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At COP29 in Baku, developed-country parties such as the EU, the US and Japan agreed to help raise “at least” $300bn a year by 2035 for climate action in developing countries.

The goal was welcomed by global-north leaders and presented as a “tripling” of the previous target for international climate finance.

Yet it faced a strong backlash from many developing countries, with some branding it a “joke” and “betrayal”.

Closer analysis of the goal and climate-finance data helps to explain this response.

Analysts have shown that the target is achievable with virtually “no additional budgetary effort” from developed countries, beyond already-committed increases.

A combination of pre-existing national pledges and multilateral development bank (MDB) plans will bring climate finance up to around $200bn a year by the end of this decade.

Counting money already being distributed by emerging economies such as China – as “encouraged” under the new goal – could bring the total to $265bn by 2030. This could mean the target is well on its way to being met by that date, with minimal extra effort.

Moreover, as activists and academics have noted, the $300bn target does not account for inflation. When this is factored in, its “real” value could shrink by around a quarter.

The new target has emerged against a backdrop of financial strain and political uncertainty in developed countries.

At the same time, developing countries have stressed that they need climate finance to reach the “trillions of dollars” needed to cut emissions and protect themselves from climate change.

This article looks at three ways in which the $300bn goal could be met with little extra financial effort by developed countries – and provide fewer benefits for developing countries than the figure suggests.

  1. Much of the goal will be met with ‘no additional effort’
  2. Developing-country contributions could cover part of the goal
  3. Inflation wipes out much of the increase in climate finance

1. Much of the goal will be met with ‘no additional effort’

The $300bn climate-finance target agreed at COP29 in Baku will be met with finance from a “wide variety of sources”, largely coming from developed countries.

This part of the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) for climate finance is likely to be made up of public finance provided directly by governments, as well as money from MDBs, specialised climate funds and private finance “mobilised” by public investments.

article-9-paris-agreement_ragout
Source: UNFCCC.

The wording of the $300bn goal frames it as an extension of the $100bn target. This was the amount that developed countries agreed in 2009 to raise for developing countries annually by 2020 – a goal that was extended through to 2025 by the Paris Agreement.

Beyond the central goal of $300bn, the NCQG also includes a much broader “aspirational” target of $1.3tn a year in climate finance by 2035.

However, this is harder to assess, as the text of the deal is vague about who will be responsible for raising the funds, which could include various sources that are beyond the jurisdiction of the UN climate process.

climate_finance_ragout
Source: UNFCCC.

Developed countries and MDBs had already committed to raising their climate-finance contributions before a deal was struck at COP29, as noted in a joint analysis by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), ODI, Germanwatch and ECCO.

The collective impact of these pre-existing commitments can be seen below, with climate finance from developed countries set to increase from $115.9bn in 2022 – the most recent year for which data is available – to $197bn in 2030. This can be seen in the chart below, which does not account for inflation. (See: Inflation wipes out much of the increase in climate finance.)

Estimated climate finance in 2030, based on funds that have already been pledged, and target set at COP29 for 2035 (red).
Estimated climate finance in 2030, based on funds that have already been pledged, and target set at COP29 for 2035 (red). Dark blue bars show historical climate finance recorded by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2013-2022 (grey). The light blue bars indicate an estimated trajectory to reach the 2030 and 2035 levels. These figures do not account for inflation. Source: OECD, NRDC, NCQG text.

The expected increase between 2022 and 2030 comes from a few different sources.

The analysts calculated that climate finance distributed “bilaterally” – as grants or loans via overseas aid and other public funding – was already expected to increase $6.6bn annually by 2025, based on existing pledges, bringing the total to $50bn. (The chart above assumes that bilateral finance remains at this level up to 2030.)

They also estimated that existing pledges and reforms at specialised climate funds, such as the Green Climate Fund and Climate Investment Funds, would add another $1.3bn per year by 2030. This would bring their contribution to $5bn.

The biggest increase that was already locked in before the COP29 deal was a pledge by MDBs – which provide 40% of existing climate finance – to increase their contributions further.

A joint statement by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and others in the first week of COP29 committed to raising $120bn of climate finance per year by 2030 for low- and middle-income countries. Of this, $84bn can be attributed to developed countries, based on their shareholdings in these banks.

On top of this, the climate-finance analysts estimated that $58bn of private finance would be mobilised by these bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2030 – up from $21.9bn in 2022.

The chart below shows the estimated breakdown, by source, of climate finance in 2030, compared to 2022.

