Greg Jackson is the founder and CEO of Octopus Energy, a global energy and technology company headquartered in London.
Set up in 2016, it now has 7.2 million customers across 18 countries, as well as a portfolio of £6bn worth of renewable energy assets. The group’s proprietary technology platform, Kraken, is now used to run more than 40m customer accounts across the globe.
The company’s energy supplier arm recently became the largest in Great Britain, surpassing legacy giant British Gas when it added 1.3 million customers after buying Shell Energy in late 2023.
Jackson is a “serial tech entrepreneur”, having built and sold a number of start-ups before Octopus Energy.
Carbon Brief sat down with him for an hour, to discuss the UK’s energy transition, the upcoming general election, misinformation in the media and much more.
- On the energy transition: “The reality is that it just boils down to electrification.”
- On technology neutrality: “This isn’t primary school, there are going to be winners and losers.”
- On Labour’s “zero-carbon power by 2030” pledge: “It’s totally achievable.”
- On using hydrogen for heating: “It’s like flushing our toilets with champagne. It might work, but it’s inordinately expensive and impractical.”
- On renewable forecasts being revised upwards: “It’s like Groundhog Day when you look at the revised [solar and wind] forecasts.”
- On misinformation in the media: “I think some of it is organised and some of it is cultural…EVs have taken 1.8m barrels of oil off the road per day. That’s enough that the global oil industry is suddenly seeing what used to look like a minor inconvenience in the future is suddenly a real and present danger.”
- On the psychology of climate change: “I think hope is as important, knowing there is a solution, is as important as knowing there’s a problem.”
- On stopping “burning stuff”: “Look at the cost curves for solar and wind and all the other technologies…Honestly, it’s going to be cheaper to stop burning stuff. That was an amazing moment, when I realised that we didn’t have to arrange the forces for saving the planet against the force of economics, because they actually lined up.”
- On the cost of renewables: “Our addiction to fossil fuel is so damaging, it even makes the solutions to fossil fuels more expensive.”
- On investment: “The demand for electricity is only going to go up. And when there’s demand for a product, you can invest in producing it.”
- On the demand flexibility service: “It’s just the equivalent of supermarkets pricing goods to clear, rather than letting them go off.”
- On concerns over digital exclusion: “People who try to hold new technology to the bar of universality are typically protecting some sort of legacy against the technology improvements that benefit consumers, and we should not have much patience for that.”
Carbon Brief: What do you think should be the key priorities when it comes to energy and climate policy for the next [UK] government over its first six months or so?
Greg Jackson: I think the energy transition used to sound like quite a complicated process. The reality is that it just boils down to electrification. We need to electrify everything we can and then be generating as much electricity as we can from renewable resources.
Now, underneath that, there may be a whole lot of policy priorities. But electrification has got to be the one word.
CB: So, when the next government comes in, whenever the election is, are there specific things you really need to see, or that you’d like to see, to really ramp up this decarbonisation process?
GJ: So, again, I’m going to talk about, for me [its] electrification. Because even when we talk about decarbonisation you’re kind of weighing up loads of different things. If we talk about electrification, primarily, then we can say, OK, what does that take?
And I think the first thing we need to do is recognise that, even today, the electricity markets we’ve got are not fit for purpose. We spend billions a year balancing and curtailing renewables – that’s turning windfarms off when it’s windy. And we need a market that means that, at the times when we’re generating a lot of electricity, it’s super cheap for people. And we need to do that on a regional basis, or even more locally than that.
So that, for example, if today we had regional pricing, every region would be cheaper than it is because we’ve been reducing waste. But, more than that, Scotland would be the cheapest electricity in Europe. These are important because as soon as people can see that renewables can lead to cheaper energy, we get public support for renewables – as we should – and it becomes a much more efficient system. We’re not putting a cost on everyone’s bills to pay for waste, which is what happens today.
I think, alongside market reform, you then get the right investment signals. So we are going to be investing in the places that need the infrastructure. And that’s not just generation, it can be things like batteries.
It’s kind of mad at the moment that a lot of people think we should put batteries next to windfarms. But, if you do that, then before anybody’s had a chance to make the most of cheap electricity, you’ve already eliminated the price signal. So the best places for batteries, for example, might be close to population centres.
Take somewhere like the southeast [of England], where, obviously, it’s hard to build new generation. But we can build infrastructure that will make electricity cheaper by, for example, deploying batteries in places that have got peak time constraints [to] enable us to reduce peak issues and benefit more from the times it’s off peak and we can store that electricity.
