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Clean energy contributed a record 11.4tn yuan ($1.6tn) to China’s economy in 2023, accounting for all of the growth in investment and a larger share of economic growth than any other sector.

The new sector-by-sector analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures, industry data and analyst reports, illustrates the huge surge in investment in Chinese clean energy last year – in particular, the so-called “new three” industries of solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries.

Solar power, along with manufacturing capacity for solar panels, EVs and batteries, were the main focus of China’s clean-energy investments in 2023, the analysis shows.

(For this analysis, we used a broad definition of “clean energy” sectors, including renewables, nuclear power, electricity grids, energy storage, EVs and railways. These are technologies and infrastructure needed to decarbonise China’s production and use of energy.)

Other key findings of the analysis include:

  • Clean-energy investment rose 40% year-on-year to 6.3tn yuan ($890bn), with the growth accounting for all of the investment growth across the Chinese economy in 2023.
  • China’s $890bn investment in clean-energy sectors is almost as large as total global investments in fossil fuel supply in 2023 – and similar to the GDP of Switzerland or Turkey.
  • Including the value of production, clean-energy sectors contributed 11.4tn yuan ($1.6tn) to the Chinese economy in 2023, up 30% year-on-year.
  • Clean-energy sectors, as a result, were the largest driver of China’ economic growth overall, accounting for 40% of the expansion of GDP in 2023.
  • Without the growth from clean-energy sectors, China’s GDP would have missed the government’s growth target of “around 5%”, rising by only 3.0% instead of 5.2%.

The surge in clean-energy investment comes as China’s real-estate sector shrank for the second year in a row. This shift positions the clean-energy industry as a key part not only of China’s energy and climate efforts, but also of its broader economic and industrial policy.

However, the spectre of overcapacity means China’s clean-energy investment growth – and its investment-driven economic model, in general – cannot continue indefinitely.

The growing importance of these new industries gives China a significant economic stake in the global transition to clean-energy technologies.

Yet it also poses questions for overseas policymakers attempting to tie their own climate strategies to domestic industrial growth.

Clean energy drives China’s growth in 2023

China’s clean-energy investment boom means the sector accounted for all of the growth in investment across the country’s economy in 2023, with spending in other areas shrinking.

China invested an estimated 6.3tn yuan ($890bn) in clean-energy sectors in 2023, up from 4.6tn yuan in 2022, a 1.7tn yuan (40%) year-on-year increase. In total, clean energy made up 13% of the huge volume of investment in fixed assets in China in 2023, up from 9% a year earlier.

With Chinese investment growing by just 1.5tn yuan in 2023 overall, the analysis shows that clean energy accounted for all of the growth, while investment in sectors such as real estate shrank.

This is shown in the figure below, which also highlights the concentration of clean-energy investment in the so-called “new three” of solar, energy storage and EVs.

Clean energy was also the top contributor to China’s economic growth overall, contributing around 40% of the year-on-year increase in GDP across all sectors.

Clean energy was the top driver of China's economic growth in 2023
Contributions to the growth in Chinese investment (left) and GDP overall (right) in 2023 by sector, trillion yuan. “New three” refers to solar, EVs and storage. Source: Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) analysis for Carbon Brief. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Including the value of goods and services, the clean-energy sector contributed an estimated 11.4tn yuan ($1.6tn) to China’s economy in 2023, an increase of 30% year-on-year.

This means clean energy accounted for 9.0% of China’s GDP in 2023, up from 7.2% in 2022.

Without the contribution of clean-energy sectors to China’s economic growth in 2023, the country would have seen its GDP rise by just 3.0%, instead of the 5.2% actually recorded.

This would have missed government growth targets at a time of increasing concerns over the nation’s economic prospects, amid the ongoing real-estate crisis and declining population.

The major role that clean energy played in boosting growth in 2023 means the industry is now a key part of China’s wider economic and industrial development.

This is likely to bolster China’s climate and energy policies – as well as its “dual carbon” targets for 2030 and 2060 – by enhancing the economic and political relevance of the sector.

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The ‘new three’ dominate clean-energy investment

This analysis is based on a combination of government releases, industry data and analyst reports, with the exact methodology varying sector-by-sector, as set out in the sections that follow.

The table below lists the estimated contributions of each sector to Chinese investment and GDP overall in 2023, as well as the year-on-year growth since 2022.

The analysis includes solar, EVs, energy efficiency, rail, energy storage, electricity grids, wind, nuclear and hydropower within the broad category of “clean-energy sectors”. All of these are technologies and infrastructure needed to decarbonise China’s energy supply and consumption.

The so-called “new three” of solar, storage and EVs are all prominent in the table – and all recorded strong growth.

Our analysis shows that investment in clean power generation and energy storage capacity reached 1.7tn yuan in 2023 (up 48% year-on-year), while investment in manufacturing capacity for solar, EVs and batteries reached 2.5tn yuan (+60%).

Investment in clean-energy infrastructure reached 1.4tn yuan (+9%, comprising grids, EV charging points and railways) and investment in energy efficiency was 600bn yuan (+15%).

Meanwhile, our analysis shows the value of production of goods and services in the clean-technology sectors reached 5.1tn yuan in 2023, increasing 26% year-on-year.

This includes the value of electricity generation, EV sales and solar exports, as well as the transport of passengers and goods via rail.

Sector Activity Value in 2023, CNY bln Value in 2023, USD bln Year-on-year growth
Solar power Investment: power generation capacity 755 107 61%
Solar power Investment: manufacturing capacity 922 131 180%
Solar power Electricity generation 277 39 45%
Solar power Exports of components 533 75 42%
EVs Investment: manufacturing capacity 1,250 177 35%
EVs Investment: charging infrastructure 102 14 33%
EVs Production of vehicles 2,200 311 30%
Energy efficiency Investment: Industry 585 83 14%
Rail transportation Investment 761 108 7%
Rail transportation Transport of passengers and goods 964 136 39%
Energy storage Investment: Pumped hydro 334 47 38%
Energy storage Investment: Electrolyzers 88 12 85%
Energy storage Investment: Battery manufacturing 317 45 116%
Energy storage Investment: Grid-connected batteries 75 11 364%
Power grid Investment: transmission capacity 540 76 8%
Wind power Investment: power generation capacity, onshore 330 47 85%
Wind power Investment: power generation capacity, offshore 72 10 17%
Wind power Electricity generation 363 51 12%
Nuclear power Investment: power generation capacity 87 12 45%
Nuclear power Electricity generation 195 28 4%
Hydropower Investment: power generation capacity 80 11 -1%
Hydropower Electricity generation 512 72 -6%
Total Investments 6,297 891 39%
Total Production of goods and services 5,082 719 26%
Total Total GDP contribution 11,379 1,610 33%

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Solar power

Solar was the largest contributor to growth in China’s clean-technology economy in 2023. It recorded growth worth a combined 1tn yuan of new investment, goods and services, as its value grew from 1.5tn yuan in 2022 to 2.5tn yuan in 2023, an increase of 63% year-on-year.

