Ye Huang is a senior researcher at Global Energy Monitor (GEM), where she tracks and analyses global renewable energy developments. Christine Shearer is project manager of GEM’s Global Coal Plant Tracker (GCPT).
As batteries redefine how power systems handle peak demand in the United States, a central question for the global clean energy transition is whether China can follow a similar path and move beyond coal-based backup power.
Batteries now regularly provide roughly one-quarter of California’s peak demand during high-load periods following rapid growth in the US in recent years. In contrast, power generation from natural gas-fired plants fell by 17% year-on-year during the spring and summer of 2025.
Highlighting the strides made in the country’s most populous state, the battery fleet of the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), the state power system, set a new record on August 6, 2025 – discharging 11.2 gigawatts (GW) during the evening peak.
California’s experience mirrors a wider national shift. US battery storage has grown at an annual rate of more than 60% for the past five years, increasing its share of the power mix and reducing dependence on fossil fuel-powered “peakers” – plants which operate for brief periods to avert outages at times of high demand.
Clean alternative to polluting peakers
The US had 999 peaker units in 2021, most fuelled by natural gas. Peakers typically run fewer than 100 to 400 hours per year, usually for short intervals of less than four hours.
As well as being costly to operate due to low efficiency, frequent cycling and rising maintenance costs, the peaker units also emit disproportionately high levels of air pollutants. The Clean Energy Group has found that more than 4.4 million Americans live within one mile (1.6 km) of a peaker plant, largely low-income and historically disadvantaged urban neighborhoods, exposing them to worse air pollution and increased health risks.
But with about 150 GW of peak capacity expected to retire in the US over the next 15 years, battery storage is emerging as a viable alternative.
Compared to the peakers, batteries offer a faster response, greater efficiency and significant environmental benefits. Technological advances are expanding the range of services batteries can provide, making medium-duration storage (less than 12 hours) an increasingly viable option to meet the integration needs of high-renewable systems.
Trump leaves battery incentives alone
Federal policy has laid the foundation for the transition to battery storage in California and elsewhere.
FERC Order 841 allows energy storage to participate directly in wholesale electricity markets, enabling batteries to compete with conventional generators for energy and grid services, as well as receive capacity payments in the same way as fossil peakers.
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 further accelerated deployment by extending the Investment Tax Credit to standalone storage, supporting private-sector investment. Unlike incentives for wind and solar, those for battery storage have been largely preserved under the Trump administration.
States are increasingly leveraging storage to replace peakers. California, for instance, explicitly targets battery storage to meet reliability and emissions goals, planning to add 15.7 GW of four-hour batteries and 2.8 GW of eight-hour batteries while cutting natural gas use by 70% by 2035.
China’s critical clean energy juncture
China is facing growing flexibility needs due to its recent record-breaking solar and wind capacity additions.
It has been heavily promoting the use of “flexible” coal-fired power to back up its growing variable power sources and meet peak demand. “Flexible” coal power in China refers to retrofitting coal-fired units so that their minimum output can fall to 35% or lower of rated capacity. At present, nearly half of China’s coal fleet (600 GW) is categorised as dispatchable for flexibility needs.
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However, this reliance on coal is problematic. As historically base-load units, coal plants inherently have slower response times and generate significant pollution, making them ill-suited for frequent ramping. Even with generous and guaranteed capacity payments, many of these coal units struggle to operate profitably. Additionally, the “flexible” coal power policy has been used to justify the continued large buildout of coal power in China, which hit a 10-year record for construction in 2024.
China is already the world’s largest market for battery storage, and installations are accelerating rapidly. Battery storage and demand response could together provide nearly 60% of China’s short-term flexibility needs by 2030, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
The US shows what is possible when policy, markets and technology align. China needs to take swift, decisive action to shift from “flexible” coal to battery storage. If batteries are to play a central role, strengthening market mechanisms is a key step.
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China is on track to establish provincial electricity spot markets in which battery storage will be formally recognised as a market participant for grid peak regulation services. Additionally, establishing capacity mechanisms, including implementing capacity payments for battery storage, would further incentivise deployment. Increasing utilisation is also essential: recent policy explicitly calls for higher dispatch levels of battery storage and prioritising its use in system regulation.
