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Artificial intelligence (AI) has undergone a rapid expansion in recent years.

Tech leaders have hailed an “AI revolution” – predicting “transformative” effects for humanity – while some governments have set their sights on AI-driven economic growth.

Yet, the industry is also facing scrutiny on many fronts, from inaccuracies in AI outputs through to the threat it poses to democracy.

One major critique concerns the environmental impact of AI, particularly the intensive energy use and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions of the data centres that power it.

Campaigners, journalists and researchers have warned that the rapid expansion of data centres could slow down or even reverse the global shift towards net-zero.

The topic is complex, not least because the future of AI – and the role it could play in increasing or potentially helping to reduce emissions – remains highly uncertain.

Below, Carbon Brief takes a look at some of the best available figures, largely from the International Energy Agency (IEA), to explore the energy and emissions impact of AI.

  1. Data centres currently account for a small share of global emissions and electricity use
  2. Around a tenth of the electricity demand growth by 2030 is set to be driven by data centres
  3. Data centres could account for half of electricity demand growth in some countries
  4. Fossil-fuel use will likely expand to power data centres, but clean-energy supplies are set to grow faster
  5. There is a lot of uncertainty about how much data centres will expand

      1. Data centres currently account for a small share of global emissions and electricity use

      The process of training and deploying AI models relies on data centres – large, energy-intensive facilities that house computing infrastructure.

      Data centres already underpin the internet, among other things, making them essential for modern life. But as hype around AI has grown in recent years, investment in new data centres has ballooned.

      The global electricity consumption of expanding data centres has grown by around 12% each year since 2017, according to the IEA’s recent “energy and AI” report.

      Concerns about “skyrocketing” electricity demand have also prompted warnings of data centres driving up CO2 emissions, as fossil fuels still generate much of the world’s power.

      Indeed, companies, such as Google, Meta and Microsoft, have reported large emissions spikes over the past few years due to data-centre expansion, despite their net-zero pledges.

      One research paper concludes that the electricity demand of AI “runs counter to the massive efficiency gains that are needed to achieve net-zero”. Others have voiced concerns that data centres will “overwhelm” and “undermine” both national and company-level climate targets.

      Reporting often mentions the electricity demand of data centres – or their emissions – “doubling”, “tripling” or increasing by some other large percentage in the coming years.

      But these increases, while potentially dramatic in relative terms, are starting from a low baseline. As shown in the chart below, data centres are currently responsible for just over 1% of global electricity demand and 0.5% of CO2 emissions, according to IEA data.

      Electricity consumption, TWh, and CO2 emissions, MtCO2, of global data centres in 2024, relative to other sectors
      Electricity consumption, TWh, and CO2 emissions, MtCO2, of global data centres in 2024, relative to other sectors. Source: IEA global energy review 2025, CO2 figures and report on energy and AI.

      Given this starting point, even as data centres expand, the IEA suggests that they will make a relatively small contribution to climate change, in the short term.

      The agency estimates that data-centre emissions will reach 1% of CO2 emissions by 2030 in its central scenario, or 1.4% in a faster-growth scenario.

      Nevertheless, it notes that this is one of the few sectors where emissions are set to grow – alongside road transport and aviation – as most will likely decarbonise in the coming years.

      2. Around a tenth of the electricity demand growth by 2030 is set to be driven by data centres

      The world is entering what the IEA describes as a “new age of electricity”, in which the electrification of transport, buildings and industry drives a surge in demand for power.

      Along with electric cars and factories, data centres are frequently highlighted by analysts as a key “emerging driver” of this demand.

      Under the IEA’s central scenario for data-centre growth, the sector’s global electricity consumption would more than double between 2024 and 2030, reaching 945 terawatt-hours (TWh) by the end of the decade. This is equivalent to the current electricity demand of Japan.

      The IEA describes AI as “the most important driver of this growth”.

      As it stands, AI has been responsible for around 5-15% of data-centre power use in recent years, but this could increase to 35-50% by 2030, according to another report prepared for the IEA.

      However, the 530TWh rise in electricity demand in data centres by 2030 would only be 8% of the overall increase in demand that the IEA projects, as shown in the chart below.

      This is less than electric vehicles (838TWh) or air conditioning (651TWh). It is considerably less than the 1,936TWh growth expected in industrial sectors by 2030.