While China has dominated the manufacturing and installations of solar panels for years, the growth of the industry in 2023 was unprecedented.

On the installation side, two major central government initiatives drove increased volumes, namely the “whole-county distributed solar” and the “clean energy base” programmes.

In addition, in response to the slowdown in the real-estate sector, the central government introduced a new policy at the start of 2023, to encourage the development of solar power industries on unused and existing construction lands.

Meanwhile, during the annual legislative meetings in the spring of 2023, 15 provinces prioritised solar industry development in their government work agendas.

Detailed data on the growth in China’s solar installations in the first 11 months of the year is shown in the figure below. (An estimated 200GW was added across the country during 2023 as a whole, more than doubling from the record of 87GW set in 2022.)

China installed record amounts of new solar capacity in 2023
Solar capacity newly installed in China in January to November each year, gigawatts. Source: National Energy Administration. Chart by Carbon Brief.

At the same time, China’s solar manufacturing industry recorded even stronger growth in 2023. China added 340 gigawatts (GW) of polysilicon production capacity and 300GW of wafer, cell and module production capacity in 2023, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

China experienced a significant increase in solar product exports in 2023. It exported 56GW of solar wafers, 32GW of cells and 178GW of modules in the first 10 months of the year, up 90%, 72% and 34% year-on-year respectively, according to the China Photovoltaic Industry Association. However, due to falling costs, the export value of these solar products only increased by 3%.

Within the overall export growth there were notable increases in China’s solar exports to countries along the “belt and road”, to southeast Asian nations and to several African countries.

For this analysis, the value of investments in new solar manufacturing capacity was estimated from the average capital costs of each step in the supply chain, taken from a compilation of reported project costs. This gave a significantly lower cost level than reported in other literature.

The analysis assumes that local government investment in facilities and infrastructure, as well as direct subsidies, added 30% to the reported private investment.

Investment in solar power was estimated by multiplying the newly added capacity from Bloomberg New Energy Finance by the unit investment costs for rooftop and utility-scale systems from China Photovoltaic Industry Association.

The value of exported solar power equipment was based on China Photovoltaic Industry Association data for 2022 and reported export growth for 2023.

The value of solar power equipment produced for domestic installation was not included in our analysis, to avoid overlap with the already-estimated investment costs for domestic solar projects.

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Wind power

China installed 41GW of wind power capacity in the first 11 months of 2023, an increase of 84% year-on-year in new additions. Some 60GW of onshore wind alone was due to be added across 2023, according to China Galaxy Securities, based on trends in previous years.

In addition, offshore wind capacity increased by 6GW across the whole of 2023.

Wind capacity added in the first 11 months of each year is shown in the figure below.

China installed record amounts of new wind capacity in 2023
Wind capacity newly installed in China in January to November each year, gigawatts. Source: National Energy Administration. Chart by Carbon Brief.

By the end of 2023, the first batch of “clean-energy bases” were expected to have been connected to the grid, contributing to the growth of onshore wind power, particularly in regions such as Inner Mongolia and other northwestern provinces. The second and third batches of clean-energy bases are set to continue driving the growth in onshore wind installations.

The market is also being driven by the “repowering” of older windfarms, supported by central government policies promoting the model of replacing smaller, older turbines with larger ones.

The potential for distributed wind power is also being explored, with initiatives such as the “villages wind utilisation action” being planned for active implementation.

Progress on offshore wind power construction in 2023 got off to a slow start. This is a reflection of a shift from nearshore to deeper offshore projects and from single projects to larger bases.

Offshore wind projects are also facing complex approval processes, involving multiple regulatory aspects, leading to uncertainties and slower-than-expected installations.

However, these issues are being addressed and the fourth quarter of 2023 saw a rebound in offshore wind construction, with 2024 expected to be a significant year for project deliveries.

Since 2021, new wind projects in China no longer receive subsidies from the central government.

Despite technological advancements reducing costs, increases in raw material prices have resulted in lower profit margins compared to the solar industry, leading to a smaller overall investment in wind power relative to solar power.

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Electric vehicles

China’s production of electric vehicles grew 36% year-on-year in 2023 to reach 9.6m units, a notable 32% of all vehicles produced in the country.

The vast majority of EVs produced in China are sold domestically, with sales growing strongly despite the phase-out of purchase subsidies announced in 2020 and completed at the end of 2022.

The national purchase subsidy for EVs was a central government finance instrument that had been fostering the EV market for 13 years. Its demise highlights a gradual shift from policy-driven to market-driven demand, making growth more likely to be sustained.

Sales of EVs made in China reached 9.5m units in 2023, a 38% year-on-year increase. Of this total, 8.3m were sold domestically, accounting for one-third of Chinese vehicle sales overall, while 1.2m EVs were exported, a 78% year-on-year increase.

The growth of “new energy vehicle” (NEV, mainly EVs) production and sales is shown in the figure below, which also shows their rising share of all vehicles sold.

Production and sales of new energy vehicles are surging in China
Production and sales of all vehicles and “new energy vehicles” (NEVs) in China, from National Bureau of Statistics and China Association of Automobile Manufacturers data via Wind Financial Terminal. NEVs include battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. The right-hand side shows the share of NEVs out of all new vehicles sold, and the cumulative share over the preceding 10 years, as an indicator of the share of NEVs out of vehicles on the road. Chart by Carbon Brief.

China’s EV market is highly competitive, with at least 94 brands offering more than 300 models. Domestic brands account for 81% of the EV market, with BYD, Wuling, Chery, Changan and GAC among the top players.

Sustaining this growth has required major investment in manufacturing capacity.

This analysis estimates investments in EV manufacturing capacity based on a study by China International Association for Promotion of Science and Technology (CIAPST), which put investment in EV manufacturing at 0.7tn yuan in 2021.

The analysis assumes that EVs accounted for all of the growth in investment in vehicle manufacturing capacity reported by China’s national bureau of statistics (NBS) in 2022 and 2023, while investment in conventional vehicles was stable

This implies that investment in EV manufacturing reached CNY 1.2tn yuan in 2023. This is likely to be conservative, because production volumes for combustion engine vehicles are falling, implying a corresponding fall in investment.

This analysis accounts for the expansion of battery manufacturing capacity separately – alongside electricity storage – even though it is being driven by the growth in EV production.

The analysis estimates the value of EV production, including both domestic sales and exports, based on vehicle production volumes from NBS and the reported average EV price.

These EV prices include the value of batteries produced for EVs, so the value of battery production is not included separately.

Meanwhile, EV charging infrastructure is expanding rapidly, enabling the growth of the EV market. In 2022, more than 80% of the downtown areas of “first-tier” cities – megacities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou – had installed charging stations, while 65% of the highway service zones nationwide provided charging points.

More than 3m new charging points were put into service during 2023, including 0.93m public and 2.45m private chargers. The accumulated total by November 2023 reached 8.6m charging points.

