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COP29 Key Outcomes - Milestones, Setbacks, and What Comes Next for Global Climate Action

The recently concluded COP29 in Baku marked another critical milestone in global climate action with mixed outcomes. Developed nations committed to channeling at least $300 billion annually into developing countries by 2035 for climate action. However, this fell short of the $1.3 trillion annual target demanded by developing nations. 

The climate summit also finalized Article 6 on carbon markets, operationalizing the Paris Agreement nearly a decade after its inception. Meanwhile, key decisions on the global stocktake and fossil fuel transition were postponed to COP30 in Brazil. The negotiations occurred amidst political tensions, including Donald Trump’s re-election and potential U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.

Below we share our six key takeaways from this year’s climate talks. 

Article 6: Carbon Markets Take Center Stage

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which deals with carbon market mechanisms, took center stage at COP29. After years of negotiation, the summit finalized mechanisms for global carbon trading. 

Article 6.2 governs direct country-to-country carbon credit trading, while Article 6.4 establishes the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), a centralized carbon market under UN supervision. It allows countries, corporations, and individuals to trade emission reduction units, referred to as A6.4ERs (Article 6.4 Emission Reductions Units).

The PACM introduces enhanced safeguards, including sustainable development tools and stricter methodologies to prevent “locking-in” high emissions. For example, it enforces baseline adjustments and “additionality” checks, ensuring projects generate genuine emission reductions. 

methodologies under Article 6.4

These features aim to avoid pitfalls of past carbon market mechanisms, like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Some projects under the CDM, such as afforestation, may transition into the PACM if they meet updated removal standards.

To prevent double-counting of credits, stringent rules for “corresponding adjustments” were introduced. For example, when a country sells emission credits, it must deduct the equivalent reductions from its own accounting, ensuring transparency and integrity.

Despite progress, experts remain cautious. While negotiators hailed the deal as a milestone, critics argue it oversells the mechanism’s potential to deliver large-scale mitigation. Concerns persist over transparency, particularly under Article 6.2, where “cooperative approaches” could lack stringent oversight. 

To address these concerns, COP29 decisions require enhanced reporting and transparency in Article 6.2 activities and encourage swift finalization of PACM methodologies by 2025. These measures are pivotal for building trust and ensuring that carbon markets contribute meaningfully to global climate goals.

  • Additionally, a “Share of Proceeds” mechanism was adopted, channeling 5% of transaction volumes and 3% of issuance fees into the Adaptation Fund. This provides critical resources for climate resilience in vulnerable regions while fostering global emissions reductions.

A New Era for Climate Finance

One of the most anticipated outcomes of COP29 was the agreement on a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) for climate finance. This goal seeks to replace the $100 billion annual target set at COP15, which had been criticized for being insufficient and inadequately mobilized. The NCQG represents a more dynamic, needs-based approach to climate financing.

COP29 climate finance

At COP29, a new global climate finance target was introduced, aiming to raise $300 billion annually for developing countries by 2035. The goal includes public funds, development bank loans, and private investments mobilized by governments.

The NCQG has been a point of contention in climate talks. Developed countries are expected to provide significant funding, but developing nations argue that trillions of dollars are needed for their transition to cleaner economies.

The agreement also allows for “voluntary” contributions from nations like China, which have not traditionally provided climate finance.

Disagreements over the size and scope of the target caused delays and frustrations, with several drafts and revisions circulating before reaching a final agreement. Developed countries argue that global efforts must include a diverse range of contributors. As Jacob Levine, a senior director for climate and energy at the White House, stated:

“When you consider the magnitude…we need people to contribute, to do their fair share and to recognize the opportunity to work together.”

In contrast, developing nations, led by groups like the G77 and China, have insisted that developed countries bear the primary responsibility. Ali Mohamed, African Group Chair, remarked:

“We need equitable access for all developing countries. Cherry-picking certain groups won’t solve the global climate crisis.”

  • The final agreement urges contributions from all sources, public and private, to meet a broader target of $1.3 trillion annually by 2035.

Mitigation Work Programme: Accelerating Action

The Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), established at COP26, received renewed attention at COP29. Delegates agreed to expand efforts to enhance renewable energy deployment and phase down unabated fossil fuel use.

However, progress has been limited to workshops and discussions. At COP28 in Dubai, negotiations faltered over whether the MWP should convey high-level political messages or remain strictly procedural. This stalemate carried into the Bonn negotiations in June 2024, with disagreements centering on linking the MWP to the global stocktake and its outcomes.

