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In his first – and most likely last – visit to sub-Saharan Africa as US President this week, Joe Biden chose to focus on the planned upgrade of a cross-border railway that is set to take minerals needed for the energy transition out of Central Africa to the coast and on to the United States.

After walking among the cargo containers at Angola’s Lobito port, from where copper and cobalt will be shipped, Biden sat around a wooden table in a food processing facility with the leaders of Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for the Lobito Corridor Trans-Africa Summit.

He told his African peers that the Lobito Corridor railway project would be a “game changer”, bringing economic growth to Africa and the rest of the world. Currently, copper is transported to the port by road with truckers often stuck in queues for weeks at border crossings, but the railway’s supporters claim it will cut the journey time from several weeks to just days.

The White House said it was announcing over $560 million in new funding this week – including commitments expected to generate at least $200 million in additional private-sector capital – for infrastructure projects along the Lobito Corridor. US investments now total more than $4 billion, it said, adding that with G7 partners and regional development banks, international investment in the Lobito Corridor exceeds $6 billion.

The Lobito Corridor is an old, recently-restored railway which runs from the Angolan coastal port of Lobito 1,344 km to the border town of Luau, where it links with the railway of the cobalt-rich DRC. A coalition of local and Western companies and governments want to extend it to Zambia’s copper mines.

Transitioning from fossil fuels to clean energy will require huge amounts of copper to carry electricity and cobalt for batteries. The US and China are competing to source limited supplies of these materials for their electric vehicle manufacturers.

China is helping refurbish the Tazara railway linking Zambia’s Copperbelt province to Africa’s east coast in Tanzania. In Angola yesterday, Biden’s energy and investment adviser Amos Hochstein said that copper and cobalt is “now going to be switching direction on this corridor”. 

Local benefits

Speaking after Biden, Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema said the project, which he drew up with Hochstein in his “dingy office” in Zambia’s capital, is a “huge opportunity” for Africa. He added that the minerals will “make our global economy greener”.

He stressed the importance of linking the railway with the Chinese-built Tazara eastern railway “which will really mean that we can connect our continent” from the west to east coast.

Sitting next to him, the president of neighbouring DRC, Felix Tshisekedi, said the project would create 30,000 jobs, reduce logistics costs, increase export revenues and offer “a strategic alternative to other exportation corridors”.

But of equal importance, he added, is the need to process the copper and cobalt locally before it is exported. “It is imperative that the wealth contained in our ground contribute directly to the well-being of our peoples,” he said through an interpreter.

Q&A: What you need to know about clean energy and critical minerals supply chains

Emmanuel Umpula Nkumba, executive director of the DRC-based African Natural Resources Watch (AFREWATCH), agreed, telling Climate Home that Africa has historically exported its raw minerals without benefiting from the finished products. “If this project will do the same, then there will not be a huge difference and we will not win in this transition,” he warned.

In a fact sheet, the White House said the US “is committed to ensuring reliable supply chains by supporting the development of this sector [critical minerals] with environmentally respectful processing so more of the value is captured on the continent”. It said US government support is being provided for a nickel mining and refining project in Tanzania, rare earths mining and refining in Angola, and a “green copper mining” project in Zambia.

Map of the Lobito Atlantic Railway Corridor (Pic: Trafigura)

Troubled railway

The Lobito railway was built by a British company in the early 20th-century and although its developers originally planned that it would reach Zambia’s copper mines, it only ever got as far as Angola’s border with the DRC.

It fell into disuse in the late 20th-century during Angola’s 27-year civil war. Zambian copper was mostly diverted east to Mozambique and then from 1976 on the Chinese-built Tazara Railway to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

In 2015, the Chinese government stepped in and carried out a $2-billion rehabilitation of the Lobito railway. But in July 2022, the Angolan government awarded a 30-year concession to maintain and operate the railway to a consortium of European companies led by Trafigura and Mota-Engil, rejecting a Chinese bid.