This analysis puts investment in EV charging infrastructure at 0.1tn yuan in 2023, based on an estimated average cost of 30,000 yuan per charging point.

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Energy efficiency

China’s energy intensity reduction targets have put pressure on industries to reduce their energy use per unit of output, spurring investment in more efficient processes.

For this analysis, the size of the market for energy service companies is used as a proxy for investment in energy efficiency in industries and buildings. This market grew to an estimated 0.6tn yuan in 2023, up from 0.5tn yuan in 2022, based on the revenue growth of the top 10 listed energy service companies ranked by market capitalization, for the first two or three quarters of 2023.

Over the past two decades, China’s energy service sector has experienced rapid expansion, growing from 1.8bn yuan in 2003 to 607bn yuan in 2021. Investment in the industrial service sector has been a key driver, accounting for about 60% of the total investment.

However, 2022 saw a significant downturn in the industrial energy service output, influenced by poor industrial growth, even though the building service sector continued expanding.

This analysis puts China’s investment in building energy efficiency at 80bn yuan per year. The country’s 14th five-year plan for energy savings in buildings and development of “green buildings” targets 80m square metres per year of renovated and newly built green buildings.

Compared with the almost 1,000m square metres of building space completed annually, this is a small percentage, and accordingly, the estimated value of total investments is modest.

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Electricity storage and hydrogen

China is rapidly scaling up electricity storage capacity. This has the potential to significantly reduce China’s reliance on coal- and gas-fired power plants to meet peaks in electricity demand and to facilitate the integration of larger amounts of variable wind and solar power into the grid.

The construction of pumped hydro storage capacity increased dramatically in the last year, with capacity under construction reaching 167GW, up from 120GW a year earlier.

This growth is illustrated in the figure below, which shows pumped hydro capacity under construction or in earlier stages of development at the end of 2023.

New pumped storage capacity in China, map.
Capacity of pumped hydro storage projects under construction or in earlier stages of development at the end of 2023, GW. Source: Global Energy Monitor global hydropower tracker.

Data from Global Energy Monitor identifies another 250GW in pre-construction stages, indicating that there is potential for the current surge in capacity to continue.

For this analysis, estimated annual investments in pumped storage are assumed to be proportional to the capacity under construction, while the reported construction cost of 6 yuan per watt is spread over three years. This implies that investment in 2023 amounted to 0.3tn yuan.

Construction of new battery manufacturing capacity was another major driver of investments, estimated at 0.3tn. This is based on the added capacity reported by the China Automotive Power Battery Industry Innovation Alliance and estimated average investment costs per unit of production capacity, taken from a compilation of publicly reported project costs.

Investment in electrolysers for “green” hydrogen production almost doubled year-on-year in 2023, reaching approximately 90bn yuan, based on estimates for the first half of the year from SWS Research. Analyst reports and compilations of projects published in news media put far larger numbers on China’s investments in green hydrogen, but these generally include the spending on electricity generation, which in this analysis is accounted for separately.

Investment in “new energy storage technologies” – a classification dominated by batteries – more than doubled in 2023, reaching 75bn yuan. This estimate is based on newly added capacity in 2023 reported by China Energy Storage Alliance and average investment costs calculated from National Energy Administration data.

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Railways

China’s ministry of transportation reported that investment in railway construction increased 7% in January–November 2023, implying investment of 0.8tn for the full year. This includes major investments in both passenger and freight transport. Investment in roads fell slightly, while investment in railways overall grew by 22%.

The share of freight volumes transported by rail in China has increased from 7.8% in 2017 to 9.2% in 2021, thanks to the rapid development of the railway network.

In 2022, some 155,000km of rail lines were in operation, of which 42,000km were high-speed. This is up from 146,000km of which 38,000km were high-speed in 2020.

The value of passenger and freight transportation on China’s railways increased by 39% year-on-year in 2023, reaching nearly 1tn yuan.

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Nuclear power

In 2023, 10 nuclear power units were approved in China, exceeding the anticipated rate of 6-8 units per year set by the China Nuclear Energy Association in 2020 for the second year in a row.

There are 77 nuclear power units that are currently operating or under construction in China, the second-largest total in the world. The total yearly investment in 2023 was estimated for this analysis at 87bn yuan, an increase of 45% year-on-year, based on data for January–November from the National Energy Administration.

The highest numbers of nuclear projects are located in coastal provinces with large concentrations of heavy industry, such as Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, as the development of inland nuclear power projects remains stalled.

These provinces get around 20% of their electricity from nuclear power and continue to expand the technology as part of their efforts to cut emissions from their power sectors.

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Electricity grids

China’s power-sector development plans include a major increase in inter-provincial electricity transmission capacity and numerous long-distance transmission lines from west to east.

State Grid, the government-owned operator that runs the majority of the country’s electricity transmission network, has a target to raise inter-provincial power transmission capacity to 300GW by 2025 and 370GW by 2030, from 230GW in 2021. These plans play a major role in enabling the development of clean energy bases in western China.

China Electricity Council reported investments in electricity transmission at 0.5tn yuan in 2023, up 8% on year – just ahead of the level targeted by State Grid.

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Why clean energy took off in 2023

The clean-energy investment boom in 2023 is the outcome of a major pivot in China’s macroeconomic strategy. As this analysis shows, investment flowed from real estate into manufacturing – primarily in the clean-energy sector.

Total investment in the manufacturing industry increased by 9% year-on-year in 2023, while investment in the power and heat sectors climbed 23%. These increases were entirely due to growth in investment in clean energy, with investment in other areas falling. Therefore, China’s pivot into manufacturing was, in reality, a pivot to cleantech manufacturing.

The reason for this pivot was the contraction in the real-estate sector, where investment fell by 10% year-on-year in 2022 and another 9% in 2023. While this drop was in line with the government’s aim to address financial risks and excess leverage in the sector, it left a major hole in aggregate investment demand and in the revenue of China’s local governments.

Local governments were under pressure to attract investment, meaning that they offered generous subsidies and helped arrange financing.

The central government, for its part, eased private-sector access to financial markets and bank loans during the Covid-19 pandemic, facilitating the growth of the clean-energy sector.

Unlike the state-owned firms dominating traditional industries, the low-carbon sector, largely composed of private companies, gained access to previously constrained credit.

The significance of this economic shift is reflected not only in the figures revealed by this analysis but also in the language being used by Chinese media.

The three largest of clean-energy sectors by value, namely solar, storage and EVs, are being referred to as the “new three”, in contrast to the “old three” – clothing, home appliances and furniture.

This pivot was only possible because China’s clean-energy policies and wider industrial policy had built the foundation and scaled up these sectors so that they were primed for rapid growth.

The post-Covid credit “push” for clean energy growth also coincided with a demand “pull”, driven by falling costs and the increased competitiveness of low-carbon technologies against fossil fuels due to technological advancements.

Moreover, the announcement in 2020 of the 2060 carbon neutrality target had raised expectations and provided the political signal for the scale-up.