      Electricity demand growth in IEA scenarios, in TWh between 2024 and 2030
      Electricity demand growth in IEA scenarios, in TWh between 2024 and 2030, due to data-centre expansion (dark blue) – including a scenario in which expansion happens faster (light blue) – as well as from other sectors (grey). Source: IEA energy and AI report.

      If data-centre electricity use rose in line with the IEA’s faster-growth scenario, the facilities would be responsible for around 12% of global demand growth overall.

      While the IEA says “uncertainties widen” when considering electricity demand growth beyond 2030, it expects a continued – albeit slower – increase to 1,193TWh by 2035.

      This would mean annual demand growth roughly halving, from around 90TWh per year out to 2030, down to less than 50TWh a year out to 2035.

      3. Data centres could account for half of electricity demand growth in some countries

      While the global picture suggests a relatively modest role for data centres in driving near-future electricity demand growth, it could be far more pronounced in some countries.

      Data centres are very geographically concentrated, both in terms of their global distribution and within leading countries. Today, nearly half of their electricity consumption takes place in the US, 25% in China and 15% in Europe, according to the IEA.

      US data centres used around 4% of the nation’s electricity in 2023 and this is set to rise to 7-12% by 2028, according to analysis by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

      In Ireland – regarded as a European “tech hub” – around 21% of the nation’s electricity is used for data centres. The IEA estimates that this share could rise to 32% by 2026.

      Data-centre electricity demand tends to be further localised in certain regions. In the US state of Virginia, these facilities already consume 26% of electricity, while in the Irish capital, Dublin, the figure is 79%, according to analysis by Oeko-Institute.

      Much of the commentary on AI threatening climate goals comes from “advanced economies” in the global north, where the IEA estimates that, on average, a quarter of electricity demand growth by 2030 will be driven by data centres.

      (In many of these countries, electricity demand has previously been flat or falling for years.)

      Roughly half of the power demand growth in the US and Japan over the next five years is expected to come from data centres, according to the IEA, as shown in the figure below.

      Share of electricity demand growth between 2024 and 2030, %, in the IEA’s central scenario for data-centre expansion, in select countries and country groupings.
      Share of electricity demand growth between 2024 and 2030, %, in the IEA’s central scenario for data-centre expansion, in select countries and country groupings. Source: IEA energy and AI report, IEA.

      While there are some notable exceptions, such as Malaysia, data centres are set to be a relatively small portion of electricity demand growth in developing and emerging markets.

      Around the world, electricity grids are under strain, with many developed countries, in particular, seeing long wait times for grid connections and new transmission lines. Data-centre growth is raising this pressure.

      There are also growing concerns, notably in the US, about the impact data-centre growth could have on energy bills.

      The IEA says that demand growth presents “advanced economies” with a “wake-up call” for the electricity sector to invest in infrastructure, otherwise “there is a risk that meeting data-centre load growth could entail trade-offs with other goals, such as electrification”.

      4. Fossil-fuel use will likely expand to power data centres, but clean-energy supplies are set to grow faster

      The extent to which data-centre growth increases emissions depends on which energy sources power those data centres.

      Data centres can use power from the grid, in which case their electricity mix will reflect that of the region they are in and could therefore become cleaner as nations decarbonise.

      They can also be powered by “captive” sources, built to supply specific facilities, such as solar panels, small nuclear reactors or gas turbines.

      There are concerns that data-centre expansion will be used to justify the prolonged use of fossil fuels, “locking in” a future of elevated emissions.

      Indeed, the likes of Shell have framed AI in such terms and some data-centre operators have been explicitly seeking gas connections to meet their electricity needs.

      Currently, coal is the biggest single electricity source for data centres globally, largely due to the numerous facilities in China.

      Overall, fossil fuels provide nearly 60% of power to data centres, according to the IEA. Renewables meet 27% of their electricity demand and nuclear another 15%.

      (These figures are based on the electricity these facilities consume, rather than any contracts they have to buy clean energy credits.)

      In the IEA’s central scenario, by 2035 the ratio of the data-centre electricity mix switches from around 60% fossil fuels and 40% clean power to 60% clean power and 40% fossil fuels, as shown in the chart below.

      This is expected to be driven primarily by the wider global expansion of renewables, although some projects will be funded directly by data-centre companies.

      However, the IEA says significantly more gas and coal power would likely still be required to meet data-centre demand, both from ramping up existing plants and building new ones.