So I think market reform is absolutely number one. And that means the most dynamic pricing possible.
By the way, it doesn’t mean that consumers will necessarily face dynamic prices, just to be really clear. Companies will be able to wrap-up that dynamic pricing in any number of tariffs. So, for those who want it, you’ll still have flat tariffs – and they’ll probably be cheaper than they are today, because the system is more efficient. But, for those who can shift demand, or want more dynamic stuff, it will enable them to benefit by using electricity more efficiently and that makes for a more efficient system for everyone.
Obviously, we need reform of two sets of regulations. We critically need grid reform, so that you can actually connect stuff to the grid. We’ve spent years talking about this publicly because of the frustration that we’ve got enormous amounts of capital to build new generation. But you can’t. You literally have no way of connecting to the grid. I mean, there’s a project we’ve got to build a solar farm in County Durham, where I think there’s a 14-year wait to connect it.
CB: So is that just planning reform?
GJ: That is grid reform. So, basically in the UK – and, by the way, this applies in many other countries as well – you’ve got a national monopoly grid and you can only build new generation if you can connect it to the grid. You haven’t got any alternative. So, if the grid tells you you’re going have to wait 14 years, you’re going to wait 14 years.
And I contrast this with what has happened in gas. During the energy crisis, Germany alone built five liquified natural gas terminals in one year. Meanwhile, because of these grid connection issues, we can’t build new renewables. And I think that the reform for that is largely bureaucratic; the government and grid need to agree on a process to enable stuff to be connected faster.
The second thing, of course, is planning. And I think, at the moment, I mean, famously, England built two onshore wind turbines in the time that Ukraine during a war built hundreds, because you can’t get planning permission. And that doesn’t just apply for wind turbines, there’s a real challenge building the infrastructure to transmit electricity around the country.
And I think the reality with this is we need to find ways to enable communities to benefit when we build new infrastructure. Wherever you build it, you get NIMBYs [“not in my back yard”]. But we need to have IMBYs as well, people who will directly benefit and can see the direct benefit of building infrastructure. And so we need reform that enables us to deploy new electricity infrastructure, but in a way which embraces, to the maximum extent possible, local communities.
Between those two priorities – i.e. market reform, planning and grid reform – we can unleash the forces that actually will mean that throughout most of the country – everywhere, in fact – consumers will be benefiting from clean energy. And the moment people are benefiting – it’s like when the new iPhone launched. The sudden demand for data meant that the mobile networks just had to build masts, because it had to meet consumer demand. And we can do that with energy, with clean energy, which is the more we enable people to benefit, the more demand there will be for rapid transition. And that’s what we need.
CB: So, moving on to Labour’s now kind of quite high-profile pledge to get net-zero power by 2030…is that broadly achievable? Is that doable if what you laid out there gets implemented? Or are there extra things that, to hit that 2030 target, would need to happen?
GJ: It’s totally achievable. And, by the way, I mean, the government’s pledge [for 2035] is not that different, right? Everyone’s pledging net-zero carbon electricity by roughly then, I can’t remember all the details, but they’re all quite similar.
But the reality is, what it does need is commitment. I was recently at a meeting of governments. Lots of industries were lobbying governments to say: we need to be technology neutral, everyone’s got to be given a chance to be part of this future. Which is all lovely, but this isn’t primary school, there are going to be winners and losers. And we need the commitments from governments that enable investors to invest in the stuff that’s going to be part of the future.
So a really good example would be, there is still this kind of crazy suggestion that hydrogen might be used to heat homes. I mean, it might just be physically possible, but it’s like flushing our toilets with champagne. It might work, but it’s inordinately expensive and impractical. It’s just a delaying tactic from the companies who own the gas infrastructure.
Now, of course, a transition that means that the gas infrastructure, over time, won’t be so valuable, or may even become entirely redundant, is not the future that they [the gas industry] want. But it’s not like we’re still running stuff down the canals. The technology changes already made [mean] that renewable electricity is the cheapest form of power we’ve ever had and is getting cheaper every year. Of course, there are minor blips like recent inflation in offshore wind, but even that was driven by the inflation and interest rates, which largely came from our addiction to fossil fuels.
