Clean energy generated a record-high 44% of China’s electricity in May 2024, pushing coal’s share down to a record low of 53%, despite continued growth in demand.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures and other data that only became available last week, reveals the true scale of the drop in coal’s share of the mix.
Coal lost seven percentage points compared with May 2023, when it accounted for 60% of generation in China.
Other key insights revealed by the analysis include:
- Monthly National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data on generation by technology is now severely limited for wind and solar. For example, it excludes “distributed” rooftop solar and smaller centralised solar plants, capturing only about half of solar generation.
- This mismatch becomes clear when comparing the NBS total for monthly electricity generation of 718 terawatt hours (TWh) with reported monthly electricity demand of 775TWh, according to the National Energy Administration (NEA). In reality, electricity generation must be higher than demand due to losses at power plants and on the grid.
- Media reports have speculated that the record renewable capacity additions would have run into grid constraints in May, but the new data shows this is not the case.
- China’s electricity demand in May 2024 grew by 49TWh (7.2%) from a year earlier.
- At the same time, generation from clean energy sources grew by a record 78TWh, including a record rise from solar of 41TWh (78%), a recovery from earlier drought-driven lows for hydro of 34TWh (39%) and a modest rise for wind of 4TWh (5%).
- With clean energy expanding by more than the rise in electricity demand, fossil fuel output was forced into retreat, seeing the largest monthly drop since the Covid 19 pandemic. Gas generation fell by 4TWh (16%) and that from coal by 16TWh (4%).
- Falling generation from fossil fuels point to a 3.6% drop in CO2 emissions from the power sector, which accounts for around two-fifths of China’s total greenhouse gas emissions and has been the dominant source of emissions growth in recent years.
The new findings show a continuation of recent trends, which helped send China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels and cement into reverse in March 2024.
If current rapid wind and solar deployment continues, then China’s CO2 output is likely to continue falling, making 2023 the peak year for the country’s emissions.
Monthly mismatch
Every month, the NBS publishes data on China’s electricity generation by technology. The figures for May 2024 came out nearly a month ago, in mid-June, and were widely reported.
However, this data is increasingly limited because it excludes, among other things, “distributed” solar sites, such as those on the roofs of homes and businesses. Analysis for this article shows this misses out about half of the electricity generated by solar overall.
The fact that the NBS data on power generation is incomplete is obvious when looking at consumption numbers: the NEA reported electricity consumption in May was 775TWh, while the NBS reported generation at only 718TWh. In reality, generation must be significantly larger than consumption because of losses at power plants and in transmission.
The seemingly small amount of power generation from solar and wind reported by the NBS has caused confusion and has led to claims that the performance of wind and solar in China is poor.
The performance of wind and solar generation is tracked by “utilisation” data collected by China Electricity Council (CEC), showing actual output relative to the maximum potential. These figures are normally included in monthly statistics released by the NEA.
The NEA omitted this data from its May release, which led to speculation from Bloomberg and Reuters that the reason would be poor numbers for wind and solar. This proved to be largely untrue when the data became available directly from the CEC, with solar power utilisation increasing significantly and wind power utilisation falling, but within normal year-to-year variation.
Another dataset, tracking the fraction of solar and wind power wasted due to grid inflexibility, showed small increases of 0.8 percentage-points for solar and 1.7 points for wind. This is problematic for plant operators, but well short of a spike that would notably affect the utilisation numbers – they typically vary by more than 5% from year to year.
There is now enough data to work around the limitations in the NBS power generation data and give a complete picture of China’s power generation mix in May.
The first thing to note is that the NBS numbers are normalised to a 30-day month, which accounts for a fraction of the mismatch. The rest of this article uses normalised 30-day numbers.
Instead of using the NBS numbers, it is possible to estimate generation from solar and wind based on reported capacity and utilisation. Combining these estimates with reported generation for other technologies yields total generation of 783TWh and year-on-year growth of 8%.
Reported electricity consumption of 750TWh – when normalised to a 30-day month – is consistent with estimated generation of 783TWh, with the 4.2% difference being due to transmission losses.
Monthly data on transmission losses is not available, but the average for 2023 was 4.5%, matching closely with the difference between reported consumption and estimated generation.
Record results
Putting the various figures together shows that, far from the modest 29% year-on-year increase in the incomplete NBS data, there was a record 78% rise in solar generation in May 2024.
Installed solar capacity increased by 52% to 691 gigawatts (GW) and capacity utilisation improved from 16% to 19%. This delivered the largest increase in China’s electricity generation for any technology, with solar generation rising 41TWh from 53TWh in May 2023 to 94TWh in May 2024.
The second-largest increase was from hydropower, where capacity only increased 1%, but utilisation jumped from 31% to 41%, as the sector recovers from the record drought seen in 2022-23. This led to a 39% or 34TWh increase in power generation, which hit 115TWh.
Wind power saw a strong increase in capacity of 21%. Utilisation fell, however, likely due to month-to-month variations in wind conditions. As a result, power generation grew by a relatively modest 5%, or 4TWh, reaching 83TWh. Nuclear and biomass-fired power generation also saw small increases in capacity, but the utilisation of nuclear plants fell from 87% to 85%.
