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Key developments
March data indicates carbon emissions peak
SURGE ENDED: Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in China fell 3% in March 2024, ending a 14-month surge and possibly signalling that Chinese CO2 emissions peaked in 2023, according to new analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta. The fall was driven by the record growth of solar and wind power generation, which “covered 90% of the growth in electricity demand”, and by declining construction activity. An increasing portion of electricity demand is being covered by distributed solar, which comprised 45% of last year’s solar capacity additions. Meanwhile, limited demand for steel and cement due to continued uncertainty in the real-estate sector saw a drop in emissions of 30 megatonnes of CO2 (MTCO2) from the construction sector.
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AMBITION GAP: Maintaining the record rate of clean energy installations could make a 2023 peak in CO2 emissions “possible” for China, the analysis added, as the “main driver of China’s emissions growth in recent years has been the power sector”, which has only grown 1% year-on-year. The article noted, however, that industry associations, such as China Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA), expect solar and wind capacity additions by 2030 to significantly exceed official targets. The analysis found the difference amounts to 1,400-1,800 gigawatts (GW), which – if the resulting clean power generation from more ambitious forecasts were to replace coal – could see a difference in CO2 emissions amounting to 10-15% of China’s current emissions. China “is already severely off track” to meet its carbon-intensity target, the analysis added. Its ability to meet this target, which is part of its international climate pledge under the Paris Agreement, “depends on clean energy growth continuing to significantly exceed the central government’s targets – or those targets being ratcheted up”, said the analysis, which was picked up by the New York Times, Reuters, Bloomberg, AFP and Straits Times, among others.
NEW ACTION PLAN: China’s state council released a new action plan for energy conservation and carbon reduction for 2024 and 2025, which pledges to reduce CO2 emissions by 130m tonnes by 2025 through reforming the “nonferrous metal industry”, according to state news agency Xinhua. Reuters also covered the story, stating that the targeted reductions in CO2 emissions is “equivalent to about 1% of the 2023 national total”.
China rebuts G7 trade accusations
G7 MEETINGS: The G7 countries’ finance ministers and central bank governors have raised a “unified voice to counter some of the concerns they had over China’s trade policies” at their meetings in Italy on 23-25 May, according to Bloomberg. The ministers plan to “continue to monitor the potential negative impacts of overcapacity and will consider taking steps to ensure a level playing field,” another Bloomberg article said. Ahead of the meeting, Reuters and Bloomberg covered comments by US treasury secretary Janet Yellen, who called for “market-driven countries” to “stand together” to counter China’s “state-driven” industrial policies, which she viewed as a “threat” to the “viability of firms around the world, including in emerging markets”. EU president Ursula von der Leyen told the Financial Times, also ahead of the G7 meeting, that she shared concerns over overcapacity, but “we want to signal it’s not about closing the market or protectionism…We want to de-risk, not decouple [from China]. And now we’re developing the toolbox.”

CHINA’S RESPONSE: China’s foreign ministry rejected the “unilateral” G7 accusation, calling it a “discriminatory practice”, reported state broadcaster CGTN. The ministry’s spokesperson, Mao Ning, said at a press conference: “The G7’s ‘Chinese overcapacity’ hype and attempt to restrict China’s new energy products are completely against the facts and the laws of economics. They are the product of protectionism and serve no one’s interest.” Separately, China “has signalled it will retaliate” to EU anti-dumping concerns, with the Ministry of Commerce announcing plans to probe imports from the EU, US and other regions of a widely used thermoplastic, according to the Financial Times. Meanwhile, the China Chamber of Commerce to the EU said on Twitter it was informed about a potential up to 25% tariff from China on vehicles with large engines, as “Beijing is ramping up threats of retaliation as a deadline looms for the EU to announce results of its probe into China’s electric-vehicle subsidies”, Bloomberg reported.