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What clean-energy growth means for China – and the world

Clean technology has been an important part of China’s energy policy, industrial strategy and climate change efforts for a long time. Last year marked the first time that the sector also became a key economic driver for the country. This has important implications.

China’s reliance on the clean-technology sectors to drive growth and achieve key economic targets boosts their economic and political importance. It could also support an accelerated energy transition.

The massive investment in clean technology manufacturing capacity and exports last year means that China has a major stake in the success of clean energy in the rest of the world and in building up export markets.

For example, China’s lead climate negotiator Su Wei recently highlighted that the goal of tripling renewable energy capacity globally, agreed in the COP28 UN climate summit in December, is a major benefit to China’s new energy industry. This will likely also mean that China’s efforts to finance and develop clean energy projects overseas will intensify.

Globally, China’s unprecedented clean-energy manufacturing boom has pushed down prices, with the cost of solar panels falling 42% year-on-year – a dramatic drop even compared to the historical average of around 17% per year, while battery prices fell by an even steeper 50%.

This, in turn, has encouraged much faster take-up of clean-energy technologies.

Projections of solar power deployment, in particular, have been upended. The IEA’s latest World Energy Outlook introduced an additional global energy scenario just to look at the implications, projecting that if global deployment of solar power and grid-connected batteries follows the expansion of manufacturing capacity, then global power-sector coal use and carbon dioxide emissions could be a sizable 15% lower than in the base case by 2030. Most of the additional deployment of solar in the IEA’s revised projections is in China.

Even with the increased deployment, however, there is a limit to how much solar power, batteries and other clean technology can be absorbed, as the manufacturing expansion has already saturated most of the global market.

This means that the expansion will run into overcapacity, if maintained. On the other hand, in order to keep driving growth in investment, clean-technology manufacturing would need to not only absorb as much capital as it did in 2023, but keep increasing investment year after year.

The clean-technology investment boom has provided a new lease of life to China’s investment-led economic model. There are new clean-energy technologies where there is scope for expansion, such as electrolysers.

Eventually, however, entirely new sectors will have to be found for investment – or China’s economic model will have to be transformed once there is nowhere left for investment to flow.

The manufacturing boom also cements China’s dominant position in clean-energy supply chains. Other countries therefore face a choice of whether they want to benefit from the low-cost supply of solar panels, batteries, EVs and other clean-energy technology from China.

The alternative is diversifying their supply and paying the cost of building new supply chains, in the form of subsidies and import tariffs required to enable domestic producers or producers in third countries to compete against Chinese suppliers. Such efforts would further increase supply and push down global prices even further.

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Analysis: Clean energy was top driver of China’s economic growth in 2023

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DeBriefed 14 March 2025:  US’s ‘moral case for fossil fuels’; Rainforest felled for ‘COP30 road’; Myanmar’s energy crisis

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

US ‘180-degree pivot’

‘SIDE EFFECT’: US energy secretary Chris Wright promised a “180-degree pivot” on climate policy while speaking in front of oil and gas executives, the New York Times reported. Addressing an industry conference in Houston, he said there was a “moral case for fossil fuels” to alleviate poverty and was dismissive of renewables, the newspaper added. CNBC reported that Wright also said: “The Trump administration will treat climate change for what it is – a global physical phenomenon that is a side effect of building the modern world.”

MORE CUTS: The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) terminated $20bn in grants for climate projects, awarded through a “green bank” known as the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, Bloomberg reported. However, Inside Climate News said that a federal judge has “sharply criticised the agency for canceling the grants without presenting any evidence of wrongdoing, calling the administration’s justification weak and unsubstantiated”. It added: “The judge stopped short of issuing a ruling on reinstatement of the funds, leaving grant recipients in limbo.” 

NASA CHANGES: NASA has dismissed its chief scientist, climate-science expert Katherine Calvin, along with 20 others as part of changes imposed by the Trump administration, says the New York Times. The newspaper also added the government “could be considering slashing the budget for NASA’s science activities by half”.

Road to COP30

COP30 HIGHWAY: Eight miles of “Amazon rainforest” are being cleared to build a four-lane highway ahead of the COP30 climate talks in Belém later this year, said the Times. BBC News, which broke the story, added the road is designed to ease traffic in the Brazilian city. However, the Brazilian government responded to say the media stories were “misleading” because the road was planned before COP30 was announced.

CLIMATE MULTILATERALISM: Meanwhile, the Times of India reported that, in the wake of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Brazilian COP30 presidency has invited the hosts of all the UN climate summits since COP21 in Paris to form a “circle of presidencies” to enhance multilateral efforts to tackle climate change. 

Carney for Canada

OH, CANADA: Mark Carney was elected leader of the Liberal party in Canada and will replace Justin Trudeau as prime minister, reported the Globe and Mail. CNN noted that the former governor of the banks of England and Canada has “advocated for the financial sector to invest in net-zero” and held the position of UN special envoy for climate action and finance in 2019.  

BANKING ROLLBACKS: Meanwhile, the Financial Times reported that the Net-Zero Banking Alliance – the “top global climate alliance for banks” founded by Carney – will ask its members to vote on abandoning a pledge to align their $54tn in assets with the Paris Agreement aim of limiting global warming to 1.5C. There has been an “exodus of many leading US banks” since Trump’s second term, but major players such as HSBC and Barclays remain in the alliance, the newspaper said.

Around the world

  • FLASH FLOODS: Agence France-Presse reported that a flash flood in Bahía Blanca, Argentina has killed at least 16 people and caused $400m in damages. 
  • ENERGY BILLS: A UK bill introduced to parliament this week sought to speed up approval of clean-energy projects and reduce energy bills by £250 a year for people living near new or upgraded pylons, BBC News reported.
  • TWO SESSIONS: China’s influential “two-sessions” political meetings ended on Tuesday, with new climate commitments, Carbon Brief reported.   
  • FEWER EMISSIONS: Emissions in Germany fell 3.4% in 2024, noted Reuters, adding that it puts the country “on track” to meet its 2030 climate targets.

3.6%

The amount that the UK’s emissions fell by in 2024, seeing emissions reach their lowest level since 1872, according to a new analysis by Carbon Brief


Latest climate research

  • A study in Public Understanding of Science, co-authored by Carbon Brief’s Josh Gabbatiss, found that UK newspapers increased their support for climate action from 2011-21, but also featured “multiple discourses of delay”. 
  • New analysis from the World Weather Attribution group concluded that human-caused climate change increased recent heavy rainfall in Botswana by 60%. 
  • A study in PLOS Climate found smallholder farmers in rural northeast Madagascar witnessed increases in temperature and decreases in rainfall over a five-year period and are concerned about the effects of climate change on their livelihoods.

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

New analysis by Carbon Brief revealed that nearly a tenth of global climate finance could be under threat, as Trump continues to cut spending on international aid. Since taking office in January, Trump has pulled the US out of multiple international climate funds and initiatives, including plans withdrawing the US from the Paris Agreement. He has also threatened to cancel virtually all US Agency for International Development (USAid) projects, with climate funds identified as a prime target. These actions are likely to endanger global efforts to help developing countries tackle climate change.

