Clean energy generated a record-high 44% of China’s electricity in May 2024, pushing coal’s share down to a record low of 53%, despite continued growth in demand.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures and other data that only became available last week, reveals the true scale of the drop in coal’s share of the mix.
Coal lost seven percentage points compared with May 2023, when it accounted for 60% of generation in China.
Other key insights revealed by the analysis include:
- Monthly National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data on generation by technology is now severely limited for wind and solar. For example, it excludes “distributed” rooftop solar and smaller centralised solar plants, capturing only about half of solar generation.
- This mismatch becomes clear when comparing the NBS total for monthly electricity generation of 718 terawatt hours (TWh) with reported monthly electricity demand of 775TWh, according to the National Energy Administration (NEA). In reality, electricity generation must be higher than demand due to losses at power plants and on the grid.
- Media reports have speculated that the record renewable capacity additions would have run into grid constraints in May, but the new data shows this is not the case.
- China’s electricity demand in May 2024 grew by 49TWh (7.2%) from a year earlier.
- At the same time, generation from clean energy sources grew by a record 78TWh, including a record rise from solar of 41TWh (78%), a recovery from earlier drought-driven lows for hydro of 34TWh (39%) and a modest rise for wind of 4TWh (5%).
- With clean energy expanding by more than the rise in electricity demand, fossil fuel output was forced into retreat, seeing the largest monthly drop since the Covid 19 pandemic. Gas generation fell by 4TWh (16%) and that from coal by 16TWh (4%).
- Falling generation from fossil fuels point to a 3.6% drop in CO2 emissions from the power sector, which accounts for around two-fifths of China’s total greenhouse gas emissions and has been the dominant source of emissions growth in recent years.
The new findings show a continuation of recent trends, which helped send China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels and cement into reverse in March 2024.
If current rapid wind and solar deployment continues, then China’s CO2 output is likely to continue falling, making 2023 the peak year for the country’s emissions.
Monthly mismatch
Every month, the NBS publishes data on China’s electricity generation by technology. The figures for May 2024 came out nearly a month ago, in mid-June, and were widely reported.
However, this data is increasingly limited because it excludes, among other things, “distributed” solar sites, such as those on the roofs of homes and businesses. Analysis for this article shows this misses out about half of the electricity generated by solar overall.
The fact that the NBS data on power generation is incomplete is obvious when looking at consumption numbers: the NEA reported electricity consumption in May was 775TWh, while the NBS reported generation at only 718TWh. In reality, generation must be significantly larger than consumption because of losses at power plants and in transmission.
The seemingly small amount of power generation from solar and wind reported by the NBS has caused confusion and has led to claims that the performance of wind and solar in China is poor.
The performance of wind and solar generation is tracked by “utilisation” data collected by China Electricity Council (CEC), showing actual output relative to the maximum potential. These figures are normally included in monthly statistics released by the NEA.
The NEA omitted this data from its May release, which led to speculation from Bloomberg and Reuters that the reason would be poor numbers for wind and solar. This proved to be largely untrue when the data became available directly from the CEC, with solar power utilisation increasing significantly and wind power utilisation falling, but within normal year-to-year variation.
Another dataset, tracking the fraction of solar and wind power wasted due to grid inflexibility, showed small increases of 0.8 percentage-points for solar and 1.7 points for wind. This is problematic for plant operators, but well short of a spike that would notably affect the utilisation numbers – they typically vary by more than 5% from year to year.
There is now enough data to work around the limitations in the NBS power generation data and give a complete picture of China’s power generation mix in May.
The first thing to note is that the NBS numbers are normalised to a 30-day month, which accounts for a fraction of the mismatch. The rest of this article uses normalised 30-day numbers.
Instead of using the NBS numbers, it is possible to estimate generation from solar and wind based on reported capacity and utilisation. Combining these estimates with reported generation for other technologies yields total generation of 783TWh and year-on-year growth of 8%.
Reported electricity consumption of 750TWh – when normalised to a 30-day month – is consistent with estimated generation of 783TWh, with the 4.2% difference being due to transmission losses.
Monthly data on transmission losses is not available, but the average for 2023 was 4.5%, matching closely with the difference between reported consumption and estimated generation.
Record results
Putting the various figures together shows that, far from the modest 29% year-on-year increase in the incomplete NBS data, there was a record 78% rise in solar generation in May 2024.
Installed solar capacity increased by 52% to 691 gigawatts (GW) and capacity utilisation improved from 16% to 19%. This delivered the largest increase in China’s electricity generation for any technology, with solar generation rising 41TWh from 53TWh in May 2023 to 94TWh in May 2024.