Historical climate finance in 2022 and estimated climate finance in 2020, by source.
Historical climate finance in 2022 and estimated climate finance in 2020, by source. Source: OECD, NRDC, NCQG text.

These expected increases over the course of this decade mean that with “no additional efforts”, beyond what had already been agreed prior to COP29, developed countries would have been on a trajectory to reach around $200bn per year by 2030, and $250bn per year by 2035. (The latter was the first numerical target proposed by developed countries at COP29, which was, ultimately, negotiated upwards to $300bn on the final day.)

NRDC climate-finance expert Joe Thwaites, one of the researchers who undertook the Natural Resources Defense Council’s (NDRC) analysis, tells Carbon Brief that bilateral funding directly from governments is the “big constraint” in climate finance. COP29 came just after the re-election in the US of climate-sceptic Donald Trump and many European countries have cut their aid budgets. Thwaites says:

“The MDBs are growing and doing all kinds of reforms and getting bigger and better, but the bilaterals are what are politically very stuck.”

Moreover, the COP29 climate-finance deal contains no pledge by developed countries to provide a set amount of public, bilateral finance, despite strong pressure from developing countries to include such a goal.

Following COP29, Thwaites released updated modelling to calculate different ways of reaching the $300bn target. He wrote:

“What is clear is that $300bn by 2035 is eminently achievable, with little to no additional budgetary effort required from developed countries, let alone other contributors, to meet the goal.”

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2. Developing-country contributions could cover part of the goal

Unlike the earlier $100bn target, contributions from developing countries could count towards the new climate finance goal.

Only developed countries are obliged to provide climate finance to developing countries under the Paris Agreement. But the NCQG outcome says that developing countries can “voluntarily” declare any climate-related funds they contribute, if they choose to do so.

voluntary-contributions_ragout
Source: UNFCCC.

This allowed negotiators at COP29 to skirt the controversial issue of formally expanding the list of official donors that are required to help with financial aid.

Developed countries had previously been pushing to enlist relatively wealthy developing nations, such as China and the Gulf states, to share the financial burden.

Several countries described since the early 1990s as “developing” under the UN’s climate convention are known to already make large, climate-related financial contributions to other developing countries. Examples include China’s Belt and Road initiative supporting clean-energy expansion and South Korea’s contributions to the GCF.

In fact, at COP29 China announced for the first time that it had “provided and mobilised” more than $24.5bn for climate projects in developing countries since 2017 – confirming that its contributions are comparable with those of many developed countries.

This roughly aligns with calculations by research groups that have placed China’s annual climate finance at around $4bn a year.

Both developed and developing countries pay money into MDBs. As well as “encouraging” developing countries to voluntarily contribute directly to climate finance, the NCQG outcome also specifies that these countries could start counting the share of climate-related money paid out of MDBs that can be traced back to their inputs.

multilateral-development-banks_ragout
Source: UNFCCC.

Roughly, 30% of the banks’ “outflows” can be attributed to developing countries in this way.

Counting the developing-country share of the projected increase in climate finance from MDBs by 2030 would add an extra $36bn to the global total, plus an extra $20bn of private finance mobilised by the funds.

It is not possible to say for sure how much climate finance new contributors such as China will choose to officially declare.

However, the chart below shows an estimate based on an “illustrative scenario”, by NRDC and others, of bilateral finance and multilateral climate funds, combined with expected MDB outflows and the associated private finance that this would mobilise. This could bring total annual climate finance up to $265bn by 2030.

Voluntary_contributions_from_developing_countries..
Potential voluntary contributions of climate finance by developing countries, including bilateral finance, contributions to multilateral funds, outflows from MDBs allocated to developing countries and private finance mobilised by developing country contributions to MDBs (lighter red), on top of estimated climate finance from developed countries in 2030 (red). The second red bar indicates the NCQG climate-finance target agreed for 2035 at COP29. The light blue bars indicate an estimated trajectory to reach the 2030 and 2035 levels. These figures do not account for inflation. Source: OECD, NRDC, NCQG text.

Some observers at COP29 said they hoped that officially counting developing-country contributions towards UN “climate finance” targets would enable parties, such as the EU, to set more ambitious goals.

However, Michai Robertson, lead finance negotiator for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), dismissed this as an “accounting trick”, because these funds are already being provided.