So, the path should be clear, and what we need from policymakers are those brave decisions that say: “Hey, look, there are going to be some losers in this process.” But…the quicker we’re clear about that, the more we can embrace, for example, the workers in those sectors and make sure that they’ve got a bright future, as we transition, and the more we can manage the transition in a way which will be good. Good for the people who were affected by it.
CB: Can the market do all of this? Or Labour’s talking of GB Energy, and you hear about nationalisation or quasi-nationalisation of the railways. What do you make of the ideas like GB Energy?
GJ: Yeah. I don’t think there’s any read-across from railways. It’s an entirely different sector. And the reality when you look at energy, I mean, first of all, GB Energy isn’t the sort of nationalised energy supplier, which is good, by the way. I mean, energy retail is one of the most competitive sectors in the UK. Margins are 2%, if energy companies are lucky.
The big problem in energy is the rest of the cost stack. It’s largely those kinds of very regulated, often monopoly parts of the system, which need reform. And so I think if GB Energy is about, for example, helping pioneer stuff that isn’t yet ready for market risk…I mean, take tidal as an example. Maybe we should have tidal power, maybe GB Energy would be a great way of kick-starting that, in the same way as government subsidies kick-started a lot of wind and solar. But, increasingly, we could run wind and solar on a merchant basis, i.e. an unsubsidised basis in many energy systems if you’ve had the market reform I talked about. So, if GB energy is helping kickstart stuff we need, that would be incredible.
If GB Energy helps get government backing for projects to enable them to, for example, overcome some of the planning and connections issues that I’ve described, that could be great. So it really depends on the role GB Energy is playing.
CB: Before we started speaking, I was looking at this Ladybird book from 1981, which I picked up from a charity shop, talking about energy conservation. Obviously, whatever that is, 40-odd years ago [and we’re now] talking about 2050 [for net-zero emissions]. What, in your view, does the UK energy system, EVs and all the rest of it look like then? What does the UK look like in 2050? And what does it need to look like?
GJ: So, first of all, I guess the question here is, if this [book] was roughly 30 years ago and 2050 is roughly 30 years away…how well did this predict where we are today? Or how dated does it look, right?
Look, I think a real challenge with targets like 2050 is that almost everyone who sets those targets will be retired by then. They’re not responsible for it. Indeed, almost everyone who’s working for them will be retired by then. It’s incredibly easy to set a target that you’re not going to be around for.
So, I’m much more of a believer in setting much shorter term targets. And given that we have the technologies we have available today, we can set really challenging targets. If you are talking about 2030, for example, net-zero electricity, that’s a much more tangible time. Because it tells us about the decisions we need to make right now.
I think one of the interesting things about predicting the future, is how wrong we get it, especially in sectors like energy, where you’ve got very powerful incumbents who have very strong views about what the future will be, but are often wrong. I mean, Kodak’s view of the future was wrong, Nokia’s view of the future was wrong, Blockbusters’ view. They were all wrong. But they didn’t get to lobby for their view of the future, they just had to compete. And the market and technology made the decision for them.
So I think if I look at energy, wind and solar, [they] have repeatedly beaten every target. They get cheaper, faster than anyone’s ever estimated. And it keeps on happening. It’s like Groundhog Day when you look at the revised forecasts, because every forecast that comes out, kind of looks back and goes: “Whoops, we underestimated how well solar would do or how well wind would do.” And then they make an estimate, and then they have to go and do the exact same process again because it keeps beating it.
It’s been the same, by the way, with batteries. Battery prices keep on plummeting way ahead of expectation. And EV adoption has kept on accelerating ahead of expectation. So, all the clean-energy technologies beat the forecasts.
By the way, the only ones that don’t are the dirty-energy technologies. No one forecast the horrific gas crisis we’ve just lived through. Nuclear keeps getting – and I’m not anti nuclear – but it keeps getting more expensive and slower than expected. And so I think the challenge with setting things like 2050 is, if we start building infrastructure based around our best guesses now, it’ll almost certainly under-deliver and it will cost too much. We’re far better off with the kind of things I talked about at the beginning, which were market reforms, so we can rapidly deploy the technologies we’ve already got.
An incredible thing that happens in technology is, each time you deploy something, it teaches you about what is possible. When the iPhone launched, no one foresaw that QR codes would get you out of a pandemic, or that Uber would change the global cab industry.
In the same way, for example, we are already discovering that if we give people, if we integrate our technologies directly with people’s electric cars, we can charge them at three or four times less than grid cost, because we’re able to grab the electricity when it’s most abundant. That means that, today, for some of our customers, they can drive electric cars for £2.30 for 100 miles, whereas with a diesel car it would be £18.