      Annually global electricity generation, TWh, expected to supply data centres globally over 2024-2035
      Annually global electricity generation, TWh, expected to supply data centres globally over 2024-2035, broken down by generation type, in the IEA’s central scenario. Low-carbon electricity sources are grey and fossil fuels are blue. required Source: IEA energy and AI report.

      Gas-power generation for data centres is expected to more than double from 120TWh in 2024 to 293TWh in 2035, with much of this growth in the US, according to the IEA.

      About 38GW of captive gas plants currently “in development” – roughly a quarter of all such projects – are planned to power data centres, according to Global Energy Monitor (GEM).

      The US has doubled the amount of gas- and oil-fired capacity it has in development over the past year, driven partly by the energy demand of the “burgeoning AI industry”, according to GEM.

      However, these projects are facing long lead times and “sharplyrising costs, with GEM noting, as a result, that many may never materialise.

      5. There is a lot of uncertainty about how much data centres will expand

      Currently, there are no comprehensive global datasets available on data-centre electricity consumption or emissions, with few governments mandating any reporting of such numbers.

      All figures concerning the energy and climate impact of AI are therefore estimates.

      The IEA has assessed hundreds of available estimates and forecasts, noting that even historical data can be “widely divergent”, due in part to a lack of common definitions.

      On top of this, there are major uncertainties, including over how quickly AI will be adopted. Despite the enthusiastic uptake of generative AI by individuals and companies, some argue that the business case for continued, rapid growth may be weaker than suggested.

      Another uncertainty is how energy-efficient AI will be. Experts have already identified efficiency improvements resulting from better chips, more efficient training algorithms and larger data centres, all of which could continue curbing electricity demand.

      (Google has also reported a substantial drop in the electricity use required for individual AI search queries, which is already small compared to the power needed to train AI models.)

      A final uncertainty is over how many proposed data centres will actually get built, with some speculative requests for grid capacity relating to plans that may never materialise.

      As a result of these knowledge gaps, there have been numerous estimates of short-term electricity demand growth from data centres, which have produced very different results, as shown in the chart below.

      Some estimates – such as one from the Gas Exporting Countries Forum arguing that more gas exports will be needed to fuel meteoric rises in electricity demand for AI – have been deemed less credible in reviews by independent experts.

      Estimated electricity demand from data centres globally in 2023 and 2030
      Estimated electricity demand from data centres globally in 2023 and 2030, according to scenarios laid out by a range of analysts. Some scenarios have been extrapolated one or two years forward or backwards so that they cover the same timescale. The Liebreich Associates scenario is approximate, based on estimates of % total electricity demand. Sources: IEA, Goldman Sachs, Deloitte, Boston Consulting Group, Gas Exporting Countries Forum, Liebreich Associates, Semianalysis, Schneider Electric, International Data Corporation, Jeffries (2024).

      Another area of great uncertainty concerns the impact that the application of AI could have on electricity use and emissions.

      Some researchers have attempted to calculate how much AI could curb emissions, by helping to identify efficiency gains in other parts of the energy system, or by making technological breakthroughs.

      In some “exploratory” analysis, the IEA says such gains could cancel out any extra data-centre emissions due to the growth of AI.

      However, it adds that despite the AI hype, “there is currently no existing momentum of AI adoption that would unlock these emissions reductions”.

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      Climate Change

      Israel’s fossil gas power play pushes climate action to the sidelines

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      When Israel’s prime minister approved a $35-billion deal to supply natural gas to Egypt last month, Energy Minister Eli Cohen said the benefits of increased gas trade with its neighbour went far beyond money.

      The approval of this gas agreement is a historic moment for the State of Israel, both in the security-diplomatic sphere and the economic sphere,” Cohen said on December 17.

      In contrast, Egyptian officials – sensitive to the optics at home due to widespread anger over Israel’s military offensive in Gaza – played down the political significance of the deal, saying it was “purely commercial”. 

        The deal’s final approval, which had been delayed by several months, reflects Israel’s commitment to ramp up offshore gas extraction as a way to assert its regional dominance and shore up economic ties amid international criticism over the war in Gaza, analysts say.

        While Israel has a globally renowned clean-tech sector, the push on fossil gas underscores how climate action is low on the country’s priority list.

        Climate action takes a backseat

        Shortly before the gas export deal was finalised, at COP30 in Brazil, Israel declined to add its voice to calls by more than 80 countries for a roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels. And before that, in October, the Energy Ministry said the country would fail to meet a 2025 target for renewables to make up 20% of its energy mix.