At COP29, these disputes persisted, particularly over including references to transitioning away from fossil fuels. Developing nations, represented by groups like the LMDCs and Arab states, opposed such language, citing concerns over top-down mandates.

Meanwhile, developed nations sought to integrate global stocktake results and emphasize stronger NDC updates. Paragraph 32 of an informal note, which mentioned the fossil fuel phaseout, proved particularly divisive, stalling discussions.

Despite efforts to revive negotiations in the summit’s second week, the final text (shown below) offered minimal progress. High-level political messaging was softened, with no explicit mention of the stocktake or fossil fuels. 

mitigation work program draft COP29

While the dialogues under the MWP, focused on urban systems, were deemed productive, the adopted text primarily reaffirmed procedural elements, leaving substantial mitigation ambitions largely unresolved.

Adaptation: Scaling Resilience

Adaptation is one of the significant COP29 outcomes. Discussions focused on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), yet progress was hindered by disagreements. The UAE-Belém work program, introduced at COP28, aims to establish indicators for adaptation targets, including resilience in water, ecosystems, and cultural heritage. 

Midway through this two-year initiative, countries clashed over including “means of implementation” (MOI)—primarily financial support—and the concept of “transformational adaptation,” which developing nations feared might create obstacles to funding access.

The outcome included the “Baku Adaptation Roadmap,” softening MOI language to “enablers of implementation” to balance developed countries’ demands for governance and transparency with developing nations’ calls for financial support. While this compromise acknowledged both sides, it left many countries dissatisfied, particularly those advocating for robust financial commitments.

NAP discussions, initially slated to conclude in week one, also experienced delays due to extensive disagreements. By week two, facilitators proposed procedural conclusions, deferring substantive decisions to Bonn in June 2025. Other adaptation-related matters, such as the adaptation fund and performance reviews, were similarly postponed.

The roadmap’s adoption and continued GGA discussions underscore adaptation’s complexity and urgency as climate impacts intensify. COP30 is expected to revisit unresolved issues, including financial commitments and equitable adaptation frameworks.

Loss and Damage Fund: A Historic Step

COP29 marked a turning point with the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund, initially agreed upon at COP27. This fund aims to provide financial support to nations suffering from climate-induced disasters such as hurricanes, floods, and sea-level rise.

The fund’s governance structure ensures equitable distribution of resources, prioritizing least-developed countries and small island developing states (SIDS). Discussions also explored innovative funding sources, including levies on fossil fuel exports and international shipping, to sustain the fund over the long term. ​

The operationalization of this fund underscores the principle of climate justice, acknowledging the disproportionate impact of climate change on vulnerable populations. 

Still, loss and damage funding remained contentious at COP29. While the fund advanced with pledges rising to $759 million, developing nations criticized the insufficient funding.

UN chief António Guterres highlighted the lack of justice for vulnerable nations. He stated that the fund’s capitalization falls far short of addressing the need.

Negotiators failed to include loss and damage in the new climate-finance goal (NCQG), as developed countries resisted expanding finance obligations. Discussions on the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and Santiago Network stalled due to disagreements, with progress deferred to mid-2025.

The UAE’s Global Stocktake

The UAE-hosted conference underscored its role as a key stakeholder in global climate action through the first-ever global stocktake (GST). This assessment measured the world’s progress toward the Paris Agreement goals, providing a clear picture of where nations stand on mitigation, adaptation, and finance.

At COP29, climate talks became contentious as nations grappled with commitments from COP28’s GST. The UAE’s approach to discussions about fossil fuel transitions sparked debate. 

Developed nations and vulnerable countries demanded stronger commitments for transitioning away from fossil fuels, while Saudi Arabia opposed the inclusion of specific fossil fuel language, emphasizing the need for finance-focused discussions. This clash led to diluted draft texts and an impasse on key issues. 

In the end, the UAE dialogue was postponed until the 2025 talks, leaving many disappointed. However, COP30 in Brazil holds the potential for renewed momentum, especially in terms of accountability and climate action. 

Conclusion

The COP29 outcomes in Baku delivered a mix of progress and challenges, with significant advancements in climate finance, carbon markets, and adaptation efforts. The outcomes reflect a growing recognition of the need for collective action to address the climate crisis.

The focus now shifts to implementing these agreements and bridging gaps in ambition, funding, and delivery. As the world gears up for COP30, the lessons from Baku will serve as a critical foundation for driving forward the Paris Agreement goals.

The post COP29 Key Outcomes: Milestones, Setbacks, and What Comes Next for Global Climate Action appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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