Global temperatures in 2023 blew past expectations to set the warmest year on record, even topping 1.5C in one of the main datasets.
This warmth has continued into 2024, meaning that this year is also on track to potentially pass 1.5C in one or more datasets.
Crossing 1.5C in one or even two years is not the same as exceeding the 1.5C limit under the Paris Agreement. The goal is generally considered to refer to long-term warming, rather than annual temperatures that include the short-term influence of natural fluctuations in the climate, such as El Niño.
Nonetheless, recent warming has led to renewed debate around whether the world might imminently pass the 1.5C Paris Agreement limit – sooner than climate scientists and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have previously estimated.
Here, Carbon Brief provides an updated analysis of when the world will likely exceed the Paris 1.5C limit (in a scenario where emissions are not rapidly cut), using both the latest global surface temperature data and climate model simulations.
The findings show that, while the best estimate for crossing 1.5C has moved up by approximately two years compared to Carbon Brief’s earlier 2020 analysis, it remains most likely to happen in the late 2020s or early 2030s – rather than in the next few years.
Understanding global temperature targets
Human emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gasses have substantially warmed the planet over the past 150 years. On top of this human-driven warming, there is year-to-year natural variability largely associated with El Niño and La Niña events.
A big El Niño or La Niña event can result in global temperatures up to 0.2C warmer or cooler, respectively, than they would otherwise be.
As the world has been warming by around 0.2C per decade, a large El Niño event can represent an early look at what typical global temperatures will be a decade in the future. Or, to put it another way, human emissions are adding a permanent super-El Niño’s worth of heat to the climate system each decade.
In the 2015 Paris Agreement, the international community agreed to limit warming to well-below 2C above pre-industrial levels and “pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C”. While there is no set definition for the time period against which the goal is measured, it is generally interpreted to refer to long-term, human-driven warming.
For example, the IPCC’s recently completed sixth assessment report (AR6) uses the midpoint of a 20-year period as a way to avoid overinterpreting short-term natural variability.
While a useful approach, this definition has the unfortunate side-effect that scientists will not know for sure that the world passed 1.5C until 10 years after it has happened.
This has led the community to propose a number of alternative approaches, such as Carbon Brief’s 2020 analysis and a 2023 Nature commentary by Prof Richard Betts and colleagues at the UK Met Office.
An updated approach for determining exceedance
Here, Carbon Brief provides an update to our 2020 analysis of both observations and the latest generation of climate models to assess when the world will likely pass the 1.5C limit across different surface temperature datasets.
While the IPCC’s 20-year average is one approach to remove short-term variability, it comes with the important downside of not being able to extend up to the present day. An alternative approach is a smoothed average using a local regression (LOWESS).
LOWESS provides an estimated value at each point in time based on a weighting where nearby points are given the highest weights and those further away are given less weight. It is an approach commonly used in timeseries analysis that can account for changes in the behaviour of data over time without assuming it is linear.
However, LOWESS approaches still require a choice on the part of the user; namely, how many nearby points should be considered when determining the smoothed average. The figure below shows three potential options that could be used: a window of the nearest 10 years, 20 years or 30 years around each point.
The data shown are a composite average of four different global surface temperature records – NASA’s GISTEMP; NOAA’s GlobalTemp; Hadley/UEA’s HadCRUT5; and Berkeley Earth – that extend back into the 1800s.
Annual global mean surface temperatures from a composite average of NASA’s GISTEMP, NOAA’s GlobalTemp, Hadley/UEA’s HadCRUT5, and Berkeley Earth (black dots) along with LOWESS fits using 10-year, 20-year, and 30-year windows. Chart by Carbon Brief.
In this case, both 20-year and 30-year windows show similar long-term changes in temperature, while a shorter 10-year window does not fully remove short-term variability associated with El Niño and La Niña events.
For this analysis, Carbon Brief selected a 30-year window for removing natural variability, though a 20-year window would have given nearly identical results. (As discussed above, there are a number of alternative approaches that could be used. These are assessed in the UK Met Office’s Climate Dashboard, though they all give comparable results to the LOWESS approach used here.)
To determine when the world will pass 1.5C and 2C, Carbon Brief combines smoothed averages of both observed temperatures and climate model projections.
The observed temperatures are used to determine the level of warming to date – 1.3C in the composite average – while climate models are used to assess the range of possible warming into the future. This approach has an advantage over just using climate models as it avoids any historical mismatch between modelled and real-world temperatures.
