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China’s exports of clean-energy technologies such as solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles are increasingly helping to cut emissions in other countries.

Such exports in 2024 alone are already shaving 1% off global emissions outside of China and, in total, will avoid some 4bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) over the lifetimes of the products.

Moreover, the global CO2 savings from using these products for just one year acts to more than outweigh the emissions from manufacturing them.

This new analysis for Carbon Brief is based on a detailed assessment of clean-technology export flows, the carbon footprint of manufacturing these products and the “carbon intensity” of electricity generation in destination countries.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

  • The solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles (EVs) and wind turbines exported from China in 2024 are set to cut annual CO2 emissions in the rest of the world by 1%, some 220m tonnes (MtCO2).
  • Manufacturing these products resulted in an estimated 110MtCO2 within China in 2024, implying that the upfront CO2 emissions are offset in much less than a year of operation.
  • Over the expected lifetime of these products, their manufacturing emissions will be offset almost 40-fold, with cumulative CO2 savings reaching 4.0GtCO2.
  • When factoring in China’s plans to build overseas manufacturing plants for clean-energy products, as well as to construct overseas clean-power projects, the avoided CO2 increases to 350MtCO2 per year. This is 1.5% of global emissions outside China and almost equal to the annual emissions of Australia.
  • The largest emission reductions are associated with direct clean-technology equipment exports – particularly solar panels – followed by manufacturing at Chinese factories overseas, with overseas projects financed by Chinese investors a distant third.
  • China’s clean-energy footprint almost spans the entire world, with exports to 191 of the 192 other UN member states, as well as manufacturing and project finance investments in dozens of countries.
  • Clean-energy exports from China in 2024 alone, along with its overseas investments from 2023 and 2024, are set to cut emissions in sub-Saharan Africa by around 3% per year once completed and in the Middle East and north Africa (MENA) region by 4.5%.

China’s rapid expansion in clean-energy manufacturing and exports is already reshaping emissions trajectories in several key regions.

While China dominates the supply of equipment, however, most of the financing for clean-energy development outside of China is provided by others, with around three-fourths of the value from clean-energy projects and products being captured in other countries.

Nevertheless, Chinese industries stand to benefit from increased exports as global demand for clean-energy technologies grows – and there are signs that this is already starting to shift China’s political and diplomatic stance on climate action.

Clean-energy’s cumulative climate impacts

China’s booming output of clean-energy technologies is enabling rapid deployment both domestically and around the world, but their production is energy- and carbon-intensive.

The new analysis shows Chinese clean-tech exports are nevertheless having immediate global climate benefits. This contradicts many commentators who have linked China’s clean-tech boom to the rapid recent rise in its emissions.

Specifically, the analysis shows that manufacturing clean-energy equipment for export resulted in an estimated 110MtCO2 of emissions in 2024, or just 1.1% of China’s CO2 from fossil fuels.

Yet the solar panels, batteries, EVs and wind turbines exported in 2024 will avoid an estimated 220MtCO2 annually when put into operation overseas.

Moreover, these products will continue to generate emissions savings for as long as they continue operating. The clean-energy products exported in 2024 alone will avoid a cumulative total of 4.0GtCO2 across their lifetimes, as shown in the figure below.

Emissions associated with the production of China’s clean-technology exports in 2024 and the annual emissions avoided during their use (columns), as well as the cumulative impact on global emissions over the lifetime of these products, MtCO2. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

The CO2-saving impact of these exports – from just one year – will compound together with emissions savings from China’s past and future shipments of clean-energy equipment.

For example, its EV exports increased by 33% in the first five months of 2025, compared with the same period in 2024, showing the potential for further growth.

Solar panel exports held steady – despite a massive spike in domestic demand – and are likely to grow in the coming years given projected growth in global capacity installations.

Looking beyond direct equipment exports, overseas clean-energy investments announced by Chinese companies in 2023-24 – building solar panel manufacturing plants, for example – will generate another 90MtCO2 of avoided emissions per year, once the projects have been built.

In addition, overseas clean-power generation projects announced by Chinese investors in 2023-24 would save another 40MtCO2 per year.

In terms of technologies, the largest avoided emissions result from solar, at 280MtCO2, followed by batteries and EVs at 50MtCO2, as shown in the figure below. Wind turbine exports are relatively small, avoiding another 20MtCO2.

CO2 emissions avoided overseas as a result of China’s clean-technology exports in 2024 and investments in 2023-24, MtCO2, broken down by technology and type of activity. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

China’s overseas clean-energy footprint

Both economically and in terms of emissions reductions, exports of clean-energy equipment dominate China’s overseas footprint.

Equipment exports in 2024 were worth a total of $177bn, whereas across 2023 and 2024, Chinese firms announced overseas clean-energy manufacturing projects worth $58bn, as well as overseas power generation and storage deals worth $24bn.

(Note that these figures do not include Chinese-backed overseas fossil-fuel developments, including coal-fired power plants, which China has pledged to stop supporting.)

Once in operation, the Chinese owned or funded overseas clean-energy developments will help avoid 130MtCO2 of emissions, with 80Mt from solar, 35MtCO2 from EVs and batteries, as well as 13MtCO2 from wind and 6MtCO2 from hydropower.

Looking at this total another way, the avoided CO2 emissions from clean-energy equipment produced in Chinese factories overseas will amount to 90MtCO2, while its financing of clean-power generation will avoid an estimated 40MtCO2.

In contrast, avoided emissions from clean-energy equipment exported from China in 2024 will amount to an estimated 220MtCO2 per year.

China’s clean-energy footprint spans essentially the entire world, with exports to 191 of the 192 UN member states, excluding China, manufacturing plans in 25 countries in 12 of the 17 UN regions and clean-energy project financing in 27 countries in 11 regions.

Some countries and regions do stand out, however, as shown in the map below.

Avoided CO2 emissions from China’s clean-tech activity in 2024, MtCO2 by country. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

In terms of resulting emission reductions, the largest destinations for China’s overseas clean-energy activity are south Asia and the Middle East and north Africa (MENA) region.

This reflects both the large volumes of Chinese clean-technology activity reaching these countries and their highly carbon-intensive power grids, which means that installing new solar panels offsets high-emissions generation, for example.

(By the same logic, driving a Chinese EV in these countries would have smaller climate benefits than with lower-carbon electricity. See: How avoided emissions are calculated.)

Solar exports to South Asia have boomed, with Pakistan the single largest market. Pakistan’s electricity shortages and increasing affordability of solar have prompted consumers to install.

The same dynamic has played out in South Africa, which also features in the top 10 countries where China’s exports are resulting in avoided emissions (left panel in the figure below).

Top 10 countries for avoided CO2 emissions from China’s overseas engagements, by type of activity and technology, MtCO2. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

Assuming that all the overseas financing deals announced in 2023–24 are realised, the MENA region will see the largest avoided emissions due to China’s overseas clean-energy activity, resulting from a combination of solar panel exports, manufacturing and financing deals.

This includes eight solar and two wind power generation projects with a total capacity of 10 gigawatts (GW), in Egypt, Algeria, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Tunisia.

On the manufacturing side, Saudi Arabia is the main destination, with a major EV production facility, two solar factories and one for wind turbines. There are also a total of five battery manufacturing projects in Morocco and Oman.