Spotlight

Myanmar’s energy crisis

This week, Carbon Brief looks at energy challenges in Myanmar and whether solar power could help to provide a solution.

Earlier this year, military rulers in Myanmar slashed power supplies for two of the country’s major cities – the capital, Naypyidaw, and Yangon. The order said that Yangon, the country’s largest city, would only receive eight hours of electricity per day on a rotating power schedule. 
However, the reality on the ground is more severe. The capital of Naypyidaw appears to have been prioritised, with 16 hours of power on and eight hours off, while residents in Yangon report sometimes only receiving two hours of electricity per day. Other parts of the country have also been affected.

‘In the dark’ 

Rolling blackouts in Myanmar are not new. Back in 2019, the country experienced widespread energy shortages due to a widening power supply-demand gap.  

However, Myanmar’s power-sector challenges have grown since the country’s military coup in February 2021.

The national power grid has been attacked and damaged due to armed conflict resisting the coup. A Frontier Myanmar article from 2023 reported that there had been 229 attacks on electricity infrastructure since the 2021 coup, which the military blamed on rebel groups. 

A loss of foreign investment, economic turmoil and mismanagement have also all contributed to Myanmar’s energy crisis, said Richard Harrison, former CEO of Smart Power Myanmar, an NGO aimed at providing solar power to small businesses. He told Carbon Brief:

“Governments and donors no longer have direct relations with the national government and most NGOs are badly underfunded. There is almost no energy-related funding in Myanmar.”

Slowing solar

The country’s electricity mix currently mostly consists of gas and hydropower.

Before the coup, multiple projects, including solar farms, had been planned to help reduce the growing power supply-demand and increase electrification rates.

According to a report by the World Bank, a “major solar tender was launched in May 2020 for 30 solar power plants to be constructed throughout the country”. But “only one of those was completed since the military takeover in 2021 and the other 29 were cancelled”, the report said. 

Myanmar has also experienced shortages of gas for power generation, compounded by investor exits and the decline of Myanmar’s largest gas field. 

The Irrawaddy, a Myanmar-focused news site in Thailand, reported that military leaders have called for solar panels to be installed on all new buildings in a bid to solve Myanmar’s energy crisis. However, it is worth noting that, according to the Irrawaddy, the junta leader’s son has “won licenses to sell solar panels and equipment while the regime has granted tax exemptions on solar imports”. 

Yet, the Irrawaddy has also noted that the cost of solar is “beyond the reach of many small businesses, which form the backbone of Myanmar’s economy”. 

Not-for-profits have continued to build solar projects in the country since the coup, aimed at supporting local businesses and powering rural healthcare facilities

However, the situation is volatile as the civil war drags on, Harrison noted:

“The outlook is bleak. Myanmar has failed to invest in new generation capacity and current sources of energy (gas) are declining or curtailed. This means that, even if conflict were to end, we will continue to see declining energy access and major shortages through 2030. In other words, Myanmar’s energy crisis is almost guaranteed to get worse and be protracted.”

Watch, read, listen

REMOVING CARBON: The Solving for Climate podcast spoke to Carbon Brief climate science contributor Dr Zeke Hausfather about whether the use of carbon removal technologies should expand. 

BLACKOUTS: Dialogue Earth reported on how extreme weather events exacerbated by climate change are causing more frequent power outages in Latin America.
SABOTAGE TACTICS: A feature in the Guardian said “tougher laws” are said to be “inspiring clandestine attacks [by climate protesters] on the ‘property and machinery’ of the fossil fuel economy”.

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DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

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The post DeBriefed 14 March 2025:  US’s ‘moral case for fossil fuels’; Rainforest felled for ‘COP30 road’; Myanmar’s energy crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 14 March 2025:  US’s ‘moral case for fossil fuels’; Rainforest felled for ‘COP30 road’; Myanmar’s energy crisis

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Explainer: What does China’s ‘two sessions’ mean for climate policy in 2025?

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China’s climate ambition at this year’s “two sessions” (两会), which ended on 11 March, was relatively subdued, with analysts expecting economic concerns to trump climate action in the year ahead.

The “two sessions”, which takes place every spring, is a major political event held in Beijing that gives an indication of China’s broad policy direction for the year.

It covers every area of governance, including energy and climate policy.

In this article, Carbon Brief outlines key signals from the 2025 “two sessions”, including: a new energy target for 2025; clean-energy and climate priorities; the ongoing development of coal in a “supporting role”; and China’s response to “green trade barriers”.

This is an update of Carbon Brief’s 6 March China Briefing newsletter, expanded to cover developments during the last few days of the event.

A key meeting

The “two sessions” (两会) is the annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it ran from 4 to 11 March.

The gathering is attended by Chinese Communist party members, as well as members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures, known as delegates or deputies.

Its centrepiece is the “government work report”, a speech delivered by the premier – the head of China’s State Council, the top body of the country’s central government. This outlines the previous year’s achievements and priorities for the year ahead, including the annual GDP target.

At the meeting, China also releases a report by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the country’s top economic planning body, as well as a central and local government budget report.

In addition, the event allows thousands of delegates to meet and raise policy proposals with senior government officials.

Low energy target

China pledged to reduce energy intensity – a measure of energy consumption per unit of GDP – by 3% in 2025, the work report said. (This measure now excludes renewables and nuclear, meaning it only applies to fossil fuels.)

This target means China is “on track to miss its 14th five-year plan energy intensity target”, Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, tells Carbon Brief.

She adds that it was an “inconvenient truth” that China’s economy has not become much more energy efficient in recent years, “offset[ting]…the decarbonisation effects of renewable technology deployment”.

China is lagging behind on its 2026 targets for reducing both energy intensity and carbon intensity – the amount of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP. Analysis for Carbon Brief has shown that they would need to fall by 6% and 7% per year, respectively, to meet the targets.

In its report, the NDRC attributed the shortfall in China’s 2024 carbon-intensity reduction figures to “rapid growth in the energy consumption in industries and the civilian sector as a result of post-Covid economic recovery and frequent extreme weather events”.

Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), wrote on Bluesky that the low target “shows the government is not prioritising controlling carbon dioxide (CO2) at the moment”.

He also said the new methodology for calculating energy intensity would, in theory, allow fossil-fuel demand to grow by 1.9% in 2025, pushing CO2 emissions up by more than 2%. (He added that he did not think this would actually happen.)

The 14th five-year plan’s carbon-intensity target, which measures CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, will likely also be missed, according to the Carbon Brief analysis. China does not typically announce annual carbon-intensity targets in the government work report.

The targets that were announced underscored that “economic growth remains the top priority, with environmental goals taking a backseat”, Li Shuo, director of the China climate hub and senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), tells Carbon Brief.