Li Shuo, head of the China climate hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), tells Carbon Brief that the NCQG outcome could bring more attention to China’s climate-related aid and lead to “stronger and better climate support from Beijing”. However, he notes that this is in the context of a low-ambition global target that is a “far cry” from what is needed:

“I take this as a classic example of geopolitical competition weakening environmental ambition, namely, the geopolitical desire of including China as a donor without corresponding desire of developed countries to contribute more limited the overall scale of climate finance.”

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3. Inflation wipes out much of the increase in climate finance

One issue that has surfaced in the wake of COP29 is the impact of inflation. Campaigners have noted that the failure to factor this into the 2035 climate-finance target means that, by the time it is met, the true value of the money pledged will be far lower than it is today.

In an article highlighting this issue, the Guardian reported that the $300bn goal was, therefore, “not the tripling of pledges that has been claimed”.

Researchers had flagged this before COP29, pointing out that the previous $100bn annually by 2020goal, which was first set in 2009, had also not accounted for inflation.

They noted that merely correcting the $100bn for inflation would bring it to between $139bn and around $150bn a year. (Such calculations depend on the rate of inflation applied to the starting figure, as well as the base year for the calculation.)

Civil-society groups at COP29, such as Power Shift Africa, estimated that the impact of inflation would cut the “real” value of the $300bn to $175bn in today’s money by 2035. This is based on an annual inflation rate of 5%.

In its analysis, the Guardian opted for an inflation rate of 2.4% – based on the average rate in the US over the past 15 years. This is taken to reflect the conditions for governments contributing climate finance and the currency much of it would be provided in.

The figure below shows the impact of an inflation rate of 3%. This is based on input from economists and analysis by the Center for Global Development (CGD), which, in turn, is based on the World Bank’s global GDP deflator.

If inflation over the next decade follows this trend, the $300bn pledged in 2024 would only be worth $217bn in today’s money in 2035 – a 28% reduction in value.

In order to offer climate finance with a real value of $300bn in 2035, countries would have needed to set a goal for that year of around $415bn.

Increase in climate finance between 2022 and 2035 under the NCQG commitment in nominal terms
Increase in climate finance between 2022 and 2035 under the NCQG commitment in nominal terms (red line), and based on the “real” value of the $300bn climate-finance pledge in 2024 value terms (blue dotted line). Source: Carbon Brief calculation based on a 3% inflation rate, as used by CGD.

(The figures in the chart above cannot be directly compared with the existing pledges made by governments and MDBs, as those too would need to be adjusted for inflation.)

CGD modelling suggests that if developed countries’ climate-finance contributions simply increase in line with expected inflation and gross national income (GNI) growth, they would reach $220bn by 2035.

The CGD analysts write in a blog post that “by the time the new goal is met, beneficiary countries will find that the purchasing power of these resources has eroded significantly”.

Independent experts, as well as climate-vulnerable countries themselves, emphasised both before and during COP29 that more than $1tn dollars will be needed each year to help developing countries deal with climate change. Many developing nations said that around $600bn of this should come directly from developed countries’ public coffers.

With such a relatively small amount of finance pledged for the NCQG, some developing countries have already indicated that they may scale back their future climate ambitions.

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DeBriefed 12 December: EU under ‘pressure’; ‘Unusual warmth’ explained; Rise of climate boardgames

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

EU sets 2040 goal

CUT CRUNCHED: The EU agreed on a legally binding target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 90% from 1990 levels by 2040, reported the EU Observer. The publication said that this agreement is “weaker” than the European Commission’s original proposal as it allows for up to five percentage points of a country’s cuts to be achieved by the use of foreign carbon credits. Even in its weakened form, the goal is “more ambitious than most other major economies’ pledges”, according to Reuters.

PETROL CAR U-TURN: Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has agreed to “roll back an imminent ban on the sale of new internal combustion-engined cars and vans after late-night negotiations with the leader of the conservative European People’s Party,” reported Euractiv. Car makers will be able to continue selling models with internal combustion engines as long as they reduce emissions on average by 90% by 2035, down from a previously mandated 100% cut. Bloomberg reported that the EU is “weighing a five-year reprieve” to “allow an extension of the use of the combustion engine until 2040 in plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles that include a fuel-powered range extender”.

CORPORATE PRESSURE: Reuters reported that EU countries and the European parliament struck a deal to “cut corporate sustainability laws, after months of pressure from companies and governments”. It noted that the changes exempt businesses with fewer than 1,000 employees from reporting their environmental and social impact under the corporate sustainability reporting directive. The Guardian wrote that the commission is also considering a rollback of environment rules that could see datacentres, artificial intelligence (AI) gigafactories and affordable housing become exempt from mandatory environmental impact assessments.

