is about building a more stable, fair and resilient energy system.

    Finally, we need binding plans to phase out fossil fuels altogether, replacing them with homegrown renewable energy that can shield economies from future shocks. Because what the current crisis has made clear is this: as long as we remain dependent on fossil fuels, we remain vulnerable – to conflict, to price volatility and to the escalating impacts of climate change.

    The true price of fossil fuels is no longer hidden. It is visible in rising bills, strained public finances and communities pushed to the brink. And it is being paid, every day, by ordinary people around the world.

    It’s time for the great power shift

    Full details on the methodology used for this report are available here.

    The Great Power Shift is a new campaign by 350.org global campaign to pressure governments to bring down energy bills for good by ending fossil fuel dependence and investing in clean, affordable energy for all

    Logo of 350.org campaign on “The Great Power Shift”

    Logo of 350.org campaign on “The Great Power Shift”

    The post What fossil fuels really cost us in a world at war appeared first on Climate Home News.

    What fossil fuels really cost us in a world at war

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    Climate Change

    Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts

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    Computer models that use artificial intelligence (AI) cannot forecast record-breaking weather as well as traditional climate models, according to a new study.

    It is well established that AI climate models have surpassed traditional, physics-based climate models for some aspects of weather forecasting.

    However, new research published in Science Advances finds that AI models still “underperform” in forecasting record-breaking extreme weather events.

    The authors tested how well both AI and traditional weather models could simulate thousands of record-breaking hot, cold and windy events that were recorded in 2018 and 2020.

    They find that AI models underestimate both the frequency and intensity of record-breaking events.

    A study author tells Carbon Brief that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.

    AI weather forecasts

    Extreme weather events, such as floods, heatwaves and storms, drive hundreds of billions of dollars in damages every year through the destruction of cropland, impacts on infrastructure and the loss of human life.

    Many governments have developed early warning systems to prepare the general public and mobilise disaster response teams for imminent extreme weather events. These systems have been shown to minimise damages and save lives.

    For decades, scientists have used numerical weather prediction models to simulate the weather days, or weeks, in advance.

    These models rely on a series of complex equations that reproduce processes in the atmosphere and ocean. The equations are rooted in fundamental laws of physics, based on decades of research by climate scientists. As a result, these models are referred to as “physics-based” models.

    However, AI-based climate models are gaining popularity as an alternative for weather forecasting.

    Instead of using physics, these models use a statistical approach. Scientists present AI models with a large batch of historical weather data, known as training data, which teaches the model to recognise patterns and make predictions.

    To produce a new forecast, the AI model draws on this bank of knowledge and follows the patterns that it knows.

    There are many advantages to AI weather forecasts. For example, they use less computing power than physics-based models, because they do not have to run thousands of mathematical equations.

    Furthermore, many AI models have been found to perform better than traditional physics-based models at weather forecasts.

    However, these models also have drawbacks.

    Study author Prof Sebastian Engelke, a professor at the research institute for statistics and information science at the University of Geneva, tells Carbon Brief that AI models “depend strongly on the training data” and are “relatively constrained to the range of this dataset”.

    In other words, AI models struggle to simulate brand new weather patterns, instead tending forecast events of a similar strength to those seen before. As a result, it is unclear whether AI models can simulate unprecedented, record-breaking extreme events that, by definition, have never been seen before.

    Record-breaking extremes

    Extreme weather events are becoming more intense and frequent as the climate warms. Record-shattering extremes – those that break existing records by large margins – are also becoming more regular.

    For example, during a 2021 heatwave in north-western US and Canada, local temperature records were broken by up to 5C. According to one study, the heatwave would have been “impossible” without human-caused climate change.

    The new study explores how accurately AI and physics-based models can forecast such record-breaking extremes.

    First, the authors identified every heat, cold and wind event in 2018 and 2020 that broke a record previously set between 1979 and 2017. (They chose these years due to data availability.) The authors use ERA5 reanalysis data to identify these records.

    This produced a large sample size of record-breaking events. For the year 2020, the authors identified around 160,000 heat, 33,000 cold and 53,000 wind records, spread across different seasons and world regions.

    For their traditional, physics-based model, the authors selected the High RESolution forecast model from the Integrated Forecasting System of the European Centre for Medium-­Range Weather Forecasts. This is “widely considered as the leading physics-­based numerical weather prediction model”, according to the paper.