The lack of an annual carbon-intensity target was “a further sign of carbon reduction being downplayed”, he adds.

Priorities in 2025

China’s climate and energy policy in 2025 will likely follow well-established priorities, such as balancing decarbonisation and energy security, based on the report’s language.

The state-run newspaper China Daily highlighted the report’s support of China’s “dual-carbon” goals on its frontpage, saying that China pledged to “diligently work” towards them.

According to the work report, China “will develop a package of major projects for climate change response and actively engage in and steer global environmental and climate governance”.

A number of climate measures were announced, but Li tells Carbon Brief that there were “no major surprises”, confirming his view that the “two sessions” has “increasingly become a platform to confirm pre-existing decisions rather than introduce new ones”.

Each year, the government work report lists a number of top priorities for the year ahead, as shown in the figure below.

For 2025, the report lowers the importance of high-quality development in favour of “expanding domestic demand”. The prioritisation of “low-carbon development” and other climate related tasks remained the same compared to 2024.

Ranking of key tasks in each government work report during the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025).

Ranking of key tasks in each government work report during the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025). Source: Xinhua publications of the government work reports for 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022 and 2021.

The report discusses China’s climate and environment efforts for 2025 under the title:

“Making coordinated efforts to cut carbon emissions, reduce pollution, pursue green development, and boost economic growth and accelerat[e] the green transition in all areas of economic and social development.”

This stands in stark contrast to the climate section’s title last year, which only highlighted “enhancing ecological conservation and promoting green and low-carbon development”.

The expanded wording signals a more “comprehensive design at the policy level” to “systematically enhance the integration of different sectors for tackling environmental problems”, Xu Song, a registered environment evaluator in China, wrote on his WeChat account.

The work report lists a number of climate initiatives for the year ahead, including: expanding pilot programmes for local governments to peak carbon emissions; building “zero-carbon industrial parks”; accelerating the shift from “dual-control” of energy to dual-control of carbon emissions; and including more industries in the national carbon market.

Most importantly, renewable energy buildouts will continue, with a particular focus on “new energy bases in desert areas, the Gobi and other arid areas”, as well as offshore wind. The report also recognises the need for China to upgrade its electricity grid to cope with vast renewables additions.

But the report also continues to commit to fossil-fuel infrastructure. It reiterates calls to “better ensure both development and security”, which for the energy sector means that China should pursue a low-carbon transition while ensuring sufficient energy supply by keeping some fossil-fuel capacity.

This year, it says China will launch “low-carbon upgrade trials” for coal-fired power plants, which are seen as necessary for energy security. (Recent analysis found that a “substantial amount” of new coal capacity will soon come online.)

The separate NDRC report also reinforces coal as having a “basic supporting role” , announcing that China will “continue to increase coal production”.

The table below compares the language used in relation to coal in government work reports from 2021-2025.

2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
While promoting the clean and efficient use of coal, we will make a major push to develop new energy sources, and take active and well-ordered steps to develop nuclear energy on the basis of
ensuring its safe use.
We will work to upgrade coal-fired power plants to conserve resources, reduce carbon emissions, make operations more flexible, and upgrade heating facilities. We leveraged the role of coal as a major source of energy, increased advanced coal production capacity and stepped up support for power plants and heat-supply enterprises to ensure energy supplies. We will see that coal and coal-fired power play their crucial role in ensuring energy supply and our energy supply meets the needs of economic and social development. Low-carbon upgrade trials will be launched in coal-fired power plants.

A table comparing the language used around coal in government work reports during the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025). Source: Xinhua publications of the government work reports for 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022 and 2021.

Ilaria Mazzocco, senior fellow with the trustee chair in Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), tells Carbon Brief that the signal that coal would only have a supporting role in the future energy system was a “good sign”, but that the language underscored that there is “little interest” in phasing out coal “for now”.

The NDRC also pledged to reduce steel output and to encourage oil refiners to produce more petrochemical products instead of fuel.

Consumption and ‘involution’

Boosting domestic consumption is seen as key to achieving China’s 2025 GDP target of 5%. Consequently, it replaces fostering innovation as the top priority for policymakers for the year, as shown in the chart above.

China’s approach to boosting growth includes a number of stimulus measures. The net impact of these measures on China’s emissions, such via the building of energy-intensive infrastructure, is currently unknown, however.

At this year’s meeting, the government stated that domestic consumption will be the “main engine” for economic growth in 2025.

“The big question mark is real estate and construction”, Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief. Real estate and construction have been the biggest driver of domestic consumption for decades.

However, Myllyvirta adds that the government would likely aim for stable growth in the sector, rather than stimulating it with rapid and energy-intensive growth.

In part, China is putting its hopes – and 300bn yuan ($41bn) – into a consumer trade-in programme, which will likely continue to allow drivers to swap combustion-engine cars for “new-energy” vehicles (NEVs, which refers to electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids).

The report also pledges to incentivise “eco-friendly consumption”.

While technological innovation remains a major priority, clean-energy technologies are not explicitly mentioned in the government work report in this context.

Last year’s government work report emphasised the need to “consolidate and enhance [China’s] leading position” in industries such as NEVs and hydrogen, as well as to “create new ways of storing energy”.

Nevertheless, according to power news outlet BJX News, this is not a signal that clean-energy technologies are out of favour, but rather a sign that they are already widely recognised as an essential part of China’s technology strategy.

Similarly, although hydrogen is not explicitly named as a “future industry” in the government work report, the NDRC confirmed it will receive support from a one trillion yuan ($138bn) fund that will be issued for “frontier fields”.

In its budget report, China’s Ministry of Finance pledges to “steadily promote” China’s climate action, such as by strengthening financial support for R&D for low-carbon technologies, enhancing the development of renewable energy, promoting NEVs and developing green finance standards and institutions.

This year’s government work report also emphasises the need to combat “rat-race competition” – a reference to what is described in China as “involution”. This term refers to the overcrowded markets and price wars plaguing some sectors, including NEVs and solar panels. The report states it will take “comprehensive” steps to address the problem.

The NDRC report notes that the government will take steps to “promote orderly development” of the NEV, lithium-ion battery and solar industries, underscoring government concerns about the sector.

Nevertheless, the government does recognise the importance of clean-energy technologies to economic growth, Mazzocco tells Carbon Brief. She explains:

“Energy is now seen as a tool to ensure the economy can grow rapidly and is meant to support technological transformation…Climate per se is not a goal that the Chinese government wants to prioritise over economic growth and international competition.”

Geopolitics

Trade tensions that underpinned the political atmosphere during last year’s two sessions have been exacerbated by a number of developments since then – particularly around export controls and tariffs.

This is reflected in the work report, which notes that “increasingly complex and severe” geopolitical tensions may “exert a greater impact on China in areas such as trade, science and technology”.

In response, the government will “take active steps to respond to green trade barriers” – pointing to the trade measures above as well as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) – the report says.

However, in a press conference at the event, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi said that he believed China and the EU had the “capacity and wisdom” to resolve disagreements through consultations.