OECD Europe is the largest destination for China’s exports and overseas manufacturing investments by value. However, relative to the volume of exports, the resulting CO2 savings are smaller than in other major destinations, due to lower carbon intensity of power generation.

The countries in the European region with the largest resulting emissions reductions are the Netherlands, Turkey, Spain, the UK, Poland and Germany.

Imports of solar power equipment are the largest category. Germany is an exception, where imports of EVs and batteries are even more significant, as is the UK, where a major battery manufacturing project could deliver larger emission reductions.

Turkey and Spain also have clean-energy manufacturing projects with Chinese involvement, while both Turkey and Germany imported wind power equipment from China in 2024.

In south-east Asia, China’s clean-energy footprint is the largest in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam. Solar manufacturing plans play the largest role in Malaysia, while imports of solar power equipment are the largest category in the other countries.

Chinese financing for solar and wind power generation projects, with a total capacity of 3.7GW, plays a significant role in the Philippines and Laos, as does financing for a hydropower project in Indonesia. Vietnam imported batteries and wind turbines in addition to solar power equipment in 2024. Chinese companies also have plans for EV and battery manufacturing in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Regional emissions set to be cut by up to 4.5% a year

Another way to look at the impact of China’s clean-energy exports and investments is to consider the avoided CO2 relative to the total emissions in each region. This highlights where China’s overseas clean-energy footprint is having the biggest impact, in relative terms.

The figure below illustrates the distinction. For each region, longer bars indicate larger avoided emissions in absolute terms, whereas the furthest dots point to the biggest relative impacts.

On a relative basis, sub-Saharan Africa stands out, in addition to MENA. Specifically, China’s clean-energy exports in 2024 alone, with investments from 2023 and 2024, are set to cut annual emissions in sub-Saharan Africa by around 3% per year – and by around 4.5% in MENA.

Left: Avoided CO2 emissions from China’s overseas engagements, MtCO2 per year. Right: Avoided emissions per year relative to regional totals, %. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

For sub-Saharan Africa, this relative measure of impact indicates that the solar power uptake in the region is rapid, in relation to the size of the region’s electricity systems.

The largest markets for China’s overseas clean-energy activity in the region are South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria and Senegal.

China’s footprint in these countries is dominated by solar exports, except for Tanzania, where financing for a hydropower project and a small solar project make up most of the projected emission reduction. There are also significant wind power equipment exports into South Africa.

China’s role in global clean-energy supply chains

In 2024, clean-energy industries contributed more than 10% of China’s GDP for the first time, generating an estimated total economic output of $1.9tn.

This milestone underscores the scale of China’s clean-energy economy and its dominant role in the global manufacturing of solar panels, batteries and EVs.

On the surface, this may suggest that other countries have limited economic opportunities in clean energy. However, a closer examination reveals a more nuanced picture.

China’s involvement in global supply chains is still largely limited to exports and manufacturing, while most of the value is downstream.

For instance, a solar panel now accounts for approximately one-quarter of the total value of a utility-scale solar power plant. IRENA reported a global weighted average investment cost of $758 per kilowatt (kW) of capacity for utility-scale solar and an average module cost of $261/kW in 2023, or 34% of the total.

Module prices fell by 35% in 2024, further reducing the share of modules in total project costs. In the case of rooftop installations, which represented 43% of all newly added solar in 2023, the total investment costs are approximately 80% higher, implying a much lower share of the modules in overall costs.

Similarly, batteries exported at 2024 prices represent only about a quarter of the value of the EVs into which they are integrated. The average export value of a Chinese pure electric passenger vehicle was $22,000, calculated based on values and volumes in China Customs data. At a battery pack cost of $94 per kilowatt hour (kWh) of capacity, an average-sized 63kWh battery pack will cost a quarter of this. Out of the average retail price of an EV in Europe, some €46,000, the battery pack will make up only a sixth of the cost.

These figures highlight a key point: most of the economic value in clean energy lies downstream – in project development, system integration, installation and end-user services – rather than in upstream manufacturing, where China dominates.

In 2024, China exported $177bn worth of solar panels, EVs, batteries and wind turbines, making up roughly 5% of its total exports. If China maintains its current global market share, this figure could rise significantly.

(These exports could reach $1.1tn by 2035, according to a recent analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) – driven primarily by a projected 12-fold increase to 2035 in the global EV market outside China – under the International Energy Agency’s 1.5C-compatible net-zero emissions by 2050 scenario.)

Trumping the $177bn value of the exports from 2024, however, the downstream value of overseas clean-energy products and projects relying on Chinese components is an estimated $720bn annually, four times the value of the exported raw components.

This includes the value of solar and wind power plants built using Chinese modules and turbines, as well as the revenue from the sales of EVs using Chinese batteries and battery materials.

Further investment in overseas manufacturing – Chinese companies building solar, battery and EV plants abroad – could lift this downstream value to an estimated $1.2tn annually.

China’s outsized role in upstream clean-energy manufacturing creates potential supply chain vulnerabilities that many countries will want to address, by diversifying supply sources and strengthening domestic capabilities.

However, China’s dominance is not synonymous with capturing the majority of the economic value in global clean-energy development. Rather, it reflects a strategic advantage in segments that other economies have often neglected, due to low value and profitability.

Implications of China’s expanding footprint

China’s rapid expansion in clean-energy manufacturing and exports is already reshaping emissions trajectories in several key regions.

In particular, markets in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa – where domestic clean-energy industries remain nascent – have benefited from lower costs and improved access to technology through Chinese imports. This dynamic has helped accelerate clean-energy deployment and shift emissions outlooks downward in these regions.

At the same time, China’s central role in global supply chains has raised concerns over supply security. Many countries are now taking steps to diversify their sourcing of key components such as solar panels, batteries and EVs.

However, given the scale and cost advantages of China’s clean-energy manufacturing sector, its products are likely to remain a large part of the global clean-energy landscape for the foreseeable future.

Economically, China’s footprint is more narrowly focused on upstream manufacturing. As clean-energy deployment continues to expand globally, there is significant potential for Chinese firms to increase their participation in downstream activities – including infrastructure development, operations and maintenance – capturing a larger share of value-added abroad.

These dynamics also reinforce China’s strategic interest in the continuation and acceleration of the global clean-energy transition.

As global demand for clean-energy technologies grows, Chinese industries stand to benefit from increased export volumes.

This economic incentive is beginning to translate into diplomatic engagement. In recent public remarks, for example, President Xi Jinping emphasised China’s role in advancing the clean-energy sector, suggesting a potential shift toward more proactive international positioning on climate and clean energy.

How avoided emissions are calculated

The manufacturing of solar panels and EV batteries is energy- and carbon-intensive, resulting in upfront carbon emissions from manufacturing.

In the case of exports and overseas manufacturing, the avoided CO2 emissions depend on the CO2 intensity of the power grid in the country where the equipment is used.

The left-most shape in the figure below shows the CO2 intensity of electricity generation in countries taking clean-energy exports from China. The width of the shape indicates the share of exports, by value, going to countries with a given carbon intensity.

The bulge in the shape shows that on average, China exports clean-energy equipment to countries with a lower CO2 intensity of power generation than its own grid (dashed line).

This increases the CO2 emission reductions from battery and EV exports, relative to using these products in China, but reduces them from solar panel and wind turbine exports.

