Climate diplomats have finished another two weeks of intense negotiations in the German city of Bonn, discussing global efforts to cut emissions and protect people from climate hazards.
Developed and developing countries were locked in a bitter struggle over who should provide the trillions of dollars required to tackle climate change across the global south.
This issue cast a shadow over wider proceedings. Discussions of everything from assessing climate adaptation, to carrying forward the outcomes from last year’s “stocktake” in Dubai, were held up by financial disputes.
Nations are expected to reach an agreement at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, on a new, global climate-finance goal that will come into play after 2025.
The COP29 presidency has highlighted this as one of its priorities, along with technical issues concerning “Article 6” carbon markets. However, neither issue made much progress in Bonn, suggesting the months ahead will be challenging.
Last year’s UN climate talks in Dubai secured the first-ever COP agreement to curb fossil fuels. Yet many delegates in Bonn were frustrated that negotiations were still not reckoning with the need to ramp up global climate ambition.
Here, Carbon Brief gives an overview of the key outcomes and disputes at the 60th biannual sessions of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) subsidiary bodies (SB60).
- Climate finance
- Adaptation
- Mitigation
- Just transition
- Article 6
- Loss and damage
- Global stocktake, NDCs and ambition
- Road to COP29
Climate finance
Climate finance was top of the agenda in Bonn. The issue is particularly urgent this year, as countries are expected to agree on a new global climate finance goal in Baku.
Negotiations took place against a bleak financial backdrop. Many rich nations have been cutting their aid budgets, citing fiscal pressures, even as developing countries struggle with debt that makes spending on climate action harder.
Developing countries say they need financial support from developed countries if they are to spend the trillions needed to meet their climate targets. As UNFCCC executive secretary Simon Stiell told delegates in Bonn at the beginning of the talks, finance is the “great enabler of climate action”.
“Developed” countries – including western Europe, the US, Japan and a handful of others – are obliged to provide finance under the Paris Agreement. They support climate projects in developing countries, largely through their foreign aid budgets.
However, these nations have fallen short on their commitments. In particular, they missed the $100bn annual target that they pledged to meet by 2020.
While the latest data compiled by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggests they exceeded that goal in 2022, many activists and global-south negotiators contest the figures. They point to the reliance on loans, money from the private sector and development aid that has been “relabelled” as climate finance.
By the end of COP29, all the parties must agree on a “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) to guide the provision of climate finance. This goal is supposed to replace the $100bn target after 2025.
Progress on negotiating the NCQG has been slow. Nations have disagreed on almost every aspect of the new target, including the amount of money that should be provided, who should provide it, who should receive it and what kind of funds should be included.
The main dividing lines are between the developed countries that have traditionally been obliged to provide finance and the developing countries who are eligible to receive it. However, country groupings have different priorities. The interactive table below captures some of this complexity.
The focus of the finance talks in Bonn was an “ad hoc work programme”, which held its first meeting in April and is meant to yield a text that can form the basis for negotiations in Baku.
Across the two weeks in Bonn, there were four sessions of the work programme, as well as a “technical expert dialogue” where experts and governments exchanged views on the goal.
Prior to the start of negotiations, countries submitted written statements explaining their – often highly divergent – positions on the topic. These were used by two co-chairs to compile a 63-page “input paper” intended to capture the full range of views.
In the first week, parties asked co-chairs to “streamline” the text, resulting in an updated “input paper”, with a somewhat slimmed-down 45 pages.
After more submissions, another text, with 35 pages, was released as the weekend drew to a close. Despite pressure to seek compromises, the text essentially remained a summary of all the proposals on the table – including many that directly contradicted each other.
As the last meeting came to a close on the second Tuesday, deep divisions remained between the parties. Numerous developed countries said the text was “unbalanced” and asked for sections to be deleted.
Developed-country parties including the US, the EU and Australia said they were frustrated by the other parties’ unwillingness to accommodate their inputs.
One of the major disputes was over the “quantum” of climate finance – that is, the amount of money that would be put towards the new goal.