China will also continue to help African nations develop in “green sectors”, Wang said, building on language in the government work report that pledges to continue with “high-quality” projects in Belt and Road Initiative partner countries.

Extreme weather

There was continued recognition of the drag of “natural disasters” on China’s economic growth, with the work report pledging to “better guard against and respond” to floods, droughts, typhoons and other extreme weather events.

The report notes that floods “occurred frequently in some parts of China” last year. This was not explicitly linked to climate change.

However, the NDRC report attributes China’s failure to meet its energy-intensity goal in 2024 to, in part, “frequent extreme weather events”.

A recent Carbon Brief analysis found that, of 114 attribution studies for Chinese extreme weather events, 88 had their “severity or likelihood” increased by climate change.

Around the two sessions

Apart from the ministers and senior officials delivering work reports, side meetings between central leaders and local officials at the “two sessions” also send out political signals.

This year, President Xi Jinping met with a delegation from Jiangsu – an eastern province that is known for its affluent economy, manufacturing, strength in exports and technological innovation.

At the meeting, Xi emphasised the “need to upgrade traditional sectors and foster future sources of innovation”, although he also warned against creating industry “bubbles”, reports the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.

He added that policymakers should “actively promote high-end, intelligent and green development of industries”.

Meanwhile, MEE head Huang Runqiu emphasised the importance of low-carbon development, both in a meeting with a delegation from the northern Heilongjiang province and in a “minister’s corridor” press conference.

Delegates raised more than 700 policy proposals on “ecological civilisation” at this year’s meetings, energy news outlet BJX News reports, covering areas including addressing China’s industrial energy transition and developing the carbon market.

Among these, the US-based NPC Observer newsletter says, were two bills proposing the enactment of a “climate change response law” that would develop a legislative scheme for reducing carbon emissions.

Finally, as the meetings came to a close, NPC head Zhao Leji confirmed that the legislative body will continue to work on China’s environment and ecology code, according to news reports, as well as the atomic energy law in the year ahead.

The post Explainer: What does China’s ‘two sessions’ mean for climate policy in 2025? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Explainer: What does China’s ‘two sessions’ mean for climate policy in 2025?

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Greenhouse Gases

Cropped 12 March 2025: Trump and timber; Food fights; Peru’s peatlands

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We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Trump’s logging orders

IF A TREE FALLS: US president Donald Trump last week signed a pair of executive orders “to increase lumber production across national forests and other public lands”, Axios reported. The outlet explained that the first order “calls for considering new categorical exclusions” under the existing law that requires environmental reviews, while the second “promotes domestic timber production to replace imports”. The latter order dealt “a devastating blow” to forests on public lands, said Inside Climate News. The outlet added that “increasing timber production would likely target the larger, older trees that are the most critical to protect as climate change accelerates”.

QUESTIONABLE IMPACT: The Trump administration claims that increasing timber production will be “the next frontier in job creation and wildfire prevention”, USA Today reported. Timber groups and lawmakers representing rural districts were in agreement, the outlet said. It added: “But conservation groups and forestry experts say cutting down more trees doesn’t inherently reduce wildfire risk and can actually increase it.” The orders are “expected to face legal pushback”, USA Today said.

NOT SO CLEAR CUT: Despite the claims of a viral Instagram post, the executive orders do not compel the clearing of 280m acres (1.1m square kilometres) of national forest, noted a Yahoo News factcheck. The outlet added that the total area of land affected by the orders is actually 251m acres (1m km2) and that “even in the most extreme scenario, the US logging industry wouldn’t have the sawmills or workers required” to clear-cut that much forest in the next four years. It said: “But whatever the scale, environmentalists warn that expanding logging while reducing oversight will damage fragile ecosystems, threaten old-growth forests, increase pollution and even worsen wildfires.”

Tit-for-tat tariffs

FOOD FIGHT: On Monday, China began imposing tariffs on US farm products, in what the New York Times called “the latest escalation of a trade fight between the world’s two largest economies”. China’s tariffs include a 15% levy on US-raised chicken, wheat and corn, along with a 10% levy on other food products, the newspaper reported. Describing the food tariffs as “a high impact yet low-cost weapon” in the US-China trade war, Bloomberg noted that “the Asian giant remains a key export market for largely Republican states in the midwest farm belt”. Alongside the new levy, it added that China also halted all American timber purchases and soybean imports from three US firms. The Washington Post mapped where tariffs could “hit” US farmers and jobs “the hardest”.

AG INDEPENDENCE: The latest move is part of China’s “broader strategy” to strengthen its food security since Trump’s first term, reported Business Standard, tracing a timeline of the country’s initiatives “to reduce its reliance on US imports”. US farmers and experts who spoke to Time magazine said they “know from experience” that Trump’s “incipient trade war will make things tougher” for them. The outlet added that “around 80% of the money the US government took in from tariffs on Chinese imports [during Trump’s first term] went back to paying farmers” affected by retaliatory tariffs. The US-China food trade fight will give Brazilian exporters “an opportunity to take an even bigger share of the Chinese market”, Reuters reported, adding that it “could also fuel already-high food inflation in Brazil”.

UH OH, CANADA: At the same time, China “open[ed] a new front in a trade war”, announcing tariffs on over $2.6bn worth of Canadian agricultural and food products on Saturday, according to Reuters. The measures include a 100% tariff on Canadian rapeseed oil and pea imports, the newswire explained. It said that China’s tariffs on Canada are being seen as a “warning shot” and “retaliati[on] against levies Ottawa introduced in October” on China-made electric vehicles and aluminium products. Canada’s 40,000 rapeseed farmers are now “caught in the middle of political tensions far outside [their] control” amid two trade fights, the Globe and Mail reported, with China’s moves combining with the “threat of 25% tariffs on $7.7bn of exports to the US, their largest market”.

Spotlight

Mining drives ‘destruction’ in Peru’s peatlands

This week, Carbon Brief covers a new study that found that small-scale, artisanal gold mining in the Peruvian Amazon is a small but growing cause of “destruction” for the region’s carbon-rich peatlands.

Peatland loss due to small-scale gold mining in the Peruvian Amazon has released up to 0.7m tonnes of carbon – some 2.6m tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) – over the past 35 years, according to new research.

The study, published in Environmental Research Letters, used satellite imagery to determine where “artisanal” mining had driven deforestation in the Madre de Dios river plain.

The researchers found that while only 5% of the mined area overlapped with known peatlands, 55% of this peatland loss occurred within just the past two years.

They warned that mining in Peru’s peatlands is “happening at a scale sufficiently large to threaten the future existence of peatland on the Madre de Dios landscape”.

Mining-driven deforestation

Peatlands are carbon-rich, water-logged ecosystems that form slowly over time as plant matter dies and partially decomposes. 

Although they make up only 3% of the Earth’s land surface, peatlands are estimated to contain 600bn tonnes of carbon – more than is stored in all of the world’s forests combined.

