Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels and cement will rise around 1.1% in 2025, reaching a record 38.1bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2), according to the latest figures from the Global Carbon Project.
However, falling land-use emissions means that global CO2 emissions in 2025 will remain relatively unchanged compared to 2024 levels.
The 20th edition of the annual Global Carbon Budget report, published today, also finds that the land carbon sink – the portion of human-caused CO2 emissions absorbed by plants and soils – appears to have recovered to its pre-El Niño strength after two unusually weak years.
However, research published alongside the report by the same team also suggests that climate change has caused a long-term decline in land and ocean carbon sinks, with sinks being about 15% weaker over the past decade than they would have been without climate impacts.
The study, published in Nature, finds that the decline of carbon sinks has contributed about 8% to the rise in atmospheric CO2 concentration since 1960.
The 2025 Global Carbon Budget report also estimates that:
- Emissions in China and India are projected to grow much less in 2025 compared to the past decade, while emissions in the US and EU are projected to grow this year after years of decline.
- Global CO2 emissions from land-use change are expected to decrease by nearly 10% in 2025, driven by reductions in deforestation and forest degradation in South America.
- Total CO2 emissions – fossil and land use – have grown more slowly over the past decade (0.3% per year on average) compared to the previous decade (1.9% per year).
- The remaining carbon budget to limit global warming to 1.5C is virtually exhausted and is equivalent to only four years of current emissions. Carbon budgets to limit warming to 1.7C and 2C would similarly be used up in 12 and 25 years, respectively.
- The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is set to reach 425.7 parts per million (ppm) in 2025, 2.3ppm above 2023 and 52% above pre-industrial levels.
(For detailed coverage of previous editions of the report, see Carbon Brief’s coverage for 2024, 2023 and 2022.)
Global emissions remain flat
The Global Carbon Budget (GCB) finds that total global CO2 emissions in 2025 – including those from fossil fuels and land use – are projected to remain approximately flat at 42.2GtCO2, falling by a negligible -0.04% compared to last year.
This means 2025 is effectively tied with 2024 as the highest global CO2 emissions on record.
Flat total CO2 emissions in 2025 reflect a combination of continued rising emissions from fossil fuel and industry and declining emissions from land-use change. Fossil CO2 emissions rose 1.1% to 38.1GtCO2, while land-use emissions declined by -9.8% to 4.1GtCO2 (albeit with large uncertainties).
The figure below shows the 2025 global CO2 emissions update (red solid line) alongside 2024 (dark blue dotted), 2023 (mid blue dotted) 2022 (light blue dotted), 2021 (light grey dotted) and 2020 (dark grey dotted). The shaded area indicates the uncertainty around the new 2025 budget.
(Each year, the GCB is updated to include the latest data as well as improvements to modelling sources and sinks, resulting in some year-to-year revisions to the historical record.)
The 2025 figures are notably higher than those in the prior five GCB reports, reflecting an upward revision in historical land-use emissions. (This is discussed in more detail in the land-use emissions section below.)
Total global CO2 emissions have notably flattened in the past decade (2014-25), growing at only 0.3% per year compared to the 1.9% rate of growth during the prior decade (2004-13) and the longer-term average growth rate of 1.6% over 1959-2014.
This apparent flattening is due to declining land-use emissions compensating for continued – but slow – increases in fossil CO2 emissions. Fossil emissions grew around 0.2GtCO2 per year over the past decade, while land-use emissions decreased by a comparable amount.
However, despite the emissions plateau, there is still no sign of the rapid and deep decrease in CO2 emissions needed to reach net-zero and stabilise global temperatures in-line with the Paris Agreement temperature goal.
If global emissions remain at current levels, the remaining carbon budget to limit warming to 1.5C (with a 50% chance) will be rapidly exhausted.
(The carbon budget is the total amount of CO2 that scientists estimate can be emitted if warming is to be kept below a particular temperature threshold. Earlier this year, the Indicators of Global Climate Change report estimated the remaining carbon budget had declined by three-quarters between the start of 2020 and the start of 2025.)
With human-caused global warming sitting at around 1.36C above pre-industrial levels in 2024, the remaining budget for 1.5C is 170GtCO2, equivalent to four years of current emissions.
The GCB report finds that the remaining carbon budgets to limit warming to 1.7C and 2C have been reduced to 525GtCO2 (12 years at current emissions levels) and 1,055GtCO2 (25 years), respectively.
Global fossil CO2 emissions also grew more slowly in the past decade (0.8% per year) compared to the previous decade (2.1%). This was driven by the continued decarbonisation of energy systems – including a shift from burning coal to gas and replacing fossil fuels with renewables – as well as slightly weaker global economic growth during the past decade.
The figure below breaks down global emissions (dark blue line) in the 2025 budget into fossil (mid blue) and land-use (light blue) components. Fossil CO2 emissions represent the bulk of total global emissions in recent years, accounting for approximately 90% of emissions in 2025 (compared to 10% for land use). This represents a large change from the first half of the 20th century, when land-use emissions were approximately the same as fossil emissions.
Global fossil emissions include CO2 emitted from burning coal, oil and gas, as well as the production of cement. However, to determine total fossil emissions, the Global Carbon Budget also subtracts the cement carbonation sink – CO2 slowly absorbed by cement once it is exposed to the air – from fossil emissions.
Global emissions can also be expressed on a per-capita basis, as shown in the figure below.
While it is ultimately total global emissions that matter for the Earth’s climate – and a global per-capita figure glosses over a lot of variation among, and within, countries – it is noteworthy that global per-capita fossil emissions peaked in 2012 and have been slightly declining in the years since.
Land-use emissions continue downward trend
Global land-use emissions stem from deforestation, forest degradation, loss of peatlands and harvesting trees for wood. They averaged around 5.0GtCO2 over the past decade (2015-24) and the Global Carbon Budget provides an initial projection for 2025 of 4.1GtCO2.