Specifically, the average CO2 intensity of electricity in China’s export markets in 2024, weighted by value, was 395 grams of CO2 per kWh (gCO2/kWh), compared to 580gCO2/kWh in China.

The centre and rightmost shapes in the figure below illustrate the equivalent distributions for countries hosting Chinese overseas manufacturing and project financing.

CO2 intensity of electricity generation in destination markets for China’s clean-energy exports, overseas manufacturing and project finance, weighted by the value of the relevant engagements. Dashed line shows China’s CO2 intensity. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

Based on the country-by-country CO2 intensities and the volume of different clean-energy exports from China, the emissions associated with manufacturing these products are, on average, offset in less than a year of operation.

Chinese solar panels pay back their upfront manufacturing emissions in four months, on average, while wind turbines take two years and EVs and batteries three years.

There is, however, wide variance between different destinations.

For example, EVs exported to the countries with the most carbon-intensive power generation, such as Uzbekistan or Botswana, result in no reduction in CO2 emissions from their operation under current conditions. These countries would need to achieve substantial reductions in the carbon intensity of their power system to realise emissions reductions from the use of EVs.

On the other hand, EVs exported to countries with very clean grids can pay back their upfront CO2 emissions in less than a year.

Similarly, solar panels and wind turbines exported to countries where power generation is already almost fully decarbonised, such as Sweden or Ethiopia, result in no emission reductions, when assessed using the average carbon intensity of power generation.

However, this does not tell the whole story because solar and wind exports to such countries could prevent increases in power generation from fossil fuels in response to growth in demand.

Much of China’s overseas manufacturing investment, though not all, is in markets with a lower average CO2 intensity of power generation than in China itself, which shortens the CO2 payback time from clean-energy equipment produced by those overseas manufacturing plants.

In the case of calculating avoided emissions from plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs), a major question is how much they are driven with electricity and how much with fuel.

PHEVs are likely to be driven more on fuel in markets with weaker charging infrastructure and weaker incentives for using electricity. For simplicity, this analysis assumes a 50-50 split in all markets. Improving infrastructure and incentives would increase the emissions savings from existing and new PHEVs, as well as likely increasing the share of full EVs in new sales.

About the data

Data on China’s exports by country are taken from China Customs. Trans-shipments from the mainland through Hong Kong are treated as exports from China, with data on Hong Kong’s international trade – which is reported separately – taken from UN COMTRADE.

The product categories used in the analysis are as follows:

EVs: electric and hybrid motor vehicles, including freight, public transport and tractors (HS codes 870122, 870123, 870124, 870220, 870230, 870240, 870340, 870350, 870360, 870370, 870380, 870441, 870451, 870460).

Battery: Lithium-ion accumulators and primary lithium cells (850760, 850650).

Solar: PV generators, photovoltaic cells, solar panels, solar-grade silicon and inverters (850171, 850172, 854140, 854142, 854143, 854149, 854150, 850440, 280461, 381800).

Wind: Wind-powered electric generators (850231).

Data on overseas manufacturing and power generation deals is taken from a mapping project by Climate Energy Finance.

Emission reductions from solar panels and wind turbines were calculated using the average utilisation – sometimes referred to as the “capacity factor” – of each technology in the destination country, along with its average CO2 intensity of power generation in 2024, both taken from Ember data.

This is a conservative assumption, as new solar and wind will mainly replace fossil-fuelled power generation, resulting in higher emission reductions in countries where fossil fuels make up a small share of total power generation.

Emission reductions from EVs and plug-in hybrids were calculated using the following assumptions for the size of the battery pack in kilowatt hours (kWh), the mileage, the emissions of an internal combustion-engine (ICE) alternative and the fuel use per 100km:

BEV PHEV Heavy-duty vehicle (buses and trucks)
Battery pack, kWh 63 15 350
Mileage, km/year 15,000 15,000 80,000
ICE emissions, g/km 230 230 800
EV electricity and fuel use, per 100km 21kWh 15kWh + 4 litres 150kWh

Emission reductions from battery exports are calculated assuming that the batteries are installed in BEV and PHEV passenger vehicles, with an equal split.

Combustion-engine vehicle CO2 emissions are estimated based on average real-world fuel efficiency and CO2 emissions from petrol and biofuel production, as well as from combustion.

Annual mileage for passenger vehicles is based on data for China, the EU and the US, while it is based on US data for heavy duty vehicles. Upfront manufacturing emissions from EVs are the additional emissions compared with building a fuel-burning vehicle.

The value of solar projects using Chinese equipment is based on averages for total investment costs in 2023 from IRENA, adjusted for the reported 35% fall in module costs in 2024.

As the IRENA cost data is for utility-scale solar, the average across the utility-scale and distributed segments, such as rooftops, is estimated assuming that rooftop installations have 80% higher costs and make up a share of 43% of all newly added solar, based on data for 2023.

The total volume of solar equipment and materials exports from China in 2024 is conservatively calculated based on the reported value of solar module exports from China Customs and module export volume, as well as estimating the volume of the exports of polysilicon, wafers and solar cells using the same average value per GW as for solar modules.

The value of EVs sold overseas using Chinese batteries is estimated based on the total value of the EV market by region and market share of Chinese batteries and battery materials globally.

The market share in the overseas market is calculated based on 2024 power battery installations in China and globally, assuming that the market share of Chinese battery materials is 100% in China. The value of EVs exported from China is subtracted from this value to avoid double counting.

CO2 emissions from overseas manufacturing were calculated using the above estimates for emissions from production in China, adjusted to the average intensity of power generation in the host country.

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Analysis: China’s clean-energy exports in 2024 alone will cut overseas CO2 by 1%

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Q&A: Does the world need ‘carbon capture and storage’ to reach net-zero?

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When carbon dioxide (CO2) is released from a factory or power plant, the gas can be captured and permanently stored underground, preventing it from driving climate change.

This is the idea underpinning carbon capture and storage (CCS), a technology that is at the heart of many nations’ net-zero plans.

Influential organisations, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), describe CCS as “critical” for cutting emissions from key sectors – and for helping to avoid dangerous global warming.

In particular, capturing CO2 is seen as one of the only viable options for decarbonising some of the world’s highest-emitting industries, such as cement production.

The UK, for example, has committed to investing as much as £21.7bn over the coming decades in its nascent CCS industry, as part of the nation’s net-zero strategy.

Yet, in the UK and elsewhere, there has been a backlash against plans for CCS.

Citing high costs, ties to the fossil-fuel industry and a “history of poor performance”, critics describe CCS as a “dangerous distraction” or a “false climate solution”.

Time and again, the outlook for the roll-out of CCS has been scaled back, as the technology has failed to deliver as quickly as expected – and as policy support has wavered.

Furthermore, critics state that the technology remains “unproven” on the scale required to make a meaningful impact on global emissions.

In this Q&A, Carbon Brief explores the role CCS is expected to play in achieving net-zero, its record to date and the reasons it has been criticised, using the UK as an example.

Article Contents

What is CCS?

CCS involves capturing CO2 emissions released from a large source, such as a gas power plant or a cement factory.

The CO2 is separated from the facility’s exhaust stream, generally using a chemical solvent, before being compressed into a liquid and transported via pipeline or vehicle. The CO2 is then stored by injecting it into underground reservoirs, such as depleted oil fields or saline aquifers.

