中国国家主席习近平于2020年承诺在2060年前实现碳中和,此后中国围绕能源转型的思路发生了巨大转变。
然而,尽管此后中国出台了一系列重大政策,但目前仍不明确什么是新的能源系统,以及中国实现碳中和目标的最有效途径是什么。
我们的最新研究为中国能源转型建立了三种情景模型:一种是中国在2055年前建立净零排放的能源系统;一种是中国在2055年左右实现这一目标;还有一种是推断当前发展趋势的基线情景。
我们发现,将能效措施、终端用能消费电气化和基于各种可再生能源(如太阳能和风能)的低碳电力供应结合起来,可以极大地帮助该国在2055年前实现脱碳目标。
在最高情景下,中国的电力部门到2055年将不使用化石燃料,而一些行业将继续使用少量煤炭和天然气。然而,配备碳捕集与封存技术的生物质发电厂所产生的负排放将对此起到平衡作用。
双碳目标如何改变局势
2020年9月,当习近平开始在联合国大会上发表演讲时,几乎无人预料到中国会发表如此具有开创性的宣言。

他说:“中国将力争2030年前实现碳达峰、2060年前实现碳中和。”
这一政策现在更多地被称为“双碳”目标。
这句话改变了人们对中国能源转型的整体认识。
在此之前,中国在2017年“十九大”上的目标是“要推进能源生产和消费革命,构建清洁低碳、安全高效的能源体系。”
而习近平在2020年的讲话将中国的优先发展从实现“低碳”转变为实现“碳中和”,使能源部门从至少包括部分化石燃料消费,转变为一旦实现碳中和就几乎不给煤炭、石油和天然气留下空间。
要实现这一转变,需要处于中国政策体系和能源系统的利益相关者,如主要发电企业,真正改变思维方式。
中国在宣布碳中和目标后立即开始行动:国务院推出了“1+N”政策体系,其中包括实现“双碳”目标的总体纲领性文件(“1”)和实施该战略的一系列更具体的指导方针和法规(“N”)。
到目前为止,这些政策主要侧重于在2030年之前实现碳达峰。不过,在2060年之前实现碳中和的长期目标始终存在。
国家能源局发布了一份新型电力系统发展蓝皮书。在更广泛的层面上,多个政府部门已提出要为实现碳中和而推动整个能源系统——而不仅仅是电力系统——进行转型。
因此,今天中国能源转型的基础比习近平宣布之前更加坚实和精确。现在的问题是:新型能源系统将是什么样子,中国将如何实现这一目标?
中国能源转型的三种情景
为了回答这些问题,我们的研究模拟了中国能源转型的三种情景:一种是中国在2055年前建立一个净零排放的能源系统;一种是中国在2055年左右实现这一目标;还有一种是推断当前发展趋势的基线情景。
该分析基于一种详细的自下而上的建模方法,同时将“美丽中国”愿景——实现“绿色和高质量增长”的官方倡议——作为转型的指导方针。
在我们的模型中,能源转型的总体战略包括三个紧密相连的行动:
- 提高整个供应链的能源效率;
- 尽可能使终端用能部门电气化;
- 将电力部门转变为以太阳能和风能为支柱的“绿色”、无化石能源部门。
(政府间气候变化专门委员会的最新评估报告显示,这些是将升温控制在1.5°C或2°C的所有全球路径的关键要素。)
遵循这一战略的结果是,中国的能源系统将能够为中国可持续的经济增长提供动能,同时实现净零碳排放、空气质量改善和高水平的能源安全。
在最高情景下,中国的电力系统将从2045年起实现碳中和,整个能源系统将在2055年前实现碳中和。
与今天的情况相比,尽管经济有所增长,但2060年的一次能源消费总量将有所下降。此外,煤炭、石油和天然气将几乎被逐步淘汰,对进口化石燃料的依赖将被消除。
下图显示了2021年中国经济的能流(上图)与2060年在最高情景下的能流(下图)的对比。
在左侧,各版块显示了流入经济的一次能源来源,如煤炭(黑色)、天然气(粉红色)、石油(灰色),以及非化石燃料,如核能(棕色)、水能(深蓝色)、风能(浅蓝色)和太阳能(黄色)。
各版块的中心都显示了一次能源转化为更有用形式的过程,如电力或精炼油产品。化石燃料中所含的大部分一次能源在这一阶段以废热的形式被浪费(“损失”)。
右侧是按部门划分的最终能源用户。
最值得注意的是,化石燃料(尤其是煤炭)是2021年最大的能源来源,而在雄心勃勃的2060年情景(见下图)中,低碳能源则占主导地位。


中国能源转型的三个阶段
我们的研究表明,转型之路将分为三个主要阶段。第一阶段是2030年前的碳达峰。
在此期间,风电和光伏发电的部署将继续增加,同时工业和交通部门的电气化也将取得进展。
然而,就一次能源消费总量而言,煤炭和石油仍将是最主要的初级能源消费。
接下来是“能源革命”阶段,从2030年到2050年。在这一阶段,光电和风电将成为电力供应的主要来源,终端用能部门的电气化程度将大幅提高。
摒弃化石燃料可以最大限度地减少发电和提炼过程中的废热损失。同时,利用可再生能源生产的“绿氢”在工业领域将变得越来越重要。
第三阶段是巩固阶段,从2050年到2060年。脱碳发生在钢铁和化工等难以实现电气化的细分部门,旧的风光发电厂将被新的风光发电厂取代,能源组合中剩余的化石燃料几乎被淘汰。
煤电成为灵活性提供者
虽然中国政府计划从2025年起“逐步淘汰”煤炭,但根据当前的政策方针和市场情况,我们估计在三种情景中,煤电装机都不会迅速消失。
相反,燃煤电厂将逐渐成为保障能源安全和满足电力需求高峰的能力提供者,而不再进行大量发电。
当燃煤电厂达到30年左右的预期寿命时就将被关闭,而不会被新的煤电装机所取代。如下图所示,在我们最高情景中,最后一批煤电厂将于2055年关闭。
图中上半部分显示了2021年至2060年燃煤电厂的装机容量,下半部分显示了燃煤电厂的发电量。