Around the world

  • EXXON BACKPEDALS: The Financial Times reported on ExxonMobil’s plans to “slash low-carbon spending by a third”, amounting to a reduction of $10bn over the next 5 years.
  • VERY HOT: 2025 is “virtually certain” to be the second or third-hottest year on record, according to data from the EU’s Copernicus Climate Change Service, covered by the Guardian. It reported that global temperatures from January-November were, on average, 1.48C hotter than preindustrial levels.
  • WEBSITE WIPE: Grist reported that the US Environmental Protection Agency has erased references to the human causes of climate change from its website, focusing instead on “natural processes”, such as variations in the Earth’s orbit. On BlueSky, Carbon Brief contributing editor Dr Zack Labe described the removal as “absolutely awful”.
  • UN REPORT: The latest global environment outlook, a largest-of-its-kind UN environment report, “calls for a new approach to jointly tackle the most pressing environmental issues including climate change and biodiversity loss”, according to the Associated Press. However, report co-chair Sir Robert Watson told BBC News that a “small number of countries…hijacked the process”, diluting its potential impact.

$80bn

The amount that Chinese firms have committed to clean technology investments overseas in the past year, according to Reuters.


Latest climate research

  • Increases in heavy rainfall and flooding driven by fossil-fuelled climate change worsened recent floods in Asia | World Weather Attribution
  • Human-caused climate change played a “substantial role” in driving wildfires and subsequent smoke concentrations in the western US between 1992-2020 | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • Thousands of land vertebrate species over the coming decades will face extreme heat and “unsuitable habitats” throughout “most, or even all” of their current ranges | Global Change Biology

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

A bar chart showing the five factors that account for most of Earth's 'unusual warmth'.

The years 2023 and 2024 were the warmest on record – and 2025 looks set to join them in the top three. The causes of this apparent acceleration in global warming have been subject to a lot of attention in both the media and the scientific community. The charts above, drawn from a new Carbon Brief analysis, show how the natural weather phenomenon El Niño, sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from shipping, Chinese SO2, an eruption from the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai volcano and solar cycle changes account for most of the “unusual warmth” of recent years. Dark blue bars represent the contribution of individual factors and their uncertainties (hatched areas), the light blue bar shows the combined effects and combination of uncertainties and the red bar shows the actual warming, compared with expectations.

Spotlight

Climate change boardgames

This week, Carbon Brief reports on the rise of climate boardgames.

Boardgames have always made political arguments. Perhaps the most notorious example is the Landlord’s Game published by US game designer and writer Lizzie Magie in 1906, which was designed to persuade people of the need for a land tax.

This game was later “adapted” by US salesman Charles Darrow into the game Monopoly, which articulates a very different set of values.

In this century, game designers have turned to the challenge of climate change.

Best-selling boardgame franchise Catan has spawned a New Energies edition, where players may choose to “invest in clean energy resources or opt for cheaper fossil fuels, potentially causing disastrous effects for the island”.

But perhaps the most notable recent release is 2024’s Daybreak, which won the prestigious Kennerspiel des Jahre award (the boardgaming world’s equivalent of the Oscars).

Rolling the dice

Designed by gamemakers Matteo Menapace and Matt Leacock, Daybreak sees four players take on the role of global powers: China, the US, Europe and “the majority world”, each with their own strengths and weaknesses.

Through playing cards representing policy decisions and technologies, players attempt to reach “drawdown”, a state where they are collectively producing less CO2 than they are removing from the atmosphere.

“Games are good at modelling systems and the climate crisis is a systemic crisis,” Daybreak co-designer Menapace told Carbon Brief.

In his view, boardgames can be a powerful tool for getting people to think about climate change. He said:

“In a video game, the rules are often hidden or opaque and strictly enforced by the machine’s code. In contrast, a boardgame requires players to collectively learn, understand and constantly negotiate the rules. The players are the ‘game engine’. While videogames tend to operate on a subconscious level through immersion, boardgames maintain a conscious distance between players and the material objects they manipulate.

“Whereas videogames often involve atomised or heavily mediated social interactions, boardgames are inherently social experiences. This suggests that playing boardgames may be more conducive to the exploration of conscious, collective, systemic action in response to the climate crisis.”