Now, no one forecast that kind of thing. It’s just what we discover, when we build out new technology. And that’s why, you know, I really believe we need the reforms to let us build the technology. And we will discover it gets cheaper, faster, easier and better for consumers, far more quickly than anyone realised.
CB: What do you make of the current mood in certain sections of the media, which is very negative, relentlessly attacking EVs, electrification, solar? What’s your view on that? It’s almost like organised misinformation, it sometimes feels like.
GJ: I think there are two layers to it. I think some of it is organised and some of it is cultural.
Let’s talk about the cultural first. Let’s look at EVs. EVs are not just an electric version of petrol cars, they are a fundamentally different creation. So, the assumption that, for example, the long-standing car makers, the manufacturers of Europe and elsewhere, were going to be able to just start making EVs, is kind of wrong. Right? They spent 100 years becoming unbelievably good at complex transmission and drive shafts and all of the engineering required to take what is actually a remarkably complex thing, a petrol or diesel engine, and turn it into a consumer device.
Meanwhile, for the last 20 years a bunch of Chinese companies that just set out to build EVs from the beginning, or Tesla, which has only ever done EVs, have re-engineered cars, built around the fundamentals of an EV, in which things like transmission becomes much simpler, but your ability to build really smart battery management, really smart software is actually a competitive edge.
Now, what we’re seeing at the moment is EVs emerging that traditional automakers find very, very difficult to compete with. And, so, their answer is: “Hang on, we can’t make money in EVs. Therefore, something’s wrong with EVs.” Because no company ever says there’s something wrong with us.
Now, that means that everyone in those companies, there’s huge numbers of people there, good people, but that are genuinely thinking EVs are too hard, they are too challenging, they’re not going to work. And they’re the people that have a 20-year relationship with motoring journalists. Their lobbyists have had the 20-year relationships with the political correspondents, their CEOs are the ones that have the relationships with the business journalists and with the editors. So, this isn’t a conspiracy, it’s just that those companies are facing existential threat from something that is really challenging for them. And that means that all the conversations these people have are about the problems with EVs, right?
Now, actually, I have lived with an EV for seven years. There are very, very few problems with an EV. And, you know, for example, the latest generation of EVs are getting cheaper and cheaper and cheaper, as all the technology scales up. And we get these great cost curves as batteries come down. But those automakers are not seeing it, in fact, this is a threat to them.
So, I think the primary layer here is simply that the influential people in the motoring industry, simply don’t get EVs.
I think the second thing is, of course, there is a backlash from the fossil fuel industry, including some car companies, because, even today, I think EVs have taken 1.8m barrels of oil off the road per day. Right? That’s enough that the global oil industry is suddenly seeing what used to look like a minor inconvenience in the future is suddenly a real and present danger. Now, we saw the ability of the tobacco industry to lobby against tobacco restrictions. The oil industry is vastly more powerful than tobacco ever was. And so, on top of the sort of cultural thing that I’ve described, you have then got a genuine concern and lobbying efforts.
And I guess the last part of that is cultural wars. There are organisations who deny climate change, who are combining anti-climate change with anti-EV, with anti-renewables and a whole load of other social topics to try and create political divides. That’s why when I talk about the market reforms that will make, for example, clean energy cheaper, it’s so critical, because if we can show people this transition is good for them, we kind of undermine that attempt at a culture war.
I spend a lot of time talking to, for example, people on the political right, because they are free marketers. They believe in entrepreneurship, they believe in efficiency and talking to them about the way in which renewables and EVs can lead to a more efficient competitive world. Actually, we make the culture war go away and we talk about the economics instead. And then we can align people’s self-interest with that industry, with that of the climate.
CB: Talking about a culture war, we obviously got an election here in the UK looming, but we’ve obviously got a US election looming too and a very, very stark choice between a Biden versus Trump presidency. In that context, given what the Trump 1.0 presidency did, what do you make of the Paris Agreement? Obviously, Trump tried to pull, or did pull the US out of it and then Biden reinstated it. Do you think the Paris Agreement has achieved things to date? Is it the international framework system that we need, or not?
GJ: I’m generally impressed that most governments really do take the commitments they’ve made seriously. And, even, while on a political level, I’ll often hear these kind of culture-war discussions, underneath that, you see the real actions.
