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Global temperatures in 2023 blew past expectations to set the warmest year on record, even topping 1.5C in one of the main datasets. 

This warmth has continued into 2024, meaning that this year is also on track to potentially pass 1.5C in one or more datasets.

Crossing 1.5C in one or even two years is not the same as exceeding the 1.5C limit under the Paris Agreement. The goal is generally considered to refer to long-term warming, rather than annual temperatures that include the short-term influence of natural fluctuations in the climate, such as El Niño.

Nonetheless, recent warming has led to renewed debate around whether the world might imminently pass the 1.5C Paris Agreement limit – sooner than climate scientists and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have previously estimated.

Here, Carbon Brief provides an updated analysis of when the world will likely exceed the Paris 1.5C limit (in a scenario where emissions are not rapidly cut), using both the latest global surface temperature data and climate model simulations.

The findings show that, while the best estimate for crossing 1.5C has moved up by approximately two years compared to Carbon Brief’s earlier 2020 analysis, it remains most likely to happen in the late 2020s or early 2030s – rather than in the next few years.

Understanding global temperature targets

Human emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gasses have substantially warmed the planet over the past 150 years. On top of this human-driven warming, there is year-to-year natural variability largely associated with El Niño and La Niña events. 

A big El Niño or La Niña event can result in global temperatures up to 0.2C warmer or cooler, respectively, than they would otherwise be. 

As the world has been warming by around 0.2C per decade, a large El Niño event can represent an early look at what typical global temperatures will be a decade in the future. Or, to put it another way, human emissions are adding a permanent super-El Niño’s worth of heat to the climate system each decade.

In the 2015 Paris Agreement, the international community agreed to limit warming to well-below 2C above pre-industrial levels and “pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C”. While there is no set definition for the time period against which the goal is measured, it is generally interpreted to refer to long-term, human-driven warming.

For example, the IPCC’s recently completed sixth assessment report (AR6) uses the midpoint of a 20-year period as a way to avoid overinterpreting short-term natural variability. 

While a useful approach, this definition has the unfortunate side-effect that scientists will not know for sure that the world passed 1.5C until 10 years after it has happened.

This has led the community to propose a number of alternative approaches, such as Carbon Brief’s 2020 analysis and a 2023 Nature commentary by Prof Richard Betts and colleagues at the UK Met Office.

An updated approach for determining exceedance

Here, Carbon Brief provides an update to our 2020 analysis of both observations and the latest generation of climate models to assess when the world will likely pass the 1.5C limit across different surface temperature datasets. 

While the IPCC’s 20-year average is one approach to remove short-term variability, it comes with the important downside of not being able to extend up to the present day. An alternative approach is a smoothed average using a local regression (LOWESS). 

LOWESS provides an estimated value at each point in time based on a weighting where nearby points are given the highest weights and those further away are given less weight. It is an approach commonly used in timeseries analysis that can account for changes in the behaviour of data over time without assuming it is linear.

However, LOWESS approaches still require a choice on the part of the user; namely, how many nearby points should be considered when determining the smoothed average. The figure below shows three potential options that could be used: a window of the nearest 10 years, 20 years or 30 years around each point. 
The data shown are a composite average of four different global surface temperature records – NASA’s GISTEMP; NOAA’s GlobalTemp; Hadley/UEA’s HadCRUT5; and Berkeley Earth – that extend back into the 1800s.

Annual global mean surface temperatures from a composite average of NASA’s GISTEMP, NOAA’s GlobalTemp, Hadley/UEA’s HadCRUT5, and Berkeley Earth (black dots) along with LOWESS fits using 10-year, 20-year, and 30-year windows. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Annual global mean surface temperatures from a composite average of NASA’s GISTEMP, NOAA’s GlobalTemp, Hadley/UEA’s HadCRUT5, and Berkeley Earth (black dots) along with LOWESS fits using 10-year, 20-year, and 30-year windows. Chart by Carbon Brief.

In this case, both 20-year and 30-year windows show similar long-term changes in temperature, while a shorter 10-year window does not fully remove short-term variability associated with El Niño and La Niña events. 

For this analysis, Carbon Brief selected a 30-year window for removing natural variability, though a 20-year window would have given nearly identical results. (As discussed above, there are a number of alternative approaches that could be used. These are assessed in the UK Met Office’s Climate Dashboard, though they all give comparable results to the LOWESS approach used here.)