Daybreak to Dawn

Menapace added that he is currently developing “Dawn”, a successor to Daybreak, building on lessons he learned from developing the first game, telling Carbon Brief:

“I want the next game to be more accessible, especially for schools. We learned that there’s a lot of interest in using Daybreak in an educational context, but it’s often difficult to bring it to a classroom because it takes quite some time to set up and to learn and to play.

“Something that can be set up quickly and that can be played in half the time, 30 to 45 minutes rather than an hour [to] an hour and a half, is what I’m currently aiming for.”

Dawn might also introduce a new twist that explores whether countries are truly willing to cooperate on solving climate change – and whether “rogue” actors are capable of derailing progress, he continued:

“Daybreak makes this big assumption that the world powers are cooperating, or at least they’re not competing, when it comes to climate action. [And] that there are no other forces that get in the way. So, with Dawn, I’m trying to explore that a bit more.

“Once the core game is working, I’d like to build on top of that some tensions, maybe not perfect cooperation, [with] some rogue players.”

Watch, read, listen

WELL WATCHERS: Mother Jones reported on TikTok creators helping to hold oil companies to account for cleaning up abandoned oil wells in Texas.

RUNNING SHORT: Wired chronicled the failure of carbon removal startup Running Tide, which was backed by Microsoft and other tech giants.

PARIS IS 10: To mark the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement, climate scientist Prof Piers Forster explained in Climate Home News “why it worked” and “what it needs to do to survive”.

Coming up

Pick of the jobs

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

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‘Cali Fund’ aiming to raise billions for nature receives first donation – of just $1,000

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A major biodiversity fund – which could, in theory, generate billions of dollars annually for conservation – received its first donation of just $1,000 in November.

The Cali Fund was created under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) at the COP16 nature negotiations in Cali, Colombia, last year.

On 19 November, nine months after the fund officially launched, UK start-up TierraViva AI put forward the first contribution.

The $1,000 payment is an “ice-breaker”, the company’s chief executive tells Carbon Brief, aimed at encouraging others “who may be hesitating” to pay in.

The fund is designed to be a way for companies that rely on nature’s genetic resources to share some of their earnings with the developing, biodiverse countries where many of the original resources are found.

Companies use genetic data from these materials to develop products, such as vaccines and skin cream.

One expert describes the $1,000 as a good “first step”, but says it is “time for larger actors to step forward”. Another says it “squarely points the finger to the profit-making enterprises that are not contributing”.

The CBD is “pleased” about the first payment, a spokesperson tells Carbon Brief, adding that “many discussions” are ongoing about future donations.

Funding biodiversity action

Companies all around the world use genetic materials from plants, animals, bacteria and fungi often found in biodiversity-rich, global south countries to develop their products.

There are existing rules in place to secure consent and ensure compensation if companies or researchers travel to a country to physically gather these materials.

Today, however, much of this information is available in online databases – with few rules in place around access. This genetic data is known as digital sequence information (DSI).

The Cali Fund is part of an effort to close this loophole.

The COP16 agreement on the creation of the fund outlined that large companies in several sectors, including pharmaceutical, cosmetic, biotechnology, agribusiness and technology, “should” contribute a cut of the money they earn from the use of these materials. (See: Carbon Brief’s infographic on DSI.)

The money is intended to fund biodiversity action, with 50% of resources going to Indigenous peoples and local communities who protect vast swathes of the world’s nature and biodiversity.

These contributions, however, are voluntary.

The fund officially launched at the resumed COP16 negotiations in Rome in February 2025, where a spokesperson for the CBD said that first contributions could be announced in spring.

However, Carbon Brief reported in August that the fund was still empty.

On 19 November, the first contribution was announced during the COP30 UN climate summit. At $1,000, the amount was significantly lower than the potential millions that larger companies could pay in. 

A UK government press release described it as a “major milestone” that will “pav[e] the way for others to do the same and mobilise private sector finance for nature at scale”.

The contribution page on the Cali Fund website, which shows the first payment of $1,000.
The contribution page on the Cali Fund website, which shows the first payment of $1,000. Source: Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office.

The payment was an “expression of our commitment to the objectives of the Cali Fund”, TierraViva AI chief executive Dr Paul Oldham wrote in a letter to the executive secretary of the CBD, Astrid Schomaker.

The $1,000 is an “initial contribution”, Oldham said, and the company plans to give more “as our business grows”. Based in the UK with a team of programmers in Nairobi, TierraViva AI was set up in 2023 and uses AI to support conservation.