Now, the US has obviously swung massively because you had the Trump rowbacks, but then you had, under Biden, the IRA [Inflation Reduction Act], which, by the way, is a very bipartisan programme. I speak to people from the US administration and, just yesterday, [we talked] about the kind of risk of a rowback depending on what happens in November and their view is, of course, there is a very real risk.
But a lot of what the IRA has done has been in red [Republican] states. The Biden officials talk about touring America and meeting all these mayors, Republican mayors and governors in red states, who have seen the benefits of jobs and the industrial regeneration created by it. And so you hope that a lot of that will mean that the underlying programmes survive any political change.
I think in terms of the global picture, we’ve also got to be a bit honest about this. Paris was about 1.5C. I think last year we exceeded 1.5C. Now, climate comes and goes, it’s very important we all recognise that, but, we’ve got to accept that we’re facing an accelerating challenge and we’ve got all the tools to solve it.
I think the place that we really need political leadership now is to be able to look at industries and say: “Look, some industries are going to be the future. And their success is not only going to benefit the climate, it’s going to create more economic opportunity than we lose as we allow some industries to start declining.” And they’ve just got to be brave about this.
I saw that G7 has just agreed to phase-out coal by 2035. [Laughs] I mean, you can be proud to be British on this one, because this is our last coal year, and even then it’s miniscule. The idea that we somehow need these forms of energy for another 11 years is mad. And, so, I’m simultaneously pleased that governments really do take these commitments seriously. But I’m also worried that they fail to grasp the opportunity that a far more rapid change could deliver greater economic growth, greater outcomes for their citizens, than in their current shape.
CB: Obviously, looking at this [Ladybird] book, and looking back over previous decades, I’m interested in your own personal epiphany, if you like, on climate change. What was the thing, that moment…was it a book, TV programme, film, a lecture, a conversation with a colleague or family member, where the penny really dropped and you thought: “OK, climate change is a thing and it’s pretty damn serious”?
GJ: I was a child in the 70s and I joined Greenpeace when I was 15. And the thing that first got me into it was actually local air pollution more than climate. Because back then you could literally see the diesel fumes belching out the back of buses, out of car exhausts, often very visible, and you could really smell and feel it in the air. And I thought it was completely unacceptable, that one person’s choice to drive a car that did that created this huge negative impact on the people behind them.
And you remember that when leaded petrol was banned, which was done almost overnight, it was because of the impact on kids’ brains in dense urban areas with a lot of vehicles. It’s just unconscionable. And I think back then what you could see was that there were clean alternatives. This wasn’t about sackcloth and ashes. It wasn’t asking people to give up the huge benefits of industrial progress. It was just we needed ways to enable people to choose better solutions at the same or lower cost.
And so that was always my philosophy and I think, as I became more and more aware of climate change, exactly the same applied.
Now, I think the real two points of epiphany for me on climate were, first of all, realising there’s a solution. I think for a long time, you kind of feel like, how can we power our society without burning stuff? And then you look at the cost curves for solar and wind and all the other technologies. And, honestly, it’s going to be cheaper to stop burning stuff. That was an amazing moment, when I realised that we didn’t have to arrange the forces for saving the planet against the force of economics, because they actually lined up.
I think the second thing was Al Gore’s movie, An Inconvenient Sequel. We’d actually started this company, we started the company in 2015-16. In 2018, it looked like we were doing quite well. And we went away for a couple of days for a management off-site. And, after a hard day slaving over clipboards or whatever you do, I arranged for everyone to watch a movie and they all came in and I think they thought that we’re going to get something fun. And when An Inconvenient Sequel opened up, all the people in the room, you could see their faces drop, because I was forcing them to watch something worthy.
But you know what, five minutes in, everyone’s WhatsApp messages start pinging, and it was like, “wow, we have to do more”. Because it was showing the very real effects of climate change, which, by the way, are only worse now. And then at the end of the movie it had hope, it ended with a deal on solar for India. And, of course, it was for dramatic effect, but the reality of this is that we do have hope.
After the movie finished, we all just sat down and said how can we accelerate the ability our company has to do something about this? And so, I think, hope is as important, knowing there is a solution, is as important as knowing there’s a problem.