    They also selected three “leading” AI weather models – the GraphCast model from Google Deepmind, Pangu-­Weather developed by Huawei Cloud and the Fuxi model, developed by a team from Shanghai.

    The authors then assessed how accurately each model could forecast the extremes observed in the year 2020.

    Dr Zhongwei Zhang is the lead author on the study and a researcher at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. He tells Carbon Brief that many AI weather forecast models were built for “general weather conditions”, as they use all historical weather data to train the models. Meanwhile, forecasting extremes is considered a “secondary task” by the models.

    The authors explored a range of different “lead times” – in other words, how far into the future the model is forecasting. For example, a lead time of two days could mean the model uses the weather conditions at midnight on 1 January to simulate weather conditions at midnight on 3 January.

    The plot below shows how accurately the models forecasted all extreme events (left) and heat extremes (right) under different lead times. This is measured using “root mean square error” – a metric of how accurate a model is, where a lower value indicates lower error and higher accuracy.

    The chart on the left shows how two of the AI models (blue and green) performed better than the physics-based model (black) when forecasting all weather across the year 2020.

    However, the chart on the right illustrates how the physics-based model (black) performed better than all three AI models (blue, red and green) when it came to forecasting heat extremes.

    Accuracy of the AI models
    Accuracy of the AI models (blue, red and green) and the physics-based model (black) at forecasting all weather over 2020 (left) and heat extremes (right) over a range of lead times. This is measured using “root mean square error” (RMSE) – a metric of how accurate a model is, where a lower value indicates lower error and higher accuracy. Source: Zhang et al (2026).

    The authors note that the performance gap between AI and physics-based models is widest for lower lead times, indicating that AI models have greater difficulty making predictions in the near future.

    They find similar results for cold and wind records.

    In addition, the authors find that AI models generally “underpredict” temperature during heat records and “overpredict” during cold records.

    The study finds that the larger the margin that the record is broken by, the less well the AI model predicts the intensity of the event.

    ‘Warning shot’

    Study author Prof Erich Fischer is a climate scientist at ETH Zurich and a Carbon Brief contributing editor. He tells Carbon Brief that the result is “not unexpected”.

    He adds that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.

    The analysis, he continues, is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.

    AI models are likely to continue to improve, but scientists should “not yet” fully replace traditional forecasting models with AI ones, according to Fischer.

    He explains that accurate forecasts are “most needed” in the runup to potential record-breaking extremes, because they are the trigger for early warning systems that help minimise damages caused by extreme weather.

    Leonardo Olivetti is a PhD student at Uppsala University, who has published work on AI weather forecasting and was not involved in the study.

    He tells Carbon Brief that “many other studies” have identified issues with using AI models for “extremes”, but this paper is novel for its specific focus on extremes.

    Olivetti notes that AI models are already used alongside physics-based models at “some of the major weather forecasting centres around the world”. However, the study results suggest “caution against relying too heavily on these [AI] models”, he says.

    Prof Martin Schultz, a professor in computational earth system science at the University of Cologne who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that the results of the analysis are “very interesting, but not too surprising”.

    He adds that the study “justifies the continued use of classical numerical weather models in operational forecasts, in spite of their tremendous computational costs”.

    Advances in forecasting

    The field of AI weather forecasting is evolving rapidly.

    Olivetti notes that the three AI models tested in the study are an “older generation” of AI models. In the last two years, newer “probabilistic” forecast models have emerged that “claim to better capture extremes”, he explains.

    The three AI models used in the analysis are “deterministic”, meaning that they only simulate one possible future outcome.

    In contrast, study author Engelke tells Carbon Brief that probabilistic models “create several possible future states of the weather” and are therefore more likely to capture record-breaking extremes.

    Engelke says it is “important” to evaluate the newer generation of models for their ability to forecast weather extremes.

    He adds that this paper has set out a “protocol” for testing the ability of AI models to predict unprecedented extreme events, which he hopes other researchers will go on to use.

    The study says that another “promising direction” for future research is to develop models that combine aspects of traditional, physics-based weather forecasts with AI models.

    Engelke says this approach would be “best of both worlds”, as it would combine the ability of physics-based models to simulate record-breaking weather with the computational efficiency of AI models.

    Dr Kyle Hilburn, a research scientist at Colorado State University, notes that the study does not address extreme rainfall, which he says “presents challenges for both modelling and observing”. This, he says, is an “important” area for future research.

    The post Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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