The second-largest increase was from hydropower, where capacity only increased 1%, but utilisation jumped from 31% to 41%, as the sector recovers from the record drought seen in 2022-23. This led to a 39% or 34TWh increase in power generation, which hit 115TWh.
Wind power saw a strong increase in capacity of 21%. Utilisation fell, however, likely due to month-to-month variations in wind conditions. As a result, power generation grew by a relatively modest 5%, or 4TWh, reaching 83TWh. Nuclear and biomass-fired power generation also saw small increases in capacity, but the utilisation of nuclear plants fell from 87% to 85%.
In total, clean power generation grew 78TWh, as shown in the figure below. This was more than enough to exceed the 49TWh increase in demand.
As a result, gas-fired generation plummeted by 16%, despite a 9% increase in capacity, driving a steep 24% drop in utilisation. Coal-fired generation capacity increased by 3% while power generation from coal fell 3.7%, resulting in average plant utilisation falling by 7%. Falling demand could temper investment in new coal capacity, which has run hot in the past two years.
The changes in coal and gas-fired generation, combined with a slight degradation in the thermal efficiency of coal-fired power plants, imply a 3.6% drop in CO2 emissions from the power sector.

After these changes in output, China’s power generation mix shifted significantly away from fossil fuels in May 2024. The share of coal-fired generation fell to 53%, down from 60% at the same time last year and the lowest share on record, as shown in the figure below.
Meanwhile, solar rose to 12%, up from 7% a year earlier and the highest on record. The remainder was made up of wind (11%), hydropower (15%), nuclear (5%), gas (3%) and biomass (2%).

The overall non-fossil energy share was a record 44% and there was also a new record-high share for variable renewable – solar and wind – which reached 23%.
Solar and wind are gaining share in China’s power mix very rapidly, despite rising demand, as shown in the figure above. In May 2016, they accounted for just 7% of the total.
Meanwhile, strong clean-energy capacity growth continued in May 2024, with 19GW of solar being added, 3GW of wind and 1.2GW of nuclear.
In the first five months of 2024, China has added some 79GW of solar and 20GW of wind. These additions are up 29% and 21% respectively from last year’s numbers, which were already record-breaking, as shown in the figure below.
Looking at solar specifically, monthly additions in May 2024 were higher than the previous month of April and also increased year-on-year compared with May 2023.

The rapid growth in power generation from solar shows that the solar capacity boom is delivering new electricity supplies at a scale sufficient to cover much of China’s demand growth.
This reinforces the view that China’s CO2 emissions are in a period of structural decline.
If clean energy additions are kept at the level reached in 2023 and early 2024, then CO2 output is likely to keep falling, which would confirm 2023 as the peak year for the country’s emissions.
With China due to announce new climate targets by early next year, the government’s level of ambition for clean energy growth remains an open question.
About the data
Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation – the proportion of maximum possible output – using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.
Total generation from thermal power, hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases. Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied.
CO2 emissions from power generation were calculated by applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018, as well as the monthly average coal power plant heat rate reported by National Energy Administration, and by assuming average thermal efficiency of 50% for gas-fired power plants.
The post Analysis: China’s clean energy pushes coal to record-low 53% share of power in May 2024 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: China’s clean energy pushes coal to record-low 53% share of power in May 2024
Climate Change
Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate
When the land no longer answers the stars the way it once did, Indigenous peoples are among the first to notice — and the first to ask why.
A Sky Full of Knowledge
Look up on a clear night on Turtle Island and you’re seeing a sky that has guided human life for thousands of years. Across Indigenous nations in Canada, detailed systems of celestial knowledge developed not as abstract science but as living, practical guides —telling people when to plant, when to harvest, when herds would move, and when ice would come. This astronomical knowledge was woven into language, ceremony, and everyday life, passed down through generations with remarkable precision.
The Mi’kmaq and the Celestial Bear
Among the Mi’kmaq of Atlantic Canada, star stories are ecological calendars, precise and functional. The story of Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters connects the annual movement of what Western astronomy calls Ursa Major to the seasonal cycle of hunting and harvest: the bear rises in spring, is hunted through summer, and falls to earth in autumn. This knowledge was brought to broader public attention in 2009 during the International Year of Astronomy, when Mi’kmaq Elders Lillian Marshall of Potlotek First Nation and Murdena Marshall of Eskasoni First Nation shared the story through an animated film produced at Cape Breton University narrated in English, French, and Mi’kmaq.¹ The story encodes specific observations about when and where to hunt, and which species to expect at which time of year. It is science in narrative form.