与此同时,在我们的情景中,天然气在电力部门作用有限。这是因为光电和风电可以提供更便宜的电力,而现有的燃煤电厂——加上储能和需求侧响应设施的大规模扩张——足以提供灵活性和调峰能力。
管理由多变的风电和光电主导的电网
依赖光电和风电作为主要电力来源的能源系统,需要采取特殊的灵活性措施促成供需有效匹配。
下图显示了在2055年前实现碳中和的雄心勃勃的情景下,2060年夏季一周内每小时电力平衡的模拟示例。
图中上半部分显示的是供应侧发电量。在白天,光电(黄色)在电力生产中占主导地位,而风电厂(浅蓝)在24小时内都有更稳定的输出。
在傍晚和夜间,储能(紫色)会被释放,水力发电量(深蓝)高于白天。
图中下半部分显示的是需求侧的用电情况。储能(紫色)在白天充电,电动汽车智能充电(蓝色)在一周内提供灵活性。

作为后备电源,电动汽车车网互动发挥着重要作用——其不一定是重要的能源供应商,而是在风电和光电输出有限时,成为必要时可以启用的最后手段。该方案是保证电力系统容量充足的一种经济、高效的方法。
在2055年之前,煤电厂同样可能是电力系统可靠且经济的容量提供者,尽管如前所述,其平均发电量并不高。
从日常调度(管理供需的过程)的角度来看,这种创造灵活性的方式似乎很复杂。然而,一个高效且运作良好的电力市场(包括消费者和生产者)可以做到这一点。
消除各省之间的电力交易障碍、构建全国统一的电力市场,将是实现这一目标的关键因素。
未来远景规划
我们在《中国能源转型展望》(China Energy Transformation Outlook)中的情景对净零排放能源系统的长期未来提供了一系列量化远景规划。
我们对电力系统和其他能源终端用能部门建立了详细的模型,从而可以将这一新能源系统的发展与实现这一转变的政策措施联系起来。
我们研究得出的一个关键结论与上述中国能源转型不同阶段的时机有关。我们的模型表明,成功协调这些阶段至关重要,这样才能在保持能源安全的同时避免对能源基础设施进行不必要的投资。
我们情景中的其他关键推动因素包括扩大电网所需投资、国家电力市场的发展和对能源系统灵活性的支持。
即使有最优的远景规划和从我们的路径中获得的洞见,中国要实现2060年的目标仍有许多需要克服的挑战和障碍。
然而,我们的情景表明,有一些可行且具有成本效益的路径可以在不等待新技术突破的情况下实施。
The post 嘉宾来稿:中国能源系统如何在2055年前实现碳中和 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Greenhouse Gases
Met Office: Ten years of naming UK storms to warn the public
This month marks 10 years since the UK recorded its first named storm.
Storm Abigail struck in November 2015, bringing high winds, lightning and snow and causing power cuts and school closures in northern Scotland.
In the decade that has passed, storm naming has become a key part of how the Met Office warns the public about impending storms.
Storm naming is a public safety tool that makes severe weather easier to remember, talk about and follow.
The success of the scheme offers lessons for how clear communication can help communities prepare, adapt and build resilience in a changing climate.
Here, we look back at a decade of naming storms in the UK and some of the most notable events.
Storms in the UK
Storms in the UK typically take place during the autumn and winter months and last for between two and three days.
The number of named storms varies from year to year. Some storm seasons – for example, 2023–24 – are exceptionally active, while others are much quieter.
The UK owes its stormy climate in large part due to the jet stream – fast-moving winds that blow from west to east high in the atmosphere and push low-pressure weather systems across the Atlantic.
These low-pressure systems can bring heavy rain and strong winds to the UK, which, in turn, causes storms.
Storms in the UK can cause serious damage, felling trees, destroying infrastructure and causing travel disruptions.
Some have resulted in widespread flooding – and others, tragically, in loss of life.
Over the last decade, the UK has seen a number of storms with extreme wind speeds and heavy rainfall.
The table below sets out a list of records set by storms between November 2015 and October 2025.
| Maximum hourly gust speeds | Storm Eunice, 2022 | 122 miles per hour (mph) |
| Highest daily rainfall total | Storm Desmond, 2015 | 264.4mm |
| Lowest mean sea level pressure | Storm Éowyn, 2025 | 941.9 hectopascals (hPa) |
UK storm records for the period November 2015–October 2025. Source: Met Office
Storm naming
Storm naming was introduced in the UK and Ireland at the start of the 2015 storm season.
Launched by the Met Office and Ireland’s weather service, Met Éireann, Dutch weather service the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) joined the storm-naming scheme in 2019.
This collaboration between the UK, Ireland and Netherlands is one of three storm-naming groups in Europe. Each group releases a new alphabetical list of storm names in September.
The graphic below highlights the storm names picked by the Western European storm-naming group for 2025-26.