This represents a 0.5GtCO2 decrease in land-use emissions relative to 2024. The GCB report suggests that this was largely driven by a combination of reductions in deforestation and forest degradation in South America and by the end of the dry 2023-24 El Niño conditions.
Overall, land-use emissions have decreased by around 32% compared to their average in the 2000s, with a particularly large drop in the past decade. This decline is statistically significant and is due both to decreasing deforestation and increasing levels of reforestation and afforestation globally.
Three countries – Brazil, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – collectively contribute approximately 57% of the global land-use emissions. In the past, China has been a meaningful contributor to land-use emissions, but in recent years its land-use emissions have turned net-negative as more trees have been planted than cut down.
The figure below shows changes in emissions over time in these countries, as well as land-use emissions in the rest of the world (grey).
Historical land-use emissions have been revised upward in the 2025 GCB report compared to prior estimates. This reflects a combination of two factors:
- The discontinuation of one of the four bookkeeping models that GCB has historically relied on for land-use emissions estimates. This model tended to show lower land-use emissions than the others.
- The inclusion of the impacts from CO2 fertilisation on global biomass densities. Because forests have higher biomass densities now than in the past, due to increasing CO2, this tends to increase the estimate of land-use emissions for recent years.
Fossil-fuel CO2 hits record highs
Global emissions of fossil CO2 – including coal, oil, gas and cement – increased by around 1.1% in 2025, relative to 2024, with an uncertainty range of 0.2-2.2%. This represents a new record high and surpasses the prior record set in 2024.
The figure below shows global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, divided into emissions from major emitting countries including China (dark blue shading), the US (mid blue), the EU (light blue), India (light blue) and the remainder of the world (grey).
China represents 32% of global CO2 emissions today. Its 2025 emissions are projected to increase by a relatively small 0.4% (with an uncertainty range of -0.9% to 2%), driven by a small rise in emissions from coal (0.3%), a modest rise in gas (1.3%) and a larger rise in oil (2.1%).
Given the uncertainty range, a decrease in Chinese emissions is also a possibility, but this will not be confirmed until the full 2025 data is available.
Similarly, recent analysis for Carbon Brief found that China’s emissions were “finely balanced between a small fall or rise” in 2025. However, it said that a drop in the full-year total became more likely after a 3% decline in September. (The Global Carbon Project estimates are based on data covering January through to August, which point towards a small rise in 2025.)
Whether China’s emissions see small rise or fall in 2025, the outcome will be due to moderate growth in energy consumption combined with an extraordinary growth in renewable power generation. This would represent the second year in a row where Chinese emissions growth was well below the average rate over the past decade.
The US represents 13% of global emissions and emissions in 2025 are projected to increase by 1.9% (-0.2 to +4.1%) compared with 2024. This marks a reversal from recent trends in declining CO2 emissions.
The projected growth of emissions in the US is likely driven by a combination of three factors: a colder start to the year after a mild 2024, which led to greater heating requirements, higher gas prices, which led to more coal being used in power generation, as well as an increase in total demand for electricity.
US emissions from coal are expected to increase by a substantial 7.5% in 2025, emissions from both oil and gas by a more modest 1.1% and emissions from cement to fall by -8.0%.
While policies enacted by the current US administration may increase CO2 emissions going forward, their impact on national emissions levels in 2025 were likely relatively modest compared to other factors.
India represents 8% of global emissions. In 2025, its emissions are projected to increase by 1.4% (-0.3% to +3.1%) on 2024 levels, significantly below recent trends.
An early monsoon with the highest-ever May rainfall substantially reduced cooling requirements in May and June, the hottest months of the year. Strong growth or renewables – particularly solar – has also helped limit the growth of Indian emissions.
Indian emissions from coal are expected to grow 1.7%, with oil growing 0.1%, gas shrinking by -6.4% and cement growing by 9.9%.
The EU represents 6% of global emissions. Its emissions are projected to increase by 0.4% in 2025, with an uncertainty range of -2.1 to +2.8%. This represents a divergence from a past decline in emissions (albeit with large uncertainties).
EU emissions from coal are expected to decline by -0.3%, whereas emissions from oil and gas are projected to increase by 0.6% and 0.9%, respectively. Cement emissions are expected to fall by -4.1%.
The increase in EU emissions is in part from weather-related low hydropower and wind generation which – despite increases in solar – have led to an increase in electricity generation from gas. In addition, a relatively cold February led to increased use of natural gas for space heating.
International aviation and shipping (included in the “rest of world” in the chart above) are responsible for 3% of global emissions. They are projected to increase by 6.8% for aviation, but remain flat for international shipping. This year will be the first time that aviation emissions have exceeded pre-Covid levels.
The rest of the world (excluding aviation) represents 38% of global emissions. Emissions are expected to grow by 1.1% in 2025 (ranging from -1.1% to +3.3%), with increases in emissions from coal (1%), oil (0.5%), gas (1.8%) and cement (2.4%).
The total emissions for each year over 2022-25, as well as the countries and regions that were responsible for the changes in absolute emissions, are shown in the figure below.
Annual emissions for 2022, 2023, 2024 and estimates for 2025 are shown by the black bars. The smaller bars show the change in emissions between each set of years, broken down by country or region – the US (dark blue), EU (mid blue), China (light blue), India (pale blue) and the rest of the world (grey). Negative values show reductions in emissions, while positive values reflect emission increases.
The US represented a large part of the rise in global fossil-fuel emissions in 2025. US emissions increases over 2024-25 contributed about 40% of the total global increase – more than the EU, China and India contributions combined.
The Global Carbon Project notes that emissions have declined over the past decade (2015-24) in 35 nations, which collectively account for 27% of global emissions. This is up from 18 countries during the prior decade (2005-14).