The term “CCUS” is sometimes also used, referring to the “utilisation” of CO2 to make products, including fertilisers, fuels or building materials. Such uses do not necessarily lead to permanent emissions cuts, as the CO2 can end up later being released back into the atmosphere.

(“CCS” is used in this Q&A, unless quoting another organisation that specifically refers to “CCUS”.)

The infographic below shows the stages of capturing CO2 and transporting it to be either stored or used in other applications.

Infographic showing the stages of capturing, transporting and then storing or using CO2.
Infographic adapted by Carbon Brief from the IEA.

Carbon capture technology was originally rolled out at US and Canadian oil wells in the early 1970s as a way to achieve “enhanced oil recovery”. This involves injecting captured CO2 into depleted wells – a process that stores CO2, but also helps to extract more oil.

This remains, by far, the most significant end use for captured CO2 worldwide, with around three-quarters of it used for this purpose.

Moreover, most of the CO2 currently captured is a by-product of gas purification – the process by which fossil fuels such as methane are separated from other, unwanted substances. Selling this CO2 can make such gas projects more economically viable.

Therefore, as shown in the chart below, which is based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data, the majority of CO2 that is both captured and used today helps the fossil-fuel industry to extract and sell more oil and gas.

CO2 captured, million tonnes per year, by sector and end use as of February 2026. Most CO2 is currently captured by the fossil-fuel industry – and then used to extract more fossil fuels. Fossil fuel processing produces ~49 of 62 Mt total, while enhanced oil recovery uses ~45 Mt. Source: IEA CCUS Projects database.

CCS was first proposed as a way to deal with CO2 emissions in a 1976 academic article, which imagined injecting the captured gas into the ocean.

It is only since the early 2000s that CCS has gained traction as a proposed climate solution, with a 2005 “special report” by the IPCC exploring the topic. At that time, the authors note there were just three small-scale projects trying to capture and permanently store CO2.

Installing CCS at factories or power plants and permanently storing the CO2 would mean that, in theory, such facilities could continue using fossil fuels without contributing to climate change.

Such applications are often mentioned alongside two related technologies, both of which could be used to “suck” CO2 out of the atmosphere and, thus, deliver “negative emissions”.

One is bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Crops absorb CO2 as they grow and BECCS involves a power plant burning these crops, then storing the resulting CO2.

The other technology is direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS).

These technologies are classed as “CO2 removal”, as they involve absorbing CO2 from the atmosphere using plants or machines and then storing it permanently.

By contrast, CCS installed at a factory is considered a way to avoid CO2 emitted by that specific facility from entering the atmosphere. This Q&A focuses on such applications, which account for the vast majority of existing and planned CCS.

Extract from study by Marchetti, C. (1977), saying: The problem of CO2 control in the atmosphere is tackled by proposing a kind of ‘fuel cycle’ for fossil fuels where CO2 is partially or totally collected at certain transformation points and properly disposed of. CO2 is disposed of by injection into suitable sinking thermohaline currents that carry and spread it into the deep ocean that has a very large equilibrium capacity. The Mediterranean undercurrent entering the Atlantic at Gibraltar has been identified as one such current; it would have sufficient capacity to deal with all CO2 produced in Europe even in the year 2100.
First mention in the academic literature of capturing and storing CO2 for climate change mitigation. Source: Marchetti, C. (1977).

How much CCS capacity has been built so far?

As of February 2026, there were a total of 75 operational CCS projects around the world. As noted above, almost all of them are at fossil-fuel extraction and processing sites, according to the IEA’s database.

Together, these projects capture 62.5m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) each year. This is equivalent to the annual greenhouse gas emissions of Ecuador.

(This compares with the 22 CCS projects, promising to capture 40MtCO2 annually, that were operational or under construction as of 2014.)

As the chart below shows, the amount of CO2 currently being captured and stored is a tiny fraction of the total emissions from fossil-fuel use.

Annual global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, compared to amount captured and stored. A square chart visually compares total fossil CO2 at 38.1bn to a tiny 0.06bn captured and stored. CCS projects currently capture less than 0.2% of the world's fossil-fuel emissions. Source: IEA, Global Carbon Budget.
“CO2 captured and stored” includes all projects that capture CO2 and use it for enhanced oil recovery, store it permanently underground or use it “with significant climate benefits”, according to the IEA.

In a 2020 report, the IEA explained that the “story of CCUS has largely been one of unmet expectations: its potential to mitigate climate change has been recognised for decades, but deployment has been slow”.

A wave of interest in CCS in the 2000s, largely from countries in Europe and North America, focused on enabling coal power plants to continue operating with lower emissions.

This interest largely petered out, as plummeting renewable energy costs weakened the case for coal plants with CCS. Today, there are only seven operating CCS-coal plants worldwide – five in China, one in the US and one in Canada.

Yet the Paris Agreement in 2015 – and the national net-zero targets that followed – highlighted the need for deep emissions cuts in sectors that previously expected to continue emitting for decades. This, once again, has fuelled interest in the use of CCS.

In recent years, there has also been growing interest in producing low-carbon “blue” hydrogen from gas with CCS.

Hydrogen is widely seen as key for decarbonising certain sectors – particularly in industry – but analyses suggest that it may be difficult to make sufficient “green” hydrogen using renewable power on the timescales required.

As the map below shows, most CCS capacity is based in the US and Canada, with other major fossil-fuel producers such as Norway, Brazil and the Gulf states also contributing.

World map showing CCS facilities are currently concentrated in oil-and-gas producing nations. The US has the highest capacity at 26.8 MtCO2, followed by Brazil (14.2), Canada (10), and China (7). Source: IEA.
Projects listed in the IEA CCUS database as split between two countries are divided equally between them. This includes projects that only store CO2, but it excludes projects that only transport CO2. DACCS projects are excluded.

A surge of projects have entered the global CCS pipeline in recent years. According to the IEA, 93.7MtCO2 of capture or storage capacity is under construction as of February 2026 and another 1,279.6MtCO2 is in the “planning” stages.

“Planned” projects include any initiative at early concept, feasibility or engineering study stages and the industry has a long history of projects being cancelled or delayed.

Nevertheless, this pipeline of projects could lead to a large expansion of facilities dedicated to permanent CO2 storage that does not involve extracting more oil.

The planned projects – if they are realised – would also include significant growth in sectors where CCS is virtually non-existent, such as steel, hydrogen and cement production, as shown in the chart below.

Global CCS capacity in different sectors, MtCO2, with projects planned for operation by 2030. Planned capacity dominates across all sectors, led by CO2 storage at nearly 400 MtCO2. CCS capacity would see significant growth if 'planned' projects go ahead. Source: IEA
A project is considered “under construction” by the IEA if a final investment decision has been announced and construction is on-going or imminent. A project is considered “planned” if it is at concept, feasibility or engineering study stage.

What role is CCS expected to play in reaching net-zero?

It will be impossible to stop dangerous climate change unless the world reaches net-zero emissions, according to the IPCC. The amount of global warming – and whether the Paris Agreement temperature target can be met – depends on when net-zero is reached.

Many global pathways that have been set out for achieving net-zero, including a majority of the IPCC-assessed pathways where global warming is limited to 1.5C, rely on the use of CCS at fossil-fuel plants and industrial sites.

“These models have been quite instrumental in bringing CCS back onto the agenda,” Lina Lefstad, an ecological economist at Lund University, tells Carbon Brief.

