Disseminated on behalf of Alaska Energy Metals Corporation.
As the global energy transition accelerates, access to critical minerals is becoming just as important as innovation itself. Among these materials, nickel plays a central role. It powers electric vehicle batteries, supports energy storage systems, and remains essential for industrial applications such as stainless steel. Yet, while demand continues to climb, supply risks are growing—largely due to Indonesia’s tightening control over global nickel production.
In this shifting landscape, Alaska Energy Metals Corporation (AEMC) is advancing its Nikolai Nickel Project in interior Alaska. The project is emerging as a potential domestic anchor for U.S. nickel supply at a time when geopolitical, environmental, and market pressures are reshaping the global nickel industry.
Indonesia’s Nickel Dominance—and Its Strategic Pullback
Indonesia currently dominates global nickel supply, accounting for nearly half of the world’s mined output. Over the past decade, the country expanded production rapidly, flooding the market and pushing prices lower. However, that era appears to be ending.
In January, Indonesia’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources announced a sharp reduction in nickel ore production quotas. For 2026, the government set quotas at 250–260 million tonnes, down significantly from the 379 million tonnes approved for 2025. This shift represents one of the most aggressive supply controls the nickel market has seen in years.
At the same time, Indonesia changed the validity of its mining work plans (RKABs) from three years to one. As a result, the government now holds direct annual control over production levels, allowing it to adjust supply more tightly in response to prices, environmental pressures, and domestic processing capacity.
The policy pivot aims to preserve long-term reserves, stabilize prices, and push miners toward value-added processing such as nickel matte production for EV batteries. However, it also introduces uncertainty for global buyers that rely heavily on Indonesian supply.
Short-Term Surplus, Long-Term Risk
On the surface, the nickel market still appears well supplied. Analysts forecast a 261,000-tonne surplus in 2026, with global supply estimated at 3.78 million tonnes compared to demand of 3.52 million tonnes. Inventories remain elevated due to previous years of overproduction.
Yet this balance may prove fragile. Actual production in 2025 already fell short of approved quotas due to underutilized capacity and rising costs. If prices weaken further, high-cost operations could shut down, tightening supply faster than expected.
Meanwhile, demand continues to grow. The IEA projects that the use of nickel in EV batteries, renewables, and stainless steel will push nickel demand above 5.5 Mt by 2035. As Indonesia tightens output and China dominates downstream processing, Western economies face rising exposure to supply disruptions and geopolitical leverage.
Why the Nikolai Project Stands Out
Against this backdrop, the Nikolai Nickel Project represents a rare opportunity for the United States.
Located in interior Alaska, Nikolai hosts the Eureka deposit, now recognized as the largest nickel resource in the U.S. Beyond nickel, the deposit also contains copper, cobalt, chromium, platinum, and palladium—metals that play key roles in clean energy, defense systems, and advanced manufacturing.
In March, AEMC released an updated 2025 Mineral Resource Estimate, which significantly upgraded the project’s scale and quality. The update increased both tonnage and metal content compared to the 2024 estimate.
Measured and Indicated Resources now include 61 billion pounds of nickel and 1.77 billion pounds of copper, representing a 46% increase. Inferred resources rose even more sharply, climbing over 120% to 9.38 billion pounds of nickel and 2.43 billion pounds of copper.
Importantly, the deposit remains open in three directions, suggesting additional expansion potential as exploration continues.
Here are the tables that show Nikolai’s 2025 mineral resource estimates:
Geology That Supports Long-Term Development
Nikolai’s geological characteristics further strengthen its strategic appeal.
The Eureka deposit features highly consistent and continuous mineralization, reducing geological risk. A higher-grade core sits near the surface, which may lower mining costs during early production phases. In addition, a low strip ratio supports efficient material movement and long-term mine planning.
Equally important, Nikolai is dominated by sulfide mineralization, rather than lateritic ore. This distinction matters. Lateritic nickel, common in Indonesia, requires energy-intensive processing and often carries a higher carbon footprint. Sulfide deposits typically allow for more straightforward processing routes with lower emissions.
Cleaner Processing and On-Site Refining Potential
To build on this advantage, AEMC is actively exploring cleaner processing pathways.
Metallurgical testing is underway at SGS Laboratories in Lakefield, Ontario, where the company has conducted extensive work using magnetic separation and flotation techniques. A processing flow sheet has already been established, and a locked-cycle test is scheduled in the near term.
The current plan aims to produce:
- A bulk nickel–copper–cobalt concentrate
- A separate iron–chromium concentrate
Further testing will determine whether copper can be separated into its own concentrate to improve overall economics. The miner planned to publish metallurgical results in November 2025.