The Anishinaabe and the Seasonal Star Map
Among the Anishinaabe peoples of the Great Lakes and northern Ontario, celestial knowledge forms part of a comprehensive seasonal understanding. Knowledge keepers like Michael Wassegijig Price of Wikwemikong First Nation have described how Anishinaabe constellations quite different from those of Western astronomy connect the movement of the heavens to naming ceremonies, seasonal gatherings, and land practices.² The Royal Astronomical Society of Canada now offers planispheres featuring Indigenous constellations from Cree, Ojibwe, and Dakota sky traditions, recognizing their value as both cultural heritage and ecological knowledge systems.³
When the Stars and the Land Fall Out of Rhythm
Here’s the challenge that climate change has introduced: the stars still move on their ancient, reliable schedule. But the land no longer always responds as expected. Migratory birds that once arrived when certain constellations appeared are now showing up earlier or later. Ice that once formed in predictable windows is forming weeks late, or not at all. Berry harvests, fish runs, animal migrations, all once timed by celestial cues accumulated over millennia are shifting. Indigenous knowledge holders across Canada describe this as a kind of dissonance: the sky remains faithful, but the land has changed.⁴
Long-Baseline Ecological Records
Far from being historical curiosity, Indigenous celestial knowledge systems are now being recognized by researchers as long-baseline ecological calendars —records of how nature behaved over centuries, encoded in story and ceremony. When an Elder observes that a particular star rising no longer predicts the arrival of certain geese, that observation represents a departure from a pattern that may have held true for hundreds of years. The Climate Atlas of Canada integrates Indigenous knowledge observations alongside western climate data, recognizing that both contribute meaningfully to understanding ecological change.⁵
Keeping the Knowledge Alive
Language revitalization and land-based education programs are helping ensure this knowledge reaches the future. From youth astronomy nights on-reserve to the integration of Indigenous sky stories in school curricula, there is growing recognition that these knowledge systems belong to what comes next, not only what came before. As Canada grapples with accelerating ecological change, the quiet precision of thousands of years of skyward observation offers something no satellite can fully replicate: a continuous record of the relationship between the cosmos and a living land.
Blog by Rye Karonhiowanen Barberstock
Image Credit: Dustin Bowdige, Unsplash
References
[1] Marshall, L., Marshall, M., Harris, P., & Bartlett, C. (2010). Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters: A Mi’kmaw Night Sky Story. Cape Breton University Press. See also: Integrative Science, CBU. (2009). Background on the Making of the Muin Video for IYA2009. http://www.integrativescience.ca/uploads/activities/BACKGROUND-making-video-Muin-Seven-Bird-Hunters-IYA-binder.pdf
[2] Price, M.W. (Various). Anishinaabe celestial knowledge. Wikwemikong First Nation. Referenced in: Royal Astronomical Society of Canada Indigenous Astronomy resources.
[3] Royal Astronomical Society of Canada. (2020). Indigenous Skies planisphere series. RASC. https://www.rasc.ca/indigenous-skies
[4] Neilson, H. (2022, December 11). The night sky over Mi’kmaki: A Q&A with astronomer Hilding Neilson. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/hilding-neilson-indigenizing-astronomy-1.6679072
[5] Climate Atlas of Canada. (2024). Prairie Climate Centre, University of Winnipeg. https://climateatlas.ca/
The post Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate appeared first on Indigenous Climate Hub.
https://indigenousclimatehub.ca/2026/04/night-skies-and-shifting-stars-how-indigenous-celestial-knowledge-tracks-a-changing-climate/
Climate Change
World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis
A much-discussed “return to coal” by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year.
The new analysis by thinktank Ember, shared exclusively with Carbon Brief, is a “worst-case” scenario and the reality could be even lower.
Separate data shows that, to date, there has been no “return to coal” in 2026.
While some countries, such as Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines, have responded to disrupted gas supplies with plans to increase their coal use, the new analysis shows that these actions will likely result in a “small rise” at most.
In fact, the decline of coal power in some countries and the potential for global electricity demand growth to slow down could mean coal generation continues falling this year.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that “the big story isn’t about a coal comeback” and any increase in coal use is “merely masking a longer-term structural decline”.
Instead, they say clean-energy projects are emerging as more appealing investments during the fossil-fuel driven energy crisis.
‘Return to coal’
The conflict following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran has disrupted global gas supplies, particularly after Iran blocked the strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint in the Persian Gulf.
A fifth of the world’s liquified natural gas (LNG) is normally shipped through this region, mainly supplying Asian countries. The blockage in this supply route means there is now less gas available and the remaining supplies are more expensive.
(Note that while the strait usually carries a fifth of LNG trade, this amounts to a much smaller share of global gas supplies overall, with most gas being moved via pipelines.)
With gas supplies constrained and prices remaining well above pre-conflict levels, at least eight countries in Asia and Europe have announced plans to increase their coal-fired electricity generation, or to review or delay plans to phase out coal power.
These nations include Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Germany and Italy. Many of these nations are major users of coal power.