The decrease in emissions in those countries comes despite continued domestic economic growth and represents a long-term “decoupling” of CO2 emissions and the economy.
The carbon intensity of energy has consistently decreased over the past decade in China, the US, the EU – and, to a lesser extent, globally.
However, peaking CO2 emissions requires that the rate of decarbonisation exceeds the growth in energy demand. This has happened in some regions, including the US and EU, but not yet globally.
Modest growth in emissions from coal, oil, gas and cement
Global fossil-fuel emissions primarily result from the combustion of coal, oil and gas.
In 2025, coal is responsible for more emissions than any other fossil fuel, representing approximately 42% of global fossil-fuel CO2 emissions. Oil is the second largest contributor at 33% of fossil CO2, while gas comes in at 21%.
The production of cement is responsible for around 3.8% of global emissions, but this is reduced to 1.9% once the carbonation sink – the drawdown of atmospheric CO2 by concrete – is taken into account.
These percentages reflect both the amount of each fossil fuel consumed globally, but also differences in CO2 intensities. Coal results in the most CO2 emitted per unit of heat or energy produced, followed by oil and gas.
The figure below shows global CO2 emissions from different fuels over time, covering coal (dark blue), oil (mid blue) and gas (light blue), as well as cement production (pale blue) and other sources (grey).
While coal emissions increased rapidly in the mid-2000s, they have largely flattened since 2013. However, coal use increased significantly in 2021 and then more modestly in the subsequent four years.
Global emissions from coal increased by 0.8% in 2025 compared to 2024, while oil emissions increased 1.0% and gas emissions increased by 1.3%.
Despite setting a new record this year, global coal use is only 6% above 2013 levels – a full 13 years ago. By contrast, during the 2000s, global coal use grew at a rate of around 4% every single year.
The figure below shows the total emissions for each year over 2022-25 (black bars), as well as the absolute change in emissions for each fuel between years.
Global oil emissions were suppressed for a few years after the 2020, but rebounded to pre-pandemic levels as of 2024 and have continued to grow in 2025.
This reflects that, despite falling sales of internal combustion engine vehicles, not enough electric vehicles (EVs) have yet been sold to result in peak oil demand.
The global carbon budget
Every year, the Global Carbon Project provides an estimate of the overall “global carbon budget”. This is based on estimates of the release of CO2 through human activity and its uptake by the oceans and land, with the remainder adding to atmospheric concentrations of the gas.
(This differs from the commonly used term “remaining carbon budget”, which refers to the amount of CO2 that can be released while keeping warming below global limits of 1.5 or 2C.)
The most recent budget, including estimated values for 2025, is shown in the figure below.
Values above zero represent sources of CO2 – from fossil fuels and industry (dark blue shading) and land use (mid blue) – while values below zero represent carbon sinks that remove CO2 from the atmosphere. Any CO2 emissions that are not absorbed by the oceans (light grey) or land vegetation (mid grey) accumulate in the atmosphere (dark grey). In addition, a dashed black line is shown to represent the expected sum of sinks based on estimated emissions.
Over the past decade (2015-24), the world’s oceans have taken up approximately 29% of total human-caused emissions, or around 11.8GtCO2 per year.
The ocean CO2 sink has been relatively flat since 2014 after growing rapidly over the prior decades, reflecting the flattening of global emissions during that period.
This estimate for carbon sinks has been revised up from 26% in prior versions of the GCB, reflecting a major update to carbon budgets driven by new data and modelling of carbon sink behavior.
The land sink takes up around 21% of global emissions, or 8.7GtCO2 per year on average over the past decade – discussed in more detail in the section below. This is down from 29% in prior budgets.
The atmosphere continues to accumulate the bulk of human-caused CO2 emissions, with about 49% going into the atmosphere on average over the past decade – a rate of 20.4GtCO2 per year.
The growth rate of atmospheric CO2 in 2025 is expected to be around 2.3ppm, which is a bit below the decadal average rate of 2.6ppm over the past decade (2015-24). This is well below the record-setting rise of 3.7ppm in 2024, which was primarily driven by the effect of the 2023-24 El Niño conditions weakening the land sink.
Atmospheric CO2 concentrations are set to reach an annual average of 425.7ppm in 2025, representing an increase of 52% above pre-industrial levels of 280ppm.
There remains an unusual imbalance in the carbon budget in 2024, where the sum of the sinks is notably larger than estimated emissions. This can be seen in the figure above, where the dashed line is below the shaded area.
Budget imbalances are not unprecedented – there are large uncertainties in both emissions data and sink estimates. But the rise in the amount of CO2 accumulating in the atmosphere in 2024 is larger than would be expected based on emissions.
There are a number of potential explanations for this 2024 imbalance. The land cover data for 2024 is not yet complete and it is possible that some fire emissions data might be missing from the record. This might result in either higher land-use emissions or lower land sinks than currently estimated.
Alternatively, it could be due to the CO2 growth rate – captured by surface stations managed by the US National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration (NOAA) – being slightly high. CO2 records for 2024 from these stations are higher than those obtained from satellite-based sensors, though it remains unclear which provides the most accurate measurement.
A declining, but not collapsing, land sink
After an usually weak land carbon sink in 2023, there were a number of media articles about its potential collapse.
For example, in October 2024, the Guardian wrote that “the sudden collapse of carbon sinks was not factored into climate models – and could rapidly accelerate global heating”.
The truth is a bit more complicated. While the impending collapse of the land carbon sink has been greatly exaggerated, there is growing evidence of a long-term weakening of both the land and ocean carbon sinks due to human activity.
And while the land sink has recovered to its pre-El Niño strength in 2025, aided by relatively low global fire CO2 emissions, it will continue to gradually weaken as global temperatures rise. This is not unexpected – scientists have long foreseen a weaker carbon sink in a warmer world.