Influential organisations relying on CCS in their net-zero scenarios range from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) through to the oil company Shell. The IEA has stated that net-zero would be “virtually impossible” without CCS.

These scenarios often include 10s to 100s of times more CCS capacity being built in the coming decades. The IEA includes 1.7GtCO2 being captured by 2035 in its net-zero scenario – nearly 30 times more than is captured today.

(Some of the much higher numbers in scenarios assessed by the IPCC have been dismissed by experts as implausible, especially given the slow rollout of CCS to date.)

When considering CCS for both emissions cuts and removals, Dr Jennifer Roberts, a researcher at the University of Strathclyde and deputy director at the UK Carbon Capture and Storage Research Centre (UKCCSRC), tells Carbon Brief the situation is clear:

“From an IPCC climate modelling perspective…reaching net-zero without CCS is far more expensive, disruptive and potentially out of reach.”

This does not mean that it would be impossible to reach net-zero without using CCS. However, net-zero scenarios that use little or no CCS rely on dramatic changes elsewhere, such as much lower global energy demand.

Net-zero scenarios often include a crucial role for CCS in “hard-to-abate” sectors, referring to activities that lack available, low-cost options to fully decarbonise. In particular, CCS is widely seen as vital for decarbonising parts of heavy industry.

The IPCC sixth assessment report (AR6) summary for policymakers calls CCS a “critical mitigation option” for some sectors, including cement and chemicals. The technical summary of the AR6 Working Group III report says that “CCS will be required to mitigate remaining CO2” in industrial sectors.

The IEA describes CCS as “virtually the only technology” that can significantly cut cement emissions, which account for around 7% of the global total. (Much of this CO2 comes from chemical processes, meaning it would still be released if the industry was electrified.)

Yet, the understanding of “hard-to-abate” emissions is changing, as alternatives to CCS become cheaper and increasingly available. As a result, CCS has become a less attractive option in some sectors, as well as being seen as less vital in some others.

Carbon Brief analysis shows that the IEA has reduced its outlook for CCS in the power sector by a third, compared to its expectations in 2021, as the chart below shows.

This reflects both slow progress in deploying CCS and rapid cost reductions in renewables, which make running gas or coal power plants less attractive.

Projected global capacity of coal and gas power plants with CCS, GW, in IEA net-zero scenarios from 2021 through to 2025. Following years of very slow growth, the IEA has significantly scaled back its outlook for CCS in the power sector. Projected 2050 capacity drops from ~400 GW in the 2021 scenario to ~240 GW in the 2025 scenario. Source: IEA
Data comes from IEA world energy outlooks between 2021-2025.

(Even prior to this adjustment, the IEA’s net-zero scenario was already at the lower end of CCS use, compared to those assessed by the IPCC.)

This declining role for CCS in the power sector would mean its use is more concentrated in industry.

Industrial sectors – particularly cement, steel and chemicals – account for 60% of the CO2 captured in 2050 under the IEA’s net-zero scenario, as shown in the figure below. The remaining 40% is roughly split between electricity generation and blue hydrogen production.

Climate NGOs Bellona and E3G have stressed that with “limited public funding, infrastructure constraints and political attention, prioritisation is essential” for CCS. Their “CCS ladder” places CCS in cement and lime production at the top – with the highest “climate value” – while power CCS has “low and decreasing value”.

Despite this, the focus of the CCS sector so far has not been in heavy industry, which represents less than 10% of announced capacity.

Chart showing the sectoral breakdown of CCS captured annual in the IEA's net-zero scenario. It shows that most CO2 is captured and stored from cement, steel and other heavy industries in the scenario.

Another key consideration is the role governments are assigning to CCS in their national net-zero strategies.

One study found that 33 of the 67 long-term net-zero strategies submitted to the UN by governments, with a further 10 indicating some potential use.

It concluded that high-income countries that produce a lot of oil and gas, such as Canada and Norway, showed the “firmest commitment” to capturing and storing CO2.

Nations have agreed at UN climate talks to “phase down” coal power that is “unabated”. This is generally understood to mean coal power without CCS – leaving space to develop “abated” coal plants. This could allow China, for example, to continue using its sizable coal fleet with CCS to reduce emissions.

Why is CCS controversial?

Despite its role in many net-zero scenarios, CCS remains a highly contested technology.

It has long been framed in some circles as a “false solution” to climate change, that is backed and lobbied for by fossil-fuel companies to “delay” the clean-energy transition.

Critics argue that CCS is expensive – especially compared to increasingly cheap wind and solar power – in part because it significantly increases the energy requirements of a facility.

A University of Oxford working paper published in 2023 concluded that a “low-CCS” pathway to net-zero emissions would cost around $1tn less a year compared to a “high-CCS” pathway. The researchers stated that “no evidence is found for technological learning or associated cost reductions” in the development of CCS to date.

(They added that CCS is “still likely necessary” for cement and chemical production.)

Pointing to the limited progress in scaling up the technology so far, some question whether CCS can play the role envisaged in many net-zero scenarios.

Responding to the IPCC’s most recent report, for example, the Centre for International Environmental Law stated that “abated fossil fuels only exist in models”.

Proponents of CCS contest the notion that CCS is “untested” or “unreliable”, pointing to some projects that have been operating for many years. Moreover, most of the component parts that make up a working CCS project are in wide use for other purposes.

Yet, another key criticism levelled at CCS projects is that they simply do not capture enough CO2, diminishing their role as a climate solution.

There is a widespread view that CCS projects should aim to capture at least 90% of the CO2 being emitted. UK guidelines are among those targeting a higher capture rate of 95%.

The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) has assessed the performance of existing projects. Its 2023 analysis is shown in the chart below.

The thinktank concluded that, in reality, most existing CCS projects are far below such capture rates, meaning they continue to emit significant amounts of CO2. (Capture is the most expensive part of the CCS process.)

Carbon capture rate, %, across existing CCS facilities. Highest capture rates range from 17% for steel to 80% for hydrogen. Many CCS projects are currently falling far short of a 95% CO2 capture rate. Source: IEEFA analyses based on publicly available data
Based on data analysed by IEEFA from the following projects: Petra Nova and Boundary Dam coal plants, US and Canada; Terrell, Lost Cabin, Shute Creek and Century Plant gas processing facilities, US, and Gorgon, Australia; Quest, Air Liquide and Air Products hydrogen production projects, US and Canada; Great Plains Synfuel and Coffeyville gasification projects, US; Enid and PCS Nitrogen fertiliser projects, US; Bonanza Bio Energy ethanol production, US; and Emirates Steel/Al Reyadah steel project, United Arab Emirates. 

Once the CO2 is captured, it must be stored. The IPCC says there is ample global geological storage available for CO2. It also says that, as long as sites are “appropriately selected and managed”, CO2 “can be permanently isolated from the atmosphere”.

Nevertheless, critics have noted that even relatively low rates of leakage along the transportation and storage chain could have a big climate impact when deployed at scale.

The continued use of gas in gas-CCS or blue hydrogen projects also brings risks of upstream emissions more broadly, such as methane leaks. (See: What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?)

Considering these factors, in 2023 Climate Analytics assessed a “high CCS pathway” from the IPCC database. It concluded that if CO2 was captured at rates seen in existing facilities – around 50% – and upstream emissions remain high, CCS use could see an extra 86GtCO2e emitted by 2050.