Solar sector struggles to ‘control capacity’
PRICING WOES: Chinese financial news outlet Yicai reported that, according to the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association, “the price of high-purity polycrystalline silicon, the raw material used to make solar panels, has plunged below cost for all producers in China”. The situation “has forced some suppliers to halt production” and means that “even big players…which should have better cost controls than smaller firms, could be losing money at the moment”. Shortly afterwards, in an announcement covered by the South China Morning Post (SCMP), the CPIA called for “more mergers, acquisitions and curbs on domestic competition to control capacity” in the solar sector, following a meeting held to address falling prices and “operational pressures”.
XI ON OVERCAPACITY: According to SCMP, Chinese president Xi Jinping, in a meeting with prominent business figures and economists, said that support for the “new three” types (solar products, lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles) must be “adapted” to local conditions, adding that the new energy industry should not be the sole focus of economic growth. A separate analysis by SCMP said China’s “overcapacity conundrum” is rooted in the economic reforms that began with its transition to a market-based economy in 1978. “Local governments have played an outsized role” in developing industrial overcapacity, it said, “prominent industry insiders have also publicly spoken on how insufficient downstream demand became a worrisome issue among authorities at city and provincial levels”.
Spotlight
Interview: China’s position on ‘international climate finance’ ahead of COP29
China’s stance on “international climate finance” – a UN-promoted mechanism designed to get developed countries to help fund developing countries address climate change – remains controversial. The country did not make a pledge to the “loss-and-damage fund” established at COP28, but has provided alternative climate funding through its South-South Climate Cooperation Fund and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Ahead of next week’s Bonn conference – where delegates are expected to negotiate climate finance – Carbon Brief has interviewed Li Shuo, head of the China climate hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), on China’s attitude towards contributing and its potential position at the upcoming COP29.
Below are highlights from the conversation. The full interview can be found on the Carbon Brief website.
Carbon Brief: At the COP29 climate talks [in November], countries will be negotiating a new climate finance target. China is facing growing calls to start contributing. How is it responding to this?
Li Shuo: I think we are expecting a pretty heated debate at COP29. This is indeed one of the most controversial issues…that sees very strong division between the global south and the global north. And, of course, China is in this unique position: it is still firmly in the developing country camp, but, at the same time, it has become one of the largest economies and the largest emitters in the world. So with that, you know, there’s this argument that China should shoulder more responsibility internationally, including by providing future climate finance.
The geopolitical environment is definitely not helping that transition…In addition to that, China’s domestic political and economic situation – let’s just say, it’s not at a particularly helpful moment for that transition to happen…So we see a lot of risk factors. There is a critical need for other countries and China…to align ahead of COP29.
CB: Some might argue that China is providing affordable, clean energy technology and shouldn’t be pressured to scale up climate finance. Could this be one of the arguments made at COP29?
LS: Well, I actually hope this could be one solution to the $100bn – or $1tn – NCQG [new collective quantified goal] question. I actually genuinely see that it could be a solution based on which we can find a path forward.
…The reason I say this is…in addition to China’s emission portfolio, the country also happens to be the biggest solution provider when it comes to low-carbon products. Of course, there are increasing political controversies around China’s position in this regard, in particular between the US and China. But, I think, if you were China, what you want to achieve is, of course, to make sure that you can continue to sell those low-carbon solutions to the rest of the world.
So I would argue it actually works in China’s self-interest to make sure that they can facilitate the deployment of renewable energy in the global south. And, that way, I think it helps address the geopolitical problem, the so-called overcapacity [problem]…If China can play a role in this regard, at the bare minimum, it is helping its own companies.
CB: Do you think that that would be politically viable?
LS: …I doubt the NCQG will ever be as explicit as China committing to support developing countries to buy China-made products…The decision will be made in more general terms; general enough to not agitate the US and the EU. In my mind, of course the NCQG discussion is still an ongoing one, but you might be familiar with this “onion” [structure] approach, a kind of multi-layer package. You have a core: public international finance. The controversial issue there is you will have a number, but who will be accountable for that number?…Then the second [layer] might be some sort of investment facilitation…that’s where I think China can play a role.
CB: How do you think that requests for China to contribute to climate finance could be more successful?
LS: When you talk about UNFCCC climate finance, it is an intrinsically more political debate. The core of the question is: how does China see itself in relation to the rest of the world, and in relation to other traditional donor developed countries…I think, going forward, messages that are crafted in a more inviting way will probably work better with China. But…the political environment that we have will almost prevent that conversation from happening.