In total, clean power generation grew 78TWh, as shown in the figure below. This was more than enough to exceed the 49TWh increase in demand.
As a result, gas-fired generation plummeted by 16%, despite a 9% increase in capacity, driving a steep 24% drop in utilisation. Coal-fired generation capacity increased by 3% while power generation from coal fell 3.7%, resulting in average plant utilisation falling by 7%. Falling demand could temper investment in new coal capacity, which has run hot in the past two years.
The changes in coal and gas-fired generation, combined with a slight degradation in the thermal efficiency of coal-fired power plants, imply a 3.6% drop in CO2 emissions from the power sector.
After these changes in output, China’s power generation mix shifted significantly away from fossil fuels in May 2024. The share of coal-fired generation fell to 53%, down from 60% at the same time last year and the lowest share on record, as shown in the figure below.
Meanwhile, solar rose to 12%, up from 7% a year earlier and the highest on record. The remainder was made up of wind (11%), hydropower (15%), nuclear (5%), gas (3%) and biomass (2%).
The overall non-fossil energy share was a record 44% and there was also a new record-high share for variable renewable – solar and wind – which reached 23%.
Solar and wind are gaining share in China’s power mix very rapidly, despite rising demand, as shown in the figure above. In May 2016, they accounted for just 7% of the total.
Meanwhile, strong clean-energy capacity growth continued in May 2024, with 19GW of solar being added, 3GW of wind and 1.2GW of nuclear.
In the first five months of 2024, China has added some 79GW of solar and 20GW of wind. These additions are up 29% and 21% respectively from last year’s numbers, which were already record-breaking, as shown in the figure below.
Looking at solar specifically, monthly additions in May 2024 were higher than the previous month of April and also increased year-on-year compared with May 2023.
The rapid growth in power generation from solar shows that the solar capacity boom is delivering new electricity supplies at a scale sufficient to cover much of China’s demand growth.
This reinforces the view that China’s CO2 emissions are in a period of structural decline.
If clean energy additions are kept at the level reached in 2023 and early 2024, then CO2 output is likely to keep falling, which would confirm 2023 as the peak year for the country’s emissions.
With China due to announce new climate targets by early next year, the government’s level of ambition for clean energy growth remains an open question.
About the data
Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation – the proportion of maximum possible output – using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.
Total generation from thermal power, hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases. Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied.
CO2 emissions from power generation were calculated by applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018, as well as the monthly average coal power plant heat rate reported by National Energy Administration, and by assuming average thermal efficiency of 50% for gas-fired power plants.
The post Analysis: China’s clean energy pushes coal to record-low 53% share of power in May 2024 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: China’s clean energy pushes coal to record-low 53% share of power in May 2024
SYDNEY, Thursday 30 October 2026 — In response to reports that the Albanese government is set to introduce draft legislation this year that would seek to ban data centres in Australia’s suburbs, Joe Rafalowicz, Head of Climate and Energy at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said:
“These reports are a testament to the growing community opposition to these completely inappropriate AI factories that have sprung up across our suburbs, and Big Tech corporations should take heed — the data centre build-out must not happen without the endorsement of the Australian people.
“But the government can’t simply ship this problem out to regional Australia without addressing the fundamental issues with this extractive new industry.
“We’re already seeing a trend of AI data centre proposals moving to the regions, in areas that are more water-scarce, more environmentally sensitive, and next to sources of fracked and coal seam gas to support their massive BYO gas-fired power plans — a pattern we’ve seen play out in the United States.
“From the Beetaloo Basin in the NT to the Western Downs in Qld, we’re seeing a wave of AI data centre proposals that would see new gas fast-tracked to support their massive energy demand, and threaten to completely derail Australia’s energy transition.
“Just as suburban Australians are asking, “what for?”, regional communities like Berry Springs and Dalby do not want dirty data centres setting up shop with absolutely no benefit to their communities. Greenpeace is calling for a moratorium on AI data centre developments until strict and enforceable safeguards are in place to protect our climate and our communities.”
-ENDS-
Media contact
Kate O’Callaghan on +61 406 231 892 or kate.ocallaghan@greenpeace.org
AI data centre ban in suburbs would not address fundamental issues: Greenpeace
In the thick of the COP29 climate summit in Azerbaijan in 2024, the UN climate talks were rattled by what can only be described as a major PR disaster. The BBC, Reuters and The Guardian all carried headlines, attributed to leading climate policy experts, that the COPs were “no longer fit for purpose”.
The articles outlined a series of reforms called for in an open letter signed by 22 eminent scientists and politicians, including a former UN secretary-general and previous UN climate chief, with a further 150 lending their support. The headlines shook confidence in the COP process, just as governments were wrestling over a new climate finance goal.
The Club of Rome – which handled the media relations for the letter – hurried to say that its “constructive, supportive ideas” had been “misinterpreted”. Negotiators kept calm(ish) and carried on, in the end landing the finance goal after some high-stakes drama on the final day.
