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China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
Shanghai cooperation summit
SUSTAINABLE COOPERATION: A “final declaration” from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin this week included a pledge to “strengthen cooperation on sustainable development issues”, said Russian news agency Tass. The SCO grouping, which includes China, India, Russia and others, adopted a “statement on sustainable energy development and approved a roadmap for implementing the strategy for energy cooperation” out to 2030, according to the full text of the declaration published by the Hindustan Times.
‘GREEN INDUSTRY’: In his speech at the summit, Chinese president Xi Jinping said that “China will establish three major platforms” for cooperation with other SCO members, covering “energy, green industry and the digital economy”, according to a transcript released by state news agency Xinhua. Xi committed to host the “SCO green and sustainable development forum” and to “work with” SCO countries to increase the installed capacity of solar and wind each by 10 gigawatts (GW) in the next five years. Xi added that SCO members “have rich energy resources” and “should seek integration, not decoupling”, according to the transcript. The Associated Press said that Xi was “attempting to expand the scope of the SCO”, originally a security forum. It added that his plans included a “development bank run by the organisation” and $1.4bn in loans over the next three years to member states.
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POWER OF SIBERIA 2: Meanwhile, Russia announced that it had signed a deal with China to build the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline linking the two countries, the Financial Times reported. Bloomberg cited Alexey Miller, CEO of Russian energy company Gazprom, saying the long-anticipated scheme could send as much as 50bn cubic metres of gas a year to China via Mongolia for 30 years. It noted that China had “yet to confirm the detail” of the deal. The flow of pipeline gas to China could “extend the oversupply period [of liquefied natural gas (LNG)] beyond the late 2020s”, according to a LinkedIn post by Anne-Sophie Corbeau, global research scholar at Center on Global Energy Policy. In another LinkedIn post, Michal Meidan, director of China energy programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, called the announcement a “huge turning point in the geopolitics of energy”. She said that China is “hedging against over reliance on US LNG” and that the project would “increase China’s reliance on Russian gas considerably”.
‘Absolute’ carbon market caps from 2027
ETS CAP: From 2027, China will begin introducing “absolute emissions caps in some industries for the first time” under its national carbon market, the emissions trading scheme (ETS), reported Reuters, citing a statement from the State Council. The newswire added that, according to this statement, the cap will be implemented with a combination of “free and paid carbon emissions allowances”. Bloomberg explained: “The plan also calls for setting absolute limits on emissions, a tougher standard than the current system, which imposes caps based on carbon intensity and allows emissions to rise over time.” The outlet quoted the official statement saying China is aiming to have a “transparent, standardised and internationally aligned voluntary reduction market” in place by 2030. State broadcaster CCTV reported the news in its morning bulletin, available online in three videos.
N2O ACTION PLAN: Meanwhile, China has published an action plan for controlling industrial emissions of nitrous oxide (N2O), industry news outlet BJX News reported. N2O is a powerful greenhouse gas with 273-times the warming impact of carbon dioxide (CO2). The plan called for the emissions of N2O, per unit of production for specific chemicals, to decrease to a “world-leading level” by 2030. A government official said that N2O accounted for 4.3% of China’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2021, according to energy news outlet International Energy Net, with industrial processes accounting for 28% of N2O emissions overall.
MARKET INCENTIVES: The plan’s key measures include finance and market incentives and technology development, as well as monitoring and reporting, according to a summary published by the Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development. Dr Jiang Lin from Lawrence Berkeley National Lab said in a LinkedIn post that the “successful implementation” of this plan could “reduce emissions by about 120m tonnes of CO2 [carbon dioxide] equivalent a year”. China has pledged that its next 2035 “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) under the Paris Agreement will cover all greenhouse gases, whereas it previously only targeted CO2. It also discussed controls on N2O – and on methane – in talks with the outgoing Biden administration of the US late last year.
‘GREEN’ CITIES: China has also announced a policy for the construction of “high-quality urban development”, reported Xinhua. The headline of the report called the policy – issued by the Central Committee of the Communist party of China and the State Council – a “roadmap” (路线图) for China’s urban development, referring to a comment from Yang Baojun, chairman of the Urban Planning Society of China. The “main goal”, according to the policy, is to make “significant progress”, including cities’ “green and low-carbon” transitions, by 2030, and establishing “modern people’s cities” by 2035, added Xinhua.