CB: Could you explain what you mean by “inviting”?
LS: If your framing is ‘China needs to pay’, or ‘we believe China is ready’ or ‘China is responsible’, then I think politically this will become very difficult for China. Because a lot of the framing – even just enlarging the donor base, that phrase – if you think about it, it assumes kind of a moral high ground…Enlarging the donor base also carries this undertone that “we want more people to pay so that we can pay less”…We do believe there could be areas where China and other traditional donor countries can complement each other. They need to work out the specific areas where they share synergy.
Watch, read, listen
COAL DECLINE?: In its monthly Tipping Point newsletter, Shanghai-based media outlet the Paper explored the shrinking role of coal in mining-focused Shanxi province, plus interviewed experts on reducing its share of the energy mix.
‘NEW DIRECTION’: Dr Yixian Sun, from University of Bath, explained on Sustainable Development Television the extent to which China’s institutions are shifting to invest in renewable energy projects overseas.
CLIMATE POLITICS: Carbon Brief’s China section editor Wanyuan Song spoke to the All Things Policy podcast, hosted by research institute Takshashila Institution, about the history of China’s climate pledges.
‘YOU MAKE MONEY’: The Associated Press covered the incentives being established to drive uptake of distributed solar power in Shandong province.
$47
Per kilowatt-hour, the average price in China for the iron-based batteries used by electric vehicles, according to a survey by BloombergNEF covered by the Information. This is half of the average price of these batteries outside of China, which are almost entirely supplied by Chinese manufacturers.
New science
Widespread societal and ecological impacts from projected Tibetan Plateau lake expansion
Nature Geoscience
By the end of the century, the surface area of lakes on the Tibetan Plateau will increase by over 50% (around 20,000km2) and water levels will rise by around 10 metres, even under a low emissions scenario, according to new research. It added that, if no adaptation measures are introduced, this lake expansion will submerge more than 1,000km of roads, around 500 settlements and around 10,000km2 of land such as grasslands, wetlands and croplands.
Researchers found that the greenhouse gas emission from the food system in China – the world’s largest producer and consumer of food – accounted for 37% of the country’s total emissions in 2020, based on an assessment of meals eaten in restaurants across the provincial capitals. The study estimated the greenhouse gas emissions of 540 dishes from 36 cuisines and then designed various dietary change strategies to explicitly link food emissions to the Paris Agreement pledges. It concluded that “transitioning towards low-emission cuisines and dishes” could reduce emissions by 38-69%.
China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
The post China Briefing 30 May: March emissions drop; ‘United’ G7 stance on ‘overcapacity’; Li Shuo on climate finance appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Climate Change
New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation
New Zealand’s parliament has adopted a controversial new law blocking a whole avenue of climate litigation and shutting down its most advanced corporate lawsuit, which has been blamed by the government for shaking business confidence and investment.
The Climate Change Response (Tort Liability) Amendment Bill, expected to take effect in the coming days after it is formally signed by the Governor-General, prevents all current and future civil claims for climate loss or harm under tort law.
Justice minister Paul Goldsmith said last week that the aim was to give businesses “certainty around their climate change obligations”, noting it would not alter the government’s responsibilities under the Climate Change Response Act 2002 nor business obligations under the Emissions Trading Scheme.
“Our response to climate change is best managed by the Government at a national level and not through piece-meal litigation in the courts,” he added in a statement.
Such litigation, he said, “risks developing a new regime that contradicts the framework Parliament has already enacted” to tackle climate change.
Goldsmith singled out a key domestic climate lawsuit brought by Northland iwi leader and activist Mike Smith against six big companies: dairy firms Fonterra and Dairy Holdings, energy firms Genesis Energy and Z Energy, New Zealand Steel and coal mining firm BT Mining. A seventh original defendant, Channel Infrastructure, was dropped after it permanently decommissioned its Marsden Point oil refinery.
