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US MINERAL

The Financial Times reported that the Pentagon plans to spend up to $1 billion on critical minerals. This move aims to cut U.S. reliance on China for essential metals in defense, clean energy, and advanced tech. Led by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), this program is the largest U.S. strategic mineral acquisition since the Cold War.

Significantly, the Pentagon’s plan is part of Trump’s broader “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” (OBBA) to enhance domestic and allied resources. Under OBBA, the DLA will use a $7.5 billion allocation to:

  • Expand the U.S. stockpile by 2027 ($2 billion)

  • Invest in mineral and processing supply chains ($5 billion)

  • Launch a Pentagon credit program to support private mining and refining projects ($500 million)

Washington’s Strategic Push: From Market Reliance to State Control

China’s control over global mineral supply chains has raised national security concerns. The country refines 80–90% of rare earths and dominates other key metals, such as cobalt and nickel.

Recent Chinese export limits on rare earths have raised concerns in the U.S. Washington views these limits as an effort to weaponize mineral exports. The Pentagon’s stockpiling shows a move from market-driven sourcing to state-led resource security.

Trump Targets China with 100% Tariffs

As per the latest news, President Trump has confirmed plans to impose 100% tariffs on all Chinese imports starting on November 1. He labeled China’s export limits a “hostile act.” He noted the timeline might change, saying, “Right now it is. Let’s see what happens.”

On Truth Social, Trump accused Beijing of manipulating supply chains and warned of “100% tariffs… over and above any tariff they are currently paying.”

This tariff announcement follows China’s decision to limit rare earth exports. These actions link industrial policy more closely to national security.

China exports

Pentagon Boosts Stockpile with High-Value Minerals

According to the Financial Times, the Pentagon’s buying spree targets four key minerals vital for defense and clean energy:

  • Cobalt – Up to $500 million. Used in batteries, superalloys, and medical implants.

  • Antimony – About $245 million, partly sourced from U.S. Antimony Corp. Key for flame retardants, batteries, and defense components.

  • Tantalum – Around $100 million. Essential for missile systems and aerospace parts.

  • Scandium – A combined $45 million, reportedly from Rio Tinto and APL Engineered Materials. Used in aerospace alloys and electronics.

These purchases will expand the U.S. national stockpile, which already holds $1.3 billion in metals. The new acquisitions focus on materials critical for weapons production, energy systems, and high-tech manufacturing.

A defense official told the FT that several Pentagon offices are now “flush with cash” for mineral procurement. The government is also exploring offshore mineral resources in the Pacific Ocean, rich in nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese.

Alaska’s Ambler Road Project Approval

President Trump approved the long-contested Ambler Road Project in Alaska. This 211-mile corridor will connect the Dalton Highway to vast mineral deposits in the northwest.

This decision reverses a Biden-era block and is seen as a vital step toward U.S. resource independence. It opens access to copper, zinc, and rare earth elements essential for clean energy and defense manufacturing.

Mineral Stockpiling: Shielding the Nation from Supply Shocks

The U.S. imports over 80% of its critical minerals and relies heavily on foreign refining, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). This dependence exposes the country to significant supply risks, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that China controls 90% of rare earth refining and significant percentages of nickel and cobalt refining. Such dominance highlights the risk of relying on a single country for critical inputs.

Thus, to tackle these challenges, the U.S. is building a stockpile of critical minerals. This will reduce supply risks, maintain production of weapons and advanced technologies, and support domestic mining investment.

In short, this stockpile acts as strategic insurance, safeguarding industrial capabilities and boosting national security.

The U.S. aligns with a global trend in mineral stockpiling. The EU requires reserves under its Critical Raw Materials Act. India launched a National Mineral Security Strategy in 2025, while Japan maintains a months-long reserve of rare earths.

Minerals with Net Import Reliance on China

u.s. import mineral commodities
Source: USGS

Market Impact and Industry Response

The Pentagon’s stockpiling effort has caught attention in mining and rare earth stocks. Companies like U.S. Antimony and MP Materials are gaining interest as Washington increases mineral procurement.

For example, the DLA’s plan for 3,000 tonnes of antimony—about one-eighth of U.S. annual demand—may stabilize the market for this volatile metal. Analysts expect similar effects for other targeted minerals as demand becomes clearer.

In conclusion, the Pentagon’s $1 billion mineral stockpile plan marks a clear shift. The U.S. government is no longer waiting for markets to secure resources. Instead, it is actively building reserves, funding domestic projects, and aligning economic policy with defense needs.

As competition for minerals increases, the Pentagon’s stockpiling is a defensive strategy and a clear signal. It shows that the next big race among global powers will be for critical minerals. These are vital for future technologies, not oil.

The post Pentagon’s $1B Mineral Stockpile Boosts U.S. Independence from China appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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