To determine when the world will pass 1.5C and 2C, Carbon Brief combines smoothed averages of both observed temperatures and climate model projections.

The observed temperatures are used to determine the level of warming to date – 1.3C in the composite average – while climate models are used to assess the range of possible warming into the future. This approach has an advantage over just using climate models as it avoids any historical mismatch between modelled and real-world temperatures.

The figure below shows the combined smoothed average from the observations and climate models, with the climate models normalised to the observations in 2023. Global temperatures are assessed to be 1.3C in 2023, with a wide range of possible future warming determined by the spread in warming after 2023 across 37 different climate models in the CMIP6 ensemble using the SSP2-4.5 current-policy-type scenario.

Annual global average surface temperatures from the composite average (black dots) along the 30-year LOWESS fit (black line), combined with 37 CMIP6 models smoothed using the same 30-year LOWESS fit. Models and observations are aligned using the smoothed average values for 2023. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Annual global average surface temperatures from the composite average (black dots) along the 30-year LOWESS fit (black line), combined with 37 CMIP6 models smoothed using the same 30-year LOWESS fit. Models and observations are aligned using the smoothed average values for 2023. Chart by Carbon Brief.

This approach suggests that the world will pass 1.5C around the year 2030 (representing the 50th percentile, or central estimate, of all the model runs), with a range of anywhere from 2028 (5th percentile) up to 2036 (95th percentile). 

Similarly, the world will pass 2C around the year 2048, with a range of 2040 to 2062 across all models assessed.

The figure below shows distribution of exceedance years (that is, the year in which the target is exceeded) across all of the different CMIP6 models. The width of the plot indicates the portion of models that show the temperature limit passed in a given year – the wider the plot, the more agreement across the models.

The spread of model projections for breaching 1.5C and 2C
Violin plot showing the distribution of exceedance years across CMIP6 models for 1.5C and 2C. The width of the plot indicates the portion of models that show the temperature limit passed in a given year. Each violin plot also shows a box plot including the median and interquartile range shown. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The results are broadly similar to Carbon Brief’s 2020 analysis, though the best estimate of when the world will pass 1.5C has moved up from 2032 to 2030, reflecting both a higher estimate of warming to date (including the development of HadCRUT5) and an inclusion of more CMIP6 model runs than were available at the time. 

The 5th and 95th percentile has narrowed to 2028-36 compared to 2026-42 in the 2020 analysis, showing the impact of three additional years of data on reducing the resulting model spread.

Sensitivity to the choice of datasets

While the averaging of different datasets into a composite average follows the approach used in the IPCC AR6 and by the WMO, it somewhat obscures important differences in estimates of warming since pre-industrial times across different research groups.

While the long-term warming the world has experienced in the composite average is 1.3C as of 2023 (similar to the results in the new Forster et al study), applying the same LOWESS smoothing approach to each individual record yields fairly different results, ranging from as low as 1.22C to 1.41C across the four different groups:

  • Composite Average: 1.30C
  • Berkeley Earth: 1.41C
  • HadCRUT5: 1.30C
  • NASA GISTEMP: 1.24C
  • NOAA GlobalTemp: 1.22C

These differences reflect a number of factors, including what land station data is included in each record, the ocean sea surface temperature datasets used and how different groups fill in the gaps between observations – particularly in the early part of the record when station data is more sparse.

The table below gives the resulting 1.5C exceedance years when Carbon Brief’s approach is applied to each different temperature record: 

Projected year of 1.5C breach
Dataset 50th percentile 5th percentile 95th percentile
Composite 2030 2028 2036
Berkeley Earth 2027 2025 2031
HadCRUT5 2030 2028 2036
NASA GISTEMP 2032 2029 2040
NOAA GlobalTemp 2033 2030 2041

Using the Berkeley Earth record gives a central estimate of passing 1.5C as early as 2027 (ranging from 2025 to 2031), while NOAA gives an estimate as late as 2033 (2030 to 2041).

Similarly, here are the results for the 2C exceedance year:

Projected year of 2C breach
Dataset 50th percentile 5th percentile 95th percentile
Composite 2048 2040 2062
Berkeley Earth 2045 2037 2056
HadCRUT5 2048 2040 2062
NASA GISTEMP 2050 2041 2067
NOAA GlobalTemp 2051 2042 2068

It is worth noting that there is no “correct” answer as to the best surface temperature record to use. Rather, the range of results across the different records represent real uncertainty around when the world will pass 1.5C and 2C.