Unlike the $100bn target, the new goal is meant to be based on analysis of developing countries’ needs – which are significant. Various independent assessments have estimated that trillions of dollars are required every year if these nations are to hit their climate targets.
Some developing country groups – including the Arab Group, the LMDCs of China, India and others, as well as the small island states (AOSIS) – have proposed targets in the trillions, in the range of around $1.1-1.3tn.
(The Arab Group provided more detail, suggesting that $441bn could come from public funds – including taxes on arms companies – and the remainder “mobilised” from other funding streams.)
They have also called for “arrears” from the $100bn goal, to make up for the two years in which the target was missed.
By contrast, the US, the EU and other developed countries have been hesitant to propose specific financial targets. The only exception is what the US described as its “quantum” proposal, which was that the target should be “from a floor of $100bn” – the bare minimum set by the Paris Agreement itself.
Instead, developed countries have sought to focus the talks on the many “layers” of finance that they see making up the final goal. They emphasise that this needs to be agreed before a number can be picked.
These groups have stressed the importance of an expansive goal that includes money “mobilised” from the private sector, the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs) and even domestic spending within countries.
By contrast, developing countries broadly want to keep the talks tightly focused on money channelled from the public coffers of developed countries and given to developing countries.
Liliam Chagas, the head of the Brazilian delegation in Bonn, explained to Carbon Brief that G77 countries want to see these negotiations between national governments focusing on funding streams that are within their power to provide:
“Others think ‘oh no, the task is so big that we must put everything [in]’ – other layers – but the other layers we don’t control.”
Another stumbling block within the negotiations is the issue of expanding the “donor base”. The group of developed countries that is currently responsible for providing funds to developing countries wants wealthy, high-emitting – but still “developing” – countries, such as China and the Gulf states, to start contributing.
The EU has suggested that contributor status could be based on a combination of “economic conditions” and emissions or membership of institutions, such as the G20 and the OECD. Switzerland even proposed it could be based on which countries have space programmes.
The G77 and China group of developing countries, meanwhile, has been firm in its position that developed countries have committed under the Paris Agreement to provide climate finance to developing countries.
These nations also want to include the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” reflected in the goal, emphasising the historical responsibilities of developed countries for causing climate change. Developed countries rejected this idea.
Michai Robertson, a climate-finance negotiator with AOSIS, told Carbon Brief that such fundamental differences of opinion were preventing any progress:
“[Developed countries] have connected the whole quantum to who’s contributing, which is a tough pill to swallow.”
He pointed out that it was highly unlikely countries would reach a consensus in which a handful of developing countries agree to provide climate finance.
Further disagreements exist around the timescale of the new goal, which countries should be the primary recipients of the money and even how to define “climate finance”. As it stands, developed countries all use different metrics to measure how much finance they provide, leading to widespread mistrust in the figures. Robertson noted:
“The number – yes, that’s important – but making sure we understand exactly what we’re counting is probably even more important, or equally important.”
Parties identified more common ground around the issues of improving countries’ access to finance and updating the Paris Agreement’s “enhanced transparency framework” in order to effectively report on climate finance.
Most of the major issues were viewed as too important to be resolved without direct input from ministries, which will take place in the run up to COP29.
“The G7, Ministerial on Climate Action and UN General Assembly are some of the opportunities in the next few months for leaders to have frank conversations that will be necessary to move beyond entrenched positions,” Joe Thwaites, a senior advocate for international climate finance at the Natural Resources Defence Council, tells Carbon Brief.
One issue raised by negotiators Carbon Brief spoke with in Bonn was that several major donor countries face changes of government in the coming months, bringing potential disruption to climate finance plans. In the US, a second term for Donald Trump could even lead to withdrawal from international climate action.
To conclude the session, the NCQG co-chairs said they would produce a new “input paper” ahead of the next meeting of the work programme – asking negotiators to propose some compromises.
Finally, a separate but very much related issue in Bonn was Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement. This calls for “financial flows” in general to be made consistent with cutting emissions and “climate-resilient development”.