        Israel’s latest climate plan sets a target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 27% by 2030 from 2015 levels, and it has not yet presented an updated nationally determined contribution (NDC) due in 2025.

        The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also preparing to launch a new offshore gas exploration campaign within weeks, following the signing in October of a ceasefire agreement to end two years of war between Israel and the Hamas militant group in Gaza.

        Beyond the Middle East, Israel’s gas push also highlights another challenge for the global clean energy transition as fossil fuels play a key role in political instability and conflict, from Ukraine to Venezuela.

        Fuelling the economy

        Fossil gas accounts for about 70% of Israel’s energy mix, followed by renewables – mainly solar – and coal.

        Last year, the 27 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas extracted off Israel’s coast were split almost evenly between domestic consumption and exports to Jordan and Egypt, the only two buyers of Israeli gas, both of which are vocal allies of the Palestinians.

        Despite their condemnation of the war, neither country sought to halt the gas trade during Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, which killed about 71,000 Palestinians and left most of the coastal enclave in ruins.

        What’s on the climate calendar for 2026?

        Israeli gas exports to both countries increased 13% during 2024, maintaining an upward trend in shipments of the fossil fuel since 2018.

        “Both Egypt and Jordan may signal solidarity with Palestinians in public, but their infrastructures tell a different story,” wrote Rafeef Ziadah, a UK-based scholar and human rights activist.

        A man charges his mobile phone by a source from the electric solar panels above his house at Al-Basaysa village which is almost fully dependent on solar energy, as the country struggles with continuous power cuts and an energy crisis, in Sharqiya, Egypt, July 22, 2024. REUTERS/Mohamed Abd El Ghany

        A man charges his mobile phone by a source from the electric solar panels above his house at Al-Basaysa village which is almost fully dependent on solar energy, as the country struggles with continuous power cuts and an energy crisis, in Sharqiya, Egypt, July 22, 2024. REUTERS/Mohamed Abd El Ghany

        Israel’s gas exports to Egypt were halted for several weeks in 2023 when the war began, and again in 2025 when Israel launched a brief air war against nuclear sites in Iran – disrupting an increasingly important supply of energy to Egypt, which has faced power shortages in recent years as its own gas production dwindled.

        Egypt is heavily dependent on fossil gas for energy generation, with renewables, mainly hydropower, making up only about 11% of the power mix, according to data from the Ember think-tank.

        For Israel, gas is a win-win trade

        Gas production has also been an important source of revenue for Israel, and income has been growing in recent years, including during the war in Gaza. Israel’s gas revenues grew in 2024 to 2.3 billion shekels ($720 million) from 2.1 billion a year earlier, official data shows.

        Some of the gas proceeds feed Israel’s sovereign wealth fund, but much of the income from gas – mainly royalties and corporate tax – goes directly to state coffers, helping to fund Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza war, both of which are opposed by Jordan and Egypt.

        Laury Haytayan, a Middle East and North Africa energy expert, described the gas ties between Israel and Egypt as a “kind of co-dependence”.

        What would Trump’s Venezuela oil plans mean for climate change?

        While that might be politically uncomfortable, Egypt’s energy crisis means it cannot afford to be choosy, analysts say.

        “Israel remains an important pillar of the energy supply in neighbouring countries, contrary voices notwithstanding,” Israel’s Petroleum Commissioner Chen Bar Yoseph told Climate Home News.

        The gas platform for Leviathan, Israel’s largest gas field is seen from a helicopter near Haifa bay, northern Israel, August 1, 2023. REUTERS/Ari Rabinovitch

        The gas platform for Leviathan, Israel’s largest gas field is seen from a helicopter near Haifa bay, northern Israel, August 1, 2023. REUTERS/Ari Rabinovitch

        The recent finalisation of the Egypt export deal also drew praise from Israel’s main international ally, the United States, with the State Department calling it “a major win for American business and regional cooperation”.

        US oil major Chevron, which holds a 40% stake in Israel’s offshore Leviathan field and operates the field, plans to expand it as a result of the agreement.

        “More gas will be found”

        When Netanyahu announced his approval of the deal, he said it would encourage other companies to explore for more gas resources off the Israeli coast.

        “More gas will be found,” Netanyahu said, two weeks after the Energy Ministry said it was close to launching a new tender for gas exploration in offshore blocks. 