Not all storms are named. A storm will be named if the Met Office anticipates it having potential to cause disruption or damage.
This is often linked to whether strong winds are expected, but impacts caused by other weather types – for instance, heavy rain, hail or snow – are also considered.
Once named, the storm is referred to consistently by weather services and other authorities in Ireland, Netherlands and the UK.
Storm naming was introduced to improve communication of the weather forecast to the public and help people stay safe during severe weather.
Using a single, authoritative name for a storm allows government and media outlets to deliver a consistent message about approaching severe weather.
In this way, the public will be better placed to keep themselves, their homes and businesses safe.
There have typically been around half a dozen named storms each year since November 2015, although this varies on a year-to-year basis.
The 2023-24 storm season saw the most named storms to date. In August 2024, Storm Lillian became the 12th named storm of that season.
Below is a table of all the storms that have been named since 2015.
| 2015-16 | 2016-17 | 2017-18 | 2018-19 | 2019-20 | 2020-21 | 2021-22 | 2022-23 | 2023-24 | 2024-25 | 2025-26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abigail (12-13 Nov) | Angus (20 Nov) | Aileen (12-13 Sept) | Ali (19 Sept) | Atiyah (8-9 Dec) | Aiden (31 Oct) | Arwen (26-27 Nov) | Antoni (5 Aug) | Agnes (27-28 Sept) | Ashley (20-21 Oct) | Amy (3-4 Oct) |
| Barney (17-18 Nov) | Barbara (23-24 Dec) | Brian (21 Oct) | Bronagh (20-21 Sept) | Brendan (13-14 Jan) | Bella (26-27 Dec) | Barra (7-8 Dec) | Betty (18-19 Aug) | Babet (18-21 Oct) | Bert (22-25 Nov) | |
| Clodagh (29 Nov) | Conor (25-26 Dec) | Caroline (7 Dec) | Callum (12-13 Oct) | Ciara (8-9 Feb) | Christoph (19-22 Jan) | Corrie (29 Jan) | Ciarán (1-2 Nov) | Conall (26-27 Nov) | ||
| Desmond (5-6 Dec) | Doris (23 Feb) | Dylan (30-31 Dec) | Deirdre (15-16 Dec) | Dennis (15-16 Feb) | Darcy (6-8 Feb) | Dudley (16-17 Feb) | Debi (12-13 Nov) | Darragh (6-7 Dec) | ||
| Eva (24 Dec) | Ewan (26 Feb) | Eleanor (2-3 Jan) | Erik (8-9 Feb) | Ellen (19-20 Aug) | Evert (30 Jul) | Eunice (18 Feb) | Elin (9 Dec) | Éowyn (24 Jan) | ||
| Frank (29-30 Dec) | Fionn (16 Jan) | Freya (3-4 Mar) | Francis (25 Aug) | Franklin (20-21 Feb) | Fergus (10 Dec) | Floris (4-5 Aug) | ||||
| Gertrude (29 Jan) | Georgina (24 Jan) | Gareth (12-13 Mar) | Gerrit (27-28 Dec) | |||||||
| Henry (1-2 Feb) | Hector (13-14 Jun) | Hannah (27 Apr) | Henk (2 Jan) | |||||||
| Imogen (8 Feb) | Isha (21-22 Jan) | |||||||||
| Jake (2 Mar) | Jocelyn (23-24 Jan) | |||||||||
| Katie (27-28 Mar) | Kathleen (6-7 Apr) | |||||||||
| Lilian (23 Aug) |
Storms named between November 2015 and October 2025. Source: Met Office.
Notable named storms
While every year since the scheme began has seen storms strong enough to be named, some storms have been particularly significant.
Storm Desmond, December 2015
Storm Desmond brought extreme rainfall to north-west England. The weather station in Honister Pass in Cumbria recorded 34.1cm of rainfall in just 24 hours in a new UK record. Another record was set when 405mm of rain fell at Thirlmere in Cumbria over two consecutive days.
The subsequent floods affected thousands of homes and businesses across Cumbria and other parts of northern England, sweeping away several bridges and cutting road and rail links.
Storm Desmond led to the government launching the National Flood Resilience Review.

Storm Arwen, November 2021
Storm Arwen is an example of how the damages caused by a storm depends on more than its overall strength. A storm’s location, duration and wind direction also plays a role.
This storm occurred after an area of pressure in the North Sea drove very strong northerly winds across north-eastern parts of the UK. Winds gusted at up to 98mph at Brizlee Wood in Northumberland.
The unusual wind direction of Storm Arwen resulted in the felling of thousands of trees and left more than a million homes without power. Parts of the Pennines also saw significant disruption from lying snow.
Storms, like Arwen, that have a wind direction different to the prevailing south-westerly direction are less frequent, but are nevertheless a key part of the UK’s climate.
Storm Eunice, February 2022
In February 2022, three named storms affected the UK within the space of a week. The second of these storms was Storm Eunice.
Storms in close succession can cause particular problems because clean-up efforts can be hampered by further severe weather.
Storm Eunice was the most severe and damaging storm to affect England and Wales since February 2014. Gusts reached 122mph at Needles on the Isle of Wight – the highest on record for England at a low-level station.
The storm caused deaths, widespread damage to buildings and major travel disruption, including the temporary closure of the Port of Dover.

Storm Babet, October 2023
Storm Babet was notable for prolonged and intense rainfall which led to severe flooding, evacuations and sadly, deaths. In eastern Scotland, particularly in the county of Angus, rainfall totals reached 150-200mm, with some areas experiencing their wettest day on record since 1891.
A key factor with this storm was its unusual track, or path. The storm moved south to north, picking up additional moisture as it crossed the Bay of Biscay. A high-pressure “blocking” weather system over Scandinavia prevented Babet clearing the UK eastwards into the North Sea. As a result, high wind speeds were sustained across north-east England and much of Scotland for a prolonged period.