Despite their importance as carbon stores, peatlands are underprotected compared to other “high-value” ecosystems, such as tropical forests. A recent study found that just 17% of peatlands are protected globally.

Artisanal gold mining – referring to mining done informally and with basic tools – is one of the main drivers of deforestation in the Peruvian Amazon in recent decades. It is highly concentrated around the Madre de Dios river, which cuts through the south-eastern part of the country.

To understand the impact of this type of mining, the researchers used 35 years of data from NASA’s Landsat satellite to monitor changes in the region around the Madre de Dios river known as its alluvial plain. They then used an algorithm to differentiate deforestation that was caused by artisanal mining from deforestation due to other factors.

The researchers identified 11,356 hectares of mining in the alluvial plain, two-thirds of which was concentrated in a 50-kilometre stretch of river.

Peatland loss

The researchers then overlaid the identified mining sites with maps of the Madre de Dios peatland complex.  

They identified more than 550 hectares of peatland that had been lost to artisanal mining between 1985 and 2023. They estimated that this “destruction” released between 0.2m and 0.7m tonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, resulting in emissions of up to 2.6MtCO2.

Moreover, mining in peatland areas has increased twice as quickly as the average rate of increase across the plain as a whole over the past five years. More than 10,000 hectares of peatland, containing between 3.5 and 14.5m tonnes of carbon, are at “imminent risk”, the authors warn.

Dr John Householder, a researcher at Germany’s Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and an author of the study, said in a statement:

“Even within a human generation, it is quite possible that large peat deposits can disappear from the landscape, before science has had a chance to describe them. For those peat deposits that are already known, these research findings are a wakeup call to protect them.”

News and views

IWATE ABLAZE: Japan was faced with its “worst wildfire in half a century” in early March, Agence France-Presse reported. The fire, which broke out in the Iwate prefecture on the country’s Pacific coast, “engulfed around 2,600 hectares” and “left one dead”, the newswire said. The Japan Times noted that “unusually dry weather, strong winds and the city’s terrain have made the situation worse than usual”. Dr Akira Kato, a forestry professor at Japan’s Chiba University, told the outlet: “There is a big misconception that fires don’t occur in humid climates, but this is actually not true, and forest fires can occur anywhere in the world.”

EXTINCTION LITIGATION: Australia’s environment minister, Tanya Pilbersek, is being sued by conservation non-profit the Wilderness Society for failing in “her promise to halt Australia’s ongoing extinction crisis”, the Sydney Morning Herald reported. The case does not mention Pilbersek by name but alleges “successive environment ministers are to blame” for failing to “implement plans to save endangered animals”, the newspaper said. Pilbersek, it added, has responded by saying “she had made double the number of [nature] recovery plans than her predecessor”. Separately, ABC News reported that Tasmania’s salmon industry is being hit by mass die-offs due to bacterial disease, with “chunks” of thousands of dead salmon washing up ashore.

ARMY OF ME: After the “worst drought in decades”, Context News reported that Zimbabwe’s maize farmers are now battling an infestation of the fall armyworm. The pests are “[n]ative to the Americas” but have “spread across almost all of sub-Saharan Africa” in just two years, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The outlet quotes Patrice Talla of the FAO saying: “Climate change has contributed to outbreaks of migratory pests beyond their regions of origin, notably the fall armyworm.” According to the story, the armyworm “reduces maize yields by up to 73% and inflicts annual economic losses valued at $9.4bn in Africa alone”, its “crop-munching” impacts also affecting Malawi, Zambia, Togo, Benin and Swaziland.

SUDANESE BREW: Excelsea coffee – discovered in South Sudan nearly a century ago – is drawing international interest “amid a global coffee crisis caused mainly by climate change”, the Associated Press reported. The coffee variety currently accounts for “less than 1% of the global market” but production trials by agroforestry company Equatoria Teak indicate that it can “thrive in extreme conditions, such as drought and heat, where other coffees cannot”, according to the newswire. While the beans “represent a chance at a better future” for the country, farmer Elia Box – who lost half his coffee crop to fire in early February – told AP that long-term crops, such as coffee, need stability: “Coffee needs peace.”

ESTATE SALE: A “mystery donor” made a record land purchase in the Scottish Highlands on behalf of the Scottish Wildlife Trust – “the largest donation in the trust’s 60-year history”, according to the Times. It quoted the charity saying that by securing the 7,618-hectare Inverbroom Estate, it could “significantly enhance its efforts to protect and restore wildlife at scale across Scotland”. Furthermore, the newspaper noted that “the trust has made a commitment to the donor that none of the work at Inverbroom would be funded through the sale of carbon credits”.

ILLEGALLY FELLED: According to a new report covered by Mongabay, nearly all of the deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon in the past year was illegal. It said Brazilian non-profit Center of Life Institute (ICV) found that 91% of deforestation in the Amazon and 51% in the tropical savanna of the Cerrado lacked authorisation between August 2023 and July 2024. The outlet noted that under Brazilian law, landowners with a government-issued permit can clear up to 20% and 80% of the vegetation on their property in the Amazon rainforest and Cerrado, respectively. However, it added that the ICV researchers found that much of the deforestation captured by Brazil’s national space agency “wasn’t registered in official databases” for deforestation permits. Separately, BBC News reported that a new highway being built for the COP30 UN climate talks in Belém is “cutting through tens of thousands of acres” of protected Amazon rainforest.

Watch, read, listen

FOREST FOR THE TREES: Dialogue Earth explained how extreme heat is affecting China’s trees – and magnifying other threats to the plants.

IN BLOOM: An in-depth piece in the New York Times covered how a warming ocean is “throwing plankton into disarray”, putting the entire marine food web at risk.

RADICAL INTELLIGENCE: A Noema long read looked at how studying intelligence as a biological property across species can “open up a world of commonalities” across all life.

EXTRACTIVE INVESTORS: The Guardian examined the investor-state lawsuit levelled against Greenland that is seeking to reverse its uranium mining ban.

New science

  • Research published in PLOS Climate found that smallholder farmers in north-eastern Madagascar reported that they perceived increased temperature and decreased rainfall over the past five years. However, despite reporting concerns over their ability to feed their families in the future, only 21% of the 479 farmers surveyed reported changing their farming practices.
  • Tropical forests in the Americas are changing certain functional traits, such as wood density, in response to warming temperatures – “but at a rate that is fundamentally insufficient to track climate change”, a new study published in Science found. Researchers used data from 415 forest plots over 1980-2021, along with temperature data, to determine how forest composition was changing in response to warming.
  • A new review in Environmental Research Letters scanned nearly 10,000 scientific papers to identify the impacts of trees outside of forests on human well-being in South Asia. While most of the literature reported an increase in economic and material well-being, negative outcomes documented included a loss of agency, political voice and social equity – “in particular with afforestation and monoculture plantation projects”.

In the diary

Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org

The post Cropped 12 March 2025: Trump and timber; Food fights; Peru’s peatlands appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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