Other approaches get similar results

This analysis is far from the first time the scientific community has asked when the world will pass various climate limits or how to best calculate the level of warming the world has experienced to date.

Copernicus/ECMWF provide a regularly updated “global temperature trend monitor” that uses a more simple approach – a linear trend over the past 30 years – to assess when global temperatures will likely exceed 1.5C in their ERA5 dataset.

Global warming reached an estimated 1.28C in April 2024. If the 30-year warming trend leading up to then continued, global warming would reach 1.5C by May 2033.
Monthly average global surface temperatures in the ERA5 reanalysis product, along with their estimated 1.5C exceedance date based on a linear trend. From Copernicus/ECMWF.

This approach gives a slightly later date, 2033, than the climate model-based approach Carbon Brief uses. This reflects the fact that most models anticipate a modest acceleration in the rate of warming that might not be fully captured using a linear trend over the past 30 years.

An alternative approach to determining when the world will pass 1.5C is to use the “assessed warming projections” developed for AR6. These assessed warming projections more closely match observed temperatures than the full CMIP6 ensemble. 

They also provide a narrower range of future warming than the full set of CMIP6, as they give less weight to “hot models” in CMIP6 that are inconsistent with the IPCC’s assessment of the likely range of climate sensitivity.

Annual global average surface temperatures from the composite average (black dots) along the 30-year LOWESS fit (red line), combined the AR6 assessed warming projection for SSP2-4.5 as published and without any baseline alignment. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Annual global average surface temperatures from the composite average (black dots) along the 30-year LOWESS fit (red line), combined the AR6 assessed warming projection for SSP2-4.5 as published and without any baseline alignment. Chart by Carbon Brief.

In addition, AR6 features an estimate of 1.5C exceedance dates based on the ScenarioMIP assessment of CMIP6 models (and previously covered by Carbon Brief here).

These three different approaches are compared to Carbon Brief’s new assessment in the table below:

Approach 1.5C exceedance year
Carbon Brief (Composite, SSP2-4.5) 2030 (2028 to 2036)
Copernicus 2033
AR6 Assessed Warming (SSP2-4.5) 2031 (2024 to 2043)
AR6 ScenarioMIP (SSP2-4.5) 2030 (2021 to 2046)

Both AR6 approaches include a wider range than the Carbon Brief approach as they rely on models that have differing estimates of current global temperatures relative to pre-industrial.

For example, the AR6 assessed warming projections give a best estimate of 2023 global temperatures (in the absence of short-term natural variability) as 1.31C, with a range from as low as 1.15C to as high as 1.48C. However, these are comparable to the range of warming to date (1.22C to 1.41C) across the different surface temperature records.

There is no single best way to assess when the world will likely pass 1.5C. But both Carbon Brief’s approach and those of other groups all agree it will most likely happen in the late 2020s or early 2030s in a world (SSP2-4.5) where global emissions remain around current levels.

The post Analysis: What record global heat means for breaching the 1.5C warming limit appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Brazil confident new rainforest fund will reach $10bn donor milestone

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Brazil’s environment minister says he is “very optimistic” that the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) – a new rainforest fund to channel private and public finance to developing nations – can meet a key $10 billion funding target this year, and is not at risk from his country’s elections next month.

The TFFF, launched by Brazil at COP30 in the Amazon last November and co-led by Norway, is intended as an alternative to traditional grant-based forest finance. The fund aims to raise $125bn in public and private capital, invest it in bond markets, and then pay countries that keep their forests standing from the annual returns. Donor contributions needed to get it going have tailed off after an initial burst.

Speaking to Climate Home News on the sidelines of Climate Week in New York, Brazilian environment minister João Paulo Capobianco pointed out that in less than a year since its official launch, the TFFF has already secured $7.3bn from governments.

“How many other initiatives can say that?” he asked. “Of course, if you have $7 billion, it’s easier for more countries to consider their own contribution. And not just countries – non-governmental organisations also. We are expecting even more support.”

    As its initial target, the TFFF aims to raise $10bn in seed capital from governments by the end of 2026, and still needs to fill a gap of $2.7bn. Its backers say that for each dollar in public funding, they can secure $4 from the private sector. Critics say the $10bn goal barely covers the fund’s expenses and would not allow it to make any significant payments to forest countries.