Storm Éowyn, January 2025
Storm Éowyn was the UK’s most powerful windstorm in more than decade, with the brunt of impacts felt in Northern Ireland and Scotland’s populous Central Belt.
Gusts exceeded 90mph in Northern Ireland – where this was the most severe wind storm since 1998 – while a 100mph gust was recorded at Drumalbin in Lanarkshire.
Roads were closed, flights, ferries and trains were cancelled and more than a million homes were reported to be without power at the peak of the storm. Scotland’s national botanical collection at the Royal Botanic Garden in Edinburgh saw several dozen felled or badly damaged trees.
Storm Éowyn’s intensity and geographic reach made it a standout event in recent years.
The timeline below shows how the Met Office worked with Met Éireann and KNMI to alert the public about Storm Éowyn.

Climate change and storms
There is no evidence of positive or negative trends in windstorm number or intensity in the UK’s recent climate.
Trends in windstorm frequency are difficult to detect, because numbers vary year-to-year and decade-to-decade.
Most climate projections indicate that winter windstorms will increase slightly in number and intensity over the UK, including disproportionately more severe storms. However, scientists have “medium confidence” in these projections – because a few climate models indicate differently.
This uncertainty highlights the need for ongoing research into how climate change may influence the severity and frequency of windstorms in northern Europe.
On the other hand, scientists are confident that climate change is making rainfall during storms more intense.
A 2024 attribution study involving Met Office scientists showed that climate change has made rainfall during storms more intense through autumn and winter in the UK. The researchers noted that this trend is set to increase as the planet warms.
Recent increases in flooding in the UK have also been linked to climate change.
Other research, meanwhile, has found that sea level rise caused by climate change will worsen storm surges and high waves during windstorms.
The continuing unpredictability of UK storms – combined with projections of increased rainfall and heightened coastal damage under climate change – means that being prepared for, and adapting to, the future weather is crucial.
The post Met Office: Ten years of naming UK storms to warn the public appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Met Office: Ten years of naming UK storms to warn the public
Greenhouse Gases
Reflections on Community at CCL’s 4th Annual Inclusion Conference
Reflections on Community at CCL’s 4th Annual Inclusion Conference
By Phalika Oum, CCL Inclusion Fellow
Maybe it was Karina’s plumeria hair clip, paying homage to the land and the native peoples of Hawaii; she humbles us with a reminder that we are merely guests here. Perhaps it was Wanda’s Elsa doll or Karis’ worn-out, well-loved book. Or perhaps it was Mike’s gentle tone, swiftly dancing to the music of multiplicity: We contain multitudes and our identities cannot be distilled into words. Words that we too often take for granted.
What’s it like to choose stillness in times of great civil unrest and mounting ecological turmoil? What’s it like to choose to love in the face of disjuncture? How do we keep moving forward, despite it all?
____
From Friday, Sept. 26, to Saturday, Sept. 27, Citizen Climate Lobby’s People of the Global Majority and members of the Inclusion team hosted their 4th annual virtual Inclusion Conference, “Rooted in Care, Growing in Community,” dedicated to sharing stories from CCL’s Affinity Action Teams and practical tools for managing anxiety at the intersections of climate and inclusion. With 77 community members attending the Friday reception and 181 members attending the Saturday conference, this year’s event demonstrates the power of convening as a community.
The event kicked off with a show and tell reception, where community members shared stories about an object of their choosing. This created room for cultural, familial, and personal reflections and storytelling, setting the stage for a weekend of intention and belonging. In this space, we saw the coming together of difference, with attendees ranging in age, race, profession, gender orientation, and more.
The Saturday conference was supported by Spanish interpretation from Gabriela and ASL interpretation from Jessy and Joe. Kendyl, a leader from our Persons with Disability affinity group, encouraged the usage of visual descriptions—an accessibility tool used by the speaker to identify themselves in a presentation. Karina also shared a playlist to celebrate the songs of difference, submitted by the People of the Global Majority (PGM) Caucus.
Jacob Shores-Argüello, Costa Rican-American environmental humanist, writer, and author of Paraíso and In Absence of Clocks, started the day off by reading poetry from his new book “Grief for the green that was.” Jacob challenged concepts of geographical boundaries and reminisced about his late mother, exploring how grieving for his mother translated to grieving for his motherland. The “grief for the green that was,” as he so eloquently stated it, is a deep longing to come home. Hear Jacob read his poetry here:
Then Julian Cauzae, a seminary student at Harvard Divinity School interested in conversations around climate change and the apocalypse, created space for attendees to share their experiences conversing about the climate question. From conversations about inductive gas stoves and the restoration of democracy to the question of human extinction, Julian patiently listened and responded by weaving in themes of time and agency.
Mayor Ukeme Awakessian Jeter
Mayor Ukeme Awakessien Jeter of Upper Arlington, Ohio, joined the conversation to share her understanding of cultural competency. While recognizing the importance of data in storytelling and advocacy, Jeter encouraged us to use a different and more qualitative method for gathering information: going directly to the people most impacted by the crisis. She walked us through how to effectively integrate cultural competency into our walk as the “connector” of community, pointing to three key steps: access your own cultural awareness, invest in your own cultural development, and foster a culture of curiosity. Ukeme challenged us to have the integrity to say, “I have some work to do here, and I am going to do the work to get there.”
The next hour of the conference included breakout sessions on various topics, led by CCL community members and members of the People of the Global Majority Caucus. The sessions included:
- “Faith, Stewardship, and the Climate Crisis: How Religion Shapes Environmental Action,” led by Mike Roman, a member of CCL’s Peace Corps Action Team
- “Our Water and Climate Change,” led by Manolo Matos, CCL’s Kentucky State Coordinator
- “Resistance is Edible: The Poetics of Food and the Teachings of Ancestors,” led by Phalika Oum, a 2025 Inclusion Fellow
- “Putting Partisan in the Past: Changing our perspectives during engagements from ‘you and I’ to ‘we’ to truly embrace our value of nonpartisanship,” led by Drew Eyerly, CCL’s Action Teams Director
- “Building Community Resilience with Educational Gardens,” led by Lucy Xue, a member of CCL’s Asian Pacific Action Team
- “At the Intersection: Gender, Justice, and the Climate Crisis,” led by Allison Fabrizio, a member of CCL’s People of the Global Majority Action Team