CB: You have talked very confidently about the cost benefits of wind and solar and you mentioned earlier how, a couple of years ago, government auctions made offshore wind look incredibly appealing. And then we had a failed auction and now it looks like quite a different picture. Heat pump installations in the UK are still very slow, costs are high. The cost of electricity versus gas makes them probably cheaper to run, but not definitely. How would you respond to lots of people saying: “Is it actually cheaper? It’s going to be more expensive, we need to consider perhaps using boilers?” How do you respond to those very serious concerns?
GJ: The first thing we’re going to do is recognise that today’s markets don’t reflect the underlying physics and economics, which is why I talk about market reform all the time. The second thing we need to do is recognise that there’s always going be short-term blips, those auction failures were driven simply by short-term inflation and interest rates, both of which were largely the consequence of the gas crisis, i.e, our addiction to fossil fuel is so damaging, it even makes the solutions to fossil fuels more expensive.
And then we talk about things like adoption of heat pumps and so on. A year ago, two years ago, no one had heard of a heat pump. Now, the climate change denying parts of the media have made heat pumps famous. Thank you very much. We’ve got to remember that we’ve got long-term transitions and almost everything we talked about there are short-term issues.
So, if we break it down a bit, we can generate electricity from renewable sources in the UK, for between 4p and 8p a kilowatt hour (kWh). New generation in solar and wind can do that.
Consumers traditionally in the UK have paid 17p/kWh. During the energy crisis our bills were paid for by the government, but they went to 40p/kWh or 50p/kWh, right? I.e. the generating cost, the cost to generate electricity, is way below what people pay. We’ve just got a crazily inefficient system for getting it from generation to consumption. We need to fix that. Which is why that was literally the first set of policies that I talked to you about.
Just by way of example, electricity roughly trebles in price in the UK between the point it’s generated and the point you consume it. Milk, which is much harder to transmit, gets schlepped about in diesel lorries, it has to be bottled and pasteurised, is stored on refrigerated shelves in supermarkets with really expensive real estate. I think milk goes up by 50% between the farm and the point you buy it. Our electricity system is just fundamentally far too inefficient. And we have to fix that. And that’s the market reforms.
But then in terms of, for example, running costs of heat pumps…on a smart tariff they’re almost certainly cheaper for the vast majority of homes than a gas boiler to run. And that’s in today’s crazy world where all of the climate and social levies are sitting on electricity. If you take away that distortion, running heat pumps on electricity is dramatically cheaper than a gas boiler.
We’ve still got to make heat pumps cheaper to buy and install. That’s why, again, going back to first principles, I was inspired here by Michael Dell, of Dell Computers. When he was doing his MBA, he sat in his dorm room and he read an article that said that a $3,000 IBM PC only had $1,000 of components. But, you know, you had an inefficient supply chain, loads of wholesalers and, when you look at heat pumps, it’s just the same. So we’ve started making our own, so we can be a bit like Dell, by going direct to make them cheaper. And already we’re seeing a big cost benefit. But the more we invest, the more we scale up, the more we’ll see that, and other companies are doing the same.
So what we’ve got is a situation where we’re at the beginning of a technology change. And if you look at the first iPhones, they cost £435 and today you would feel like you’re holding a brick that barely performed. But they were enough to kick start the smartphone revolution and that’s just the process we’re going through with the heat pumps.
The UK has very specific needs for heating, not only do we have poorly insulated homes, but we’ve got a very temperate climate. We also heat our homes with wet radiators, whereas most countries that use heat pumps have used air to heat the home. And so we’ve needed to make heat pumps that are UK specific. All of this is happening at the moment and it just gives me huge optimism.
And if I compare this to the alternative, by the way – the idea of, for example, piping hydrogen into people’s homes – I don’t know where to start.
We can start with engineering. Hydrogen is the smallest molecule in the universe. When a rocket launch is delayed by a fuel leak, which they are, that’s hydrogen. Rocket scientists can’t keep it in a very closed and carefully designed system. You know, there are bits of our gas network that are unmapped, that are 100 years old, I think there are bits of the piping that have got wood in them! Anywhere you’ve got a leak, hydrogen can get out. And so, before you can pipe hydrogen [into homes], you’ve got to make sure that every single home, every single inch of every pipe in every home, every valve and every joint, every appliance is going to be able to keep the hydrogen in. And this is unbelievably complex.
I saw the other day a hydrogen cooking hob, with an invisible flame, literally invisible flame. I don’t know why you’d want one of those in your kitchen, so you’ve got an explosive leaky substance with an invisible flame, or you could have an electric induction hob for roughly the same amount. The same cost to run, wipe clean, totally safe, incredibly controllable and you don’t need all this stuff piped into your home.