The figure below shows the combined smoothed average from the observations and climate models, with the climate models normalised to the observations in 2023. Global temperatures are assessed to be 1.3C in 2023, with a wide range of possible future warming determined by the spread in warming after 2023 across 37 different climate models in the CMIP6 ensemble using the SSP2-4.5 current-policy-type scenario.
Annual global average surface temperatures from the composite average (black dots) along the 30-year LOWESS fit (black line), combined with 37 CMIP6 models smoothed using the same 30-year LOWESS fit. Models and observations are aligned using the smoothed average values for 2023. Chart by Carbon Brief.
This approach suggests that the world will pass 1.5C around the year 2030 (representing the 50th percentile, or central estimate, of all the model runs), with a range of anywhere from 2028 (5th percentile) up to 2036 (95th percentile).
Similarly, the world will pass 2C around the year 2048, with a range of 2040 to 2062 across all models assessed.
The figure below shows distribution of exceedance years (that is, the year in which the target is exceeded) across all of the different CMIP6 models. The width of the plot indicates the portion of models that show the temperature limit passed in a given year – the wider the plot, the more agreement across the models.
The results are broadly similar to Carbon Brief’s 2020 analysis, though the best estimate of when the world will pass 1.5C has moved up from 2032 to 2030, reflecting both a higher estimate of warming to date (including the development of HadCRUT5) and an inclusion of more CMIP6 model runs than were available at the time.
The 5th and 95th percentile has narrowed to 2028-36 compared to 2026-42 in the 2020 analysis, showing the impact of three additional years of data on reducing the resulting model spread.
Sensitivity to the choice of datasets
While the averaging of different datasets into a composite average follows the approach used in the IPCC AR6 and by the WMO, it somewhat obscures important differences in estimates of warming since pre-industrial times across different research groups.
While the long-term warming the world has experienced in the composite average is 1.3C as of 2023 (similar to the results in the new Forster et al study), applying the same LOWESS smoothing approach to each individual record yields fairly different results, ranging from as low as 1.22C to 1.41C across the four different groups:
- Composite Average: 1.30C
- Berkeley Earth: 1.41C
- HadCRUT5: 1.30C
- NASA GISTEMP: 1.24C
- NOAA GlobalTemp: 1.22C
These differences reflect a number of factors, including what land station data is included in each record, the ocean sea surface temperature datasets used and how different groups fill in the gaps between observations – particularly in the early part of the record when station data is more sparse.
The table below gives the resulting 1.5C exceedance years when Carbon Brief’s approach is applied to each different temperature record:
| Projected year of 1.5C breach | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Dataset | 50th percentile | 5th percentile | 95th percentile |
| Composite | 2030 | 2028 | 2036 |
| Berkeley Earth | 2027 | 2025 | 2031 |
| HadCRUT5 | 2030 | 2028 | 2036 |
| NASA GISTEMP | 2032 | 2029 | 2040 |
| NOAA GlobalTemp | 2033 | 2030 | 2041 |
Using the Berkeley Earth record gives a central estimate of passing 1.5C as early as 2027 (ranging from 2025 to 2031), while NOAA gives an estimate as late as 2033 (2030 to 2041).
Similarly, here are the results for the 2C exceedance year:
| Projected year of 2C breach | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Dataset | 50th percentile | 5th percentile | 95th percentile |
| Composite | 2048 | 2040 | 2062 |
| Berkeley Earth | 2045 | 2037 | 2056 |
| HadCRUT5 | 2048 | 2040 | 2062 |
| NASA GISTEMP | 2050 | 2041 | 2067 |
| NOAA GlobalTemp | 2051 | 2042 | 2068 |
It is worth noting that there is no “correct” answer as to the best surface temperature record to use. Rather, the range of results across the different records represent real uncertainty around when the world will pass 1.5C and 2C.
Other approaches get similar results
This analysis is far from the first time the scientific community has asked when the world will pass various climate limits or how to best calculate the level of warming the world has experienced to date.
Copernicus/ECMWF provide a regularly updated “global temperature trend monitor” that uses a more simple approach – a linear trend over the past 30 years – to assess when global temperatures will likely exceed 1.5C in their ERA5 dataset.
This approach gives a slightly later date, 2033, than the climate model-based approach Carbon Brief uses. This reflects the fact that most models anticipate a modest acceleration in the rate of warming that might not be fully captured using a linear trend over the past 30 years.