Alexandra Sgobbi, head of the climate finance unit at the European Commission, explained at a press briefing early in the talks how she saw Article 2.1c:
“My personal opinion [is] that means that we should be heading to a time when we actually don’t talk about climate finance any more because everything is actually supporting countries and companies and individuals in meeting climate neutrality and climate resilient objectives.”
In Bonn, the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue provided space to discuss this issue.
However, it also related directly to the broadly developed-country notion in NCQG negotiations that the goal should incorporate all kinds of finance – and potentially discourage investment in fossil fuels.
Many developing countries, meanwhile, interpret Article 2.1c as a way to distract attention from developed countries’ responsibilities to provide climate finance. Groups such as the LMDCs and the Arab Group, which include major fossil-fuel producers, have been particularly resistant to discussing the issue.
Adaptation
The issue of climate adaptation featured across multiple strands of the Bonn negotiations. Much of the tension in these talks came back to the question of climate finance.
At COP28, negotiators made long-awaited progress on a “global goal on adaptation” (GGA). They agreed on a “framework” to guide countries in their efforts to prepare for rising global temperatures – dubbed the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience.
Developing countries in the G77 and China group had pushed hard in Dubai for adaptation finance to feature prominently in the GGA. Some had also advocated for a clear recognition of “common but differentiated responsibilities” – highlighting the historical responsibility that they say developed countries must accept when addressing climate adaptation.
They were ultimately unsuccessful in this push. However, demands for developed countries to provide climate finance continued to be a live issue throughout the negotiations in Bonn.
Among the major adaptation-related issues discussed at Bonn was the UAE-Belém work programme on “indicators” – a two-year effort that was also agreed in the GGA negotiations.
“Indicators” could include any measures that are relevant for climate adaptation – from the area of land available for food production to the number of climate-related deaths. Many are already available and used in other contexts, but this work involves identifying a set that can be applied globally under the GGA.
Negotiators were meant to discuss the “modalities” of this programme in Bonn. This refers to practicalities, such as overall plan, timeline and who is involved, which must be organised before the programme can begin its technical work.
There was frustration among some parties and delegates that little progress was being made on these, given it was expected to be a relatively straightforward part of the programme.
Developing countries raised the issue of finance throughout, wanting to include it as one of the key indicators. Ugandan negotiator Adonia Ayebare, who is also chair of the G77 and China, told Carbon Brief that their focus on finance in these negotiations was straightforward:
“Without finance, there’s nothing that can happen from a developing country’s perspective…It’s in the Paris Agreement. We agreed on it, so we should do it.”
The argument goes that dealing with adaptation cannot be separated from the urgent need for investment in adaptation – which has been severely lacking. The most recent UN analysis found that developing countries’ annual adaptation financial needs were 10-18 times greater than the public funds they received from developed countries in 2021.
Ultimately, negotiators found a compromise in the outcome text, which will be forwarded on to talks in Baku. This included “recall[ing]” an opening paragraph from the GGA, which in turn referenced the importance of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities.
Another major divergence was the question of which organisation should be charged with “mapping” existing adaptation indicators. Developed parties, such as the US, the EU and Japan, wanted this to be handled by the Adaptation Committee, but G77 countries broadly wanted it to be handled by a newly formed “expert group”.
In the end, another compromise was found, with a footnote in the final text that left different options open for future talks. It said negotiators would consider the “Adaptation Committee and/or an ad hoc expert group and/or expert groups”.
The other notable strand of adaptation negotiations at Bonn focused on countries’ national adaptation plans (NAPs). As the name suggests, NAPs allow countries to plan for climate impacts, but an assessment of them has been repeatedly delayed.
Around 50 countries have NAPs in place, but the GGA envisages comprehensive NAP coverage by 2030. Again, finance is a central issue, as developed countries say they need money not only to implement NAPs, but to actually put them together in the first place.
In the end, following disputes over the role of private finance in adaptation and the long delays in receiving funds for NAP production, negotiators settled on a lengthy, seven-page “informal note” that included issues both developed and developing countries disagreed with.
