You probably couldn’t pick Kazakhstan out on a map—even though it’s the ninth-largest country in the world.
But Kazakhstan is a superpower in its own right.
This little-known former Soviet state hosts seven of the twelve largest producing uranium deposits in the world.
Kazakhstan, using American technology, went from producing 1 million pounds annually to over 46 million pounds annually in 20 years and becoming the world’s largest producer of uranium.
In 2022, it was the top uranium producer, mining 43% of the world’s uranium at 46.8 million pounds. To put that in context: Kazakhstan produced more uranium than the next four countries combined.
The renewed proliferation of nuclear power around the world has made Kazakhstan a hot commodity.
Only it hasn’t controlled its own uranium destiny.
Kazakhstan needed two crucial things to be able to secure a pathway to monetization of its uranium riches:
- uranium refinement and enrichment infrastructure, and
- trade agreements to access uranium sales to utilities around the world
Russia took quick advantage of Kazakhstan’s plight, providing both trade routes and uranium processing infrastructure. Certain companies in the west, like Cameco, took advantage also, which we will get to later.
- For the last three decades, one-third of global uranium supply has been under the control of Rosatom, the state-owned Russian company created under the Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s watch.
But this is now changing in real time…
Russia has tried to implement a different kind of nuclear warfare: control over the energy security of the United States.
You see, Rosatom provides nearly one-third of the enrichment services and one-fifth of the uranium for U.S. nuclear power plants.
“Currently, we’re reliant on Russia for nuclear fuel.”
– former ExIm Bank Advisor Rich Powell
What does that mean?
1 in every 10 homes in America is powered by Russian enriched uranium.
Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use that reliance as leverage—as when it threatened to cut off nuclear fuel access in 2014, or when it did cut off natural gas supplies to Europe in 2022.
That alone is a grave national security threat to the U.S. But it gets worse…
The uranium that Russia doesn’t have direct control over is rapidly coming under the domain of another country—one that is even more likely to use it as a weapon, China.
Never Wake a Sleeping Giant
In the last decade, China has increased its nuclear power generation by 400%. And they’re somehow still accelerating their nuclear buildout.
Currently, one-third of global nuclear reactors under construction in the world are in China.
And they’re planning to build at least 100 more.
It’s all part of a plan to become the largest producer of nuclear power in the world in just seven years.
But China has struggled to produce the uranium required to fuel those reactors. In 2023, it’s expected to mine just 15% of its domestic uranium demand.
And its uranium resources are rapidly shrinking.

At the current rate of decline, China’s entire uranium resources at any price point will last less than a decade. And that’s if it builds zero new reactors.
China is well aware that to secure its economic growth it must be able to secure lower cost clean base load energy.
Has America lost its Nuclear Advantage?


- The U.S. could power about four of its nuclear reactors with domestic uranium production.
The other 92 require imported uranium.
From where? Mother Russia.
In 2021, 54% of U.S. uranium purchases came from Russia or former Soviet states (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan).
The U.S. can’t buy more from Canada and Australia, the other two main producers as those nation producers have sold and hedged their production in long term contracts.
China has bought the dragon’s share of uranium in every other major producing country.
Here’s the bottom line…
- If the U.S. does not immediately build a domestic uranium industry,
Russia and China could easily destroy the United States’ secure supply of nuclear power.
U.S. leadership, including Trump, Biden, Congress, and the Secretary of Energy, recognizes the danger this presents.
Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette says that the current state of uranium production “threatens our national interest and our national security.”
So last year, a bill was introduced in the House and Senate: the National Opportunity to Restore Uranium Supply Services In America Act of 2022.
In case you missed the acronym, the bipartisan message is loud and clear: NO RUSSIA. Russia’s influence will be expelled from the U.S. uranium market.
Almost 30 years to the day that the Russian US HEU agreement was inked in Washington DC, Senator Joe Manchin introduced Bill S.452 on February 2, 2023.
If passed in Senate, it would require the Secretary of Energy to establish a Nuclear Fuel Security Program.
The Bill hit the floor on December 11th, 2023 and passed the House and will now move onto the Senate for a vote.
The U.S. government has officially reset the domestic uranium industry. And with that, power 91 nuclear power reactors that in total require over 50 million pounds of uranium to run rain or shine, day or night and supply its military nuclear fuel needs.
We have found a “value investors dream”.
This company we are highlighting in the report below has in the past valued the portfolio at almost a $1 Billion valuation.
Today, the company enterprise value (Market price minus cash and equitable securities) can be obtained for less than $30 Million.
Yet, just one of its assets, a uranium asset in the highest grade producing region in the world would be valued at $75 Million using a comparable peer valuation based on the $600 per hectare valuation the bankers just valued a large three way merger in the same mining district.
This is rare, unique and how one goes about value investing in the Energy Transition by finding discount to current value with considerable value in low risk jurisdictions that will benefit from Americas Nuclear Renaissance and Energy Transition.
Click here for a full report on the company.
Never bet against America, but rather benefit from America’s greatness.
Regards,
The www.carboncredits.com Team
The post BREAKING: The US House Passed A Bill That Just Repatriated The Nuclear Cycle From Russia’s Control appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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Carbon Footprint
Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions
Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?
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