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U.S. Green Hydrogen Cuts Give China an Edge in the Clean Energy Race

The United States’ push to lead in green hydrogen, once a centerpiece of its clean energy strategy, is slowing down. Recent policy changes by the Trump administration cut funding for hydrogen hubs. They also reduced tax credits for large-scale projects. Analysts say this slowdown could open the door for China to dominate the emerging market for low-carbon hydrogen technology.

The cuts mark a major shift from the previous administration’s investment-heavy approach. Under the Biden-era Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the U.S. planned to spend billions to make hydrogen from renewable electricity. The goal was to decarbonize industries such as steel, cement, and chemicals, which are hard to electrify.

Now, with federal incentives being reduced or delayed, several projects are being reassessed. Developers worry that without consistent support, production costs will remain too high to compete globally.

Funding Cuts Stall the Hydrogen Hub Dream

In mid-2025, the U.S. Department of Energy began reviewing funding for several regional hydrogen hubs. These hubs were meant to create networks linking producers, users, and transport systems. Seven hubs were approved in 2023, backed by more than $7 billion in federal funding, but four are now facing cuts or slowdowns.

Industry groups warn that this could affect projects worth tens of billions of dollars. “Policy certainty is crucial for investors,” said one energy analyst cited in the Bloomberg report. “Every delay or rollback increases the cost of capital and slows deployment.”

The U.S. also faces uncertainty about the Section 45V hydrogen tax credit. This credit offers up to $3 per kilogram for hydrogen produced with near-zero emissions. The credit helped close the gap between costly green hydrogen and cheaper fossil-based hydrogen. Without it, the cost of producing green hydrogen in the U.S. could rise from $3 to $5 per kilogram to over $7, according to BloombergNEF estimates.

China Powers Ahead in the Hydrogen Race

While U.S. funding stalls, China is moving fast. The country already leads the world in electrolyzer manufacturing — the core technology used to make hydrogen from water. In 2024, Chinese companies supplied more than 65% of global electrolyzer capacity, up from just 40% in 2022.

Electrolyser manufacturing capacity by company
Source: IEA

China’s domestic market is also growing. The government has set a goal to produce 200,000 tonnes of green hydrogen per year by 2025 and up to 5 million tonnes by 2030. To support this, provinces such as Inner Mongolia and Hebei have started big solar-powered hydrogen plants.

China’s advantage lies in scale and cost. Electrolyser units made in China cost $600–$1,200 per kilowatt, far lower than the $2,000–$2,600 range typical in the U.S. and Europe. If current trends continue, the price difference might make Chinese-made equipment the top choice for global projects.

Rising Costs and Shrinking Margins

Hydrogen production costs remain the biggest obstacle to global growth. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that low-carbon hydrogen made with renewables costs two to four times more than conventional hydrogen from natural gas.

Producing one kilogram of green hydrogen costs between $4 and $12. This varies based on electricity prices and how efficient the electrolyzer is. Grey hydrogen, made from natural gas, costs $1–3 per kilogram. Analysts say costs must fall below $2 per kilogram to compete in most industries.

Scaling up manufacturing and securing cheap renewable power are key. The IEA projects that with large-scale deployment, electrolyzer costs could fall by 60% by 2030. But this requires steady investment and policy support — something the U.S. may now struggle to sustain.

According to BloombergNEF, global investment in hydrogen production and infrastructure reached $24 billion in 2024, up 50% from 2023. China accounted for nearly half of that total, while U.S. spending slowed after federal policy reviews.

Companies Pivot Amid Uncertainty

Despite the funding cuts, some U.S. companies are pressing ahead. Plug Power, a leading hydrogen firm, recently secured a $1.7 billion loan guarantee to expand production. The company plans to build several U.S. facilities that will supply green hydrogen to logistics and industrial customers.

Meanwhile, developers are adjusting strategies to reduce costs. Some plan to co-locate hydrogen plants near wind or solar farms to secure cheap power. Others are exploring blending hydrogen with natural gas in pipelines to reduce emissions without full conversion.

Industry leaders also call for cooperation with allies. The European Union, for example, continues to fund green hydrogen projects through its Hydrogen Bank initiative. They argue that closer cooperation across the Atlantic could help Western producers compete with China’s growing supply chain.

The Global Hydrogen Race

The race for leadership in green hydrogen is as much about geopolitics as it is about technology. Countries view hydrogen as a way to cut oil imports, boost industry, and ensure energy independence.

In 2024, global hydrogen demand reached about 97 million tonnes, according to the IEA. Only a small share — less than 1% — came from low-carbon production. To meet the world’s climate targets, that share must grow to at least 20% by 2030.

BloombergNEF expects the global hydrogen market to surpass $500 billion each year by 2050. This includes production, storage, and transport. But success depends on which countries can bring down costs first and scale up faster.

If the U.S. loses momentum now, analysts warn, it may have to rely on imported technology later — particularly from China. The following table compares the costs, market share, and 2030 planned output between the two nations. 

US versus China green hydrogen metrics

Can America Catch Up?

Green hydrogen is central to decarbonizing heavy industry and transport. It also supports renewable integration by storing excess power from wind and solar. Without continued investment, the U.S. risks missing key climate targets.

According to the Department of Energy’s earlier projections, hydrogen could cut up to 10% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 if widely adopted. That potential could shrink if projects slow or shift overseas.

At the same time, China’s expansion means more global supply, which could help reduce costs worldwide. Some analysts see this as an opportunity for global cooperation — if the U.S. can focus on innovation, efficiency, and regulation rather than pure scale.

The chart from Bloomberg below shows the potential changes under Trump’s current policy moves. 

2050 Green Hydrogen Estimates Change With Trump
Source: Bloomberg

Experts say the U.S. can still recover its position with the right mix of policy and private investment. Restoring tax credits, simplifying permits, and investing in electrolyzer manufacturing can help create a fairer market.

For now, China appears to have the upper hand. Its rapid manufacturing growth and strong state support have created momentum that the U.S. may struggle to match. However, as clean energy technologies mature, global demand will likely outstrip any single country’s supply.

The coming years will decide whether the U.S. remains a key player or becomes a buyer in the green hydrogen market it once hoped to lead.

The post U.S. Green Hydrogen Cuts Give China an Edge in the Clean Energy Race appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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