This too will be taken up by negotiators at COP29 in November, but unlike the “draft conclusions” on indicators and the GGA, its status as an “informal note” means it carries less weight and is further from any legal decision that would be agreed in Baku.
Jeffrey Qi, a policy advisor with the International Institute for Sustainable Development’s (IISD) resilience programme, tells Carbon Brief.
“Countries will find it rather challenging to streamline this text in the first week of Baku, especially when there are many elements they find uncomfortable…A lot of time will be spent on repeating the same positions again and again hoping for flexibility and compromise.”
Other negotiations also covered adaptation, such as the “matters relating to the least developed countries” and the “Nairobi work programme”, but these passed without much event.
Mitigation
Parties in the mitigation ambition and implementation work programme (MWP) were unable to come to an agreement on draft conclusions at Bonn, due to disagreements around whether there should be a procedural versus substantive outcome.
(At Bonn in 2023 similar debates arose, becoming one of the key areas of contention at the talks. The MWP’s inclusion in the agenda was one of the sticking points that led it to not even be agreed until the day before the two-week session was due to close.)
The MWP was adopted at COP27 in Sharm-el-Sheikh and is expected to run until 2026, when a decision will be made about the extension of its work.
Ahead of the start of the wider Bonn session, the third “global dialogue and investment-focused event” under the work programme was held in the city between 27-29 May, focused on “Cities: buildings and urban systems“.
Informal consultations then began on 4 June with co-facilitators Kay Harrison (New Zealand) and Carlos Fuller (Belize) inviting parties to share their views on substantive elements they would like addressed under the programme and its outcomes. According to Third World Network (TWN), divergence among parties quickly became clear.
Much of the disagreement within the work programme focused on its mandate, in particular with regard to the outcome of the “global stocktake” (GST) that was finalised at COP28 and called, among other things, for countries to “transition away” from fossil fuels.
A number of negotiating groups including small island states (AOSIS), the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG, including Switzerland and Mexico), the EU and Latin American countries (AILAC), as well as Japan, called for a decision that would reflect and build on the outcomes of the GST, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB).
Paragraph 186 of the GST outcome document “invites the relevant work programmes and constituted bodies under or serving the Paris Agreement to integrate relevant outcomes of the first global stocktake in planning their future work, in line with their mandates”.
However, the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), including China and India, noted that this paragraph also contains the caveat that GST outcomes should be applied “in line with [the] mandates” of programmes.
Together with the Arab Group, they argued that this does not apply to the MWP, and opposed the GST being reflected in the decision text.
Speaking on a panel following the first week, David Knecht, program manager for energy and climate justice at Swiss NGO Fastenaktion, said it was very important to unblock the MWP, given it was the only agenda item explicitly focused on mitigation. He added:
“We wish that the mitigation work programme can also contribute to the implementation of the global stocktake elements, which are related to mitigation, so that the mitigation work programme can start to deliver to its potential.”
Other disagreements emerged around the appropriate relationship between the MWP and nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
In a statement, Fernanda Carvalho, global policy manager for climate and energy practice at WWF International, said there needed to be a “dramatic change of pace on the mitigation work programme and on discussions related to nationally determined contributions”. She added:
“Discussions on mitigation in Bonn – or the lack of them – are completely disconnected from a sad reality: the window to 1.5C is closing fast. To get there, we need to collectively reduce emissions by 43% by 2030 and 65% by 2035 in relation to 2019 levels. That demands much stronger nationally determined contributions in 2025, backed up by solid technical and financial support.”
The LMDCs, African Group and Arab Group stressed that the MWP should not impose any targets on countries, arguing instead that the objective of the programme was to facilitate dialogues, TWN reported. New targets through the inclusion of key messages would go beyond the mandate of the MWP and place further burdens on developing countries, they noted.
AOSIS pointed to the urgency of the need to mitigate the impact of climate change, instead insisting that there should be “strong outcomes” from the MWP.
These disagreements continued through the informal consultations on 6 and 8 June. By this point, there was general agreement to continue the discussion on “improvement of future global dialogues and the investment focused events”, noted TWN.