A weaker land sink will contribute to higher global temperatures in the future as more CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels and land use change will accumulate in the atmosphere.
The figure below shows the percentage of human emissions absorbed by the land sink in every year since 1959, with a recovery upwards in 2025 after two relatively low years.
In a study published in Nature alongside the release of the 2025 Global Carbon Budget, the same team of researchers provide a detailed estimate of exactly how the land and ocean sinks have changed as a result of human activity.
The research finds that the land and ocean sinks are 25% smaller and 7% smaller, respectively, than they would have been without the effects of climate change over 2015-24.
This amounts to a nearly 20% reduction in the efficacy of current global carbon sinks – that is, both the land and ocean – and a 15% reduction compared to how large they would be without the effects of climate change.
The figure below, from the new paper, shows the impact of climate change on the ocean sink (blue), the land sink (green) and atmospheric CO2 concentrations (grey) since 1960.
The weakening of carbon sinks due to human activity has led to an increase of atmospheric CO2 of more than 8ppm since 1960. The combined effects of climate change and deforestation have turned tropical forests in south-east Asia and in large parts of South America from CO2 sinks to sources.
And these sinks will likely continue to weaken as long as atmospheric CO2 concentrations continue to rise and the world continues to warm. There are a wide range of estimates of carbon cycle feedbacks among climate models, but a large carbon cycle feedback could result in a few tenths of a degree of future warming.
The post Analysis: Fossil-fuel CO2 emissions to set new record in 2025, as land sink ‘recovers’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Fossil-fuel CO2 emissions to set new record in 2025, as land sink ‘recovers’
Greenhouse Gases
Cropped 3 December 2025: Extreme weather in Africa; COP30 roundup; Saudi minister interview
We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
COP30 roundup
FOOD OFF THE MENU: COP30 wrapped up in the Brazilian Amazon city of Belém, with several new announcements for forest protection, but with experts saying that food systems were seemingly “erased” from official negotiations, Carbon Brief reported. Other observers told the Independent that the lack of mention of food in some of the main negotiated outcomes was “surprising” and “deeply disappointing”. The outlet noted that smallholder farmers spend an “estimated 20 to 40% of their annual income on adaptive measures…despite having done next to nothing to contribute to the climate crisis”.
‘BITTERSWEET’: Meanwhile, Reuters said that the summit’s outcomes for trees and Indigenous peoples were “unprecedented”, but “bittersweet”. It noted that countries had “unlocked billions in new funds for forests” through the Tropical Forest Forever Facility. (For more on that fund, see Carbon Brief’s explainer.) However, the newswire added, “nations failed to agree on a plan to keep trees standing as they have repeatedly promised to do in recent summits”. Mongabay noted that pledges to the new forest fund totalled “less than a quarter of the $25bn initially required for a full-scale rollout”.
‘MIXED OUTCOMES’: A separate piece in Mongabay said that COP30 “delivered mixed outcomes” for Indigenous peoples. One positive outcome was a “historic pledge to recognise Indigenous land tenure rights over 160m hectares” of tropical forest land, the outlet said. This was accompanied by a monetary pledge of $1.8bn to support “Indigenous peoples, local and Afro-descendant communities in securing land rights over the next five years”, it added. However, Mongabay wrote, there were some “major disappointments” around the summit’s outcomes, particularly around the absence of mention of critical minerals and fossil-fuel phaseout in the final texts.
Africa on edge
SOMALIA DROUGHT: Somalia officially declared a drought emergency last month “after four consecutive failed rainy seasons left millions at risk of hunger and displacement”, allAfrica reported, with 130,000 people in “immediate life-threatening need”. According to Al Jazeera, more than 4.5 million people “face starvation”, as “failed rains and heat devastated” the country, with displaced communities also “escaping fighting” in their villages and aid cuts impacting relief. Down to Earth, meanwhile, covered an Amnesty International report that demonstrated that Somalia failed to “implement a functional social-security system for the marginalised, particularly those negatively affected by drought”.
COCOA CRASH: Ivory Coast’s main cocoa harvest is expected to “decline sharply for [the] third consecutive year” due to erratic rainfall, crop disease, ageing farms and poor investment, Reuters reported. Africa Sustainability Matters observed that the delayed implementation of the EU’s deforestation law – announced last week – could impact two million smallholder farmers, who may see “delays in certification processes ripple through payment cycles and export volumes”. Meanwhile, SwissInfo reported that the “disconnect between high global cocoa prices and the price paid to farmers” is leading to “unprecedented cocoa smuggling” in Ghana.
‘FERTILISER CRISIS’: Nyasa Times reported that, “for the first time”, Malawian president Peter Mutharika admitted that the country is “facing a planting season…for which his government is dangerously unprepared”. According to the paper, Mutharika acknowledged that the country is “heading into the rains without adequate fertiliser and with procurement dangerously behind schedule” at a meeting with the International Monetary Fund’s Africa director. “We are struggling with supplies… We are not yet ready in terms of fertiliser,” Mutharika is quoted as saying, with the paper adding that his administration is “overwhelmed” by a fertiliser crisis.
News and views
PLANT TALKS COLLAPSE: “Decade-long” talks aimed at negotiating new rules for seed-sharing “collapsed” after week-long negotiations in Lima, Euractiv reported. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture allows “any actor to access seed samples of 64 major food crops stored in public gene banks”, but “virtually no money flows back to countries that conserve and share seed diversity”, the outlet said. Observers “criticised the closed-door nature of the final talks”, which attempted to postpone a decision on payments until 2027, it added.