An anthropologist who worked on Indigenous peoples’ rights in the Amazon, Oldham’s research helped inform the list of sectors most likely to “directly or indirectly benefit from the use of DSI”, including “generative biology” and AI companies.

Oldham noted in a speech at the sidelines of COP30 that although the company’s earnings are not large enough to meet the contribution thresholds set out in the Cali Fund agreement, its contribution showed that companies “of any size” can pay in.

Mary Creagh CBE MP (account name @MaryCreagh_) says in a tweet: "Delighted to announce the first private sector contribution to the Cali fund by UK company Tierra Viva Al. The fund will mobilise private sector finance for nature. At least half will go to indigenous peoples and local communities." A photo is attached to the tweet, showing two men and one woman smiling at the camera.

He tells Carbon Brief that while “some” companies “are not serious about contributing and are seeking to delay” paying into the fund, others have different concerns, including the “need for a level playing field” and positive incentives to contribute:

“This will be hard-earned company money, so it’s reasonable enough to imagine that one of the first questions companies will want an answer to is: ‘well, what is this actually going to be spent on?’ And: ‘what is the benefit of this to us’, which is likely to vary by sector.

“In my view, the best way forward would be for companies that can to make contributions. That would give everybody, including governments, confidence that there might be constructive ways to address difficult topics.” 

Future contributions

A spokesperson for the CBD tells Carbon Brief:

“We are pleased that the Cali Fund is not only ‘open for business’, but that this first contribution also demonstrates it is fully operational. We thank and congratulate TierraViva AI for being the first company to step up.”

“Many discussions” are ongoing around future donations to the fund, the spokesperson says, and the CBD is “hopeful that further announcements can be made soon”, ahead of the next UN biodiversity summit, COP17, in October 2026.

Asked whether the CBD was expecting more contributions at this stage, the spokesperson says the fund was set up in “very short order” and that the first payment shows that companies are “able to contribute”.

US biotechnology company Ginkgo Bioworks was the first to pledge to contribute to the fund earlier this year, but has so far not put forward any money. The company did not respond to Carbon Brief’s request for comment.

Carbon Brief reported earlier this year that at least two companies were contacted by a UK department with opportunities to be involved in the Cali Fund before its launch in February, but no company took up on the offer.

Launch of the Cali Fund at the resumed COP16 negotiations in Rome, Italy on 25 February 2025.
Launch of the Cali Fund at the resumed COP16 negotiations in Rome, Italy on 25 February 2025. Credit: IISD/ENB | Mike Muzurakis.

The first contribution coming from a “startup that has just begun operations squarely points the finger to the profit-making enterprises that are not contributing”, Dr Siva Thambisetty, associate professor of law at the London School of Economics, tells Carbon Brief. Thambisetty adds:

“Strident cries of lack of legal certainty, unfairness or stacking obligations [combining responsibilities from different agreements and laws] would be more credible if industry organisations encouraged large firms that use DSI to begin contributing, instead of denying the last 20 years of multilateral [negotiations] that have led to this point.”

Dr June Rubis – Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLC) lead from Asia on the Cali Fund’s steering committee – welcomes TierraViva AI’s “first step”, but tells Carbon Brief that the “real test lies ahead” and that it is “now time for larger actors to step forward”.

She says the Cali Fund offers “clarity” on how the private sector can directly increase support to UN-backed funds at a time when “states are retreating” from their climate and biodiversity finance obligations:

“It’s not a voluntary offsetting scheme or a…risky or fringe fund; it’s a multilateral mechanism designed to meet the highest fiduciary and equity standards. We invite companies to see this not as philanthropy, but as participation in a globally endorsed system where trust is institutionalised, benefits are traceable and equity is operationalised.

“Contributing to the Cali Fund isn’t just ethical, it’s strategic. [But] It’s about more than funding: it’s about trust, power-sharing and making sure IPLCs are part of the decisions, not just the outcomes.”

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Net-zero scenario is ‘cheapest option’ for UK, says energy system operator

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A scenario that meets the “net-zero by 2050” goal would be the “cheapest” option for the UK, according to modelling by the National Energy System Operator (NESO).

In a new report, the organisation that manages the UK’s energy infrastructure says its “holistic transition” scenario would have the lowest cost over the next 25 years, saving £36bn a year – some 1% of GDP – compared to an alternative scenario that slows climate action.

These savings are from lower fuel costs and reduced climate damages, relative to a scenario where the UK fails to meet its climate goals, known as “falling behind”.

