China has reopened its voluntary carbon credit market after eight years. This has caused sharp price swings. A Bloomberg report showed that the new China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) credits rose to 107.36 yuan ($14.82) per ton.
This price was 21% higher than mandatory carbon allowances. However, it then fell to 72.81 yuan, a 17% discount.
The price shifts reflect strong initial demand and a limited credit supply. In the first five days, traders exchanged 911,000 tons of credits. That’s almost three times the volume of China’s mandatory emissions market.

Understanding the CCER Program
China’s Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) program is key to the country’s carbon market. It allows companies to trade carbon credits, supplementing the Emissions Trading System (ETS). CCER allows firms to create and sell carbon credits voluntarily.
However, this is different from the ETS, which sets limits on emissions. This approach promotes investments in clean energy and emission reduction projects.
The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) manages the CCER program. Project operators and verification agencies maintain transparency. On January 23, 2024, China’s voluntary carbon market saw its first transaction. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) bought 250,000 tons of carbon credits.
CCER credits fall into two categories:
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Emission allowances: Government-allocated quotas that companies must follow.
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Certified carbon credits (CCER credits): Tradeable credits from emission reduction projects.
The program helps industries reduce emissions, manage carbon credits, and trade them for financial gain. High-emission sectors can offset quotas, while low-emission industries can trade credits and enhance their reputation. Renewable energy companies can use carbon credit revenue to improve profits.
A New Beginning for CCER Credits
The CCER program started in 2012 to reward projects that cut greenhouse gas emissions. China paused it in 2017 because of worries about project approvals. In 2024, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment revived the program.
It now focuses on four areas: afforestation, solar thermal power, offshore wind power, and mangrove restoration. This effort aims to promote green projects and help China meet its carbon neutrality goals.
Notably, the China Beijing Green Exchange (CBGEX) believes China’s carbon market will expand significantly because of financialization. The estimated quota is 7 to 8 billion tons. Annual trading volumes could exceed 10 billion tons. Transaction values might top RMB 1 trillion (US$140 billion).
China’s Carbon Emissions: 2025
China’s emissions surged in 2023, putting the country off track from its goal of reducing carbon intensity by 18% under the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25). To stay on course for its 2060 carbon neutrality target, CO2 emissions must now drop by 4-6% by 2025.

Expanding the Carbon Credit Market
The Bloomberg report further revealed more details about China’s expansion of its carbon credit market.
- China approved nine new projects expected to supply 9.5 million tons of carbon credits in 2025.
These projects include seven deepwater offshore wind farms and a solar thermal plant. Key state-owned companies leading these initiatives are China Three Gorges Corp, State Power Investment Corp, China Energy Investment Corp, and China General Nuclear Power Corp.
China’s national carbon market, launched in 2021, initially covered power utilities. However, low liquidity and oversupply kept prices below European levels. It plans to include steel, aluminum, and cement producers by the end of 2025, expanding coverage to a larger share of national emissions.
BloombergNEF analyst Layla Khanfar explained that the market activity picked up a bit in February after a slow start. However, supply and demand are still lower than in early 2023.
Strengthening ETS to Counter CBAM Impact
China is a top exporter of CBAM-liable goods. From 2026 to 2040, it will likely ship about 868.94 million metric tons of these commodities, according to a forecast from S&P Global Commodity Insights. Iron and steel account for 42% of these exports, cement 8%, and aluminum 6%.
The country’s ETS (launched in 2021) now covers 40% of emissions and is set to expand to 8 billion tons. Major 2024 reforms include stricter allowance banking rules, a shorter compliance cycle, and the addition of CBAM-affected industries.
Clear Blue Market forecasted that the China Emissions Allowance (CEA) price, averaging 98 yuan (€13) in 2024, is projected to reach 100 yuan (€13) in 2025 and 200 yuan (€25) by 2030, with a market deficit expected by 2026.

To meet CBAM regulations, China requires factories emitting over 26,000 tons of CO₂ annually to verify emissions data. Thus, China is challenging the EU’s CBAM at the WTO while reinforcing its ETS to align with global carbon pricing.
China is expanding carbon credits. The above-explained actions show a global push to regulate emissions. However, price volatility and economic concerns remain challenges. As carbon prices rise and regulations tighten, businesses must adapt to remain competitive. Lastly, the effectiveness of carbon markets in reducing emissions will be closely monitored.
The post China Revives Its Carbon Credit Market: Price Swings & Future Outlook appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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Carbon Footprint
Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions
Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?
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