    Because setting up its financial architecture, raising the starting capital and making the first investments will take time, experts say the TFFF is unlikely to generate any payments for developing countries before 2028.

    Seeking new pledges

    Capobianco told Climate Home News that Brazil is still in talks with potential new contributors to the fund, among them China, Korea and Japan, and said he hoped to see more pledges announced at the upcoming biodiversity and climate COPs in October and November. The Netherlands is expected to up its first small contribution and Canada may also come in, according to other sources close to the TFFF.

    Because the fund was not created as part of the UN climate talks and is hosted by the World Bank, developing countries can contribute without taking on wider donor responsibilities for climate finance. Brazil and Indonesia – both large emerging rainforest nations – have each pledged $1bn to the TFFF.

    Earlier in September, the UK became the latest country to pledge funding – promising a loan of £400 million (about $540 million). Capobianco welcomed the contribution and noted that Britain has also said it will keep “under review” the possibility of putting in more.

    Currently the largest donor is Norway, which announced a $3bn pledge last year at COP30 in Belém. However, that pledge came with conditions, among them that the fund must reach $10bn in sponsor capital by 2026, and that Norway’s contribution can’t make up more than 20% of that total. Over the longer term, this means the fund must raise $15bn from governments to unlock Norway’s full investment.

    Comment: UK’s budget juggling trick with rainforest loan for bus-fare cap needs transparency

    Speaking at a forest finance event in New York, Norway’s environment minister Sigrun Aasland said the country’s pledge was made not “only out of solidarity but because of shared interests”, adding that protecting rainforests is critical for climate and biodiversity goals as well as for national security.

    “Tropical deforestation matters to people in the Amazon and in the Congo. But let’s not forget that it also matters to global food production and to the cost of living in Oslo or in London,” she said.

    At the event, Guyana’s minister of natural resources Vickram Bharrat said the TFFF is “one in a menu of options” to finance forest protection in developing countries. He added that to boost its capital “maybe we should put some amount of pressure on oil companies to contribute to the fund”.

    Upcoming election “not a risk”

    Brazil, which has been pivotal to getting the fund off the ground, is now heading into a national election that could see the country swing back to an anti-climate stance if right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro beats current left-wing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Capobianco, however, said the election result does not pose a risk to the TFFF.

    “It’s a global initiative, not a Brazilian initiative. We proposed the first idea, but nowadays it’s a global initiative,” he said. “We believe the investor countries and the tropical countries together have the possibility to continue this process.”

    In Brazil, the first round of voting is scheduled for Sunday, October 4. If no candidate wins more than 50% of valid votes, a run-off ballot will take place on October 25.

    COP30 roadmap to end deforestation will invite countries to draft domestic plans

    In July, the TFFF board adopted a charter, which outlines the instrument’s objectives and values, including that 20% of the payments made to tropical countries will go directly to Indigenous people and local communities.

    The charter also says the TFFF board may comprise up to 12 member countries during the initial phase. Currently, seven seats are filled by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Germany, Brazil, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Indonesia.

    The board has also formally incorporated the Tropical Forest Investment Fund (TFIF) – the TFFF’s investment arm that will trade bonds in financial markets – hosted in Luxembourg.

    The post Brazil confident new rainforest fund will reach $10bn donor milestone appeared first on Climate Home News.

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    COP31 must aim higher to cut emissions from the use of materials  

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    Patrick Schröder is a senior research fellow at Chatham House’s Environment and Society Centre.

    A climate summit serious about implementation cannot afford to leave major emissions reductions off the table. Yet, that is the risk COP31 faces unless it makes reducing raw material use central to the way countries decarbonise their economies.

    On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York last week, COP31 host Türkiye laid out proposals to accelerate emissions cuts in the next decade. Its plans include global goals to increase the share of recycled products in material use to at least 15% (up from 6.9% in 2025) and halve waste generation by 2035.

    COP31 offers an opportunity to connect efforts to improve material circularity with stronger national climate commitments and mitigation pathways. But these targets could be a lot more ambitious.

    The case for circularity

    The Paris Agreement cannot be delivered through cleaner electricity alone. We must also reduce the emissions that are embedded in the way we extract resources, manufacture products, build infrastructure and dispose of waste.

    Circularity principles are pivotal to credible mitigation pathways: designing technologies and products to last, repairing and reusing them, and reducing demand for virgin resources.