An alternative approach to determining when the world will pass 1.5C is to use the “assessed warming projections” developed for AR6. These assessed warming projections more closely match observed temperatures than the full CMIP6 ensemble.
They also provide a narrower range of future warming than the full set of CMIP6, as they give less weight to “hot models” in CMIP6 that are inconsistent with the IPCC’s assessment of the likely range of climate sensitivity.
Annual global average surface temperatures from the composite average (black dots) along the 30-year LOWESS fit (red line), combined the AR6 assessed warming projection for SSP2-4.5 as published and without any baseline alignment. Chart by Carbon Brief.
In addition, AR6 features an estimate of 1.5C exceedance dates based on the ScenarioMIP assessment of CMIP6 models (and previously covered by Carbon Brief here).
These three different approaches are compared to Carbon Brief’s new assessment in the table below:
| Approach | 1.5C exceedance year |
|---|---|
| Carbon Brief (Composite, SSP2-4.5) | 2030 (2028 to 2036) |
| Copernicus | 2033 |
| AR6 Assessed Warming (SSP2-4.5) | 2031 (2024 to 2043) |
| AR6 ScenarioMIP (SSP2-4.5) | 2030 (2021 to 2046) |
Both AR6 approaches include a wider range than the Carbon Brief approach as they rely on models that have differing estimates of current global temperatures relative to pre-industrial.
For example, the AR6 assessed warming projections give a best estimate of 2023 global temperatures (in the absence of short-term natural variability) as 1.31C, with a range from as low as 1.15C to as high as 1.48C. However, these are comparable to the range of warming to date (1.22C to 1.41C) across the different surface temperature records.
There is no single best way to assess when the world will likely pass 1.5C. But both Carbon Brief’s approach and those of other groups all agree it will most likely happen in the late 2020s or early 2030s in a world (SSP2-4.5) where global emissions remain around current levels.
The post Analysis: What record global heat means for breaching the 1.5C warming limit appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: What record global heat means for breaching the 1.5C warming limit
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China has said that hydrogen is a key “future industry”, important to both its energy transition and its industrial policy.
Hydrogen frequently goes through hype cycles, most recently driven by rising oil and gas prices due to the conflict in the Middle East.
Yet, even in China, the world’s largest producer and consumer of the fuel, hydrogen remains expensive and inefficient to produce.
This is especially the case for “green” hydrogen derived from renewables.
Moreover, there is limited supporting infrastructure and there is little incentive to use hydrogen over other energy sources.
As a result, uptake in China of hydrogen as an alternative fuel remains low.
Nevertheless, these challenges echo the early circumstances of another key clean-energy technology – electric vehicles (EVs).
In China, EVs benefited from a policy environment that included consistent signals of support, financial aid and the development of supporting infrastructure.
Many similar policies are now being deployed – and in some cases improved upon – to support the development of China’s hydrogen industry.
This article examines China’s approach to developing hydrogen and how its evolving industrial policy could make the fuel viable.
How is China using hydrogen and where does it come from?
Electrification and rising installations of solar and wind power have been the biggest drivers of China’s decarbonisation story so far. However, how China will address the more energy-intensive, hard-to-electrify segments of its economy remains an open question.
Hydrogen is seen by some in China as a potential solution for reducing emissions in a range of “hard-to-abate” industries, from steel and chemicals to aviation and shipping.
The country is the world’s foremost producer and consumer of hydrogen. It produced 36.5m tonnes of the gas in 2024, with maximum production capacity standing at 50m tonnes that year.
It also consumed nearly a third of the world’s hydrogen in 2024, as shown below.
Most of China’s production capacity is in regions with potential for high demand, such as Shandong, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Shanxi and other provinces with significant heavy industry.
In 2024, the vast majority of China’s hydrogen – around 78% – was produced using fossil fuels, predominantly coal and gas, as shown in the figure below.
Another 21% was produced as an industrial by-product, while only 1% – just 320,000 tonnes – was derived from renewable-powered electrolysis of water.
One study found that, for every kilogram of hydrogen produced, 38.6kg of carbon dioxide (CO2) is emitted if the hydrogen is produced using coal-fired power. Hydrogen made through coal gasification results in 28.5kg of CO2 for every kilogram of hydrogen, while gas-based hydrogen creates 13kg of emissions.