After, we rejoined the main conference room to hear from Clara Fang, Founder of Green Tara Consulting. Clara shared strategies for preventing burnout and productivity, as well as the value of dismantling oppression and colonial regimes through self-care, a radical form of resisting the culture of white supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalism. Clara recognized the work of CCL’s Personal Resilience Action Team, which seeks to strengthen group and personal resilience through trainings and workshops. She also encouraged attendees to join her Activism Hour, held every Tuesday at 6 p.m. ET, as a coworking meeting for activists.
Pamela Benson Owens
Vanessa Nakate sent along a video message for conference attendees, urging us to join people in the frontlines of the climate crisis with a spirit of one-ness, community, and care. Vanessa spoke about a world without oppression where nature is recognized and treated as the source of life.
Our final speaker, Pamela Benson Owens of Edge of Your Seat Consulting, Inc., shared a powerful message about the importance of integrating inclusion into every organizational standard. Using her experience training other organizations, including like-minded groups and disagreeing parties, she urged us to create space for relationship-building and communication by seeing each other as humans first, anchored in the common experience. Pamela held the truth that to build on inclusion, we need to have respectful communication, which includes active listening, inclusive language, and curiosity without judgement.
_____
It’s times like this I feel the most connected with the world, with humanity, and with my body. Historians, anthropologists, and all other scientists alike say there was a time before written language, following the language of gestures. It was in these times that our ancestors passed down knowledge and wisdom through the practice of oral storytelling and share outs. How incredible it is to return to our roots and dance with words together in the blight of monoculture and during the age of erosion!
Conferences, such as this one, leaves us feeling empowered and ready to act. But what comes next? What do you do the day after? The month? The year?
Many attendees shared that their motivation for engaging in climate work are their children, grandchildren, neighbors, friends, and even strangers—this is the heart of inclusion in climate work, for we cannot sufficiently address climate justice without addressing the ones currently most impacted and will be most impacted by what’s to come if we do not act.
Phalika Oum, CCL 2025 Inclusion Fellow
Over the years, I’ve placed my hope in places and rhythms that leave me feeling more helpless. For reasons I’m still piecing together, this multicultural and intergenerational space that the CCL Inclusion team has cultivated left me with security. I am one of the lucky ones to stand alongside veterans, retirees, high school students, college students, academics, climate professionals, and more to discuss the very pressing issues in our climate and celebrate the beauties of inclusion.
For all the attendees who chose to use their weekend to attend CCL’s 4th Inclusion Conference, thank you. Thank you for your presence and solidarity. Thank you for sharing your thoughts and experiences. And thank you for being open-minded and choosing to listen to difficult conversations. I feel forever grateful.
As for me, I sit with wonder. My chest fills with gravity and eagerness. And somehow, the air feels lighter knowing that I have a whole community to reflect alongside. I continue to meditate on the praxis of holding space for people and communities. I’m walking a tightrope held together by tensions and truths. This, I know, will be a lifetime of reflection and endurance.
Phalika Oum has served as CCL’s Inclusion Fellow since January 2025.
The post Reflections on Community at CCL’s 4th Annual Inclusion Conference appeared first on Citizens' Climate Lobby.
Reflections on Community at CCL’s 4th Annual Inclusion Conference
Greenhouse Gases
Analysis: Fossil-fuel CO2 emissions to set new record in 2025, as land sink ‘recovers’
Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels and cement will rise around 1.1% in 2025, reaching a record 38.1bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2), according to the latest figures from the Global Carbon Project.
However, falling land-use emissions means that global CO2 emissions in 2025 will remain relatively unchanged compared to 2024 levels.
The 20th edition of the annual Global Carbon Budget report, published today, also finds that the land carbon sink – the portion of human-caused CO2 emissions absorbed by plants and soils – appears to have recovered to its pre-El Niño strength after two unusually weak years.
However, research published alongside the report by the same team also suggests that climate change has caused a long-term decline in land and ocean carbon sinks, with sinks being about 15% weaker over the past decade than they would have been without climate impacts.
The study, published in Nature, finds that the decline of carbon sinks has contributed about 8% to the rise in atmospheric CO2 concentration since 1960.
The 2025 Global Carbon Budget report also estimates that:
- Emissions in China and India are projected to grow much less in 2025 compared to the past decade, while emissions in the US and EU are projected to grow this year after years of decline.
- Global CO2 emissions from land-use change are expected to decrease by nearly 10% in 2025, driven by reductions in deforestation and forest degradation in South America.
- Total CO2 emissions – fossil and land use – have grown more slowly over the past decade (0.3% per year on average) compared to the previous decade (1.9% per year).
- The remaining carbon budget to limit global warming to 1.5C is virtually exhausted and is equivalent to only four years of current emissions. Carbon budgets to limit warming to 1.7C and 2C would similarly be used up in 12 and 25 years, respectively.
- The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is set to reach 425.7 parts per million (ppm) in 2025, 2.3ppm above 2023 and 52% above pre-industrial levels.
(For detailed coverage of previous editions of the report, see Carbon Brief’s coverage for 2024, 2023 and 2022.)
Global emissions remain flat
The Global Carbon Budget (GCB) finds that total global CO2 emissions in 2025 – including those from fossil fuels and land use – are projected to remain approximately flat at 42.2GtCO2, falling by a negligible -0.04% compared to last year.
This means 2025 is effectively tied with 2024 as the highest global CO2 emissions on record.
Flat total CO2 emissions in 2025 reflect a combination of continued rising emissions from fossil fuel and industry and declining emissions from land-use change. Fossil CO2 emissions rose 1.1% to 38.1GtCO2, while land-use emissions declined by -9.8% to 4.1GtCO2 (albeit with large uncertainties).
The figure below shows the 2025 global CO2 emissions update (red solid line) alongside 2024 (dark blue dotted), 2023 (mid blue dotted) 2022 (light blue dotted), 2021 (light grey dotted) and 2020 (dark grey dotted). The shaded area indicates the uncertainty around the new 2025 budget.
(Each year, the GCB is updated to include the latest data as well as improvements to modelling sources and sinks, resulting in some year-to-year revisions to the historical record.)