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Early speakers’ list suggests few powerful leaders will attend COP31
Just 77 heads of state or government are scheduled to address the COP31 climate summit in Antalya, a third less than the COP28 peak -
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The African Group wants dedicated space on tripling adaptation finance, the Green Climate Fund and trade, setting up a possible clash
To my surprise, when I went back this week to read the letter again, I could not find the offending line about the COPs not being fit for purpose. The Club of Rome has yet to respond to my query about its disappearance.
Whatever happened to the wording, that sentiment has been widely shared. COPs have ballooned in size while the importance of their outcomes seems to have diminished since the 2015 Paris Agreement (with the exception of the 2023 COP in Dubai where countries agreed to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems).
The same on the surface
Two years on from those painful headlines in Baku, has anything changed for the better? You might be forgiven for thinking not. Official decisions are still made by consensus rather than the majority voting some have called for to stop blockers.
Tens of thousands of officials, activists and business execs still scurry around the halls to an ever-growing list of side events, roundtables and dialogues, while deals still come down to rows, all-nighters and jargon-filled texts adopted to rounds of applause.
But it would not be true to say that COPs have completely failed to respond to the very real need to translate the words of the Paris Agreement into action in the outside world.
Global warming is projected to be around 1.3C lower this century than it would have been if the world had not committed to tackle the climate crisis under that accord. Developing countries have a valued space at COPs in which their voices have equal weight in decision-making, unlike in many other international fora. And most importantly, perhaps, there has been a subtle shift, tipping the balance away from negotiating towards doing.
Brazil branded last year’s summit in Belém as the “COP of Implementation”, corralling the sprawling Action Agenda into six axes. This was a bid to impose some structure on the mushrooming efforts between governments, UN agencies, cities, businesses and civil society to set targets and spur faster results on their pet issues, from methane emissions to health and adaptation in conflict zones. COP30 alone saw the launch of 120 “plans to accelerate solutions”.
COP30 roadmaps off the cuff
Meanwhile, as the formal negotiations drew to a close, it was clear that consensus decision-making was evolving into something a little more improvised.
With only around half of all countries on board with the idea of a roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago announced his team would put one together over the coming year, along with another on how to meet a global goal to halt deforestation by 2030. Those roadmaps will be launched next week, presented and discussed at COP31, though it’s still unclear whether or how they’ll be incorporated into the formal negotiating agenda.
Some leading policy-makers don’t think that matters too much. Speaking to journalists before the Antalya summit, COP30 CEO Ana Toni and Dutch climate minister Stientje van Veldhoven said “coalitions of the willing” can move ahead without needing consensus from the COPs. This, they said, was evident this year at the first global conference on TAFF, co-chaired by van Veldhoven and attended by 60 countries.
“Consensus or no-consensus in the general COP doesn’t make a difference for the choices I have to make in my country to get my country to phase out fossil fuels,” said the Dutch minister. The Netherlands recently became one of the first to publish a national TAFF plan.
COP31 banks on flagship voluntary initiatives
This thinking has permeated the management and expected outcomes of this year’s COP too. Earlier this year, Türkiye, supported by international energy agencies, floated the idea of a voluntary goal to boost electrification to 35% of the world’s final energy consumption by 2035 – and this is now being touted as one of the main results to be expected from Antalya.
Türkiye is also championing a pledge on AI and climate, while co-host Australia is pushing to ease access to climate finance for least developed countries and small island states.
COP31 presidency announces AI pledge as UN climate chief says Big Tech ‘on thin ice’
None of these needs consensus. But with a political cover decision already in the works, as trailed by the COP presidents, they – and perhaps the fossil fuel roadmap – may find a home in the official text if language acceptable to most can be found, giving them them additional weight.
UNFCCC reform process in the shadows
Formal reform is underway too, if quietly. UN climate chief Simon Stiell is leading a review informed by ongoing consultations with a group of 15 well-respected climate policy experts, three of whom signed the open letter in 2024.
Among them is leading Swedish climate and sustainability scientist Johan Rockström who has strong ideas about how to make COPs function better, including a switch to majority voting. He told the same press briefing nothing stands in the way of this, because the rules of procedure for making decisions at COPs have never been formally agreed.
Still, to get away from the default setting of consensus would require agreement on a new system that may be impossible to achieve given the rise in bullying tactics by fossil fuel heavyweights.
Comment: The UN climate process was built for negotiation – now it must support implementation
The deliberations with the high-level policy gurus, as reflected in a summary of June’s session in Bonn, largely echo what’s already happening organically, calling for stronger partnerships and accountability both in and between the Action Agenda and negotiations. It doesn’t mention voting.
A general overview of the reform exercise says that “improving and optimizing the [UN climate] process over the medium to long term… will be critical to fostering trust, enhancing collaboration, and catalyzing increased ambition”.
In the short term, don’t hold your breath for anything concrete on reform at COP31 but watch for signs in what ends up dominating the headlines from Türkiye.
The post Editor’s Desk: COP reform is happening quietly, behind the headlines appeared first on Climate Home News.
Editor’s Desk: COP reform is happening quietly, behind the headlines