Wind and solar capacity ‘tripled since 2020’
ENERGY ‘ACHIEVEMENTS’: At a press conference on China’s energy “achievements” during the 14th “five-year plan” period (2020-25), China’s National Energy Administration (NEA) said the capacity of wind and solar has more than tripled since the end of 2020, with the total hitting 1,680GW as of the end of July, reported finance news outlet Caixin. The head of the NEA said China was on track to achieve its “key” energy goals for the 14th five-year plan period “on schedule”, Xinhua reported, citing the agency’s head Wang Hongzhi. Wang stated that China’s wind and solar exports in the same period have allowed other countries to cut carbon emissions by 4bn tonnes, said another Xinhua article. CCTV said that, according to Wang, China’s “newly increased” electricity consumption between 2020-25 will exceed the “annual electricity consumption of the EU”.
‘SURGING’ POWER DEMAND: Electricity consumption growth over the next 10 years will ease from 5.6% per year out to 2030 to 4.3% a year to 2035, predicted Ouyang Changyu, deputy chief engineer of State Grid Corporation of China, according to financial outlet Yicai. He said China will “increasingly look” at its west and north regions of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet – which are rich in renewable energy resources such as solar, wind and hydropower – to meet this “surging” demand, added the outlet. Meanwhile, top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) released new draft regulations on rules for the “medium- and long-term electricity market”, according to BJX News.
Solar and steel face ‘overcapacity’ controls
TACKLING ‘OVERCAPACITY’: The Chinese government has been continuing in its efforts to curb overcapacity of the solar industry, with Bloomberg reporting “signs of progress”. The Financial Times reported: “China has ordered the solar sector to rein in overcapacity and cut-throat pricing as the biggest manufacturers suffer billions of dollars in losses.” The steel industry, which has also been “tackl[ing] overcapacity”, will face a production cut between 2025 and 2026, Reuters reported, citing an “official document reviewed by Reuters and a source with knowledge of the matter”. A new steel policy will tighten controls on the production capacity and output of the sector, said Xinyi Shen, China team lead at thinktank the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), on LinkedIn.
EXPORTS TO AFRICA: Meanwhile, China exported more than 15GW in solar equipment to Africa over the past 12 months, Bloomberg reported, citing analysis of customs data by thinktank Ember. The New York Times, covering the same report, said Africa offered “huge” markets to Chinese solar panels when domestic prices had “fallen sharply” due to “overproduction”. Wired wrote that while solar sales remain small in Africa, the “global south appears to be at a turning point in how it thinks about energy”, with solar “emerging as the cheaper and greener way forward” for the first time. A Wall Street Journal newsletter also noted the African solar figures and the debate around “overcapacity”, adding: “There’s a novel dimension to China’s clean-tech boom. It’s possible, in the context of climate change, to estimate the ‘correct’ production volume – not based on current levels of supply and demand, but on what’s required to limit global warming.”
Captured
Spotlight
China’s adaptation to ‘more frequent and intense’ heat extremes
China has seen a series of temperature records broken this summer. The China Meteorological Administration (CMA) says that “extreme high temperatures” have shown an “increasing trend” in China since its records began in 1961.
In this issue, Carbon Brief looks into the heat extremes in China and how the country is adapting to the impacts. The full article is available on Carbon Brief’s website.
How are heat extremes changing in China?
China’s average annual temperature is rising, according to data from the CMA’s Climate Bulletins, with 2024 being the hottest year on record.
Moreover, as the global climate has warmed, the number of “hot days” that China is experiencing has been on the rise.
The CMA defines a “hot day” or “high temperature day” as one that reaches or exceeds 35C. It adds that “high temperatures for several consecutive days constitute a heatwave”.
Prof Wenjia Cai, from the department of earth system science of Tsinghua University, told Carbon Brief that there are more ways to define heatwaves than CMA’s absolute threshold of 35C.
However, regardless of the definition used, the “number of heatwave days is definitely increasing as a result of climate change”, she added.
What role does human-caused climate change play?
A field of climate science called “attribution” has emerged over the past two decades to establish the role that human-caused warming plays in individual extreme weather events.
Some 114 extremes and trends in China have been the subject of an attribution study, including more than 20 relating specifically to extreme heat.
One study found that “more intense and more frequent warm extremes” were observed across “most regions” in China during 1951-2018 and that “greenhouse gas forcing plays a dominant role” in this.
What impact are these heatwaves having?
Heatwaves have a wide variety of impacts on human activities, such as public health, crop yields and economic output.
In 2023, more than 30,000 deaths were related to heatwaves in China – 1.9 times higher than the average over 1986-2005, according to a report by Cai and her colleagues.
Another profound impact of heatwaves is that they can exacerbate droughts, with knock-on impacts for agriculture.