The 2025 figures are notably higher than those in the prior five GCB reports, reflecting an upward revision in historical land-use emissions. (This is discussed in more detail in the land-use emissions section below.)
Total global CO2 emissions have notably flattened in the past decade (2014-25), growing at only 0.3% per year compared to the 1.9% rate of growth during the prior decade (2004-13) and the longer-term average growth rate of 1.6% over 1959-2014.
This apparent flattening is due to declining land-use emissions compensating for continued – but slow – increases in fossil CO2 emissions. Fossil emissions grew around 0.2GtCO2 per year over the past decade, while land-use emissions decreased by a comparable amount.
However, despite the emissions plateau, there is still no sign of the rapid and deep decrease in CO2 emissions needed to reach net-zero and stabilise global temperatures in-line with the Paris Agreement temperature goal.
If global emissions remain at current levels, the remaining carbon budget to limit warming to 1.5C (with a 50% chance) will be rapidly exhausted.
(The carbon budget is the total amount of CO2 that scientists estimate can be emitted if warming is to be kept below a particular temperature threshold. Earlier this year, the Indicators of Global Climate Change report estimated the remaining carbon budget had declined by three-quarters between the start of 2020 and the start of 2025.)
With human-caused global warming sitting at around 1.36C above pre-industrial levels in 2024, the remaining budget for 1.5C is 170GtCO2, equivalent to four years of current emissions.
The GCB report finds that the remaining carbon budgets to limit warming to 1.7C and 2C have been reduced to 525GtCO2 (12 years at current emissions levels) and 1,055GtCO2 (25 years), respectively.
Global fossil CO2 emissions also grew more slowly in the past decade (0.8% per year) compared to the previous decade (2.1%). This was driven by the continued decarbonisation of energy systems – including a shift from burning coal to gas and replacing fossil fuels with renewables – as well as slightly weaker global economic growth during the past decade.
The figure below breaks down global emissions (dark blue line) in the 2025 budget into fossil (mid blue) and land-use (light blue) components. Fossil CO2 emissions represent the bulk of total global emissions in recent years, accounting for approximately 90% of emissions in 2025 (compared to 10% for land use). This represents a large change from the first half of the 20th century, when land-use emissions were approximately the same as fossil emissions.
Global fossil emissions include CO2 emitted from burning coal, oil and gas, as well as the production of cement. However, to determine total fossil emissions, the Global Carbon Budget also subtracts the cement carbonation sink – CO2 slowly absorbed by cement once it is exposed to the air – from fossil emissions.

Global emissions can also be expressed on a per-capita basis, as shown in the figure below.
While it is ultimately total global emissions that matter for the Earth’s climate – and a global per-capita figure glosses over a lot of variation among, and within, countries – it is noteworthy that global per-capita fossil emissions peaked in 2012 and have been slightly declining in the years since.

Land-use emissions continue downward trend
Global land-use emissions stem from deforestation, forest degradation, loss of peatlands and harvesting trees for wood. They averaged around 5.0GtCO2 over the past decade (2015-24) and the Global Carbon Budget provides an initial projection for 2025 of 4.1GtCO2.
This represents a 0.5GtCO2 decrease in land-use emissions relative to 2024. The GCB report suggests that this was largely driven by a combination of reductions in deforestation and forest degradation in South America and by the end of the dry 2023-24 El Niño conditions.
Overall, land-use emissions have decreased by around 32% compared to their average in the 2000s, with a particularly large drop in the past decade. This decline is statistically significant and is due both to decreasing deforestation and increasing levels of reforestation and afforestation globally.
Three countries – Brazil, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – collectively contribute approximately 57% of the global land-use emissions. In the past, China has been a meaningful contributor to land-use emissions, but in recent years its land-use emissions have turned net-negative as more trees have been planted than cut down.
The figure below shows changes in emissions over time in these countries, as well as land-use emissions in the rest of the world (grey).

Historical land-use emissions have been revised upward in the 2025 GCB report compared to prior estimates. This reflects a combination of two factors:
- The discontinuation of one of the four bookkeeping models that GCB has historically relied on for land-use emissions estimates. This model tended to show lower land-use emissions than the others.
- The inclusion of the impacts from CO2 fertilisation on global biomass densities. Because forests have higher biomass densities now than in the past, due to increasing CO2, this tends to increase the estimate of land-use emissions for recent years.
Fossil-fuel CO2 hits record highs
Global emissions of fossil CO2 – including coal, oil, gas and cement – increased by around 1.1% in 2025, relative to 2024, with an uncertainty range of 0.2-2.2%. This represents a new record high and surpasses the prior record set in 2024.
The figure below shows global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, divided into emissions from major emitting countries including China (dark blue shading), the US (mid blue), the EU (light blue), India (light blue) and the remainder of the world (grey).