The report found that even the IEA’s net-zero scenario, which relies on “more limited fossil CCS use”, could result in an additional 16GtCO2e due to “underperforming fossil CCS”.

All of this calls into question many uses of CCS, according to Andrew Reid, energy finance analyst at IEEFA: “Is there really any point in trying to decarbonise fossil fuels, which comes with significant technical, timing and additional cost risk?” Reid tells Carbon Brief:

“As for cement and chemicals, again, there are alternatives, but these are nascent and expensive. CCS may be a solution here and if investment is going to be made in any area, it most likely should be these.”

On the other hand, CCS advocates argue that gas, for example, is likely to be an important, “dispatchable” part of many electricity systems as nations transition to clean energy.

Prof Stuart Haszeldine, a CCS researcher at the University of Edinburgh, explains this position to Carbon Brief:

“If we’re going to burn gas, then we should be fitting CCS on that…Otherwise we’re just going to say it’s OK for us to burn lots of gas and carry on emitting.”

There is also a line of argument referred to – sometimes pejoratively – as “techno-optimism”, which often stresses CCS as a core climate solution. This was exemplified by a controversial report on climate action in 2025 by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (TBI), in which the former UK prime minister wrote that CCS should be “at the centre of the battle”.

This diverges from the IPCC’s conclusion that, while CCS will likely have a role in achieving net-zero emissions, its contribution will be dwarfed by that of renewables.

CCS also attracts criticism due to its connection to the fossil-fuel industry. Dr Jen Roberts at the UKCCSRC tells Carbon Brief that she agrees these links make for complicated messaging:

“CCS is critical for net-zero, but is intrinsically tied with an industry sector that is climate polluting and historically anti-climate lobbying.”

Roberts says careful policymaking, including the development of business models and standards, can support CCS in hard-to-abate sectors where it is most needed.

Some experts suggest that governments should require companies to capture and store their emissions under the “polluter pays” principle.

Roberts also notes that fossil-fuel companies have the experience and the workforce needed to scale up CCS. “Oil and gas companies can evidence a track record in multi-million or billion-dollar subsurface engineering projects,” Roberts adds.

Despite the fossil-fuel industry’s apparent support for CCS, one 2021 study co-authored by Haszeldine noted that they had, in fact, invested relatively small amounts in the technology, compared to renewables and nature-based solutions.

Lina Lefstad at Lund University questions whether the fossil-fuel industry stands to benefit financially through the deployment of CCS as much as some critics imply:

“People seem really worried that the fossil-fuel industry is going to come out the winner again, but if that was the case I think we would have large-scale CCS by now.”

What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?

The UK government has committed “up to” £21.7bn of funding over 25 years to support the nation’s first five CCS projects and to make the nation an “early leader” in the sector.

This package, supported by both the former Conservative and current Labour governments, is intended to help create “clusters” of connected facilities across industrial areas of the UK.

Some have suggested that this represents a large pot of government spending, which could be raided to support more pressing priorities. Indeed, media coverage often points to CCS funding as a potential target for government cuts, or as a way to boost, say, military spending.

This is in spite of the fact that three quarters of the funding is expected to come from levies on consumers, rather than government budgets.

The first two CCS clusters, which are currently set to be deployed in the late-2020s, are the East Coast Cluster in north-east England and HyNet in north-west England and north Wales. The second two, scheduled for around 2030, are Acorn in north-east Scotland and Viking in the Humber.

The projects are expected to include blue-hydrogen production, gas power with CCS and industrial uses. The CO2 captured would be pumped into offshore saline aquifers and depleted gas fields.

Former UK energy secretary Ed Miliband has stated that CCS will “unlock” hard-to-abate sectors and play an “important role” in achieving clean power by 2030.

This position is supported by the UK government’s climate advisors at the Climate Change Committee (CCC), who have consistently stressed that CCS is “essential” for net-zero.

In the CCC’s most recent net-zero pathway, released as part of its seventh carbon budget advice, CCS contributes 2% of emissions cuts in 2030 and 8% in 2050, as shown in the chart below. (If CO2 removals using BECCS are included, this increases to 15% in 2050.)

Sources of emissions abatement in the CCC's "balanced pathway" to net-zero, MtCO2e. Around 8% of UK emissions cuts are linked to CCS by 2050 in the Climate Change Committee's net-zero pathway. Source: CCC.

The CCC maintains that it “cannot see a route to net-zero that does not include CCS”. Nevertheless, the committee has downgraded its expectations for CCS in recent years.

Between the CCC’s sixth and seventh carbon budget advice, its recommendations for power and industry CCS capacity dropped from 46MtCO2 to 41MtCO2.

Dr Jamie Tarlton, the committee’s CCS lead, addressed this at a conference in March 2025, stating that it was “partly because we see more opportunities for decarbonising the other sectors and reducing those residual emissions than we saw five years ago”.

More recently, the UK government also scaled back its expectations for industrial CCS in its latest carbon budget delivery plan for 2035, bringing it more in line with the CCC’s net-zero pathway. It still describes CCS as “part of the most cost-effective route to net-zero”.

The UK’s CCS plans have drawn criticism. A September 2024 letter to Miliband signed by 22 scientists and activists expressed concern about “locking the UK into a fossil-fuel based pathway”.

They note that the gas-CCS power plants and blue hydrogen facilities initially backed by the government would leave the UK reliant on gas imports, as North Sea production declines. This could be expensive and result in “upstream” emissions due to methane leaks.

(At the end of 2025, BP withdrew its involvement in one of the blue hydrogen facilities at the Teesside site. A data centre is planned for the site instead.)

Net Zero Teesside, a gas-CCS power plant in the East Coast Cluster run by BP and Equinor, has been unsuccessfully challenged in court over its emissions savings. The challenge was based on the idea that potential upstream emissions could significantly exceed any emissions cuts from CCS use.

According to a report by Carbon Tracker, the lifecycle emissions of Net Zero Teesside gas-CCS power plant would depend heavily on where it sources its fuel.

The project could cut emissions by around three-quarters, relative to an unabated gas plant, says the report. But it adds that if the plant relies on imported gas with high upstream emissions, then it might only cut emissions by a quarter.

(Most of the upstream emissions from imported gas would be released overseas, meaning they would not be counted in the UK’s official emissions inventory.)

Besides driving “gas dependence” in the UK, the government’s approach has drawn criticism for failing to ensure that CCS is prioritised in the industries that are hardest to decarbonise.

A report by the Public Accounts Committee in early 2025 took aim at the government’s cluster-based approach. It said this “does not ensure that financial support for CCUS is directed at the sectors which will need it most” – highlighting cement production.

(Of the CO2 captured in the CCC’s net-zero pathway in 2050, around 40% is in the industrial and waste sectors, while the remaining 60% is from gas power plants and the production of fuels such as hydrogen.)

Dr Andrew Boswell, the energy analyst who challenged Net Zero Teesside in court, says he is “more nuanced” when it comes to applications of CCS that do not involve gas. “There may be a case for cement, lime and waste…However, the case is unproven,” he tells Carbon Brief.

The Public Accounts Committee report also criticised the “high-risk” approach of using public funds for CCS projects, as well as slow progress in developing the technology.