Smith argued that these companies had caused him harm under public nuisance and negligence law, as well as a third breach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change that has yet to be tested domestically. He did not seek financial compensation, instead asking for the companies to immediately stop emitting or contributing to net greenhouse gas emissions.
In one of the most advanced corporate climate accountability lawsuits in the world, a trial had been scheduled for April 2027 after the Supreme Court unanimously allowed the case to continue.
Corporate lobbying in the shadows
Smith described the passing of the bill as “deeply concerning”, particularly as it coincided with the Supreme Court hearing another of his climate lawsuits. In that case, Smith v Attorney-General, he argues that the government’s response to climate change and its impacts on Māori communities in particular breaches rights to life and culture.
“That timing raises profound questions about the separation of powers and the rule of law,” said Smith. “Whatever one’s view of the merits of these cases, it is deeply troubling when parliament intervenes to remove a legal pathway while the courts are actively considering fundamental questions about climate responsibility, rights and the crown’s obligations.”
The bill – which says that no person (including the government) can be found liable in tort for emissions-related climate change effects – followed major lobbying efforts by the companies defending themselves in Smith’s lawsuit. They outlined a proposed legal amendment in a briefing note to the government in 2024.
The centre-right government has been fiercely criticised over its lack of transparency in relation to this lobbying activity. The national ombudsman recently found that the Prime Minister’s Office effectively withheld information requested by the Environmental Law Initiative about meetings, discussions and conversations regarding Smith’s case.
Green groups fail to stop bill
The bill sparked huge concern among environmental campaigners in New Zealand and elsewhere. Greenpeace Aotearoa called it a “shocking abuse of executive power” and the vast majority of submissions to a parliamentary inquiry said it should be rejected.
But in the end, it was adopted with little resistance, moving relatively smoothly through parliament, passing its third reading by 67 votes to 53. Sam Bookman, climate law lecturer at Melbourne Law School, told Climate Home News he was not surprised by this, given that the coalition government has a secure majority.
A complaint has been made to the UN special rapporteur on climate change and human rights by Smith, the National Iwi Chairs Forum Pou Tikanga and youth coalition Climate Clinic Aotearoa over what they see as the government’s heavy-handed approach. Smith is also challenging the new law in yet another lawsuit.
“Pathetic”: New Zealand plans to barely cut emissions between 2030 and 2035
Bookman thinks it “very unlikely” that such a challenge will succeed, noting that New Zealand’s constitution is firmly anchored in parliamentary sovereignty.
But the expert in climate law does not see the bill as the end of legal action in the country, noting that New Zealand has a “sophisticated climate litigation landscape with a growing number of specialist and experienced lawyers and NGOs”.
The country is also approaching its next general election in November, and some opposition parties have pledged to restore access to the courts if elected.
Amanda Larsson, global project lead on agriculture for Greenpeace International, said: “This law deserves to be tested, and I strongly encourage the international climate litigation community to unite and help defend New Zealanders’ fundamental right to hold polluters accountable before this becomes a global blueprint.”
Copycat legislation on the rise
New Zealand’s move is part of a small but growing legislative effort to shut down climate litigation around the world.
In the US, Republican politicians introduced legislation in the House and Senate in April that would shield fossil fuel firms from climate liability lawsuits. Similar laws have already been passed at state level in Tennessee, Utah, Iowa and Louisiana.
The German state of Bavaria has put forward a similar proposal to the Federal Council, aiming to block private climate claims as well as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments imposing such liability. There are also proposals to limit available remedies and actions in the Netherlands and Belgium.
UN General Assembly backs “climate obligations” set by world’s top court
Bookman said he expects more efforts to counter climate damages litigation and advised plaintiffs to think about how to respond, including drawing on broader support in opposing them.
“Even though it’s very hard for plaintiffs to win these types of cases, companies are very eager to avoid the expense, embarrassment and political accountability that come even with unsuccessful lawsuits,” he said.
The post New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation appeared first on Climate Home News.
New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation
Climate Change
Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry
Bhima Yudhistira Adhinegara is the Executive Director of the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), an Indonesia-based economic think tank. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the China-Indonesia desk at CELIOS.