China represents 32% of global CO2 emissions today. Its 2025 emissions are projected to increase by a relatively small 0.4% (with an uncertainty range of -0.9% to 2%), driven by a small rise in emissions from coal (0.3%), a modest rise in gas (1.3%) and a larger rise in oil (2.1%).
Given the uncertainty range, a decrease in Chinese emissions is also a possibility, but this will not be confirmed until the full 2025 data is available.
Similarly, recent analysis for Carbon Brief found that China’s emissions were “finely balanced between a small fall or rise” in 2025. However, it said that a drop in the full-year total became more likely after a 3% decline in September. (The Global Carbon Project estimates are based on data covering January through to August, which point towards a small rise in 2025.)
Whether China’s emissions see small rise or fall in 2025, the outcome will be due to moderate growth in energy consumption combined with an extraordinary growth in renewable power generation. This would represent the second year in a row where Chinese emissions growth was well below the average rate over the past decade.
The US represents 13% of global emissions and emissions in 2025 are projected to increase by 1.9% (-0.2 to +4.1%) compared with 2024. This marks a reversal from recent trends in declining CO2 emissions.
The projected growth of emissions in the US is likely driven by a combination of three factors: a colder start to the year after a mild 2024, which led to greater heating requirements, higher gas prices, which led to more coal being used in power generation, as well as an increase in total demand for electricity.
US emissions from coal are expected to increase by a substantial 7.5% in 2025, emissions from both oil and gas by a more modest 1.1% and emissions from cement to fall by -8.0%.
While policies enacted by the current US administration may increase CO2 emissions going forward, their impact on national emissions levels in 2025 were likely relatively modest compared to other factors.
India represents 8% of global emissions. In 2025, its emissions are projected to increase by 1.4% (-0.3% to +3.1%) on 2024 levels, significantly below recent trends.
An early monsoon with the highest-ever May rainfall substantially reduced cooling requirements in May and June, the hottest months of the year. Strong growth or renewables – particularly solar – has also helped limit the growth of Indian emissions.
Indian emissions from coal are expected to grow 1.7%, with oil growing 0.1%, gas shrinking by -6.4% and cement growing by 9.9%.
The EU represents 6% of global emissions. Its emissions are projected to increase by 0.4% in 2025, with an uncertainty range of -2.1 to +2.8%. This represents a divergence from a past decline in emissions (albeit with large uncertainties).
EU emissions from coal are expected to decline by -0.3%, whereas emissions from oil and gas are projected to increase by 0.6% and 0.9%, respectively. Cement emissions are expected to fall by -4.1%.
The increase in EU emissions is in part from weather-related low hydropower and wind generation which – despite increases in solar – have led to an increase in electricity generation from gas. In addition, a relatively cold February led to increased use of natural gas for space heating.
International aviation and shipping (included in the “rest of world” in the chart above) are responsible for 3% of global emissions. They are projected to increase by 6.8% for aviation, but remain flat for international shipping. This year will be the first time that aviation emissions have exceeded pre-Covid levels.
The rest of the world (excluding aviation) represents 38% of global emissions. Emissions are expected to grow by 1.1% in 2025 (ranging from -1.1% to +3.3%), with increases in emissions from coal (1%), oil (0.5%), gas (1.8%) and cement (2.4%).
The total emissions for each year over 2022-25, as well as the countries and regions that were responsible for the changes in absolute emissions, are shown in the figure below.
Annual emissions for 2022, 2023, 2024 and estimates for 2025 are shown by the black bars. The smaller bars show the change in emissions between each set of years, broken down by country or region – the US (dark blue), EU (mid blue), China (light blue), India (pale blue) and the rest of the world (grey). Negative values show reductions in emissions, while positive values reflect emission increases.

The US represented a large part of the rise in global fossil-fuel emissions in 2025. US emissions increases over 2024-25 contributed about 40% of the total global increase – more than the EU, China and India contributions combined.
The Global Carbon Project notes that emissions have declined over the past decade (2015-24) in 35 nations, which collectively account for 27% of global emissions. This is up from 18 countries during the prior decade (2005-14).
The decrease in emissions in those countries comes despite continued domestic economic growth and represents a long-term “decoupling” of CO2 emissions and the economy.
The carbon intensity of energy has consistently decreased over the past decade in China, the US, the EU – and, to a lesser extent, globally.
However, peaking CO2 emissions requires that the rate of decarbonisation exceeds the growth in energy demand. This has happened in some regions, including the US and EU, but not yet globally.
Modest growth in emissions from coal, oil, gas and cement
Global fossil-fuel emissions primarily result from the combustion of coal, oil and gas.
In 2025, coal is responsible for more emissions than any other fossil fuel, representing approximately 42% of global fossil-fuel CO2 emissions. Oil is the second largest contributor at 33% of fossil CO2, while gas comes in at 21%.
The production of cement is responsible for around 3.8% of global emissions, but this is reduced to 1.9% once the carbonation sink – the drawdown of atmospheric CO2 by concrete – is taken into account.
These percentages reflect both the amount of each fossil fuel consumed globally, but also differences in CO2 intensities. Coal results in the most CO2 emitted per unit of heat or energy produced, followed by oil and gas.
The figure below shows global CO2 emissions from different fuels over time, covering coal (dark blue), oil (mid blue) and gas (light blue), as well as cement production (pale blue) and other sources (grey).
While coal emissions increased rapidly in the mid-2000s, they have largely flattened since 2013. However, coal use increased significantly in 2021 and then more modestly in the subsequent four years.

Global emissions from coal increased by 0.8% in 2025 compared to 2024, while oil emissions increased 1.0% and gas emissions increased by 1.3%.
Despite setting a new record this year, global coal use is only 6% above 2013 levels – a full 13 years ago. By contrast, during the 2000s, global coal use grew at a rate of around 4% every single year.
The figure below shows the total emissions for each year over 2022-25 (black bars), as well as the absolute change in emissions for each fuel between years.