Encouraging battery storage to replace fossil peaker plants is not only an effective way to accelerate China’s “dual-carbon” goals, but also helps China to consolidate its global leadership in the battery storage industry. China has the resources, the market momentum and the industrial know-how to leapfrog “flexible” coal and make batteries the backbone of its clean and flexible grid. The question is not whether it can, but how quickly it will do so.
The authors are grateful to Xing Zhang for helpful discussions that informed this article.
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To break its coal habit, China should look to California’s progress on batteries
Climate Change
COP17 must settle who decides how Cali Fund money is disbursed
June Rubis is a steering group committee member for the Cali Fund, from Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo.
At COP16 in Cali, governments made a significant commitment: at least half of the funding from the new Cali Fund should support the self-identified needs of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, including women and youth. It was a watershed moment for multilateral benefit-sharing.
The challenge now is to translate that commitment into access arrangements that recognise the different institutions, priorities and decision-making processes of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.
For generations, biodiversity and traditional Indigenous knowledge have provided significant value to companies who depend on nature’s genetic diversity to discover new drugs that fight diseases, create products that improve health, and grow crops resilient to extreme heat and flooding events. While some compounds are sampled directly from the source country, increasingly the digital blueprints are held in online public databases which are freely accessible to use for innovation and research.
Countries urged to ramp up “insufficient” nature policies at COP17
The Cali Fund was established at COP16 to encourage commercial users of Digital Sequence Information, or DSI, to share benefits arising from its use. Estimates suggest it could generate over $3.5 billion a year – a stark contrast to the modest $10,656 currently committed to the fund from just five SMEs, underlining how much progress must be made at COP17 over the next two weeks.
The COP16 decision that set up the fund offers two routes for money to reach Indigenous Peoples and local communities: through government authorities, and through direct payments to institutions identified by Indigenous Peoples and local communities themselves.
Varied ways of organising
Indigenous Peoples and local communities organise through a wide range of institutions. Some have national or regional organisations experienced in managing international grants. Others work through territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations, cooperatives or networks. Some have professional finance teams and audited accounts; others have extensive experience governing territories, collective resources or conservation work without having been organised around international funding requirements.
For direct access, some questions are already apparent. Which institutions should be able to receive funds? How should they be identified? What fiduciary standards should apply? How should safeguards and accountability work where institutional capacities differ? What support may be needed where institutions have strong community mandates but less experience with international finance?
Comment: Protecting nature is a public duty, not a Wall Street profit opportunity
If access is designed mainly around institutions that already meet the expectations of large international finance mechanisms, early funding will tend to favour those already familiar to funders. They will gain further experience and become better positioned for future funding, while institutions with less administrative capacity may remain outside the system despite strong community mandates and long histories of stewardship.
These first decisions matter most, because they set the terms for everyone who follows.
The role of intermediaries requires care. Some Indigenous organisations may want a fiscal host to hold and manage funds on their behalf. Communities may choose to work through an NGO they trust. Government-facilitated arrangements may work well in particular national contexts.
What matters is the function an intermediary performs and the authority that comes with it. Providing administrative support is different from deciding which Indigenous organisations qualify, which priorities can receive support, or how success will be assessed. Direct access means communities keep that decision-making authority.
Decision-making power
The COP16 decision refers to institutions that Indigenous Peoples and local communities identify. But authority among Indigenous Peoples does not sit in one kind of body. It may sit with territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations or combinations of these. Legal recognition and customary authority do not always align neatly.
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An important feature of the Cali Fund’s governance is that Indigenous Peoples and local communities participate as full members of the Steering Committee, rather than as observers. Seven Indigenous Peoples and local community representatives, one from each of the seven socio-cultural regions, participate in consensus-based decision-making alongside representatives of governments and UN entities. Six additional representatives from civil society, scientific institutions and the private sector participate as observers.
That representation carries responsibility. Institutional legitimacy, access and representation take different forms across the seven socio-cultural regions. Indigenous Peoples and local communities members therefore have an important role in bringing those differences into the Fund’s governance and in ensuring that arrangements developed for one context do not become the assumed model for everyone else.
