In a significant development for the global energy landscape, China has led a surge in coal-power capacity, driving the world’s total to a record high in 2020, according to a new report from Global Energy Monitor. This increase was primarily fueled by new plants in China, which accounted for about two-thirds of the expansion, with Indonesia and India following closely behind.
The Current State of Coal Consumption
The coal fleet expanded by 2% to 2,130 gigawatts, a remarkable increase driven by a decrease in retirements worldwide. This trend was particularly prominent in China, where the country initiated the construction of 70 gigawatts of new coal plants in 2020. That’s nearly 20x more than the rest of the world combined.

The report, titled “Global Coal Plant Tracker 2021: The World’s 1000 Largest Coal Plants,” highlights the significant role China plays in the global coal market.
The country’s aggressive expansion of coal-power capacity is a stark contrast to the trend of retiring coal plants in many developed countries, such as the United States and the European Union.
The increase in coal-power capacity has significant implications for global energy markets and climate policy initiatives.
According to Global Energy Monitor, about as many countries opened new coal plant units as shut units down in 2023. Yet overall, more capacity is added than retired.

Here are 8 key points from the coal report:
- Global operating coal capacity grew by 2% in 2023, with China driving two-thirds of new additions. However, this accelerated growth in coal capacity may be short-lived, as low retirement rates in 2023 that contributed to coal’s rise are expected to pick up speed in the U.S. and Europe, offsetting the blip.
- Heightened capacity additions will also be tempered if China takes immediate action to ensure it meets its target of shutting down 30 gigawatts (GW) of coal capacity by 2025. Countries with coal plants to retire need to do so more quickly, and countries with plans for new coal plants must ensure these are never built.
- Otherwise, meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement and reaping the benefits of a swift transition to clean energy will be difficult. Coal’s fortunes this year are an anomaly, as all signs point to reversing course from this accelerated expansion.
RELEVANT: Global Team Develops World’s First “Coal-to-Clean” Carbon Credit Program
- The data for the report comes from GEM’s Global Coal Plant Tracker, an online database updated biannually that identifies and maps every known coal-fired generating unit and every new unit proposed since January 1, 2010 (30 MW and larger). This data serves as a vital international reference point used by organizations including the IPCC, IEA, and the UN.
- According to the IEA, global coal demand is predicted to decline by 2.3% in 2026 compared to 2023 levels. And that’s even without stronger clean energy and climate policies. This decline is driven by the major expansion of renewable energy capacity coming online in the three years to 2026.
- More than half of the global renewable capacity expansion is set to occur in China, which currently accounts for over half of the world’s demand for coal. As a result, Chinese coal demand is expected to fall in 2024 and plateau through 2026.
- The shift in coal demand and production to Asia is accelerating, with China, India, and Southeast Asia set to account for three-quarters of global consumption in 2023, up from only about one-quarter in 1990. Consumption in Southeast Asia is expected to exceed that of the U.S. and the EU in 2023.
- The three largest coal producers globally – Indonesia, China, and India – are expected to break production records in 2023, pushing global output to a new high. However, to decrease emissions at a rate keeping with Paris Agreement goals, relentless coal use would need to fall much more quickly.
China’s Pivotal Role and the Shift in Coal’s Global Leadership
China’s growth in coal capacity highlights its focus on fulfilling energy needs for economic and industrial expansion, despite global efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions. The interplay between increasing coal capacity and the shift toward cleaner energy will significantly influence the worldwide energy scenario.
The role of China and other key players in this process will be crucial in determining the pace and scope of the shift towards a more sustainable energy future.
The report further highlights a significant shift in global leadership regarding coal policies, particularly within the G7 and G20 nations. The G7 countries, which accounted for 23% of the world’s operating coal capacity in 2015, have reduced their share to 15% in 2023.
The reduction is underscored by the completion of new units in Japan. This marks the end of coal construction within the G7, although proposals still exist in Japan and the U.S.
Meanwhile, the G20 nations hold 92% of the world’s operating coal capacity, with Brazil, the current G20 chair, witnessing a decrease in pre-construction capacity, leaving only two projects remaining in Latin America.
This geographical shift in coal policies and projects underscores a broader global trend toward reducing reliance on coal. Moreover, it will have significant implications for international energy markets and climate policy initiatives.
Coal Plant Proposals and Retirements
The dynamics of coal plant proposals and retirements provide a nuanced view of the global coal industry’s future. In 2023, while 69.5 GW of coal power capacity was added, only 21.1 GW was retired, leading to a net increase in global coal capacity.

This trend is particularly pronounced outside of China, where new proposals totaled 20.9 GW, led by countries like India, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia.
Despite a general trend toward decommissioning, these developments indicate a complex global landscape where certain regions continue to explore new coal projects.
This ongoing activity suggests that while the global momentum is towards reducing coal dependency, achieving this goal requires concerted efforts across all nations, particularly those with significant new proposals.
The post Coal Power is Accelerating Despite the Energy Transition appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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Carbon Footprint
Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions
Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?
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