Global oil emissions were suppressed for a few years after the 2020, but rebounded to pre-pandemic levels as of 2024 and have continued to grow in 2025.
This reflects that, despite falling sales of internal combustion engine vehicles, not enough electric vehicles (EVs) have yet been sold to result in peak oil demand.
The global carbon budget
Every year, the Global Carbon Project provides an estimate of the overall “global carbon budget”. This is based on estimates of the release of CO2 through human activity and its uptake by the oceans and land, with the remainder adding to atmospheric concentrations of the gas.
(This differs from the commonly used term “remaining carbon budget”, which refers to the amount of CO2 that can be released while keeping warming below global limits of 1.5 or 2C.)
The most recent budget, including estimated values for 2025, is shown in the figure below.
Values above zero represent sources of CO2 – from fossil fuels and industry (dark blue shading) and land use (mid blue) – while values below zero represent carbon sinks that remove CO2 from the atmosphere. Any CO2 emissions that are not absorbed by the oceans (light grey) or land vegetation (mid grey) accumulate in the atmosphere (dark grey). In addition, a dashed black line is shown to represent the expected sum of sinks based on estimated emissions.

Over the past decade (2015-24), the world’s oceans have taken up approximately 29% of total human-caused emissions, or around 11.8GtCO2 per year.
The ocean CO2 sink has been relatively flat since 2014 after growing rapidly over the prior decades, reflecting the flattening of global emissions during that period.
This estimate for carbon sinks has been revised up from 26% in prior versions of the GCB, reflecting a major update to carbon budgets driven by new data and modelling of carbon sink behavior.
The land sink takes up around 21% of global emissions, or 8.7GtCO2 per year on average over the past decade – discussed in more detail in the section below. This is down from 29% in prior budgets.
The atmosphere continues to accumulate the bulk of human-caused CO2 emissions, with about 49% going into the atmosphere on average over the past decade – a rate of 20.4GtCO2 per year.
The growth rate of atmospheric CO2 in 2025 is expected to be around 2.3ppm, which is a bit below the decadal average rate of 2.6ppm over the past decade (2015-24). This is well below the record-setting rise of 3.7ppm in 2024, which was primarily driven by the effect of the 2023-24 El Niño conditions weakening the land sink.
Atmospheric CO2 concentrations are set to reach an annual average of 425.7ppm in 2025, representing an increase of 52% above pre-industrial levels of 280ppm.
There remains an unusual imbalance in the carbon budget in 2024, where the sum of the sinks is notably larger than estimated emissions. This can be seen in the figure above, where the dashed line is below the shaded area.
Budget imbalances are not unprecedented – there are large uncertainties in both emissions data and sink estimates. But the rise in the amount of CO2 accumulating in the atmosphere in 2024 is larger than would be expected based on emissions.
There are a number of potential explanations for this 2024 imbalance. The land cover data for 2024 is not yet complete and it is possible that some fire emissions data might be missing from the record. This might result in either higher land-use emissions or lower land sinks than currently estimated.
Alternatively, it could be due to the CO2 growth rate – captured by surface stations managed by the US National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration (NOAA) – being slightly high. CO2 records for 2024 from these stations are higher than those obtained from satellite-based sensors, though it remains unclear which provides the most accurate measurement.
A declining, but not collapsing, land sink
After an usually weak land carbon sink in 2023, there were a number of media articles about its potential collapse.
For example, in October 2024, the Guardian wrote that “the sudden collapse of carbon sinks was not factored into climate models – and could rapidly accelerate global heating”.
The truth is a bit more complicated. While the impending collapse of the land carbon sink has been greatly exaggerated, there is growing evidence of a long-term weakening of both the land and ocean carbon sinks due to human activity.
And while the land sink has recovered to its pre-El Niño strength in 2025, aided by relatively low global fire CO2 emissions, it will continue to gradually weaken as global temperatures rise. This is not unexpected – scientists have long foreseen a weaker carbon sink in a warmer world.
A weaker land sink will contribute to higher global temperatures in the future as more CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels and land use change will accumulate in the atmosphere.
The figure below shows the percentage of human emissions absorbed by the land sink in every year since 1959, with a recovery upwards in 2025 after two relatively low years.

In a study published in Nature alongside the release of the 2025 Global Carbon Budget, the same team of researchers provide a detailed estimate of exactly how the land and ocean sinks have changed as a result of human activity.
The research finds that the land and ocean sinks are 25% smaller and 7% smaller, respectively, than they would have been without the effects of climate change over 2015-24.
This amounts to a nearly 20% reduction in the efficacy of current global carbon sinks – that is, both the land and ocean – and a 15% reduction compared to how large they would be without the effects of climate change.
The figure below, from the new paper, shows the impact of climate change on the ocean sink (blue), the land sink (green) and atmospheric CO2 concentrations (grey) since 1960.

The weakening of carbon sinks due to human activity has led to an increase of atmospheric CO2 of more than 8ppm since 1960. The combined effects of climate change and deforestation have turned tropical forests in south-east Asia and in large parts of South America from CO2 sinks to sources.
And these sinks will likely continue to weaken as long as atmospheric CO2 concentrations continue to rise and the world continues to warm. There are a wide range of estimates of carbon cycle feedbacks among climate models, but a large carbon cycle feedback could result in a few tenths of a degree of future warming.
The post Analysis: Fossil-fuel CO2 emissions to set new record in 2025, as land sink ‘recovers’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Fossil-fuel CO2 emissions to set new record in 2025, as land sink ‘recovers’
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