        Trump to pull US out of UN climate convention and climate science body

        The deal signed between Egyptian firm Blue Ocean Energy and Chevron, along with its partners in Leviathan, will see 130 billion cubic metres of Israeli gas pumped to Egypt over the next 15 years. Israeli media reports linked the planned offshore gas expansion to concerns over limited gas reserves which resurfaced in the wake of the export agreement.

        Israeli officials hope the ceasefire in Gaza, coupled with the finalisation of the Egypt deal, will boost international interest in the bidding, which could take place early this year.

        Pro-Palestinian groups denounce exploration

        Climate and environmental campaign groups, meanwhile, have repeatedly demanded that Israeli gas exploration be frozen, citing the potential consequences for planet-heating emissions and marine ecosystems.

        Palestinian human rights NGOs have warned that the hunt for fossil gas could also expand Israel’s illegal exploitation of Palestinian natural resources since several maritime zones earmarked by Israel for gas exploration overlap waters claimed by Palestinians in a 2019 submission to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

        “Israel cannot operate there unilaterally. It is not an Israeli territorial or economic zone with authority to operate there,” said Suhad Bishara, legal director at Adalah, an Israel-based organisation focused on promoting Palestinian rights.

        “Any company that agrees, or enters, or is associated with drilling in this area is complicit in breaching international law,” Bishara said.

        Climate Justice Coalition activists take part in a pro-Palestinian protest during the United Nations climate change conference COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan November 11, 2024. REUTERS/Aziz Karimov

        Climate Justice Coalition activists take part in a pro-Palestinian protest during the United Nations climate change conference COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan November 11, 2024. REUTERS/Aziz Karimov

        Whether or not more exploration licences are granted, some experts question how much more undiscovered oil and gas lies beneath the seabed off Israel.

        Geologist Yossi Langotsky, considered the father of Israeli offshore gas, has long maintained that the Leviathan and Tamar fields – which are not in areas claimed by the Palestinians – are the only large gas reservoirs along Israel’s coast.

        For as long as the two fields are producing enough, Israel will likely find a willing buyer in energy-hungry Egypt – whatever the geopolitical backdrop.

        “Even when regional leaders rail against occupation or genocide, the gas keeps flowing,” said Ziadah, the UK-based rights activist.

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        Climate Change

        The battle over a global energy transition is on between petro-states and electro-states

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        Jennifer Morgan is a senior fellow with the Center for International Environment and Resource Policy and Climate Policy Lab at Tufts University and a former special climate envoy for the German government.

        Two years ago, countries around the world set a goal of “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner”. The plan included tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling energy efficiency gains by 2030 – important steps for slowing climate change since the energy sector makes up about 75% of the global carbon dioxide emissions that are heating up the planet.

        The world is making progress: More than 90% of new power capacity added in 2024 came from renewable energy sources, and 2025 saw similar growth.

        However, fossil fuel production is also still expanding. And the United States, the world’s leading producer of both oil and natural gas, is now aggressively pressuring countries to keep buying and burning fossil fuels.

          The energy transition was not meant to be a main topic when world leaders and negotiators met at the 2025 United Nations climate summit, COP30, in November in Belém, Brazil. But it took centre stage from the start to the very end, bringing attention to the real-world geopolitical energy debate underway and the stakes at hand.

          Fight over transition roadmap at COP30

          Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva began the conference by calling for the creation of a formal roadmap, essentially a strategic process in which countries could participate to “overcome dependence on fossil fuels.” It would take the global decision to transition away from fossil fuels from words to action.

          More than 80 countries said they supported the idea, ranging from vulnerable small island nations like Vanuatu that are losing land and lives from sea level rise and more intense storms, to countries like Kenya that see business opportunities in clean energy, to Australia, a large fossil fuel-producing country.

          Opposition, led by the Arab Group’s oil- and gas-producing countries, kept any mention of a “roadmap” energy transition plan out of the final agreement from the climate conference, but supporters are pushing ahead.

          I was in Belém for COP30, and I follow developments closely as former special climate envoy and head of delegation for Germany and senior fellow at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. The fight over whether there should even be a roadmap shows how much countries that depend on fossil fuels are working to slow down the transition, and how others are positioning themselves to benefit from the growth of renewables. And it is a key area to watch in 2026.

          The battle between electro-states and petro-states

          Brazilian diplomat and COP30 President André Aranha Corrêa do Lago has committed to lead an effort in 2026 to create two roadmaps: one on halting and reversing deforestation and another on transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner.