UNSUSTAINABLE: The UK food system is driving nature loss and deepening climate change, according to a new WWF report. The report analysed the impacts on nature, climate and people of 10 UK retailers representing 90% of the domestic grocery market. Most of the retailers committed in 2021 to halving the environmental impact of the UK grocery market by 2030. However, the report found that the retailers are “a long way off” on reducing their emissions and sourcing products from deforestation-free areas.
GREY CARBON: A “flurry” of carbon-credit deals “covering millions of hectares of landmass” across Africa struck by United Arab Emirates-based firm Blue Carbon on the sidelines of COP28 “have gone nowhere”, according to a joint investigation by Agence-France Presse and Code for Africa. In Zimbabwe – where the deal included “about 20% of the country’s landmass” – national climate change authorities said that the UAE company’s memorandum of understanding “lapsed without any action”. AFP attempted multiple ways to contact Blue Carbon, but received no reply. Meanwhile, research covered by New Scientist found that Africa’s forests “are now emitting more CO2 than they absorb”.
UK NATURE: The UK government released an updated “environmental improvement plan” to help England “meet numerous legally binding goals” for environmental restoration, BusinessGreen reported. The outlet added that it included measures such as creating “wildlife-rich habitats” and boosting tree-planting. Elsewhere, a study covered by the Times found that England and Wales lost “almost a third of their grasslands” in the past 90 years. The main causes of grassland decline were “increased mechanisation on farms, new agrochemicals and crop-growing”, the Times said.
IN DANGER: The Trump administration proposed changes to the US Endangered Species Act that “could clear the way for more oil drilling, logging and mining” in key species habitats, reported the New York Times. This act is the “bedrock environmental law intended to prevent animal and plant extinctions”, the newspaper said, adding that one of the proposals could make it harder to protect species from future threats, such as the effects of climate change. It added: “Environmental groups are expected to challenge the proposals in court once they are finalised.”
‘ALREADY OVERSTRETCHED’: Producing enough food to feed the world’s growing population by 2050 “will place additional pressure on the world’s already overstretched” resources, according to the latest “state of the world’s land and water resources” report from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. The report said that degradation of agricultural lands is “creating unprecedented pressure on the world’s agrifood systems”. It also found that urban areas have “more than doubled in size in just two decades”, consuming 24m hectares “of some of the most fertile croplands” in the process.
Spotlight
Saudi minister interviewed
During the second week of COP30 in Belém, Carbon Brief’s Daisy Dunne conducted a rare interview with a Saudi Arabian minister.
Dr Osama Faqeeha is deputy environment minister for Saudi Arabia and chief adviser to the COP16 presidency on desertification.
Carbon Brief: Thank you very much for agreeing to this interview. You represent the Saudi Arabia COP16 presidency on desertification. What are your priorities for linking desertification, biodiversity and climate change at COP30?
Dr Osama Faqeeha: First of all, our priority is to really highlight the linkages – the natural linkage – between land, climate and biodiversity. These are all interconnected, natural pillars for Earth. We need to pursue actions on the three together. In this way, we can achieve multiple goals. We can achieve climate resilience, we can protect biodiversity and we can stop land degradation. And this will really give us multiple benefits – food security, water security, climate resilience, biodiversity and social goals.
CB: Observers have accused Saudi Arabia, acting on behalf of the Arab group, of blocking an ambitious outcome on a text on synergies between climate change and biodiversity loss, under the item on cooperation with international organisations. [See Carbon Brief’s full explanation.] What is your response?
OF: We support synergies in the action plans. We support synergies in the financial flows. We support synergies in the political [outcome]. What we don’t support is trying to reduce all of the conventions. We don’t support dissolving the conventions. We need a climate convention, we need a biodiversity convention and we need a desertification convention. There was this incident, but the discussion continued after that and has been clarified. We support synergies. We oppose dissolution. This way we dilute the issues. No. This is a challenge. But we don’t have to address them separately. We need to address them in a comprehensive way so that we can really have a win-win situation.
CB: But as the president of the COP16 talks on desertification, surely more close work on the three Rio conventions would be a priority for you?
OF: First of all, we have to realise the convention is about land. Preventing land degradation and combating drought. These are the two major challenges.
CB: We’re at COP30 now and we’re at a crucial point in the negotiations where a lot of countries have been calling for a roadmap away from fossil fuels. What is Saudi Arabia’s position on agreeing to a roadmap away from fossil fuels?
OF: I think the issue is the emissions, it’s not the fuel. And our position is that we have to cut emissions regardless. In Saudi Arabia, in our nationally determined contribution [NDC], we doubled [the 2030 emissions reductions target] – from 130MtCO2 to 278MtCO2 – on a voluntary basis. So we are very serious about cutting emissions.
CB: The presidency said that some countries see the fossil-fuel roadmap as a red line. Is Saudi Arabia seeing a fossil-fuel roadmap as a red line for agreement in the negotiations?
OF: I think people try to put pressure on the negotiation to go in one way or another. And I think we should avoid that because, trying to demonise a country, that’s not good. Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the Paris Agreement. Saudi Arabia made the Paris Agreement possible. We are committed to the Paris Agreement.
[Carbon Brief obtained the “informal list” of countries that opposed a fossil-fuel roadmap at COP30, which included Saudi Arabia.]
CB: You mention that you feel sometimes the media demonises Saudi Arabia. So could you clarify, what do you hope to be Saudi Arabia’s role in guiding the negotiations to conclusion here at this COP?
OF: I think we have to realise that there is common but differentiated responsibilities. We have developed countries and developing countries. We have to realise that this is very well established in the convention. We can reach the same end point, but with different pathways. And this is what the negotiation is all about. It’s not one size fits all. What works with a certain country may not work with another country. So, I think people misread the negotiations. We, as Saudi Arabia, officially announced that we will reach carbon neutrality by 2060 – and we are putting billions and billions of dollars to reach this goal. But it doesn’t mean that we agree on everything. On every idea. We agree to so many things, you never hear that. Saudi Arabia agrees on one thousand points and we disagree on one point, then suddenly it becomes the news. Now, why does the media do that? Maybe that gives them more attention. I don’t know. But all I can tell you is that Saudi Arabia is part of the process. Saudi Arabia is making the process work.