Enrique Cornejo, head of energy policy at fossil-fuel trade body Offshore Energies UK, tells Carbon Brief that the UK needs to maintain momentum and deploy CCS in order to “achieve economies of scale” and to reduce the cost of the technology more broadly:

“It is indeed necessary to streamline the cluster sequencing process to ensure that emitters in sectors such as cement have a clear route to the CCS market.”

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Egypt seeks to unlock renewable potential to power regional clean energy hub

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After the US-Iran war caused energy prices to soar, ballooning Egypt’s energy import bill, the government has doubled down on plans to boost renewable energy in the country’s power mix – part of its broader plan to become a clean energy export hub for the region.

With abundant sunshine, swathes of unused desert land and plenty of wind, Egypt is seen as having the potential to become a major force in renewable power generation, helping to cut the planet-heating carbon emissions of Africa’s second-largest economy and beyond.

The conflict in the Middle East has given the government’s clean energy plans more salience, making the case for renewable power to bolster the country’s energy security and help it meet its economic development goals by exporting clean power.

The government recently announced an accelerated timeline for renewables to reach 45% of the electricity mix within two years – up from a previous target of 42% by 2030 and a huge jump from around 13% in 2025, according to think-tank Ember.

In June, President Abdel ​Fattah el-Sisi met with government ministers to discuss the faster delivery of solar and energy storage projects as well as upgrades to the electricity grid to deliver on the new goal, including 105 renewable energy projects intended to bolster grid stability.

    Big challenges lie ahead, among them a parallel bet on continued fossil fuel exploration and the need to upgrade electricity infrastructure, a task that could require multibillion-dollar investments, experts say.

    “The technical and financial plumbing – the grid, foreign-currency financing and the supply chain – are the real gatekeepers,” Nadia Elmasry, an expert at the Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, told Climate Home News.

    In a speech to the nation in March, President Sisi said $50 billion worth of investment were needed to overhaul the electricity grid and transmission infrastructure.

    During the COP29 climate talks in 2024, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly warned that Egypt’s targets for renewable power expansion could be missed without more international support for critical infrastructure.

    Multimillion-euro investment

    Modernising and expanding power grids has emerged as a central pillar of an intensifying global push for electrification – a key priority of the COP31 UN climate talks taking place in Türkiye in November.

    As dozens of governments led by the European Union and the UK throw their political weight behind a rapid electrification of the global economy, Egypt’s hunt for foreign investment in power infrastructure has found sympathetic ears.

    In June, the EU and its European Investment Bank lending arm announced a financing package of up to €690 million ($795 million) to modernise Egypt’s transmission network – widely seen as a weak point in the nation’s clean energy ambitions.

    The project aims to help the grid absorb 22 GW of renewable capacity by 2030, reduce electricity losses and move power from wind and solar zones to consumers and, eventually, foreign markets, including the EU.

    New substations and transmission lines will connect wind and solar zones around the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, reducing losses and preparing the network for future cross-Mediterranean trade.

    Under the country’s ambitious regional plans, Egypt would supply clean power via existing interconnections with Jordan, Libya and Sudan, as well as a 3 GW link under construction with Saudi Arabia.

    Further ahead, proposals envision the export of renewable electricity to southern Europe via a subsea cable, and Egypt also aims to be a primary source of green hydrogen and ammonia for European markets.

    Conflicts, cash among the challenges

    Planned investment in electricity and renewables reached 136.3 billion Egyptian pounds ($2.7 billion) for the 2025/26 financial year, up from 72.6 billion pounds ($1.4 million) the year before, with public investment expected to account for about three-quarters of that.

    Grid investment is “the cornerstone” of Egypt’s hub strategy, said energy and environmental economy expert Mohammed Abdel Raouf, allowing it to integrate renewables without destabilising the power system and create the smart-grid infrastructure needed to trade electricity with other countries.

    But Egypt’s plans face several major challenges, besides the necessary grid upgrades, which are estimated to cost billions of dollars alone, according to a December 2025 study by the Amsterdam-based think-tank Transnational Institute.

    A man on a bicycle balances baskets of bread on his head in Cairo, Egypt
    A man carries baskets of bread on his head through Cairo, Egypt (Photo: MM/Flickr)

    Regional conflicts are disrupting supply chains and discouraging investment, particularly in renewable energy, Abdel Raouf warned. High borrowing costs, financing rules, limited EU-compliant capacity and uncertain long-term buyers of Egypt’s clean power could also slow progress, according to the Transnational Institute study.

    The Arab world’s most populous country has been grappling with the aftermath of a steep currency devaluation and economic fallout from the Gaza and Iran wars.

    Elmasry pointed to pressures from Egypt’s shortage of foreign currency and the need for concessional finance or guarantees to make long-term projects bankable. Egypt says it has mobilised $4 billion in concessional finance for 4.2 GW of renewable energy projects.

    Regulatory coordination and workforce development will be essential, particularly as Egypt seeks to trade across grids governed by different technical and commercial rules, Elmasry added.

      In order to generate an exportable surplus of clean electricity at a time of rising domestic power needs, Egypt also needs to give a bigger role to decentralised minigrid systems such as rooftop solar projects, said Cairo-based solar entrepreneur Hatem Tawfik.

      “We will [only] be a hub in 2040 after we produce more than we need,” said Tawfik, co-founder and managing director of Cairo Solar, a solar engineering, procurement and construction company, calling for cheaper loans and simpler permitting and grid-connection rules.

      For Tawfik, such small-scale projects are also fundamental to the government’s goal of shoring up energy security to avert crises like that of 2023/2024, when Egypt’s falling gas output contributed to rolling blackouts during sweltering heatwaves.

      At a time of heightened geopolitical uncertainty in the Middle East, this is even more urgent.

      “In the event of war, or if a country such as Israel, which supplies 40-60% of Egypt’s [imported] gas, suddenly cut off supplies [again], Egypt would be less vulnerable,” he told Climate Home News.

      A man charges his mobile phone thanks to the electric solar panels above his as the country struggled with continuous power cuts and an energy crisis in 2024
      A man charges his mobile phone thanks to the electric solar panels above his house at Al-Basaysa village as the country struggled with continuous power cuts in 2024 (Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Abd El Ghany)

      Home-grown batteries

      Storage could determine whether Egypt’s renewable power is merely abundant at midday or commercially valuable around the clock.

      “Storage is what turns intermittent renewables into firm, exportable power,” said Elmasry.

      In January, Norwegian developer Scatec signed a 25-year power purchase agreement with the Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company for 1.95 GW of solar and 3.9 GWh of battery storage.

      Demand for more storage has also raised the prospect of Egypt developing a domestic battery industry.

      Chinese company Sungrow plans to build a battery-storage-system factory in Ain Sokhna, its first in the Middle East, with annual production capacity of 10 GWh and operations scheduled to begin in April 2027. It will provide the batteries for Scatec’s energy storage project.

      Egypt has also granted licences for two battery-storage projects in Aswan and Suez worth a combined $800 million. Huawei and Egyptian company AIS have meanwhile signed an agreement to explore local production of grid-forming battery systems.

      At the same time, Egypt is conducting an aerial geophysical survey in search of critical minerals across six regions, a first in about half a century.

      Still, Mohamed Gamal Kafafy, president of the World Green Economy Council, said competing directly with China would be unrealistic, suggesting Egypt should instead manufacture under Chinese licences or through joint ventures, reducing imports while building local skills.