And that’s just looking at the piping, nevermind where’s the hydrogen coming from! 97% of the hydrogen in the world at the moment is unabated carbon emitting hydrogen. And this is years after we were told we’d be starting to get green hydrogen available. And then, if you’re going to use hydrogen to heat a home, if it’s green hydrogen, you’ve got to create renewable electricity, you then use that to power electrolysers, you then have to compress the hydrogen, pump it into the home and burn it. End-to-end, 40% efficient at turning the electricity you started with into heat. And, meanwhile, the heat pump is end-to-end 250% to 400% efficient.
There we go. I’m very optimistic because all you ever have to do is go back to the physics of this stuff.
Oh sorry, the other thing you mentioned, you know…is electricity more expensive than gas? Well, of course electricity is about three times more expensive per unit, maybe four times with the distorting taxes that need to be taken away. But electricity is so much more efficient. An EV turns 80% of the energy and electricity into motion, a petrol engine is 25%. A heat pump, you get 300% efficiency efficiency, a gas boiler gives you 85%. So electricity is so much more efficient.
And then the real magic with electricity is that it’s fungible. If you’ve got an EV, it can store the electricity at the cheapest times, you can’t do that kind of thing with gas. In fact, increasingly, some EVs can put that energy back into your house at peak times, reducing your energy costs.
Fundamentally, I think there is one thing here which is that electricity puts consumers far more in control. If they choose to, they can get solar panels and largely eliminate their dependence on anyone else. But with fossil fuels, we’re totally dependent on the countries and, to a degree, corporations that provide that molecule. One reason they don’t want to let go is that control gives them power and it gives them money. And we saw that during the gas crisis.
Any comparison of gas costs versus electricity costs has to remember that, from time to time, we experience these fossil fuel crises, because we’re dependent on people in control. And during the worst of the gas crisis, the price of gas went up to 30-fold. There was a very real chance that Europe was not going to have enough gas. In fact, it is potentially the case that we were saved from a gas crisis by a mild winter.
So we should never allow anyone to get away with this idea that electricity is more expensive than gas, because they cherry-pick the times that gas is cheap and they forget about the times that gas or other fossil fuels brutalise our economies. I think it cost the UK £100bn, the government paid two-thirds of our energy bills during the crisis. That’s how bad fossil fuels are.
CB: You’ve talked already about market reform and how important you think it is. One of the key arguments from people who are in favour of this transition that the economy is going through, is that dramatic reform of the electricity markets puts at risk the investments we need to get 2030, 2035 or whatever our targets are, which currently relies on the system as it is today. How do you respond to that?
GJ: It’s just not true. Of course, investors quite rightly, when investors write a large cheque, they are making a huge commitment and they need to know it’s got a good chance of delivering a return. And, so, whenever investors have got comfortable with one way of doing things, they of course want to see that carry on.
But, first of all, there are plenty of other investors available. Whilst in electricity, investors have long had these kind of guaranteed returns through different mechanisms, oil and gas investors make their colossal investments against enormous technology risk, enormous political risk and enormous market risk. When they decide to start extracting or to buy the licences for an oil or gas field and then make a huge investment required to extract the stuff. And then huge investments in LNG tankers and terminals. They have no idea what the future price of oil or gas will be. And they can still make those investments. So you can make massive investments against degrees of uncertainty.
And what we’ve seen already in electricity in the past was, for example, when we moved to the CfD [contracts for difference] regime, from the RO [renewable obligations] or FiTs [feed in tariffs] or whatever. A lot of investors said: “Well, that will kill investment.” It all [still] happened.
Similarly, when we’ve seen, for example, a number of states in the US have introduced dynamic zonal pricing, the investments carried on unaffected. So, at the end of the day, people need electricity. In fact, the demand for electricity is only going to go up. And when there’s demand for a product, you can invest in producing it.
CB: One of the things that Octopus has been quite involved in is the demand flexibility service being run by the electricity system operator. And that’s obviously encouraging customers to cut their use at peak times. How much importance do you put on that kind of system as we transition to a net-zero power system?
GJ: First of all I’d say Octopus was pioneering that for four years before the ESO brilliantly introduced it. Because the sort of legacy energy system said: “Customers won’t do this stuff.” Everything we’d invested in, in trials and experiments with customers showed that they loved that.