          What those roadmaps will look like is still unclear. They are likely to be centred on a process for countries to discuss and debate how to reverse deforestation and phase out fossil fuels.

          Over the coming months, Corrêa do Lago plans to convene high-level meetings among global leaders, including fossil fuel producers and consumers, international organisations, industries, workers, scholars and advocacy groups.

          For the roadmap to both be accepted and be useful, the process will need to address the global market issues of supply and demand, as well as equity. For example, in some fossil fuel-producing countries, oil, gas or coal revenues are the main source of income. What can the road ahead look like for those countries that will need to diversify their economies?

          Nigeria is an interesting case study for weighing that question.

          Oil exports consistently provide the bulk of Nigeria’s revenue, accounting for around 80% to over 90% of total government revenue and foreign exchange earnings. At the same time, roughly 39% of Nigeria’s population has no access to electricity, which is the highest proportion of people without electricity of any nation. And Nigeria possesses abundant renewable energy resources across the country, which are largely untapped: solar, hydro, geothermal and wind, providing new opportunities.

          A solar microgrid run by Husk Power Systems serves Kiguna village in Nasarawa state, Nigeria, September 26, 2022 (Photo: Megan Rowling)

          A solar microgrid run by Husk Power Systems serves Kiguna village in Nasarawa state, Nigeria, September 26, 2022 (Photo: Megan Rowling)

          What a roadmap might look like

          In Belém, representatives talked about creating a roadmap that would be science-based and aligned with the Paris climate agreement, and would include various pathways to achieve a just transition for fossil fuel-dependent regions.

          Some inspiration for helping fossil fuel-producing countries transition to cleaner energy could come from Brazil and Norway.

          In Brazil, Lula asked his ministries to prepare guidelines for developing a roadmap for gradually reducing Brazil’s dependency on fossil fuels and find a way to financially support the changes.

          His decree specifically mentions creating an energy transition fund, which could be supported by government revenues from oil and gas exploration. While Brazil supports moving away from fossil fuels, it is also still a large oil producer and recently approved new exploratory drilling near the mouth of the Amazon River.

          Norway, a major oil and gas producer, is establishing a formal transition commission to study and plan its economy’s shift away from fossil fuels, particularly focusing on how the workforce and the natural resources of Norway can be used more effectively to create new and different jobs.

          Both countries are just getting started, but their work could help point the way for other countries and inform a global roadmap process.

          The European Union has implemented a series of policies and laws aimed at reducing fossil fuel demand. It has a target for 42.5% of its energy to come from renewable sources by 2030. And its EU Emissions Trading System, which steadily reduces the emissions that companies can emit, will soon be expanded to cover housing and transportation. The Emissions Trading System already includes power generation, energy-intensive industry and civil aviation.

          Fossil fuel and renewable energy growth ahead

          In the US, the Trump administration has made clear through its policymaking and diplomacy that it is pursuing the opposite approach: to keep fossil fuels as the main energy source for decades to come.

          The International Energy Agency still expects to see renewable energy grow faster than any other major energy source in all scenarios going forward, as renewable energy’s lower costs make it an attractive option in many countries. Globally, the agency expects investment in renewable energy in 2025 to be twice that of fossil fuels.

          At the same time, however, fossil fuel investments are also rising with fast-growing energy demand.

          The IEA’s World Energy Outlook described a surge in new funding for liquefied natural gas, or LNG, projects in 2025. It now expects a 50% increase in global LNG supply by 2030, about half of that from the US. However, the World Energy Outlook notes that “questions still linger about where all the new LNG will go” once it’s produced.

          What to watch for

          The Belém roadmap dialogue and how it balances countries’ needs will reflect on the world’s ability to handle climate change.

          Corrêa do Lago plans to report on its progress at the next annual UN climate conference, COP31, in late 2026. The conference will be hosted by Turkey, but Australia, which supported the call for a roadmap, will be leading the negotiations.

          With more time to discuss and prepare, COP31 may just bring a transition away from fossil fuels back into the global negotiations.

          This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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          Climate Change

          Saudi Arabia issues last-minute climate plan with unclear emissions-cutting goal

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          On the last day of 2025, the Saudi Arabian government submitted an updated climate plan to the United Nations which contains a new but ambiguous emissions-reduction target and argues the world should keep buying the kingdom’s fossil fuels so that it can afford to shift its economy away from oil.