Droughts in 2024 hit more than 11 million people in China, with more than 1.2m hectares of affected crops and direct economic losses topping nearly 8.4bn yuan ($1.2bn), the Ministry of Emergency Management said in early 2025.
Heat-related economic losses could reach nearly 5% of China’s GDP by 2060, according to a recent guest post for Carbon Brief.
Other than manufacturing, electricity supplies in China have also been frequently reported to be affected by hot days.
Dr Muyi Yang, senior energy analyst at thinktank Ember, told Carbon Brief that “when temperatures soar, electricity demand spikes – mainly due to air conditioning – and that can stretch the grid, especially in already tight systems”.
How is China adapting to heatwaves?
In recent years, China has implemented more and more policies aimed at adapting to heatwaves. For example, weather forecasts and heatwave alerts have been provided.
Central and local governments have also issued labour policies aimed at protecting workers against extreme heat.
Last year, China published the “national climate change health adaptation action plan (2024-30)”. This followed the 2022 publication of a national adaptation strategy for 2035, which mentions heatwaves in relation to the power sector, agriculture and health.
Ember’s Yang says that in terms of the electricity system, the old “planning psychology” needs to shift towards a more coordinated strategy, so that it can better cope with extreme heat:
“For example, during extreme heat, instead of just ramping up supply, we should also be encouraging users to reduce or shift their electricity use during peak hours, using price signals or incentives.”
Watch, read, listen
HONG KONG ROOF: Climate outlet Xylom published an article exploring why rooftop solar panels have not been rolled out at scale in Hong Kong.
GRID REFORM: In an article for China Electricity Power News shared by Xinhua, Prof Xia Qing of Tsinghua University and Chen Yuguo, director of Qingneng Interconnection Consulting, discussed how developing “new energy market entry and trading mechanisms” will help China’s grid reforms.
ENERGY AND TECHNOLOGY: Dan Wang, research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover History Lab, talked to Bloomberg’s Odd Lots podcast about China’s “breakneck economic growth”, as well as developments in energy, industry and technology.
AMAZON REPORTING: Greenpeace East Asia interviewed Liu Min, one of only three independent Chinese journalists who reported from the COP16 biodiversity summit last November in Colombia, finding out her reporting journeys in the Amazon.
52.2 billion yuan
The value of “direct economic losses” in China – equivalent to $7.3bn in July 2025 alone – due to flooding, landslides, earthquakes and drought, according to a Reuters report citing China’s Ministry of Emergency Management. The newswire said “road damages” since 1 July amounted to 16bn yuan ($2.2bn), according to the Ministry of Transport.
New science
Climate impacts and future trends of hailstorms in China based on millennial records
Nature Communications
The number of “hailstorm days” in China “increased significantly” after 1850 due to global warming, according to a new study. The authors combined hail damage records from Chinese historical books, governmental hail damage records and hailstorm observations from more than 2,000 meteorological stations around China to analyse the variation in hailstorm days over the past 2,890 years. They also developed a model, which suggests a further increase in the number of hailstorm days as the planet continues to warm.
The 2021 Henan flood increased citizen demand for government-led climate change adaptation in China
Communications earth and environment
The 2021 flood in Henan – one of the deadliest floods in China’s history – led to a “sharp increase” in petitions for drainage, neighborhood safety and flood prevention, according to new research. The authors analysed “citizen engagement” on a government-run petition platform to “examine how residents communicate demands for public safety and infrastructure”. The study showed that “climate risk can catalyse political engagement in non-democratic settings, highlighting the value of citizen input in adaptation planning”, according to the authors.
China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
The post China Briefing 4 September 2025: Shanghai cooperation summit; ETS ‘absolute emissions cap’; China’s heatwave adaptation appeared first on Carbon Brief.
June Rubis is a steering group committee member for the Cali Fund, from Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo.
At COP16 in Cali, governments made a significant commitment: at least half of the funding from the new Cali Fund should support the self-identified needs of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, including women and youth. It was a watershed moment for multilateral benefit-sharing.
The challenge now is to translate that commitment into access arrangements that recognise the different institutions, priorities and decision-making processes of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.
For generations, biodiversity and traditional Indigenous knowledge have provided significant value to companies who depend on nature’s genetic diversity to discover new drugs that fight diseases, create products that improve health, and grow crops resilient to extreme heat and flooding events. While some compounds are sampled directly from the source country, increasingly the digital blueprints are held in online public databases which are freely accessible to use for innovation and research.