Indonesia produces around 60% of the world’s nickel, a metal used to manufacture batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) – more than any other country in the world. But in 2026, the government sharply reduced how much of its nickel can be extracted from the ground.
Production quotas were reduced by around 40% this year compared to 2025. Weda Bay, the largest nickel mine on Earth, had its allowance cut by more than 70% and exhausted its full-year quota by the end of May, halting mining entirely; it cannot resume large-scale extraction until next year unless regulators grant an extension.
The policy has sparked a vivid debate in Indonesian policy circles: how can the country shift its strategy from a decade of mining vast quantities of cheap nickel to producing a high-value and low-carbon material that the rest of the world wants for EV batteries.
The cuts aren’t a silver bullet to clean up Indonesia’s nickel industry, whose smelters are powered by coal – the most polluting fossil fuels. But alongside stricter enforcement of environmental rules, it is one side of efforts to produce more sustainable nickel for a premium.
Restricting Indonesia’s nickel output
Production quotas were introduced to stop the collapse of nickel prices because of oversupply in the market. Prices had fallen more than 40% in 2023 alone and kept sliding as Indonesian supply kept growing, hitting a four-year low of around $13,900 a ton in late 2025.
Critics called the recent tightening of production quotas proof that Indonesia’s nickel strategy has failed, arguing that the industry shouldn’t need to throttle its own output to survive. But when assessed against what the policy was supposed to do – push up nickel prices – it has worked. Prices jumped to $20,000 a ton in May, the highest since 2024.
Chinese industry groups representing companies that have invested billions to mine and refine the country’s nickel were furious, warning Indonesia’s president Prabowo Subianto that the cuts put $50 billion worth of investment at risk. But much of that Chinese capital is sunk into smelters and processing plants built specifically to run on Indonesian ore, and cannot simply be moved elsewhere. That gives Jakarta more room to hold its ground than the warning suggests.
Stronger environmental enforcement
Since the start of the year, Indonesia’s forestry task force has seized more than four million hectares of land from mines and plantations operating illegally in protected forests, collecting over two trillion rupiah ($113 million) in fines.
This included 148 hectares seized from Weda Bay for lacking a forestry permit. The share of nickel produced from illegal small-scale mining also fell from about a quarter in 2022 to roughly 10% by 2024.
The crackdown responds to serious environmental damages in the nickel industry. On Obi Island, a waste pond collapsed after heavy rain in June 2025, flooding three villages and killing a resident. Internal company tests found chromium-6 – a carcinogen – in the water, in quantities far above the legal limit. The footprint of another mine near Raja Ampat, which is home to some of the world’s richest coral reefs, grew 60-fold in just eight years.

The market is responding to early cleanup efforts. Low-carbon nickel now sells for a real premium, roughly $18,800 to $19,300 a ton compared with $17,900 to $18,300 otherwise, as carmakers seek to source cleaner materials to comply with the European Union’s new emissions rules for imports.
In turn, this is incentivising the industry to do more to green its operations. Vale Indonesia’s smelter in South Sulawesi now runs almost entirely on hydropower, for example.
None of this addresses coal use, however. Major Indonesian nickel producers still emitted an estimated 15 million metric tons of greenhouse gases in 2023. Indonesia may be cracking down on illegal mining and rewarding cleaner producers but it is still running its mines on the dirtiest fuel available.
Unequal benefits
For Indonesia to truly benefit from producing cleaner and high-value nickel, it needs to reap the economic benefits too. Although the industry has boosted the country’s economic growth, the reality on the ground tells a different story.
Konawe in Southeast Sulawesi is home to a major smelting complex. Growth in the district jumped from 6% to 22% between 2015 and 2023, driven almost entirely by the nickel industry, according to a study by the Lowy Institute study. At the same time, poverty levels increased slightly and unemployment remained unchanged.
In Halmahera, another epicentre of the nickel industry, spending by the poorest fifth grew just 5% between 2019 and 2022, compared with 28% for the wealthiest fifth, according to a separate study.