          The 27-page nationally determined contribution (NDC) was sent to the UN’s climate arm (UNFCCC) on December 31 2025, just in time to meet the 2015 Paris Agreement’s requirement that governments submit an NDC every five years. The bottom of the front page says in capital letters “2025 SUBMISSION TO UNFCCC”.

          The document was not uploaded to the UNFCCC website, and so was not publicly available, until the night of January 5-6.

          Saudi Arabia’s third climate plan sets a new target for reducing emissions by 2040 – unlike most other new NDCs which contain a goal for 2035.

          As with the oil-rich government’s earlier 2030 target, it is not clear what share of the oil producing-country’s emissions the 2040 goal equates to, as the baseline is not clearly specified. The Saudi government also states that it may change the baseline, effectively making the target less ambitious if it feels unfairly targeted by global climate policies.

          The document says Saudi Arabia will aim to “reduce, avoid, and remove greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 335 million tons of [carbon dioxide equivalent] annually reached by 2040… on the basis of a dynamic baseline, with the year 2019 designated as the base year for this NDC”.

          Saudi Arabia’s last NDC in 2021 had a similar format, aiming to cut emissions by 278 million tons a year (mtpa) by 2030. But neither target specifies the total the emissions reductions should be measured against, leaving analysts unclear as to what level of absolute emissions Saudi Arabia is aiming for in 2030 and 2040.

            Climate Action Tracker (CAT), which analyses climate plans from major-emitting nations, has yet to publish its view on Saudi Arabia’s new NDC.

            But commenting on the 2021 NDC, it said that “although not explicitly mentioned in the document, the CAT interprets the NDC target to be a reduction below a baseline scenario. It is important to note that neither the previous nor the updated NDC includes a baseline projection to which the emissions reductions target is applied.”

            A 2024 study by researchers from the Riyadh-based King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Centre (KAPSARC) and the US’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory said “the Kingdom has not officially defined the baseline emissions in their updated NDCs”. They suggested that, under Saudi Arabia’s current policies, emissions will continue to rise until at least 2060.

            Saudi authorities have not clarified what baseline the previous NDC’s targets are against and have not spoken publicly about the new NDC. The website for the government’s Vision 2030 initiative says only that the Kingdom aims to “reduce carbon emissions by 278 mtpa by 2030”.

            NDC depends on continued oil exports

            As well as being unclear in terms of numbers, Saudi Arabia says the baseline for its 2040 target is contingent on “sustained economic growth and diversification, supported by a robust contribution from hydrocarbon export revenues to the national economy”.

            Hydrocarbons are another word for fossil fuels, which the NDC says Saudi Arabia aims to become less reliant on by moving into sectors like financial and medical services, tourism, renewable energy and energy-efficiency technologies.

            UN carbon accounting rules mean emissions of fossil fuels are counted where they are consumed, not where they are produced, so the emissions from exported Saudi oil do not count towards the kingdom’s emissions.

            Saudi Arabia’s emissions-cutting ambitions also rest, the NDC says, “on the assumption that the economic and social consequences of international climate change policies and measures will not pose a disproportionate or abnormal burden on the Kingdom’s economy”.

              The country – which gets about three-fifths of its export earnings from fossil fuels – has long been the leading opponent of international measures to reduce their production and use. It has recently opposed efforts to map out a transition away from fossil fuels in climate talks, measures to restrict plastics production in negotiations on a global treaty to cut plastic pollution and taxes on polluting ships at the International Maritime Organization.

              If other governments do not continue to buy its fossil fuels in sufficient quantities, the NDC says that Saudi Arabia will use fossil fuels domestically to produce plastics and power heavy industries like cement, mining and metals production. In this scenario, Saudi Arabia’s emissions will be higher, the plan says.

              The NDC lists green initiatives Saudi Arabia is pursuing, including carbon capture and storage, green hydrogen, direct air capture of greenhouse gases and renewables. To adapt to more extreme heatwaves and droughts, the NDC says the government is using cloud seeding technology to make rain artificially.

              The country’s 2021 NDC set a target for Saudi Arabia to get half of its energy from renewables by 2030. That target is not mentioned in the new NDC. The International Energy Agency’s latest figures said that in 2023 the country still got far less than 1% of its energy from renewables.

              Around 70 countries have yet to submit their latest NDCs, which were due in 2025, including India.

              The post Saudi Arabia issues last-minute climate plan with unclear emissions-cutting goal appeared first on Climate Home News.

              Saudi Arabia issues last-minute climate plan with unclear emissions-cutting goal

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