On 12 June, the co-chairs presented a draft conclusions text and an informal note produced under their own authority.
LMDCs, the Arab group and others refused to even engage with the documents, arguing that Harrison and Fuller had not been mandated to produce them, according to ENB.
ENB added that, at the final informal meeting, several parties highlighted their disappointment with how the negotiations had been conducted, including calling into question the neutrality of the co-facilitators.
The divides between countries targeting substantive and those who preferred a strictly procedural decision ran across both weeks, ultimately leading to the failure to agree draft conclusions.
Within ENB’s “in the corridor” section, it quoted a seasoned delegate who quipped: “To speak about a mitigation work programme for this many hours and still not come out with a definition of our own mandate…well, there’s got to be some kind of award for that.”
Just transition
In Bonn, progress stalled once again in the just transition work programme (JTWP), as familiar challenges resurfaced.
The JTWP was established at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh. Since then, there have been ongoing disagreements about the focus of the programme. Developed countries broadly view it as focused on jobs, while developing countries argue it needs to be broader.
Last year at Bonn, for example, the G77 and China said their views were being overlooked in the talks, which they described as being “mitigation-centric”. While this dynamic continued to play out in Dubai at COP28, progress was made and parties agreed on the elements of the work programme.
However, over the two weeks of Bonn the same issues re-emerged, with the TWN noting that the negotiations were “like déjà vu”.
The first dialogue of the programme took place on 2-3 June, just ahead of the start of Bonn.
Speaking at the opening of the dialogue, Nabeer Munir (Pakistan), chair of the UN climate regime’s Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) said:
“Just transition is not just about reducing carbon emissions; it is about building a future with social justice and environmental sustainability to go hand in hand…safeguarding biodiversity and ensuring [a] prosperous planet for the generations to come.”
Within this first dialogue, the goal was to discuss how just transitions could be incorporated into NDCs, national adaptation plans and long term strategies.
Here, there were areas of agreement, including that just transition actions should be tailored to local contexts and national circumstances, that there should be a whole-of-government approach and that they should align with the Paris Agreement goals, while including the rights of workers, Indigenous Peoples and other vulnerable groups, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB).
A draft text was introduced by co-chair Marianne Karlsen (Norway) on 5 June, with parties invited to share their views.
Disputes quickly emerged, in particular with the G77 and China group proposing a work plan for the JTWP, supported by others including the African Group and the LMDCs. The US opposed this, arguing that it was “a premature anticipation of the outcome of the JTWP’s review in 2026”, according to ENB.
Across the two weeks, this disagreement became increasingly entrenched. The African Group also called for the development of a work plan at COP29 later this year. The EU, US, Canada, Australia and Japan opposed the call, with Canada subsequently arguing that it would be premature.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Dr Leon Sealey-Huggins, senior campaigner at charity War on Want, says:
“The creation of a work plan was a sticking point, but I think it was more a broader refusal of developed countries to agree to anything that made the JTWP more than just a talk shop or talking shop.”
Parties clashed on the “modalities” of the UAE JTWP, with different parties having different interpretations of the agreement from Dubai. This refers to practicalities, such as overall plan, timeline and who is involved, which must be organised before the programme can begin its technical work.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Anabella Rosemberg, senior advisor on the just transition at NGO Climate Action Network International (CAN), explains that developed countries broadly viewed the modalities as having been set at COP28, while developing countries and civil society viewed them as a platform to be built on. She adds:
“[In Bonn many developed countries argued] there’s no further clarification needed. There’s no need for adding more activities. There’s no need for knowing more about the themes. We are happy as it is.
“That was not seen as sufficient…On the one side, it does look like some of the developed countries have flexed that position, realised that those two [already agree] dialogues might not be enough, but at the same time, they are raising concerns about funding and other issues that may make things complicated.”
Additionally, there were disagreements around language, with the G77 and China proposing that the draft conclusions “take note” rather than “welcome” the first hybrid dialogue, while the LDCs suggested “acknowledge”, noted ENB.