Countries urged to ramp up “insufficient” nature policies at COP17
The Cali Fund was established at COP16 to encourage commercial users of Digital Sequence Information, or DSI, to share benefits arising from its use. Estimates suggest it could generate over $3.5 billion a year – a stark contrast to the modest $10,656 currently committed to the fund from just five SMEs, underlining how much progress must be made at COP17 over the next two weeks.
The COP16 decision that set up the fund offers two routes for money to reach Indigenous Peoples and local communities: through government authorities, and through direct payments to institutions identified by Indigenous Peoples and local communities themselves.
Varied ways of organising
Indigenous Peoples and local communities organise through a wide range of institutions. Some have national or regional organisations experienced in managing international grants. Others work through territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations, cooperatives or networks. Some have professional finance teams and audited accounts; others have extensive experience governing territories, collective resources or conservation work without having been organised around international funding requirements.
For direct access, some questions are already apparent. Which institutions should be able to receive funds? How should they be identified? What fiduciary standards should apply? How should safeguards and accountability work where institutional capacities differ? What support may be needed where institutions have strong community mandates but less experience with international finance?
Comment: Protecting nature is a public duty, not a Wall Street profit opportunity
If access is designed mainly around institutions that already meet the expectations of large international finance mechanisms, early funding will tend to favour those already familiar to funders. They will gain further experience and become better positioned for future funding, while institutions with less administrative capacity may remain outside the system despite strong community mandates and long histories of stewardship.
These first decisions matter most, because they set the terms for everyone who follows.
The role of intermediaries requires care. Some Indigenous organisations may want a fiscal host to hold and manage funds on their behalf. Communities may choose to work through an NGO they trust. Government-facilitated arrangements may work well in particular national contexts.
What matters is the function an intermediary performs and the authority that comes with it. Providing administrative support is different from deciding which Indigenous organisations qualify, which priorities can receive support, or how success will be assessed. Direct access means communities keep that decision-making authority.
Decision-making power
The COP16 decision refers to institutions that Indigenous Peoples and local communities identify. But authority among Indigenous Peoples does not sit in one kind of body. It may sit with territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations or combinations of these. Legal recognition and customary authority do not always align neatly.
Global deforestation slowed in 2025 but Brazil’s election could undo “fragile” gains
An important feature of the Cali Fund’s governance is that Indigenous Peoples and local communities participate as full members of the Steering Committee, rather than as observers. Seven Indigenous Peoples and local community representatives, one from each of the seven socio-cultural regions, participate in consensus-based decision-making alongside representatives of governments and UN entities. Six additional representatives from civil society, scientific institutions and the private sector participate as observers.
That representation carries responsibility. Institutional legitimacy, access and representation take different forms across the seven socio-cultural regions. Indigenous Peoples and local communities members therefore have an important role in bringing those differences into the Fund’s governance and in ensuring that arrangements developed for one context do not become the assumed model for everyone else.
Safeguards and clear responsibilities
COP17 can establish the core principles and direction, while allowing operational pathways to develop in ways that respond to different regional contexts. The decisions countries take in Yerevan will shape how that flexibility is realised in practice.
The choices made around access will influence which institutions are able to participate, which routes become established and which forms of authority are recognised within the funding architecture. The aim should be an architecture with enough structure to maintain confidence while allowing for different forms of Indigenous and community governance.
A credible direct-access pathway will need safeguards, financial oversight and clear responsibilities. This would give the 50% commitment a stronger institutional foundation.
The Cali Fund’s importance will ultimately depend not only on how much funding reaches Indigenous Peoples and local communities, but on whether they are able to determine how the money is accessed, governed and used. This requires access pathways that recognise their institutions, priorities and decision-making processes, rather than requiring them to conform to a single predetermined model.
The post COP17 must settle who decides how Cali Fund money is disbursed appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP17 must settle who decides how Cali Fund money is disbursed
The UK government has approved extraction at the Jackdaw gas field in the North Sea, despite acknowledging that this decision could make it harder for Britain to convince other countries to move away from fossil fuel production.
UK energy secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh approved the drilling on Wednesday after months of high-profile debate, fuelled in part by interventions from US President Donald Trump. She argued that the project would boost energy security in the wake of the Middle East fossil fuel crisis, protect hundreds of jobs and add £2.9 billion ($3.88bn) to the UK economy.
She said Jackdaw’s gas would be cleaner than imported gas and would not prevent the UK from meeting its legally-binding carbon targets and its goal of net zero by 2050. As the field is already licensed, she said extraction was consistent with the Labour Party’s 2024 manifesto promise not to issue any new oil and gas licenses.
The same morning, the government announced a new Energy Wealth Fund to reinvest oil and gas revenues in the climate transition. It will star