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National Atomic Company Kazatomprom JSC, the world’s largest uranium producer, has moved closer to sealing a massive long-term supply deal with India. The Kazakh state miner announced that it plans to sell a significant portion of its natural uranium concentrates to India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE).

However, the transaction is so large that it requires shareholder approval under Kazakhstan’s Joint Stock Companies law. As a result, the company has called an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) at the initiative of its Board of Directors.

If approved, the agreement could tighten an already strained global uranium market.

A Deal That Could Reshape Uranium Supply

The proposed contract signed with the Directorate of Purchase & Stores (DPS) under India’s DAE, covers the long-term sale of natural uranium concentrates (U₃O₈) for physical delivery to India.

The value of the transaction equals or exceeds 50% of Kazatomprom’s total book asset value. Under Kazakh law, such a major transaction must go before shareholders for approval.

While pricing, volumes, and delivery schedules remain confidential due to commercial sensitivity, the scale alone signals its strategic weight.

Kazatomprom’s Q4 2025 Fourth-Quarter Uranium Output

Kazatomprom currently accounts for about 20% of global uranium production. In 2025, it produced 25,839 tonnes of uranium (around 67.2 million pounds U₃O₈) on a 100% basis. That marked a 10–11% increase from 2024, driven largely by ramp-up at JV Budenovskoye.

  • Meanwhile, spot transactions increased sharply. Spot volumes rose 50% year-over-year to 55.3 million pounds U₃O₈ (around 21,270 tonnes), with an average price of $72.75 per pound.
  • Group sales volumes reached 5,719 tonnes (14.87 million pounds U₃O₈), up 14% from the previous year.
Kazatomprom uranium
Source: Kazatomprom

At the same time, global uranium mine production for 2025 was projected at 62.2 kilotonnes (ktU), according to industry estimates. Reactor demand stands higher at 68.9 ktU. This gap highlights a persistent supply deficit. Therefore, removing a sizeable share of Kazakh output under long-term contracts with India could tighten spot availability even further.

global uranium output
Source: Mining.com, data from Global Data

Fueling India’s Nuclear Ambitions: Why Uranium Imports Matter

India’s nuclear expansion explains the urgency behind this deal.

The country’s domestic uranium production currently meets only about 36% of its needs. Between 2025 and 2033, imports were projected to reach roughly 9,000 tonnes of uranium (tU) to support new reactor capacity.

India holds recoverable reserves estimated at 252,500 tU below $260/kgU. In addition, the Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD), a unit of the Department of Atomic Energy, has identified 433,800 tonnes of in-situ U₃O₈ resources across 47 deposits in states including Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Telangana.

Mining at Jaduguda began in 1967 under Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL). Recently, AMD discovered 26,437 tonnes of additional in-situ uranium oxide resources at the Jaduguda North–Baglasai–Mechua deposit in Jharkhand. This discovery is expected to extend the mine’s life significantly.

Still, domestic output alone cannot support India’s long-term reactor fleet expansion. Hence, securing a stable overseas supply has become a strategic priority.

The DPS, which handles procurement and inventory for India’s nuclear industry, accepted Kazatomprom’s commercial offer within its validity period. That move now awaits shareholder approval in Kazakhstan.

uranium output india
Source: Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD)

Uranium Supply in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

The uranium market remains highly concentrated in 2025, and this proposed deal reflects a broader shift in global nuclear geopolitics.

  • Looking ahead, Kazatomprom’s 2026 production guidance stands at 27,500–29,000 tonnes on a 100% basis, slightly below nominal capacity due to sulphuric acid supply constraints. Group sales are expected at 19,500–20,500 tonnes.

If the India contract absorbs a major portion of future output, the free market could feel the impact quickly, especially given the structural supply gap.

Reports say that by 2050, Kazakhstan and Canada are expected to dominate uranium exports. And in this market, uranium giants like Kazatomprom and Canada’s Cameco Corp. will dominate global revenue and production. Yet pricing trends have shown volatility. As demand for nuclear energy grows, countries are likely to form tighter supply alliances to secure fuel.

global uranium output

Balancing Strategy and Market Risk

At present, we can perceive that political tensions and energy security concerns are reshaping trade routes in oil and gas. And uranium may follow a similar path. Significantly, the IAEA has repeatedly noted that primary mining will remain the main source of uranium supply. Secondary sources, such as stockpiles and recycled materials, can only play a limited role.

Therefore, policymakers must rethink production and export strategies. Uranium-rich nations may reassess how much supply they allocate to long-term bilateral deals versus the open market.

For importing nations like India, long-term contracts provide stability. They reduce exposure to spot price volatility. They also strengthen diplomatic and economic ties. However, for the broader market, such agreements may reduce liquidity and amplify price swings during supply shocks.

The post Kazatomprom Deepens Strategic Ties with India in Major Long-Term Uranium Supply Deal appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide

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Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.

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