This interview has been edited for length.
Watch, read, listen
NEW CHALLENGE: CNN discussed the environmental impacts of AI usage and how scientists are using it to conserve biodiversity.
AMAZON COP: In the Conversation, researchers argued that hosting COP30 in the Amazon made the “realities of climate and land-use change jarringly obvious” and Indigenous voices “impossible to ignore”.
DUBIOUS CLAIMS: DeSmog investigated an EU-funded “campaign blitz” that “overstated the environmental benefits of eating meat and dairy, while featuring bizarre and misleading claims”.
WASP’S NEST: In a talk for the Leverhulme Centre for Nature Recovery, Prof Seirian Sumner explained the “natural capital” of wasps and why it is important to “love the unlovable parts of nature”.
New science
- Climate change can “exacerbate” the abundance and impacts of plastic pollution on terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems | Frontiers in Science
- The North Sea region accounts for more than 20% of peatland-related emissions within the EU, UK, Norway and Iceland, despite accounting for just 4% of the region’s peatland area | Nature Communications
- Economic damages from climate-related disasters in the Brazilian Amazon rose 370% over 2000-22, with farming experiencing more than 60% of total losses | Nature Communications
In the diary
- 1-5 December: Meeting of the implementation review committee of the UN desertification convention | Panama City
- 2-5 December: Meeting of the contracting parties to the Barcelona Convention on the protection of the Mediterranean Sea | Cairo
- 5 December: World soil day
- 8-12 December: International Water Association water and development congress and exhibition | Bangkok
Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Ayesha Tandon also contributed to this issue. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org
The post Cropped 3 December 2025: Extreme weather in Africa; COP30 roundup; Saudi minister interview appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Cropped 3 December 2025: Extreme weather in Africa; COP30 roundup; Saudi minister interview
Greenhouse Gases
Analysis: Why COP30’s ‘tripling adaptation finance’ target is less ambitious than it seems
One of the headline outcomes to emerge from COP30 was a new target to “at least triple” finance for climate adaptation in developing countries by 2035.
Vulnerable nations stress that they urgently need to strengthen their infrastructure as climate hazards intensify, but they struggle to attract funding for these efforts.
The new goal, which builds on a previous target agreed four years ago to double adaptation finance by 2025, was a central demand for many developing countries at the UN climate summit in Belém.
Yet, throughout the two-week negotiations, developed-country parties opposed new targets that would give them more financial obligations.
As a result of this opposition, the final target is less ambitious than the idea originally floated by developing countries, resulting in less pressure on developed countries to provide public funds.
This article looks at precisely what the final COP30 outcome does – and does not – say about tripling adaptation finance, as well as the implications for developing countries.
- 1) The final COP30 decision delayed the ‘tripling’ target by five years and added uncertainty
- 2) The new target is looser than the previous ‘doubling’ goal for adaptation finance
- 3) The target also falls far short of developing countries’ adaptation needs
1. The final COP30 decision delayed the ‘tripling’ target by five years and added uncertainty
At COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, a target was agreed for developed nations to double the amount of adaptation finance they would provide to developing countries by 2025.
This target has been broadly interpreted as approximately $40bn by 2025, using the agreed baseline of $18.8bn in 2019.
As of 2022, the latest year for which official data is available, annual adaptation finance from developed countries had reached $28.9bn. (Final confirmation of whether the target has been met will not come until 2027, due to the delay in climate-finance reporting.)
With the “doubling” target set to expire this year, some developing countries came to COP30 with the aim of agreeing on a new target.
The least-developed countries (LDCs) group called for “a tripling of grant-based adaptation finance by 2030 to at least $120bn”. They were backed by small-island states, the African group and some Latin American countries.
This proposal was included in the first draft of the “global mutirão“, the key overarching decision text produced by the COP30 presidency.
However, the text that ultimately emerged pushed the “tripling” deadline back to 2035. As the chart below shows, this delayed target could mean far less adaptation finance in the short term, due to developed countries taking longer to ramp up their contributions.
Lina Yassin, an adaptation advisor to the LDCs, tells Carbon Brief that this goal is “fundamentally out of step” with the obligation for developed countries to achieve a “balance” between adaptation and mitigation finance.
(This obligation is set out in the Paris Agreement, but, in practice, developed countries provide far more finance for mitigation initiatives, such as clean-energy projects. Adaptation finance has been around a third of the total in recent years and this would still be the case if the overall $300bn climate-finance and tripling adaptation finance targets are both met.)
The final text also removed a mention of 2025 as the baseline year, adding uncertainty as to what precisely the 2035 target means.
“The [LDCs] wanted a clear number, tied to a clear baseline year, that you can actually track and hold providers accountable for,” Yassin explains.
The text does allude to the “doubling” target agreed at COP26 in Glasgow, which some analysts say is an indicator of what the baseline should be.
“It is obviously deliberately vaguely written, but we think the reference to the Glasgow pledge means they should triple that pledge,” Gaia Larsen, director for climate finance access at the World Resources Institute (WRI), tells Carbon Brief.
2. The new target is looser than the previous ‘doubling’ goal for adaptation finance
The “doubling” target set at COP26 was based on adaptation finance “provided” by developed countries.
This means it exclusively comes as publicly funded grants and loans from many EU member states, the US, Japan and a handful of other nations, including finance they raise via multilateral development banks (MDBs) and funds.
The LDCs’ original proposal for the “tripling” goal was even more specific. It called for “grant-based finance”, meaning any loans would not be included.
