A war in the Middle East may increase demand for carbon credits if it continues for a long time. Analysts say energy supply disruptions from the conflict could push some industries back to higher‑emission fuels like coal. This, in turn, could raise emissions and force companies in regulated markets to buy more carbon credits.
The Middle East conflict has already disrupted liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies. Qatar, a top LNG producer, has halted output at its largest LNG plant. This is due to disruptions in transport routes through the Strait of Hormuz. Qatar supplies about 20% of global LNG output.
LNG provides cleaner fuel for power generation than coal. When gas costs rise sharply or supply is limited, utilities sometimes increase coal use to meet electricity demand. Higher coal use increases carbon emissions. This can lead to higher demand for carbon credits in compliance markets.
Carbon Credits 101: How the Market Responds
A carbon credit represents one tonne of greenhouse gas emissions reduced, avoided, or removed from the atmosphere. Companies must hold carbon credits to meet emissions limits in regulated markets. These markets are part of government climate policy.
Compliance carbon markets, like emissions trading systems (ETS), require companies to lower their emissions. If they can’t, they must buy credits to stay within a limit.
Over 113 carbon pricing systems are in use worldwide. This includes ETS and carbon taxes, which cover about 28% of global greenhouse gas emissions.
In compliance markets, rising emissions usually increase demand for allowances or carbon credits. If companies cannot reduce emissions fast enough, they buy credits to stay compliant. Strong or rising demand can also influence credit prices.
Voluntary carbon markets exist separately from compliance markets. In voluntary markets, companies buy credits to meet internal climate goals, not legal limits.
The voluntary market is smaller but growing. The global voluntary carbon credit market is expected to rise from $1.88 billion in 2025 to $2.29 billion in 2026. It could reach $4.92 billion by 2030.
From Gas to Coal: When Utilities Flip the Switch
The Middle East conflict has pushed energy prices higher. Global natural gas and oil prices climbed because of risks to supply routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, a key passage for crude oil and LNG.

When gas prices rise, utilities may switch from gas‑fired generation to coal, which is cheaper but emits more CO₂. Analysts observed that fuel switching happened in 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine. European gas supply was disrupted, so utilities turned to burning more coal.
Coal prices have also risen in response to supply pressures. Some markets saw thermal coal prices climb about 26%, reaching highs not seen in more than two years.

Such shifts can put pressure on emissions limits in regulated markets. Higher emissions would require companies to buy more compliance credits to avoid penalties. This dynamic is central to why analysts say carbon credit demand could rise if disruptions persist.
Compliance Markets Under Pressure, So Who Pays the Price?
Compliance carbon markets form the largest portion of carbon credit demand. These include emissions trading systems in Europe, China, and the U.S., and expanding carbon pricing schemes globally. The Middle East conflict could affect these markets, which shows how energy security and climate policy are connected.
Demand for carbon credits depends on how countries and companies aim to meet climate goals, like those in the Paris Agreement. This agreement aims to limit global warming to below 2°C. Compliance markets set legal limits, and voluntary markets support corporate climate goals.
If more companies switch to coal and emissions go up, compliance markets might see a higher demand for allowances or credits. This happens as companies try to stay within legal limits. This could result in higher carbon prices and tighter markets, depending on how regulators respond.
In the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), companies must hold allowances equal to their emissions, or face fines. The EU is considering reforms to improve market stability and balance supply and demand for allowances. This scheme has been a key tool for reducing emissions in Europe since 2005.
In addition, more sectors are entering compliance markets. For example, China’s national ETS covers key industrial sources. It accounts for a big part of emissions from the world’s largest emitter.
Any rise in emissions from fuel switching could increase demand in these established markets. However, the exact impact will depend on how long energy disruptions continue and whether regulators adjust compliance caps or other rules.
Voluntary Market Volatility: Green Goals on Hold?
Global carbon pricing revenues topped over $100 billion in 2023 and in 2024. The World Bank reports that around $69 billion came from emissions trading systems and $33 billion from carbon taxes. This amount covers nearly 24% of global greenhouse gas emissions, which reflects the growing scale of these markets.

- RELATED: 2026 Could Redefine Voluntary and Compliance Carbon Market Convergence, with Japan Leading the Way
While compliance demand may rise if emissions increase, the outlook for the voluntary market could differ.
According to analysts, an energy crisis may temporarily constrain corporate spending on voluntary credits. High energy prices raise operating costs. This may lead companies to delay voluntary purchases as they will focus more on their core operations instead.
High-integrity voluntary markets have grown recently. This growth is driven by corporate net-zero commitments and new standards. Companies increasingly seek credits that meet quality criteria such as compliance eligibility, durability, and third‑party verification.

Sudden economic strains or changes in energy costs could quickly change how companies buy.
The Ripple Effect: Energy Security Meets Climate Action
A prolonged Middle East conflict could have ripple effects beyond energy prices. Disruptions to LNG supply may push some utilities toward higher‑emission fuels, raising emissions levels. That could drive demand for carbon credits in regulated markets where companies must meet emissions limits.
At the same time, short‑term pressures from high energy costs could slow voluntary demand as companies focus on operational priorities. The overall direction of carbon credit demand will depend on the duration of energy supply disruptions, policy responses by regulators, and the pace of the global energy transition.
Carbon markets are an evolving part of climate policy, linking energy markets and climate goals. As energy security concerns grow, the role of carbon credits in balancing compliance and emissions reductions may attract more attention from policymakers, investors, and companies in the coming years.
- READ MORE: The Carbon Credit Market in 2025 is A Turning Point: What Comes Next for 2026 and Beyond?
The post War Could Boost Carbon Credit Demand: How Middle East Energy Crisis May Reshape Climate Markets appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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