The Africa Finance Corporation, owned by private companies and the Nigerian government, has promised to try and mobilise $500 million in finance through various instruments to bring the Lobito railway to Zambia. The US government is aiming for construction of that stretch to start in 2026.

The US government has backed the Lobito project financially, with its Development Finance Corporation (DFC) approving a $553-million loan to improve the Angolan section of the railway and add more carriages to the trains.

Lithium boom: Zimbabwe looks to China to secure a place in the EV battery supply chain

However, with Donald Trump taking over the White House in January, it is unclear whether the Republican president-elect will support the project once in office.

There are pointers that Trump may well continue the project and possibly claim it was inspired by him because it is backed by the reformed Development Finance Corp – America’s development finance institution which, alongside the private sector, funds solutions to challenges facing developing countries and was started during his first tenure. Reuters reported that two government officials who served under Trump say the next US president will likely back parts of the Lobito project. 

Asked whether the project was “Trump-proof” on the presidential plane to Angola, White House National Security Communications Adviser John Kirby said: “It’s our fervent hope that as the new team comes in and takes a look at this that they see the value too, that they see how it will help drive a more secure, more prosperous, more economically stable continent.”

(Reporting by Vivian Chime; editing by Joe Lo and Megan Rowling)

The post Biden uses only Africa visit to promote “game changer” railway for copper and cobalt appeared first on Climate Home News.

Biden uses only Africa visit to promote “game changer” railway for copper and cobalt

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COP17: Key outcomes agreed at the UN biodiversity conference in Yerevan

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Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.

The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.

It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.

Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.

Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.

This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.

It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.

The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.

During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.

Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later. 

Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.

Formal negotiations

Finance

Finance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks.

At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes.

The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.

As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.

The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.

Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.

Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya. 

Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after.

Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030.

However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.

Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF.

The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature.

BlueSky post by Aruna Chandrasekhar (@arunacsekhar.bsky.social): "COP17 was supposed to be a nature finance stocktake, ramping contributions to "at least $30bn/yr" and sketching the bones of post-2030 nature funding. "Broadening the contributor base" was an outlier, appearing exactly once in the COP16 decision. Now it's the headliner."

Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature. 

The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. The text says: "The developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of this Convention and to benefit from its provisions and which costs are agreed between a developing country Party and the institutional structure referred to in Article 21, in accordance with policy, strategy, programme priorities and eligibility criteria and an indicative list of incremental costs established by the Conference of the Parties. Other Parties, including countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, may voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties. For the purpose of this Article, the Conference of the Parties, shall at its first meeting establish a list of developed country Parties and other Parties which voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties. The Conference of the Parties shall periodically review and if necessary amend the list. Contributions from other countries and sources on a voluntary basis would also be encouraged. The implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy, predictability and timely flow of funds and the importance of burden-sharing among the contributing Parties included in the list."
The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. Source: UN CBD

The text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”.

The list was last amended in 2006.

(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)

Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan.

The first “non-paper” had four different options for expanding the contributor base. These ranged from using the World Bank’s country income groups “as a proxy” to identify high-income countries, to commissioning a study on the impacts of being included on the list.

By 21 October, the number of options swelled to eight, including two from Saudi Arabia and one from Peru.

Some countries “expressed concern” that certain options were based on a CBD secretariat study on “what constitutes a developed country”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported.

By the end of the first week, it was clear that the finance deadlock would have to go into informal ministerial consultations for any consensus to emerge.

At a press conference on 28 October, Christopher O’Sullivan, Ireland’s nature minister and representing the EU delegation, told Carbon Brief:

“Our position isn’t that we want to pull back in terms of contributing…but it’s been 20 years since that list was added to, times have changed and there are new realities. We just simply want those new realities reflected. I don’t fully understand why there’s so much opposition to that.”

The EU chose not to comment on which countries it would like to see on that list.