    The scale of the opportunity is striking. A recent European Environment Agency review found that adopting such principles could deliver average global emissions reductions potential of 52% in the waste sector against a business-as-usual scenario, 48% in construction and buildings, 28% in transport and mobility, 26% in industry and 24% in agriculture.  

      These figures make a compelling case for raising circularity ambitions across the economy, offering the promise of far more than better recycling bins.

      In fact, recycling minerals used in cleantech equipment, for example, illustrate the extent of the emissions savings available. The carbon footprint of minerals and metals recovered from secondary sources is up to 80% lower than those produced from new mining and processing, according to the International Energy Agency.

      A major EU-funded project estimates that recovered materials could substitute up to 56% of Europe’s primary critical raw material requirements by 2050, provided they achieve the necessary quality. The main takeaway goes beyond Europe: yesterday’s products can become tomorrow’s strategic resources while mitigating climate change.

      In this light, a target to increase the share of recovered material use to 15% isn’t enough.

      The evidence-based Circularity Gap Report found a 17% target by 2032 is possible and could unlock additional emissions reductions amounting to several gigatonnes of CO2.

      Reducing material demand

      A higher circularity metric is only part of the answer, however. An economy can increase its recycling rate at the same time as extracting more primary materials if total material demand keeps growing.

      The tougher issue governments need to address is identifying what reductions in primary material use are needed.

      The Circularity Gap Report uses an indicative benchmark of eight tonnes of virgin materials consumed per person annually. This is already being translated into policy: Germany’s 2024 circular economy strategy aims to reduce primary resource consumption, with the German Federal Environment Agency identifying six to eight tonnes per person as an ambitious target.

      An engineer walks past a pump at the battery recycling pilot plant installed in the Eramet Research & Innovation center in Trappes, near Paris, France
      An engineer walks past a pump at the battery recycling pilot plant installed in the Eramet Research & Innovation center in Trappes, near Paris, France (Photo: REUTERS/Gonzalo Fuentes)

      Reducing primary material demand will require a closer integration of energy and resource policies. Efficient EVs charged with solar power can complement better public transport and walkable cities, while batteries designed to be repaired and reused for stationary energy storage before being recycled will reduce the materials footprint of transport and clean energy services.

      Coordinated infrastructure development and urban planning can prevent unnecessary overbuild, while renovating existing building stock reduces demand for new steel, cement and aluminium, which are emissions-intensive to produce. Connecting industrial waste heat to district heating networks can further reduce energy demand and emissions.

      What governments should agree at COP31

      COP31 can translate this approach into three concrete commitments.

      First, governments should agree a stronger circularity ambition, supported by material-footprint indicators and milestones. The presidency should seek recognition of these priorities in negotiated outcomes, alongside concrete delivery partnerships under its COP31 Action Agenda.

      Second, countries should include quantified circular economy measures in their updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and implementation plans. Such measures should include reuse, material efficiency and circularity targets, as well as transparent estimates of emissions savings that avoid double counting across sectors. By the end of 2025, countries had developed 101 national circular economy roadmaps and action plans, yet these often remained disconnected from their NDCs.

        Third, climate finance should support the delivery of circular solutions such as material recovery at scale, investments into circular critical mineral value chains beyond mining, developing a circular plastics economy, and designing buildings and cities that support material reuse. Developing countries need technology, affordable finance and support to deliver these ambitions, including for the informal workers whose livelihoods depend on recovering and recycling materials.

        The test for COP31 is to reach an agreement that can start the transformation of our production and consumption systems and how they are financed.

        A headline circularity target will achieve little without policies that address absolute resource demand and deliver measurable emissions cuts. But COP31 offers an opportunity to make circularity a central element of climate policy, with targets strong enough to matter and institutions equipped to deliver them.

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        As El Niño intensifies, we should be investing more in the world’s farmers

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        An exceptional El Niño is building. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) says it has intensified to very strong levels and is likely to last at least through February 2027. If its current trajectory holds, it could become stronger than anything seen since WMO monitoring began four decades ago.

        That is bad news for agriculture. El Niño – a naturally occurring weather phenomenon – can scramble rainfall patterns across the world, bringing drought to some regions and floods to others. And this time it is unfolding against the backdrop of a significantly hotter climate, with farmers already contending with unreliable growing seasons, extreme heat and less predictable rainfall because of global warming.