It was brilliant the way the ESO introduced it. And Octopus Saving Sessions accounts for 50% of all of the participation. Because we’d nurtured relationships with customers.
These are not energy geeks, by the way. Energy geeks were already on dynamic tariffs and smart tariffs, which meant, actually, it was kind of hard for them to participate in the Saving Sessions, because they were already fully optimised. This was one and a half million for us, one and a half million ordinary households that finally had the opportunity to shop for bargain electricity the way that they already do with supermarkets.
And giving people the opportunity to cut costs, especially in a crisis, but also to have agency, to be able to make decisions, is so critically important. And I think that this isn’t about renewables, this is just about the way the energy system has treated customers as dumb offtakers, rather than them being the very reason we exist. And as soon as we truly embraced customers, we discover all these ways in which we simultaneously provide them with better service and better value through a more efficient system. It’s just the equivalent of supermarkets pricing goods to clear, rather than letting them go off.
I think the big challenge for the energy sector now – and there’s a real risk that legacy thinking kills this – but the real opportunity and challenge is to make this the norm. It shouldn’t be a weird add-on in one winter in a crisis. It’s like every day, there are a bunch of people, turning electric generation on and off. There’s a whole bunch of companies investing heavily in things like batteries. And the ability to shift demand around is just as big, a potential contributor to an efficient system. In fact, it’s better because you don’t have to buy any assets. And so I think we shouldn’t be thinking this has been an add-on system, it is the system.
It’s insanely popular, too, just be really clear. We got 100,000 customers asking for smart meters during that programme just to participate.
CB: The last question neatly segues into this. Technology is a key part of being able to do that, but also your broader pitch to customers. A big part of this transition to EVs requires integrating very well with your technology. But how do you deal with customers that aren’t up to date? Who don’t necessarily have smartphones, who aren’t digitally savvy? How do you ensure that they’re not left behind?
GJ: I tell you what, those customers were being brutalised in the old energy industry. If they’re calling a legacy energy company that has got a 45-minute wait on the phones and then you get through to someone and they can’t help you, because it’s got to be a different department, so they promise to call you back and they don’t call me back, and then they hand me through to another department, and you just do all of the security questions, just as they’re closing the line, that was the experience those people had in energy.
So the first thing is great technology enables you to provide everybody with a better service. Octopus’s magic is that when you phone us up, 95% of the time, the person you are speaking to can sort out your problem there and then, because of technology [which is known as Kraken]. Fewer things go wrong, because of technology.
Second thing is, I’m so sorry, I can’t remember the number, but, actually, there are relatively few people in the UK that don’t have access to a smartphone. And if we think about things like everything from universal credit to the ability to buy an enormous range of products and services, it requires a smartphone. And the most important thing is making sure that wherever someone has got the access, we enable them to become part of an efficient system.
For the very small number of people that don’t have those technologies, it’s very unlikely you’d have an EV and not have a smartphone. And so a lot of the technologies we really need to optimise to make the system efficient for everyone, like EVs, naturally you are going to find the people that have the kit.
So I think the most important thing is you look at everybody, regardless of where they are, but you don’t get held back by saying that everything’s universal, right? After all, Aldi and Lidl, great supermarkets, but we don’t prevent them from rolling out because some people might not be able to get there. In fact, the more they’ve rolled out, the more they’ve been able to become closer to being universally accessible anyway.
You know, things like when the iPhone launched it was £435 plus I think about minimum £35 a month. It was a super premium product. But, within five years, it paved the way to the $50 Android, $20 Android, the ubiquitous Android that has transformed not only the lives of people in wealthy countries, but many developing countries, too.
People who try to hold new technology to the bar of universality are typically protecting some sort of legacy against the technology improvements that benefit consumers and we should not have much patience for that.
For example, someone recently wrote to me because their 700-year old house had a heat pump that didn’t always work efficiently – by the way, I think it was badly installed and we can fix that – but there’s not that many 700-year old houses, and I’d love to serve them. But 20% of households don’t have gas in the UK, so heat pumps are held to this idea that they have got to work for everyone in all situations, which, by the way, they are better than gas because every house has got electricity and only 80% have got gas. So even when we talk about universality, we are usually using it for a false comparison anyway.
CB: Thank you.
GJ: Thank you.
The post The Carbon Brief Interview: Octopus Energy’s Greg Jackson appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Greenhouse Gases
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.

The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.

Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured

UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.

‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Greenhouse Gases
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.

The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.


The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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