Lim Li Ching from the Third World Network, meanwhile, called the push for others to “assume the obligations” of developed countries “sheer hypocrisy”, adding that any country could make a voluntary contribution. She told Carbon Brief:

“At a forum like the CBD, this linking of income status with finance does not take into account where historical and current responsibilities lie. If you want to generate more funding for biodiversity, let’s look at sovereign debt burdens and rules, which are inequitable for developing countries. But if you can fund wars, and provide resources for your defence industry, then you know where the priorities are.”

On 29 October – at a plenary meant to adopt final texts for the most contentious subjects – Norway’s Gaute Hanssen announced that resource-mobilisation discussions would go into a smaller “friends of the chair” meeting.

Facilitated by Carolina Caceres from Canada and Imèn Meliane from Tunisia, the meeting would discuss the most contentious elements of a draft decision that had swelled to 112 brackets, denoting areas of disagreement on specific details in the text.

While the meeting was open to all, countries that were called to be present included Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Fiji, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the UK.

At the same time, a “non-paper” text by finance and environment ministers laid out countries’ red lines and compromises.

A key paragraphs from a minister’s non-paper on nature finance published on 29 October. The text says: "Operative paragraphs (the following paragraphs would replace options A-H in the CRP) 1. Emphasizes the importance of accelerating the implementation of the strategy for resource mobilization for the period 2025–2030; 2. Invites Parties not on the list of developed country Parties and other Parties that may voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties as adopted in Decision VIII/18, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 20 of the Convention, to indicate to the Secretariat their interest in being included in the corresponding list established in accordance with that Article and invites Parties to provide their views on improving the modalities and timing of such invitations;"
A key paragraphs from a minister’s non-paper on nature finance published on 29 October. Source: UN CBD

At the end of COP17, countries welcomed a final compromise text, with Kenya thanking the “strong women” co-chairs who strove to strike a “delicate” balance.

China, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Fiji cautioned against any further interventions, with Brazil warning: “If we open this text, we will never close it again.”

While the final decision “recognises” that “contributions from more parties would improve the mobilisation” of biodiversity finance, it steered away from issuing criteria to expand the list of donor countries.

The text makes it clear that no additions to the list would be made without inviting and confidentially consulting with interested countries, to secure their explicit consent.

Instead, the CBD secretariat “invites” countries keen to be on the list and “assume the obligations” of developed countries to “signal interest” before COP18 and at every alternate COP thereafter.

At the same time, developing countries can contribute to meeting the GBF and biodiversity convention’s goals on a “voluntary basis”, with contributions not implying inclusion on the list.

A negotiator for China told Carbon Brief at the closing plenary:

“We welcome this balanced document. It was a very long discussion that has gone [on] since [2022 nature talks in] Nairobi. But actually this time, there were a lot of sensitive issues, [there were] a lot of critical things we didn’t open in the contact groups; it mainly went to the high-level discussion.”

The decision also establishes a financial mechanism for nature funding after 2030 under the governance of the COP, a key ask from developing countries.

However, it defers decisions on what form this mechanism would take – whether this would be a new fund or based on existing arrangements – until COP18.

Oscar Soria at the Common Initiative told Carbon Brief that the decision on the financial mechanism leaves things “very open”, with “no movement” towards a new fund or money and no upgrades to existing funding arrangements.

The text acknowledges the links between debt and biodiversity eight times, mentioning how debt-related instruments can be included in biodiversity plans, but does not go further.

“It is almost as if the debt studies they called for at COP16 didn’t happen,” said Soria, who had earlier flagged serious methodological issues with the first-ever COP-commissioned report on debt and biodiversity. 

Global review

In Yerevan, countries agreed on the first stocktake of progress towards the 2030 nature targets – known as the “global review”.

The review was one of the keenly anticipated outcomes from COP17 and was seen as less controversial than some of the other major negotiation strands.

It was swiftly signed off by countries at the start of the final COP17 plenary, with just one last-minute addition.

The concept of carrying out a global review on “collective progress” was set out in the GBF and its underlying documents.

The details of how this review would be carried out were supposed to be agreed at COP16, but it was not discussed before the plenary in Cal