The UK will need to make significant investments to reach net-zero, NESO says, but this would cut fossil-fuel imports, support jobs and boost health, as well as contributing to a safer climate.

Slowing down these efforts would reduce the scale of investments needed, but overall costs would be higher unless the damages from worsening climate change are “ignored”, the report says.

In an illusory world where climate damages do not exist, slowing the UK’s efforts to cut emissions would generate “savings” of £14bn per year on average – some 0.4% of GDP.

NESO says that much of this £14bn could be avoided by reaching net-zero more cheaply and that it includes costs unrelated to climate action, such as a faster rollout of data centres.

Notably, the report appears to include efforts to avoid the widespread misreporting of a previous edition, including in the election manifesto of the hard-right, climate-sceptic Reform UK party.

Overall, NESO warns that, as well as ignoring climate damages, the £14bn figure “does not represent the cost of achieving net-zero” and cannot be compared with comprehensive estimates of this, such as the 0.2% of GDP total from the UK’s Climate Change Committee (CCC).

Net-zero is the ‘cheapest option’

Every year, NESO publishes its “future energy scenarios”, a set of four pathways designed to explore how the nation’s energy system might change over the coming decades.

(Technically the scenarios apply to the island of Great Britain, rather than the whole UK, as Northern Ireland’s electricity system is part of a separate network covering the island of Ireland.)

Published in July, the scenarios test a series of questions, such as what it would mean for the UK to meet its climate goals, whether it is possible to do so while relying heavily on hydrogen and what would happen if the nation was to slow down its efforts to cut emissions.

The scenarios have a broad focus and do not only consider the UK’s climate goals. In addition, they also explore the implications of a rapid growth in electricity demand from data centres, the potential for autonomous driving and many other issues.

With so many questions to explore, the scenarios are not designed to keep costs to a minimum. In fact, NESO does not publish related cost estimates in most years.

This year, however, NESO has published an “economics annex” to the future energy scenarios. It last published a similar exercise in 2020, with the results being widely misreported.

In the new annex, NESO says that the UK currently spends around 10% of GDP on its energy system. This includes investments in new infrastructure and equipment – such as cars, boilers or power plants – as well as fuel, running and maintenance costs.

This figure is expected to decline to around 5% of GDP by 2050 under all four scenarios, NESO says, whether they meet the UK’s net-zero target or not.

For each scenario, the annex adds up the total of all investments and ongoing costs in every year out to 2050. It then adds an estimate of the economic damages from the greenhouse gas emissions that primarily come from burning fossil fuels, using the Treasury’s “green book”.

When all of these costs are taken into account, NESO says that the “cheapest” option is a pathway that meets the UK’s climate goals, including all of the targets on the way to net-zero by 2050.

It says this pathway, known as “holistic transition”, would bring average savings of £36bn per year out to 2050, relative to a pathway where the UK slows its efforts on climate change.

The overall savings, illustrated by the dashed line in the figure below, stem primarily from lower fuel costs (orange bars) and reduced climate damages (white bars).

In-year energy costs of the “holistic transition” pathway relative to “falling behind”
In-year energy costs of the “holistic transition” pathway relative to “falling behind”, £bn in 2025 prices and assuming central estimates for future fossil-fuel prices. Credit: NESO.

Note that the carbon pricing that is already applied to power plants and other heavy industry under the UK’s emissions trading system (ETS) is excluded from running costs in the annex, appearing instead within the wider “carbon costs” category.

This makes the running costs of fossil-fuel energy sources seem cheaper than they really are, when including the ETS price.

Net-zero requires significant investment

While NESO says that its net-zero compliant “holistic transition” pathway is the cheapest option for the UK, it does require significant upfront investments.

The scale of the additional investments needed to stay on track for the UK’s climate goals, beyond a pathway where those targets are not met, is illustrated in the figure below.

This shows that the largest extra investments would need to be made in the power sector, such as by building new windfarms (shown by the dark yellow bars). This is followed by investment needs for homes, such as to install electric heat pumps instead of gas boilers (dark red bars).

These additional investments would amount to around £30bn per year out to 2050, but with a peak of as much as £60bn over the next decade.

These investments would be offset by lower fuel bills, including reduced gas use in homes (pale red) and lower oil use in transport (mid green).

Notably, NESO says it expects EVs to be cheaper to buy than petrol cars from 2027, meaning there are also significant savings in transport capital expenditure (“CapEx”, dark green).