Amid widespread cuts to aid budgets, notably in the US, developed countries have been unwilling to commit to new targets based solely on them providing public finance.
Instead, they stressed at COP30 that any new pledges should align with the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) to raise $300bn by 2035, which was agreed last year. This is reflected in the final decision, which says the tripling target is “in the context of” the NCQG.
Unlike the COP26 goal, the NCQG covers finance from a variety of sources, including “mobilised” private finance and voluntary contributions from wealthier developing countries.
Assuming $120bn as the 2035 objective, WRI has estimated what its composition could be, based on the looser accounting allowed under the new adaptation-finance goal.
As the chart below shows, the institute estimates that more than a quarter of the target could be met by these new sources, with the rest coming from developed-country governments.
WRI assumes that MDBs will play a “critical role” in meeting the 2035 target, amid calls for them to triple their overall finance. More MDB funding would also automatically be counted, as the new adaptation goal includes MDB funds that are attributable to developing countries, as set out in the NCQG.
The WRI analysis also assumes a big increase in the amount of private finance for adaptation that is “mobilised” by public spending, scaling up significantly to $18bn by 2035.
Traditionally, it has been difficult to raise private investment for adaptation initiatives, as they provide less return on investment than clean-energy projects.
3. The target also falls far short of developing countries’ adaptation needs
The UN Environment Programme’s (UNEP) recent “adaptation gap” report estimates that developing countries’ adaptation investment requirements – based on modelled costs – will likely hit $310bn each year by 2035.
Developing countries have self-reported even higher financial “needs” in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans (NAPs) submitted to the UN.
When added together, UNEP concludes these needs amount to $365bn each year for developing countries between 2023 and 2035.
(According to NRDC, most of this discrepancy comes from middle-income countries reporting significantly higher needs than the UNEP-modelled costs.)
As the chart below shows, the new COP30 target would not cover more than a third of these estimated needs by 2035.
Both domestic spending and private-sector investment that is independent of developed-country involvement are expected to play a role in meeting developing countries’ adaptation needs.
Nevertheless, UNEP states that the overarching climate-finance goals set by countries are “clearly insufficient” to close the adaptation-finance “gap”.
Even in a scenario based on the LDCs’ original proposal of tripling adaptation finance to $120bn by 2030, the UNEP report concluded that a “significant” gap would have remained.
The post Analysis: Why COP30’s ‘tripling adaptation finance’ target is less ambitious than it seems appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Why COP30’s ‘tripling adaptation finance’ target is less ambitious than it seems
Greenhouse Gases
Asia-Pacific faces ‘$500bn-a-year’ hit from rising seas if current policies continue
Coastal flooding could bring $500bn of annual damages to the Asia-Pacific by the year 2100, if countries do not adapt to rising sea levels.
This is according to new research, published in the journal Scientific Reports, which assesses how coastal flooding is impacting the Asia-Pacific region – and models how the damages could worsen as sea level rises over the 21st century.
The paper finds that coastal flooding is already driving $26.8bn of damage every year across 29 countries in Asia and the Pacific, equivalent to 0.1% of the region’s GDP.
It projects that, under current policies, annual coastal flood damages in the region could rise to $518bn by 2100 – but this could drop to $338bn if warming is capped at 1.5C.
Small island states face the greatest risks from coastal flooding and will continue to bear the brunt of the damage as the planet continues to warm, according to the research.
For example, it finds that Tuvalu will face annual coastal flood damage equivalent to 38% of its GDP by the end of the century.
Meanwhile, small island states such as Kiribati, the Maldives, Micronesia and Tuvalu will permanently lose around 10% of their total land area.
The study’s lead author says the research shows how “rising seas” create “existential” and “economic” risks for low-lying islands in the Asia-Pacific.
He tells Carbon Brief that the paper highlights a “sharp inequality”, as developing nations with little historical responsibility for sea level rise face the brunt of its impacts.
Coastal damage
More than one billion people – about 15% of the world’s population – currently live within 10km of a coast.
Asia is home to some of the largest cities in the world, many of which are located near the sea, such as Mumbai, Tokyo, and Shanghai. The continent is home to 60% of the world’s coastal population.
However, there are hazards to living near the water.
Coastal flooding is caused by a combination of gradually rising sea levels and “episodic extreme sea levels”, such as high tides and storm surges, the study explains.
To assess these two factors, the study combines components including an ocean model and tide-height data.
The authors model flooding in all coastal Pacific and Asian countries that are listed as “developing member countries” by the Asian Development Bank. These 29 countries include Bangladesh, the Philippines and Tuvalu.
They calculate the economic damage caused by flooding, by combining their flood model with data on land use and “asset values” across the residential, commercial, industrial, infrastructure and agricultural sectors.
The authors assume when land floods permanently, the “assets” are completely lost. For areas that only flood periodically, the authors use a model linking flood depth to a percentage of land damaged to calculate the economic consequences.
They find that coastal flooding currently drives $27bn of damage every year in the Asia-Pacific.
China and Indonesia bear the greatest damage, each losing more than $6bn every year. The study authors say this is because both countries have “extensive coastlines, large populations in flood-prone areas and critical economic infrastructure concentrated near the coast”.
However, the study finds that small islands face the greatest economic damage as a percentage of their GDP.
The study shows that the five most-severely affected countries are small island states. Vanuatu tops the ranking, losing 1.5% of its GDP to flooding every year. It is followed by Papua New Guinea and Micronesia.
Dr Michalis Vousdoukas is a researcher in coastal geography at the University of the Aegean in Greece and lead author of the study.
He tells Carbon Brief that even these damage estimates are “conservative” as they do not consider indirect economic losses, such as disruption to business, the loss of critical infrastructure, such as airports, or social impacts, such as migration.