Part of the reason for this inequality is the system for transferring mining royalties to district authorities where the mines are located. In theory, they are entitled to the largest share. But in practice, payments are delayed, companies routinely dispute what they owe and royalties are pooled and distributed across a larger area.
The Natural Resource Governance Institute has found that decentralisation handed local governments power to approve new mines faster than they could build their capacity to manage them. Higher output raises national income on paper, but local governments remain constrained by fiscal rules and infrastructure costs that scale with mining.
None of this makes the 2026 quota cuts a mistake. Indonesia has every right to defend its pricing power over a resource it controls. But limiting extraction isn’t going to fix underlying issues around environmental enforcement and revenue-sharing. That requires rules that are consistently enforced, royalties that reach communities living by the mines, and a plan to wean smelters off coal.
The post Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry appeared first on Climate Home News.
Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry
Climate Change
Risk of “catastrophic” oil spill reaching Kimberley coast found in Woodside’s Scott Reef gas drilling plans
SYDNEY, Monday 24 August 2026 – New analysis of Woodside modelling released by Greenpeace Australia Pacific and Environs Kimberley has revealed the oil and gas corporation’s plans to drill at Scott Reef could cause an oil spill up to 30 times bigger than the 2009 Montara disaster, impacting the Kimberley coastline and reaching as far as Indonesia.
The new analysis details the “catastrophic” oil spill risk put to environmental regulators for approval by Woodside in its Browse to North West Shelf Project (Browse) plans, the worst-case scenario being a blowout directly below Scott Reef, polluting whale migratory pathways and covering isolated turtle nesting ground with oil condensate.
An FOI application (F348) revealed the federal environment department (DCCEEW) asked offshore oil and gas regulator NOPSEMA to look into the oil spill risk in 2025. NOPSEMA’s response to the application refused access to its report, and one document shows DCCEEW sought further advice this year.
Greenpeace and Environs Kimberley are calling on the Federal Government to publicly release the NOPSEMA report given the risk of an uncontrolled release of oil condensate from directly below Scott Reef.
Hannah Schuch, Senior Campaigner at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “Woodside is aware that drilling at Scott Reef risks a massive oil spill that would have severe, far-reaching consequences. It appears environmental regulators are aware too.
“The state and federal governments need to take this risk from Woodside’s drilling plans seriously, as they could end up allowing the worst oil spill in Australian history.
“The pygmy blue whales that migrate up and down the WA coast with their newborns each year could be swimming and feeding in toxic, oil-slicked water. Woodside’s proposal to drill at Scott Reef is an environmental disaster waiting to happen, and the WA and federal governments have one surefire way to prevent catastrophe — reject Browse.”
Martin Prichard, Executive Director at Environs Kimberley, said: “A catastrophic oil spill by Woodside would be disastrous not just for marine life in the area but also for the Kimberley’s $500 million tourism industry.
“The state and federal governments will see five marine parks on the Kimberley coast included in the risk area of a catastrophic Woodside oil spill.
“The Montara oil spill was disastrous for West Timor with the toxic oil destroying seaweed farmers’ livelihoods. The Kimberley dodged a bullet with Montara, we were lucky the spill didn’t head our way. Myself and a crew flew over the Montara oil spill and followed it as far as we could. It was like a scene from a disaster movie.”
After the WA Environmental Protection Authority deemed Browse “unacceptable” due, in part, to oil spill risk, Woodside submitted a mitigation plan based on technology that has never been used “in anger”, a weakness stated in an independent expert review of the plan.
Professor Richard Steiner, independent oil spill expert, said: “A large offshore spill is impossible to effectively contain or recover. Historically, only 2-6% of total spill volume is recovered and the ecological injury from the release of toxic hydrocarbons in the sea can be severe, extensive, and long-term.
“Here in Alaska, government research concludes that several marine populations injured by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, including whales, fish, and seabirds, are still not recovering today, 37 years later. We should expect similar long-term ecological impacts in Western Australia if there were to be a major oil spill. The only sure way to avoid the risk of a catastrophic marine oil spill is to not develop oil and gas projects in marine environments.”
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Media contact
Emma Sangalli on emma.sangalli@greenpeace.org or 0431 513 465
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