Such announcements have triggered a wave of reporting by global media outlets and analysts about a “return to coal”. Some have lamented a trend that is “incompatible with climate imperatives”, while others have even framed this as a positive development that illustrates coal’s return “from the dead”.
This mirrors a trend seen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which many commentators said would lead to a surge in European coal use, due to disrupted gas supplies from Russia.
In fact, despite a spike in 2022, EU coal use has returned to its “terminal decline” and reached a historic low in 2025.
Gas to coal
So far, the evidence suggests that there has been no return to coal in 2026.
Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air found that, in March, coal power generation remained flat globally and a fall in gas-fired generation was “offset by large increases in solar and wind power, rather than coal”.
However, as some governments only announced their coal plans towards the end of March, these figures may not capture their impact.
To get a sense of what that impact could be, Ember assessed the impact of coal policy changes and market responses across 16 countries, plus the 27 member states of the EU, which together accounted for 95% of total coal power generation in 2025.
For each country, the analysis considers a maximum “worst-case” scenario for switching from gas to coal power in the face of high gas prices.
It also considers the potential for any out-of-service coal power plants to return and for there to be delays in previously expected closures as a result of the response to the energy crisis.
Ember concludes that these factors could increase coal use by 175 terawatt hours (TWh), or 1.8%, in 2026 compared to 2025.
(This increase is measured relative to what would have happened without the energy crisis and does not account for wider trends in electricity generation from coal, which could see demand decline overall. Last year, coal power dropped by 63TWh, or 0.6%.)
Roughly three-quarters of the global effect in the Ember analysis is from potential gas-to-coal switching in China and the EU.
Other notable increases could come from switching in India and Indonesia and – to a lesser extent – from coal-policy shifts in South Korea, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
However, widely reported policy changes by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines are estimated to have very little, if any, impact on coal-power generation in 2026. The table below briefly summarises the potential for and reasoning behind the estimated increases in coal generation in each country in 2026.
Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, stresses that the 1.8% figure is an upper estimate, telling Carbon Brief:
“This would only happen if gas prices remained very high for the rest of the year and if there were sufficient coal stocks at power plants. The real risk of higher coal burn in 2026 comes not from coal units returning…but rather from pockets of gas-to-coal switching by existing power plants, primarily in China and the EU.”
Moreover, Jones says there is a real chance that global coal power could continue falling over the course of this year, partly driven by the energy crisis. He explains:
“If the energy crisis starts to dent electricity demand growth, coal generation – as well as gas generation – might actually be lower than before the crisis.”
‘Structural decline’
Energy experts tell Carbon Brief that Ember’s analysis aligns with their own assessments of the state of coal power.
Coal already had lower operation costs than gas before the energy crisis. This means that coal power plants were already being run at high levels in coal-dependent Asian economies that also use imported LNG to generate electricity. As such, they have limited potential to cut their need for LNG by further increasing coal generation.
Christine Shearer, who manages the global coal plant tracker at Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief that, in the EU, there is a shrinking pool of countries where gas-to-coal switching is possible:
“In Europe, coal fleets are smaller, older and increasingly uneconomic, while wind, solar and storage are becoming more competitive and widespread.”
In the context of the energy crisis, Italy has announced plans to delay its coal phaseout from 2025 to 2038. This plan, dismissed by the ECCO thinktank as “ineffective and costly”, would have minimal impact given coal only provides around 1% of the country’s power.
Notably, experts say that there is no evidence of the kind of structural “return to coal” that would spark concerns about countries’ climate goals. There have been no new coal plants announced in recent weeks.
Suzie Marshall, a policy advisor working on the “coal-to-clean transition” at E3G, tells Carbon Brief:
“We’re seeing possible delayed retirements and higher utilisation [of existing coal plants], as understandable emergency measures to keep the lights on, but not investment in new coal projects…Any short-term increase in coal consumption that we may see in response to this ongoing energy crisis is merely masking a longer-term structural decline.”
With cost-competitive solar, wind and batteries given a boost over fossil fuels by the energy crisis, there have been numerous announcements about new renewable energy projects since the start of war, including from India, Japan and Indonesia.
Shearer says that, rather than a “sustained coal comeback” in 2026, the Iran war “strengthens the case for renewables”. She says:
“If anything, a second gas shock in less than five years strengthens the case for renewables as the more secure long-term path.”
Jones says that Ember expects “little change in overall fossil generation, but with a small rise in coal and a fall in gas” in 2026. He adds:
“This would maximise gas-to-coal switching globally outside of the US, leaving no possibility for further switching in future years. Therefore, the big story isn’t about a coal comeback. It’s about how the relative economics of renewables, compared to fossil fuels, have been given a superboost by the crisis.”
The post World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.
World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis
Climate Change
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