Vousdoukas tells Carbon Brief that the study “highlights a sharp inequality between responsibility and impact”, explaining that the “countries that contributed the least to global emissions, particularly atoll nations, face the highest relative damages”.
Island nations in the Asia-Pacific region made of atolls – ring-shaped coral reefs or islands – include Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu.
Exposure
The authors also calculate population exposure to flooding, by overlaying their flood model with world population data.
Vousdoukas explains that “a person is considered exposed if they live in an area that appears as flooded in our model”.
The paper finds that six million people across the Asia-Pacific are currently at risk of coastal flooding each year, accounting for 0.2% of the region’s total population. The paper says:
“Although this may appear to be a small percentage, it still represents millions of individuals and families whose lives and livelihoods are under constant threat.”
Ranjan Panda is the convenor of the Combat Climate Change Network in India. Panda, who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that sea level rise is already forcing “millions of people to migrate out in distressed conditions to cities and other countries”.
China and Bangladesh rank the highest, with 2.2 million and 1.5 million people, respectively, exposed to coastal flooding each year.
However, small islands have the greatest percentage of their population exposed to flooding. Vanuatu again tops the table, with 2% of its population facing coastal flooding every year, according to the study. It is followed by Micronesia and the Maldives.
Bangladesh is the highest ranking non-island country, due to its “densely populated and flood-prone delta region”, the study finds.
Rising seas
As the climate warms, coastal flooding is worsening.
Average global sea levels have risen by more than 20cm since 1900, driven mainly by the thermal expansion of the ocean and the melting of glaciers and ice sheets.
Global warming is also “supercharging” hurricanes and typhoons, causing storm surges – the temporary rise in sea level that happens during a storm – to become more intense.
The study uses projections from the IPCC’s sixth assessment report to model sea level rise over the 21st century. These include thermal expansion and meltwater from glaciers and ice sheets, but exclude “low-likelihood, high-impact” events, such as ice-sheet collapse.
The authors assess five future scenarios:
- SSP1-1.9: A very-low emissions reductions pathway that “aligns with” the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit
- SSP1-2.6: A “low” emissions pathway achieving net-zero emissions after 2050
- SSP2-4.5: A “moderate” emissions scenario, often described as the trajectory under current climate policies.
- SSP3-7.0: A “high” emissions pathway
- SSP5-8.5: A very-high emissions pathway of “high fossil fuel reliance” throughout the 21st century
They find that, even under the lowest 1.5C warming scenario, countries in the Asia-Pacific will face damages of $338bn due to coastal flooding every year by the end of the century. This accounts for 1.3% of the region’s present-day GDP. (The authors assume no adaptation measures, changes in land use or inflation over the century.)
Under the current policy scenario, annual damage from coastal flooding rises to $518bn by the end of the century.
The chart below shows coastal flood damage as a percentage of annual GDP by the end of the century under the five scenarios for each country. Each horizontal bar shows the damage for one country, with the lowest warming SSP1-1.9 scenario on the left (grey) and highest warming SSP5-8.5 scenario (black) on the right.
The study finds that, by the end of the century, the Pacific island of Tuvalu will face the worst economic consequences from coastal flooding. Even under the 1.5C warming scenario, its annual economic losses due to coastal flooding will reach 38% of its GDP.
The authors also assess the amount of land that will be permanently lost to the sea.
They find that small island states – such as Kiribati, the Maldives, Micronesia and Tuvalu – will experience the highest percentage of their land permanently submerged, each losing around 10% of their total land area.
Two million people currently live in areas of the Asia-Pacific that will be permanently flooded by the end of the century under the 1.5C warming scenario, according to the research.
Finance gap
Countries can reduce the impacts of coastal flooding through adaptation. This can include building flood defenses, making infrastructure more resilient to flooding, or arranging “managed retreat” to move people away from vulnerable areas as the seas encroach.
The study authors model the cost of building defences – such as sea walls, levees, embankments and sand dunes – high enough that the economic damage from coastal flooding over the 21st century does not worsen beyond 2020 levels.
The research highlights that the cost of investing in these defences is substantially lower than the potential economic damages of sea level rise.
The authors estimate that, under a 1.5C warming scenario, building flood defenses to limit flood damage to 2020 levels would cost $9bn in total. However, building these defences would avoid $157bn in damages due to coastal flooding, they find.
Dr Rafael Almar is a researcher at the Laboratory of Space Geophysical and Oceanographic Studies in France and was not involved in the study. He says the study has “significant implications for development banks and financial institutions” as it could help them prioritise investments in “clearly identified hotspots”.
However, he emphasises that building flood defences “is not the only solution”. For example, he argues that “relocation and renaturalisation” – the process of moving people away from the coast and allowing the area to return to its natural state – can make an area “more resilient”.
Panda also warns that physical flood defenses “could actually be triggering further local environmental crises that accelerate the losses and damages faced by people due to sea level rise and flooding impacts”.
Sea walls have been shown to damage wildlife – for example, blocking animals such as turtles from reaching parts of the beach – according to an article in Climate Home News. The piece adds that physical defenses are “inflexible” and “mainly benefit the rich and encourage risky building near the coast”.
Sourcing money for developing countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change is an ongoing talking point at international climate negotiations.
A group of developed nations, including much of Europe, the US and Japan, is obliged under the Paris Agreement to provide international “climate finance” to developing countries. This money can be used for both mitigation – reducing emissions to limit warming – and adaptation.
In 2023, developed nations provided $26bn in international adaptation finance to developing nations, according to a recent UN report. This is roughly the amount that Asia-Pacific countries currently lose every year due to coastal flooding alone.
The post Asia-Pacific faces ‘$500bn-a-year’ hit from rising seas if current policies continue appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Asia-Pacific faces ‘$500bn-a-year’ hit from rising seas if current policies continue
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