By contrast, one kilogram of renewables-based hydrogen results in 0.5kg of CO2.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) calculates that hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels could help China avoid close to 16bn tonnes of CO2 cumulatively by 2060 – but only if it comes from low-carbon sources.
The biggest reductions, it adds, would come from heavy industry, particularly chemicals and steel, with the maritime and shipping sectors also seeing some benefit.
Currently, around half of the hydrogen produced in China is used in synthetic ammonia and methanol production.
Ammonia is primarily used to manufacture fertiliser and is seen as a possible fuel technology for shipping. Methanol is used as a fuel for the transport industry, as well as for heating.
Another quarter of China’s current hydrogen usage is consumed by the oil refining and coal-to-chemical sectors. The remaining amount is used in other industries, including transport, heating and metallurgy.
What are the barriers to scaling up hydrogen?
Although China is the largest producer and consumer of hydrogen globally, the industry faces several barriers to becoming a viable clean-energy technology.
Agora Energiewende, a thinktank focused on the energy sector, says that, in order to make hydrogen a practical clean-energy solution, China would need to expand the scale and range of its application, as well as improving the conversion efficiency of production and use.
Both BloombergNEF and the IEA highlight the importance of China creating demand for hydrogen, such as through quotas for industrial usage.
Hydrogen “suffers from a relatively large efficiency loss during various conversion processes”, adds Agora. For example, it notes that only around 22% of the energy put into hydrogen fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) is converted into motion, compared to 73% for battery electric vehicles. Producing hydrogen with renewable energy is also less efficient than coal-to-hydrogen processes.
Cui Chuansheng, technical director at East China Engineering Science and Technology, tells state news agency Xinhua that the variability of wind and solar power often leads to low utilisation of electrolysers, resulting in “efficiency losses”.
Meanwhile, the cost of producing hydrogen – particularly green hydrogen – remains high.
One study placed the cost of hydrogen produced through alkaline water electrolysis (AWE), the most common method for producing green hydrogen in China, at $4-6 per kilogram, compared with $1.20-2.50/kg for steam methane reforming and $1.30-2 for coal gasification.
In some specific cases, such as blending hydrogen with gas, researchers find that hydrogen prices would need to fall to one-third of gas prices to incentivise uptake.
These constraints are all “interdependent”, Kevin Tu, managing director of Agora Energy China, tells Carbon Brief, with the need to ensure “bankable demand” while also reducing costs and developing infrastructure. He adds:
“Without credible offtake in the right sectors, costs will not fall; without lower costs and better logistics, downstream users will not commit.”
The IEA says that green hydrogen “could become cost-competitive by the end of this decade due to low technology costs and cost of capital”.
For now, however, the China Hydrogen Bulletin Substack reports that China’s four listed hydrogen equipment manufacturers all reported significant losses in 2025.
Meanwhile, a senior executive at a Chinese hydrogen company told economic news outlet Jiemian that he expected 40% of companies in the sector to have closed down by the end of 2026, with surviving companies only turning a profit in 2029 at the earliest.
The industry also lacks refueling and pipeline infrastructure. China’s development of a pipeline network for hydrogen remains in its early stages, with around 400km of pipelines currently in operation. By contrast, its long-distance gas network stands at 128,000km. Similarly, storage remains expensive and inefficient, creating a further obstacle to wider uptake.
How is China supporting hydrogen development?
China began considering the use of hydrogen as an energy source in earnest in the early 2000s, to address concerns around pollution and dependence on imported oil for the transport sector.
A clearer signal of its importance came in 2015, when the State Council included the technology in a 10-year national industrial strategy known as the “Made in China” initiative. This pitched hydrogen as a way to contribute to electrification of China’s road-transport system through the development of FCEVs.
Yuki Yu, founder of research firm Energy Iceberg, tells Carbon Brief that, from 2018-2021, hydrogen was treated as a “FCEV and manufacturing technology challenge”.
This has since evolved, she says, given that battery electric vehicles have emerged as the more popular technology.
Shen Xinyi, senior advisor at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), agrees, telling Carbon Brief that recent policy documents suggest the aim is now for hydrogen to be targeted at areas where direct electrification is harder, such as hydrogen-based chemicals, hydrogen metallurgy and some heavy-duty transport applications.
This is in line with the “hydrogen ladder”, an analysis of how likely different possibilities for applying hydrogen as a clean alternative are to become significant. The ladder sees significant future use of hydrogen in these hard-to-electrify areas as much more likely than for light vehicles.