        El Niño expected to bring next record-hot year as soon as 2027

        We are seeing the consequences already. In Sri Lanka, drought linked to El Niño has dried wells and reservoirs and cut into crops and farmer incomes. Indonesia is experiencing its worst wildfire season in 11 years, with prolonged drought and extreme heat exacerbated by El Niño. And in Peru, authorities are preparing for the opposite extreme: intense rains, flooding and landslides which the national civil-defence agency says could affect around 1.2 million people.

        These impacts will multiply as El Niño intensifies.

        And yet, just as the risks to food production are rising, the money available to help farmers withstand them is shrinking.

        10% funding decline in 2024

        A forthcoming analysis from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) shows that climate-related development finance for agrifood systems is moving in the wrong direction. In 2024, the latest year for which data is available, it fell by 10 percent compared with a 2 percent overall decline. The sectors that put food on our tables — crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries — received just 5 percent.

        Yet this is precisely the moment when climate investment in agriculture needs to grow, not shrink. It can help communities adapt, build resilience and protect food security, while unlocking larger flows of public and private finance. Agriculture feeds us, supports the livelihoods of well over a billion people, and is often the first sector hit by drought, floods and extreme heat. Cutting that investment now is a false economy.

        One failed harvest can plant the seed for the next crisis, forcing farmers to eat the seed they have saved for planting, sell livestock or tools, or take on debt. It can also deepen food insecurity, disrupt supply chains and drive up prices, showing up months later in supermarket aisles far away.

        Comment: A supercharged El Niño is coming – are we ready?

        The Central American Dry Corridor, stretching through much of the region, shows both how exposed farmers are, and what investment can do. Based on an analysis of 41 years of satellite observations, FAO finds that some crop and pasture areas there face more than a 50 percent chance of agricultural drought over the coming months.

        About half of Central America’s 1.9 million producers of maize, beans and other basic grains live in the Dry Corridor. Many grow food both for sale and for their own families. When a harvest fails, they lose both income and dinner.

        El Salvador project conserves water and soil

        In El Salvador, which lies within the Dry Corridor, more than 50,000 farmers have adopted practices to better withstand drought and increasingly unreliable rainfall through RECLIMA, a project financed by the Green Climate Fund and implemented by FAO in partnership with the government of El Salvador. It has substantial national co-financing, including from the country’s Environmental Investment Fund.

        El Niño can intensify El Salvador’s annual mid-season dry spell, known as the canícula, turning it into a longer, harsher drought just as maize needs water most.

        RECLIMA promoters carry out the construction of hillside ditches to optimise water infiltration and minimise the loss of fertile topsoil, thereby strengthening the climate resilience of their local livelihoods in Santiago de María, Usulután North, El Salvador, June 4, 2025. (Photo: © FAO / Mario Araujo)

        RECLIMA promoters carry out the construction of hillside ditches to optimise water infiltration and minimise the loss of fertile topsoil, thereby strengthening the climate resilience of their local livelihoods in Santiago de María, Usulután North, El Salvador, June 4, 2025. (Photo: © FAO / Mario Araujo)

        For María Cristina Corvera de López, a second-generation farmer in rural Nahualapa, adapting means changing how every drop of rain is captured and used. She plants trees alongside her crops to provide shade and minimise evaporation and uses simple irrigation channels and a homemade drip system to conserve water. Instead of burning stalks, leaves and husks after harvest, as generations before her did, she turns them into mulch to hold moisture in the soil.

        “The effects of climate change are a constant challenge,” she says. But the new techniques have made her farm more resilient to El Niño as well. Where she once harvested about 50 bags of maize per acre, she now gets around 80, even during droughts. It’s enough to feed her family and sell the surplus.

        Managing risk now cuts future costs

        Together, these adaptations can mean the difference between losing a crop and getting through a dry season with enough food, seed and income to plant again. They are also the result of climate finance invested before disaster strikes.

        RECLIMA shows what that kind of adaptation investment can buy. Adaptation accounted for 45 percent of climate-related development finance to agrifood systems in 2024, and multilateral development banks are directing more agricultural finance towards resilience. That shift reflects a growing recognition that adaptation is a form of risk management, not just a development cost.

        We need much more of it. The same investments that help farmers withstand El Niño also enable them to adapt to a hotter, more unpredictable future. Cutting investment in the people who produce our food just as climate risks intensify does not save money. It simply pushes a much larger bill into the next harvest, the next food crisis, and the next El Niño.

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        As El Niño intensifies, we should be investing more in the world’s farmers

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