Detailed breakdown of in-year energy costs of the “holistic transition” pathway relative to “falling behind”
Detailed breakdown of in-year energy costs of the “holistic transition” pathway relative to “falling behind”, £bn in 2025 prices and assuming central estimates for future fossil-fuel prices. Credit: NESO.

Again, the biggest savings in “holistic transition” relative to “falling behind” would come from avoided climate damages – described by NESO as “carbon costs”.

Net-zero cuts fossil-fuel imports

In addition to avoided climate damages, NESO says that reaching the UK’s net-zero target would bring wider benefits to the economy, including lower fuel imports.

Specifically, it says that climate efforts would “materially reduce” the UK’s dependency on overseas gas, with imports falling to 78% below current levels by 2050 in “holistic transition”. Under the “falling behind” scenario, imports rise by 35%”, despite higher domestic production.

This finding, shown in the figure below, is the opposite of what has been argued by many of those that oppose the UK’s net-zero target.

Annual gas imports to the UK
Annual gas imports to the UK, billion cubic metres (bcm) 2024-2050, under different NESO scenarios. Credit: NESO.

NESO goes on to argue that the shift to net-zero would have wider economic benefits. These include a shift from buying imported fossil fuels to investing money domestically instead, which “could bring local economic benefits and support future employment”.

The operator says that there is the “potential for more jobs to be created than lost in the transition to net-zero” and that there would be risks to UK trade if it fails to cut emissions, given exports to the EU – the UK’s main trading partner – would be subject to the bloc’s new carbon border tax.

Beyond the economy, NESO points to studies finding that the transition to net-zero would have other benefits, including for human health and the environment.

It does not attempt to quantify these benefits, but points to analysis from the CCC finding that health benefits alone could be worth £2.4-8.2bn per year by 2050.

Investment is higher for net-zero than for ‘not-zero’

It is clear from the NESO annex that its net-zero compliant “holistic transition” pathway would entail significantly more upfront investment than if climate action is slowed under “falling behind”.

This idea, in effect, is the launchpad for politicians arguing that the UK should walk away from its climate commitments and stop building new low-carbon infrastructure.

As already noted, the NESO analysis shows that this would increase costs to the UK overall.

Still, NESO’s new report adds that “falling behind” would “save” £14bn a year – relative to meeting the UK’s net-zero target – as long as carbon costs are “ignored”.

Specifically, it says that ignoring carbon costs, “holistic transition” would cost an average of £14bn a year more out to 2050 than “falling behind”, which misses the net-zero target. This is equivalent to 0.4% of the UK’s GDP and is illustrated by the solid pink line in the figure below.

In-year energy costs of the “holistic transition” pathway relative to “falling behind”
In-year energy costs of the “holistic transition” pathway relative to “falling behind”, £bn in 2025 prices and assuming central estimates for future fossil-fuel prices. Credit: NESO.

Some politicians are indeed now willing to ignore the problem of climate change and the damages caused by ongoing greenhouse gas emissions. These politicians may therefore be tempted to argue that the UK could “save” £14bn a year by scrapping net-zero.

However, NESO’s report cautions against this, stating explicitly that the “costs discussed here do not represent the cost of achieving net-zero emissions”. It says:

“Our pathways cannot provide firm conclusions over the relative costs attached to the choices between pathways…We reiterate that the costs discussed here do not represent the cost of achieving net-zero emissions.”

It says that the scenarios have not been designed to minimise costs and that it would be possible to reach net-zero more cheaply, for example by focusing more heavily on EVs and renewables instead of hydrogen and nuclear.

Moreover, it says that some of the difference in costs between “holistic transitions” and “falling behind” is unrelated to climate action. Specifically, it says that electricity demand from data centres is around twice as high in “holistic transitions”, adding some £5bn a year in costs in 2050.

In addition, NESO says that most of the “saving” in “falling behind” would be wiped out if fossil fuel prices are higher than expected – falling from £14bn per year to just £5bn a year – even before considering climate damages and wider benefits, such as for health.

Finally, NESO says that failing to make the transition to net-zero would leave the UK more exposed to fossil-fuel price shocks, such as the global energy crisis that added 1.8% to the nation’s energy costs in 2022. It says a similar shock would only cost 0.3% of GDP in 2050 if the country has reached net-zero – as in “holistic transition” – whereas costs would remain high in “falling behind”.

The post Net-zero scenario is ‘cheapest option’ for UK, says energy system operator appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Net-zero scenario is ‘cheapest option’ for UK, says energy system operator

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