Notable policy moves are being made in “three layers”, says Agora’s Tu, which are combining to improve the technology’s chances of scaling up. These are: the “legal and institutional” layer; “application-oriented” policies; and targeted measures to address “practical bottlenecks” at the local level.
One of the documents underpinning this pivot was the “medium- and long-term plan for the development of the hydrogen energy industry (2021-2035)”, issued in March 2022.
According to a report by the National Energy Administration (NEA), the plan is an attempt to develop an “industrial ecosystem” for hydrogen that features “diverse stakeholders, coordinated innovation and clustered development”.
The plan was the first government document to “lay out a long-term vision for China’s hydrogen economy”, unifying a previously disparate policy push into one document, according to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, a UK-based thinktank.
Following on from the 2022 plan, the importance of hydrogen as a broad clean-energy solution has been emphasised in a number of policies. These include its classification being changed from a hazardous chemical to an energy carrier in China’s Energy Law, a 2024 action plan to “accelerate” the use of low-carbon hydrogen in industry and a new pilot scheme offering subsidies for projects that achieve specific targets.
The table below sets out the timeline and content of China’s hydrogen-related policies over the past 25 years.
| Policy | Year published | Key features |
|---|---|---|
| 10th five-year plan (2001–2005) | 2001 | Calls for “actively developing” low-emission vehicles, understood to include hydrogen vehicles |
| Made in China 2025 | 2015 | Pledges to “continue to support” development of fuel cell vehicles and “master core technologies” for low-carbon vehicles |
| Notice on implementation of demonstration projects for fuel cell vehicles | 2020 | Creates a dedicated subsidy programme for finding breakthroughs in FCEV core technologies and industrial applications |
| 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 2021 | Hydrogen listed as a future industry |
| Medium- and long-term plan for the development of the hydrogen energy industry (2021–2035) | 2022 | Aims to reach 100,000-200,000 tonnes of green hydrogen production [this target has been met]. Also aims to get 50,000 FCEVs on the road by 2025, leading to a “diversified” hydrogen industry by 2035 |
| Opinions on accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development | 2024 | Promotes further development of hydrogen production, transport, storage and applications |
| Implementation plan for accelerating the application of clean and low-carbon hydrogen in the industrial sector | 2025 | Outlines tasks to promote use of low-carbon hydrogen to reduce emissions in heavy industries, such as steel and chemicals |
| Energy law | 2025 | Sees hydrogen included in national legislation for the first time, re-classifies it from a hazardous chemical to an energy carrier |
| 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | 2026 | Again lists as a future industry, and calls for the development of green fuels derived from green hydrogen |
| Notice on the implementation of pilot projects for the comprehensive application of hydrogen energy | 2026 | Provides subsidies to projects to reduce hydrogen costs to 15-25 yuan/kilogram ($2.20-3.67/kg) and help develop a fleet of 100,000 FCEVs |
Key policies in the development of China’s hydrogen sector.
In addition, the NEA said in 2025 that local governments across China had issued more than 560 hydrogen-related energy policies by the end of 2024.
Tu notes that these local policies cover everything from permitting reforms and pipeline planning to exempting FCEVs from paying road toll.
Different provinces across China adopt distinct strategies for developing hydrogen industries, based on local conditions, says the US-based Center on Global Energy Policy, such as energy mix, availability of coal and industrial needs.
However, these local policies and targets are frequently more ambitious than the “conservative” national-level targets, it adds.
Could a new pilot programme boost hydrogen’s prospects?
A new pilot programme, announced in March 2026, aims to commercialise the country’s hydrogen industry by funding projects to reduce the cost of the fuel to 15-25 yuan/kilogram ($2.20-3.67/kg) by 2030, as well as other targets.
Unlike the 2020 subsidies, which focused on FCEVs, the new programme reaffirms China’s interest in a broader series of sectoral applications for hydrogen, including in clean heating, production of low-carbon iron and steel, and production of “green fuels” and other chemicals.
This new pilot is the “strongest financial instrument ever released for China’s green hydrogen application” in terms of creating a comprehensive hydrogen policy that covers a broad swathe of the economy, supporting it with financial backing and targeting application scenarios, Yu says.
However, she argues that strict grant caps – 240m yuan ($35m) per project and 1.6bn yuan ($235m) per selected region across only five regions – limited the overall funding scale available to the industry.
Energy Iceberg has calculated that only around 60-70 projects nationally could receive funding under the current rules, out of more than 670 active green hydrogen proposals in China.