Safeguards and clear responsibilities
COP17 can establish the core principles and direction, while allowing operational pathways to develop in ways that respond to different regional contexts. The decisions countries take in Yerevan will shape how that flexibility is realised in practice.
The choices made around access will influence which institutions are able to participate, which routes become established and which forms of authority are recognised within the funding architecture. The aim should be an architecture with enough structure to maintain confidence while allowing for different forms of Indigenous and community governance.
A credible direct-access pathway will need safeguards, financial oversight and clear responsibilities. This would give the 50% commitment a stronger institutional foundation.
The Cali Fund’s importance will ultimately depend not only on how much funding reaches Indigenous Peoples and local communities, but on whether they are able to determine how the money is accessed, governed and used. This requires access pathways that recognise their institutions, priorities and decision-making processes, rather than requiring them to conform to a single predetermined model.
The post COP17 must settle who decides how Cali Fund money is disbursed appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP17 must settle who decides how Cali Fund money is disbursed
Climate Change
UK approves gas drilling despite admitting blow to “climate leadership” status
The UK government has approved extraction at the Jackdaw gas field in the North Sea, despite acknowledging that this decision could make it harder for Britain to convince other countries to move away from fossil fuel production.
UK energy secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh approved the drilling on Wednesday after months of high-profile debate, fuelled in part by interventions from US President Donald Trump. She argued that the project would boost energy security in the wake of the Middle East fossil fuel crisis, protect hundreds of jobs and add £2.9 billion ($3.88bn) to the UK economy.
She said Jackdaw’s gas would be cleaner than imported gas and would not prevent the UK from meeting its legally-binding carbon targets and its goal of net zero by 2050. As the field is already licensed, she said extraction was consistent with the Labour Party’s 2024 manifesto promise not to issue any new oil and gas licenses.
The same morning, the government announced a new Energy Wealth Fund to reinvest oil and gas revenues in the climate transition. It will start with £2 billion ($2.67bn) from the government and be topped up over time with tax revenues from offshore oil and gas production.

Climate campaigners in the UK and abroad were quick to condemn the decision, while a leading legal expert told Climate Home News it goes against the advice of the International Court of Justice. Meanwhile, the government’s own documents reveal that it recognises the drilling could damage the UK’s reputation and its ability to push forward the global transition away from fossil fuels.
“Climate leadership” blow
The 92-page decision document says Fahnbulleh “acknowledges that international standing on climate is important and accepts that a decision to grant consent may not further the UK’s international climate leadership.”
It adds: “She acknowledges concerns about the potential implications for the UK’s credibility and influence – including the difficulty inherent in encouraging other states to move away from fossil fuel production while the UK continues, in a limited and transitional way, to draw on its own domestic resources.”
While noting that Jackdaw has not been issued with a new license – just permission to extract gas – the document says Fahnbulleh “accepts this does not fully resolve the underlying tension in the UK’s position” but “considers this alongside the substance of the UK’s wider record [on emissions reduction], which remains significant”.
It continues that she accepts these concerns are “legitimate” and weigh against approving gas extraction, but only gives this argument a “moderate negative weight” set against the benefits of gas production.
“Huge” wrong signal
In international climate talks, the UK has long supported the transition away from fossil fuels and is one of very few major oil and gas producers to ban new licenses. Across the North Sea, the Norwegian government continues to make offshore areas available for oil and gas exploration through annual licensing rounds.
Climate experts and campaigners shared the concern, acknowledged in the decision document, that approving Jackdaw could set a precedent for fossil fuel production elsewhere. Sam Fankhauser, professor of climate change economics at Oxford University, said the direct climate impact of Jackdaw is “much smaller than the debate around it would suggest” but the “wrong signal it sends, however, is huge”.
Bob Ward, policy and communications director at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change, said that while Jackdaw’s output will be very small, “it will signal to other fossil fuel producers that they too should carry on with business as usual, less than a month before the COP31”.
Kenyan campaigner Mohamed Adow, director of Power Shift Africa, called the decision “a serious blow to Britain’s international climate credibility” as “the UK cannot expect developing countries to move away from fossil fuels while giving the green light to new drilling in its own backyard”.
International Court of Justice
In July 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advised that government failure t