      The Ministry of Electricity did not respond to Climate Home News’ request for comment.

      Mixed messages?

      The government’s climate investment programme aims to add 10 GW of renewable capacity and retire 5 GW of inefficient fossil-fuel generation by 2028, but Egypt is not turning its back on oil and gas.

      President Sisi told energy companies attending the Egypt Energy Show in March to pursue a double strategy – intensifying efforts to explore and increase oil and gas production while also accelerating investment in renewable energy. The Petroleum Ministry plans to drill about 480 exploratory oil wells over five years.

      Drivers refuel vehicles at a gas station in Cairo, Egypt, after the government introduced power rationing measures due to shortages of petroleum products caused by the war between the US, Israel and Iran (Photo by Sayed Hassan/Getty Images)

      The risk, Tawfik said, is that a large oil or gas discovery reduces the incentive to focus on investment in renewables.

      “When a major oil or gas discovery, such as the Zohr gas field, leads to overconfidence, it reduces the focus on renewable energy,” he said, noting that renewable project rollouts largely stagnated after the completion of the giant Benban solar park in 2019.

      But major developments such as the El Dabaa nuclear plant and the Abydos solar and energy-storage project demonstrate that significant work is already under way to meet Egypt’s clean energy hub ambitions, Tawfik said.

      “Simply implementing the existing plans would be an excellent outcome,” he added.


      Main image: The Sharm El Sheikh solar power plant in Egypt (Photo:
      Hassan Allam Utilities)

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      UN chief warns climate crisis “in overdrive” as El Niño threatens to fuel the fire

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      The United Nations Secretary-General and foreign ministers from the UK, France and Spain have blamed the deadly wildfires engulfing Europe on climate change, using the disaster to renew calls for faster cuts to greenhouse gas emissions.

      António Guterres told journalists on Friday that the “climate crisis is in overdrive”, adding that global heat seen so far is just a “warm up act” as a phenomenon known as El Niño intensifies “adding fuel to a planet already on fire”.

      A new World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) report published on Friday predicts that the weather pattern will grow into a “strong event” between now and October, increasing the risk of higher than normal temperatures across much of the world and disrupted rainfalls.

      “That risks shattering every seasonal record – and driving even more severe effects worldwide,” Guterres said.

      El Niño builds on top of an already warming world, driven primarily by the burning of fossil fuels. A WMO scientist, who did not want to be named, told journalists that all the heatwaves and other climate impacts seen so far this year are “before the effects of El Niño are really kicking in at a global scale”.

      Fossil fuellling the fires

      Fires have broken out across much of Europe but are threatening the most people in the south-west of France near Bordeaux and in Central Spain near Madrid. Nearly a quarter of a million people have been evacuated in France with hundreds of homes destroyed while in Spain 80,000 people have had to leave their homes and at least 13 died in one village.

      A scientific study published on Friday by the World Weather Attribution group found that man-made climate change made deadly fires in France twice as likely and those in Spain twenty times more likely. Smaller fires in the UK were not analysed by the study.

      UN Climate Change leader Simon Stiell blamed fossil fuels for the fires, as well as storms in Chile and heatwaves in North America and Japan in recent weeks. “The climate alarm is blaring”, he said on Wednesday.

      Guterres criticised new fossil fuel production projects and fossil fuel subsidies for causing hardship across the world. Discussing his speech, a senior UN official – who did not want to be named – said the subsidies amounted to trillions of US dollars a year and criticised pension funds and institutional investors, including insurance companies, for continuing to invest in fossil fuel projects.

      The head of the United Nations Antonio Guterres (right) with the head of the UN’s climate arm Simon Stiell (left) at COP30 (Photo: Kiara Worth/UNFCCC)

      Asked why world leaders and the public are not prioritising climate action, Guterres said they are distracted by wars in Ukraine, the Middle East, Sudan and elsewhere and sometimes forget “other aspects that are a sometimes even more dangerous threat”.

      Also the fossil fuel industry and “some countries” are campaigning to pretend that climate change does not exist, he said, adding that the UN should be more active in “naming the situations as they are and the responsibilties as they are and mobilising the public opinion”.

      After meetings in Paris and Madrid earlier in the week, the UK’s new foreign minister Ed Miliband issued joint statements with his French and Spanish counterparts – Jean-Noël Barrot and José Manuel Albares Bueno – calling on the world to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels.

      They promised to do more to reduce emissions and protect their people and encouraged other governments to do the same.

      The UK-French statement called on governments to publish UN climate plans, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which are aligned with the Paris Agreement’s goal to limit global average temperatures to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.

      According to Climate Action Tracker, only three countries – the UK, Nigeria and Norway – have submitted NDCs with 2035 emissions reduction targets which are compatible with 1.5C. Fifty-two countries – including Egypt, Vietnam and Argentina – have yet to submit an NDC at all.

      Defending science

      Beyond action on emissions, the ministers also intervened in an ongoing dispute over the timing of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC)’s next flagship assessment.

      Miliband and Barrot’s statement said they “underline the importance” of scientific report feeding into governments’ next global stocktake of progress on climate action in two years’ time, calling it a “critical input” to that process.

      The timing of this report has been a contentious issue in government negotiations at the IPCC and at June’s climate talks in Bonn. While a group of nations calling themselves the “friends of science” want the report before the stocktake, others like Saudi Arabia and India have argued that this would make the report of a worse quality and less inclusive of developing countries’ scientists.

      Science ‘under attack’ from fossil fuel interests at UN climate talks

      The UK-Spanish statement weighed in less explicitly on this issue but said that they “recall the importance of scientific evidence and acknowledge the work of the IPCC in this respect.”

      The British and French ministers said they would seek to accelerate reductions of emissions in methane, a particularly potent greenhouse gas, at COP31 in November. They encouraged governments “to work jointly to develop a marketplace for fossil fuels with near-zero methane intensity.”

      Methane leaks from oil, gas and coal production are a major contributor to global warming. Over a 20-year period, methane traps around 80 times more heat than carbon dioxide.

      Ed Miliband meets José Manuel Albares Bueno in Madrid on 29 July 2026. (Picture by Ed Morris / FCDO)

      The UK and Spanish statement emphasised the importance of supporting the Global South and underlined the need to mobilise sustainable financing “at scale with the challenge we face”. The previous UK government, in which Miliband was energy minister, cut climate finance to developing countries to pay for increases in military spending.

      The UK government led by new Prime Minister Andy Burnham has yet to outline any major changes to climate finance in its two weeks in power but has announced it will convert some finance from grants to loans in order to free up money to subsidise bus travel in England.

      More adaptation needed

      Guterres said that “it is time to stop treating each disaster as an isolated tragedy and recognise the systemic risk that is unfolding before our eyes.” A recent study found that three-quarters of UK media reports about the British June heatwave did not mention climate change.

      As well as reducing emissions, the UN Secretary-General called for measures to adapt vulnerable people to extreme heat. Specifically, he said that buildings should be built and retrofitted for extreme heat and that every city and country should have heat-health action plans and early warning systems. Over 250 cities have joined the UN’s ‘beat the heat’ initiative, he said.

      The Portuguese diplomat called for governments and employers to do more to protect their workers from heat, criticising global fashion brands for not setting heat standards for the factories that supply them. “No one should have to risk their life to earn a living,” he said.

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