Speaking on a panel on 8 June, Caroline Brouillette, executive director of CAN Canada, said momentum was lost over the first week of Bonn. Echoing others, she said negotiations had become a “talkshop”, simply reopening discussions on elements that were agreed in Dubai.
On 12 June, co-chair Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) noted that as no decision could be reached, draft procedural conclusions would be put together. However, parties reconvened again in the evening to try and find agreement.
This renewed push continued into 13 June. Ultimately, an agreement was reached with draft conclusions and an informal note published.
While a work plan was absent from the conclusions, the informal note included a “placeholder on the workplan for the work programme”, albeit within square brackets, meaning the wording had not yet been agreed by all parties.
In a statement at the end of the two weeks, Brouillette, added:
“Parties agreed to procedural conclusions in Bonn which give the Just Transition Work Programme a bit of oomph. But now they need to show up in Baku with a clear vision on how the JTWP delivers justice for people: this includes stronger and more inclusive modalities and deeper content discussions. Bringing workers, communities and all peoples along and ensuring adequate support and international cooperation is the only way we can move fast enough to limit warming to the crucial threshold of 1.5C.”
Article 6
Coverage of these negotiations will follow shortly.
Loss and damage
Coverage of these negotiations will follow shortly.
Global stocktake, NDCs and ambition
Coverage of these negotiations will follow shortly.
Road to COP29
With Bonn coming to a close, attention is turning to COP29 host Azerbaijan, which, like its predecessor the United Arab Emirates, is a major fossil fuel producer.
The country is planning to expand its gas operations, with President Ilham Aliyev saying the country’s fossil fuel reserves were “a gift of the gods”, according to Politico.
European officials have also recently suggested that Azerbaijan could run its gas through a pipeline currently used to bring Russian fuel to the EU via Ukraine, in an effort to reduce the bloc’s dependance on Russia, a separate article in Politico reported.
Because of its role in the oil and gas industry, being a former Soviet bloc country and sitting between the east and the west, Mukhtar Babayev, the minister of ecology for Azerbaijan and COP29 president designate, has looked to position the country as the crossroads of the world, an interview with the Guardian noted.
COP29 will take place amid a period of high geopolitical tension. In addition, Azerbaijan has already drawn criticism for media crackdowns, with Human Rights Watch reporting the country had arrested or sentenced at least 25 journalists and activists in the past year.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Anabella Rosemberg, senior advisor on the just transition at CAN says:
“The mood for cooperation going into COP is a very difficult one. Of course, there is Gaza, but there are also many other things, multiple elections still coming and the multilateralism across the board that is under attack.
“So, yeah, the extent to which we are able to maintain this line of conversation from governments that today are hardly able to agree on anything without going into a lowest common denominator approach to save the process, which is something that CAN could not accept. It’s a very difficult balancing act.”
Efforts will continue over the coming months to lay the groundwork for COP29. This will include further work from the COP presidencies “Troika”, made up of the hosts of COP28, COP29 and COP30. Collectively, they launched the Roadmap to Mission 1.5C in April.
The spotlight will continue to be on finance, with the importance of the new global climate finance goal in Baku hanging over preparations.
In a statement at the end of Bonn, Alden Meyer, senior associate at E3G said:
“As in past years, it will take hard work by ministers and leaders over the next several months to lay the groundwork for the political agreements that will make COP29 in Baku a success. We must create the conditions that will drive high ambition in the next round of national emissions reduction pledges due by early next year to give us a fighting chance to keep the 1.5C Paris temperature limitation goal in reach as is needed to avert even more devastating climate impacts than those people are already experiencing all across the world.”
| Date | Milestone |
|---|---|
| 13 to 15 June 2024 | G7 summit, Italy |
| 12-14 July 2024 | G20 summit, Brazil |
| 21 October to 1 November 2024 | Biodiversity COP16, Cali, Columbia |
| 11 to 22 November 2024 | COP29, Baku, Azerbaijan |
The post Bonn climate talks: Key outcomes from the June 2024 UN climate conference appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Bonn climate talks: Key outcomes from the June 2024 UN climate conference
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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