Shen agrees that the pilot programme is significant and that it will expand the use of hydrogen in China’s climate strategy, particularly green hydrogen.
She notes a provision that “explicitly states that coal-based ammonia and methanol projects cannot be labelled as ‘green’ ammonia or methanol”, suggesting that policymakers are increasingly paying attention to the “integrity” of definitions for hydrogen and hydrogen-derived fuel.
The “real value” of the pilot scheme, says Tu, is that it focuses on developing “integrated city-cluster ecosystems linking supply, transport, infrastructure and end-use demand”, rather than only supporting individual projects.
This “should help identify viable business models, accelerate cost discovery and concentrate support on applications with stronger scale potential”, as well as boost investor confidence, adds Tu.
However, he continues that the broader effect it will have on boosting production of hydrogen will “depend on how quickly the selected clusters can translate the programme into real offtake and lower delivered hydrogen prices”.
How does this compare to China’s EV policy push?
The debate around the viability of hydrogen is reminiscent of critiques of EVs.
Until recently, EVs were seen as too expensive for consumers, inefficient and challenging to use without supporting infrastructure. As a result, many western automakers chose to temper their focus on EVs, while continuing to develop internal combustion engines.
However, China has managed to develop a competitive EV industry with products that top global sales.
Part of the playbook that spurred China’s success on EVs included consistent policy signalling in favour of the technology, including mentions in high-level documents and committing resources to building charging infrastructure.
“The defining features of China’s industrial-policy success are its persistence and adaptability,” says Kyle Chan, fellow at the Brookings Institution, adding that “long before the technology and economics of EVs and batteries were proven, China was making long-term investments and policy bets [in the sectors]”.
More tangible measures included direct and indirect subsidies and policy support in the shape of favourable loan rates and low-cost land. One estimate by US-based thinktank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) pegs the amount of support allocated to the EV industry between 2009-2023 at $230.9bn.
This coupled with the success of private Chinese manufacturers in creating innovative, nimble companies that “forc[ed] policymakers to adapt”, as well as growing links between the automotive and information technology industries, according to a separate CSIS report.
But this progress on EVs also reportedly came with significant fraud. In 2016, one investigation found that 33 companies were involved in subsidy fraud totalling 9.2bn yuan ($1.3bn).
(It should also be noted that profitability in the industry lags far behind the average for downstream industrial sectors, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, which says that “only a handful” of nearly 50 EV makers have reported profits.)
Being the subject of an industrial policy push alone does not guarantee success, states CSIS. It says the strength of the EV industry “was neither inevitable nor the result of a single master plan” and that China’s aims to develop globally-competitive industries in areas such as commercial aviation remain unaccomplished.
China’s approach to hydrogen has been markedly different.
Instead of offering blanket subsidies, the fuel cell demonstration programme it established in 2020 focused on performance-based rewards.
To avoid the subsidy issues seen in the solar and EV industries, the ministry of finance deliberately chose this indirect funding model, says Yu.
However, Yu argues, the programme did not work as well as hoped, due to the funding ceiling and the siloed attempts made by different regional governments to develop hydrogen ecosystems .
But Chinese policy thinking is becoming more selective and pragmatic for hydrogen compared with EVs, says Shen. She says:
“Electrification remains the primary decarbonisation pathway [for road transport], while hydrogen is increasingly positioned for applications where direct electrification is more difficult.”
Tu echoes this, adding that China is “clearly moving toward a more supportive policy environment for hydrogen”.
But its approach is “unlikely to replicate the EV story one-for-one”, he adds.
China’s concerted hydrogen push is also unlikely to echo the EV story at a global level, according to the IEA.
In terms of green hydrogen, around 60% of global electrolyser manufacturing capacity is currently in China, prompting concerns from the EU about a repeat of China’s global dominance in the solar and EV sectors.
However, the IEA says, electrolysers made in China “might not supply other markets at scale in the short term”, due to difficulties transporting the bulky technology globally, expectations that costs will only fall gradually, uncertainty around global demand and questions over how well Chinese electrolysers perform against global alternatives.
China’s industrial focus on hydrogen is centred more on domestic use, Shen argues. “It is less about near-term export competitiveness and more about building domestic industrial ecosystems,” she says.
The post Q&A: Can China turn hydrogen into its next clean-energy industry? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: Can China turn hydrogen into its next clean-energy industry?
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