In parallel, the company signed a memorandum of understanding with RecycLiCo U.S. Mineral Recovery. This partnership will test hydrometallurgical refining methods that could be applied directly to Nikolai concentrates. If successful, this approach may allow semi-refined or refined nickel, copper, and cobalt to be produced on site in Alaska. Such a development would reduce reliance on foreign smelters, cut transportation emissions, and strengthen domestic battery supply chains.
Alongside, AEMC has also signed an MOU with Lucid Group, Inc (NASDAQ: LCID), maker of the world’s most advanced electric vehicles.
AEMC President & CEO Gregory Beischer commented on this development,
“By developing resilient automotive supply chains, we establish commercially viable mining operations that also help strengthen the American Defense Industrial Base. Sourcing minerals domestically enables better regulatory oversight, higher environmental standards, metal source traceability, and responsible sourcing. This approach mitigates harmful environmental and human rights risks often associated with foreign mining operations and provides an opportunity to improve the livelihoods of American communities.”
Strategic Importance for U.S. Supply Chains
The United States currently relies entirely on imported nickel, making it vulnerable to supply shocks, trade restrictions, and price volatility. In this context, Nikolai represents more than an economic opportunity—it carries strategic value.
A domestic nickel source could support:
- EV battery manufacturing
- Grid-scale energy storage
- Defense and aerospace applications
- Long-term clean energy deployment
As electrification expands and renewable energy integration accelerates, reliable access to nickel will become increasingly critical. Domestic production could help ensure that clean energy growth does not come at the cost of supply insecurity.
Permitting, Planning, and Federal Support
Nikolai’s inclusion on the U.S. FAST-41 Transparency Dashboard highlights its national significance. The program aims to improve coordination and transparency for major infrastructure and resource projects, potentially streamlining future permitting processes.
Meanwhile, AEMC continues to pursue U.S. government funding, noting recent federal support awarded to other critical minerals projects in Alaska. Public funding or strategic investment could help de-risk early development stages and accelerate timelines.
The company is also conducting an internal Options Study to assess potential mine development pathways and high-level economics. While results will not be published, the work will inform a formal Preliminary Economic Assessment planned for 2026.
Investment Takeaway
As Indonesia tightens supply and demand continues to grow, the nickel market is entering a new phase—one defined less by oversupply and more by security, jurisdiction, and processing control.
In this environment, Alaska Energy Metals’ Nikolai Project stands out as a long-duration strategic asset. Its scale, location, resource growth, and alignment with U.S. supply chain priorities position it well for long-term relevance.
For investors seeking exposure to nickel beyond Indonesia and China, Nikolai offers a differentiated opportunity—one that combines commodity upside with geopolitical and strategic optionality.
- ALSO SEE: Nickel Prices Hit $18,000 in 2026 Amid Global Oversupply, US Boosts Domestic Supply Chain
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CAUTIONARY STATEMENT AND FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION
Certain statements contained in this news release may constitute “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable securities laws. Forward-looking information generally can be identified by words such as “anticipate,” “expect,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “plan,” and similar expressions suggesting future outcomes or events. Forward-looking information is based on current expectations of management; however, it is subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors that may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated.These factors include, without limitation, statements relating to the Company’s exploration and development plans, the potential of its mineral projects, financing activities, regulatory approvals, market conditions, and future objectives. Forward-looking information involves numerous risks and uncertainties and actual results might differ materially from results suggested in any forward-looking information. These risks and uncertainties include, among other things, market volatility, the state of financial markets for the Company’s securities, fluctuations in commodity prices, operational challenges, and changes in business plans.
Forward-looking information is based on several key expectations and assumptions, including, without limitation, that the Company will continue with its stated business objectives and will be able to raise additional capital as required. Although management of the Company has attempted to identify important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially, there may be other factors that cause results not to be as anticipated, estimated, or intended.
There can be no assurance that such forward-looking information will prove to be accurate, as actual results and future events could differ materially. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking information. Additional information about risks and uncertainties is contained in the Company’s management’s discussion and analysis and annual information form for the year ended December 31, 2025, copies of which are available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.
The forward-looking information contained herein is expressly qualified in its entirety by this cautionary statement. Forward-looking information reflects management’s current beliefs and is based on information currently available to the Company. The forward-looking information is made as of the date of this news release, and the Company assumes no obligation to update or revise such information to reflect new events or circumstances except as may be required by applicable law.
The post AEMC’s Nikolai: America’s Answer to Indonesia’s Nickel Crunch appeared first on Carbon Credits.
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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