It has been more than one year since the gavel came down at the last UN biodiversity summit, where almost every country in the world agreed on a plan to protect nature.
The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework was signed off at the COP15 summit in Montreal, Canada in December 2022. (See Carbon Brief’s in-depth summary of the key outcomes.)
The landmark deal contained a number of goals and targets for countries to achieve over the coming years – such as setting aside land for wildlife, reducing pesticide risks and restoring ecosystems.
In the months since, more nature pledges have been announced, a new biodiversity fund was established and more science showing the impacts of humans on nature has been published.
Countries will gather at the next UN biodiversity summit, due to be held in Colombia this October, to take stock of progress since the deal was given the green light and submit new national plans outlining how they will protect biodiversity.
Carbon Brief has taken an in-depth look at progress on individual nature issues and the key biodiversity updates since the COP15 summit.
- What was agreed at the UN biodiversity summit in Montreal?
- What has happened since the Global Biodiversity Framework was adopted?
- Key negotiation issues
- What do we know about the next UN biodiversity summit?
What was agreed at the UN biodiversity summit in Montreal?
The UN biodiversity summit takes place every two years, unlike the climate COP, which takes place annually.
At COP15 – the last round of biodiversity talks in Montreal in December 2022 – almost every country in the world agreed to a landmark deal to repair nature.
The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) included four long-term global goals and 23 specific targets, with an overall mission of halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030.
Some of the key targets include conserving 30% of the world’s land and 30% of the ocean by 2030, reducing the impact of invasive species, cutting pesticides, sustainably managing agriculture and prioritising involvement of Indigenous peoples and local communities in different ways.
Alongside the overall framework, dozens of other decisions were made around the more technical aspects of the negotiations, including figuring out ways to monitor national progress and gather finance to fund action, particularly in lower-income countries.
Although the agreements made at the summit are not legally binding, nations also agreed on a plan to report on, review and voluntarily increase their ambitions to tackle biodiversity loss. This is similar to the plan drawn up to implement the Paris Agreement for climate change.
A lack of implementation was widely cited as one of the major factors behind the failure of the Aichi targets, the last set of global biodiversity aims.
Although the COP15 agreement was widely seen as a success, some countries – particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo – felt frustrated and outraged at the manner in which the GBF was given the green light.
In the final stages of the summit, the deal was seen to be quickly gavelled through by summit president, Chinese environment minister Huang Runqiu, despite objections from the DRC minutes earlier in the plenary.
Following the close of the plenary, there were arguments over the manner in which the final approval happened, but all countries eventually supported the deal.
In the wake of the agreement, UN secretary general António Guterres said that “we are finally starting to forge a peace pact with nature”.
Canadian environment minister Steven Guilbeault said that the GBF is a “major win for our planet and for all of humanity”, which will chart a course “away from the relentless destruction of habitats and species”.
The International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity welcomed the “timely recognition” of Indigenous peoples and local community contributions, roles, rights and responsibilities to nature. A statement from the group said:
“We have spoken and you have heard us, let us now put those words into action.”
What has happened since the Global Biodiversity Framework was adopted?
Several events and meetings since COP15 have addressed nature and biodiversity in different ways.
On 15 February 2023, Dr David Cooper took over from Elizabeth Maruma Mrema as the new acting executive secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The CBD is an international treaty established in 1992 with the objective of conserving and sustainably using biodiversity, and ensuring the fair sharing of benefits from the use of genetic resources.
Before his appointment, Cooper had assisted the CBD secretariat as deputy executive secretary, contributing to a “successful finalisation and adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework”, according to the CBD. He was a lead author of three editions of the Global Biodiversity Outlook and other assessments.
Mrema was appointed deputy executive director of the UN Environment Programme.
March saw the emergence of the High Seas Treaty, a legally binding global agreement for conserving and sustainably using areas of the ocean beyond national jurisdictions – also known as the “high seas” or international waters. Carbon Brief reported that the treaty “provides the framework for establishing protected areas where previously there had not been a clear mechanism for doing so”. (For more on the high seas treaty, see: Oceans.)
The Amazon Summit, held in August last year, gathered leaders of the eight Amazon basin countries, who delivered the Belém Declaration. The document will strengthen the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization to prevent the rainforest “from reaching the point of no return”. The summit’s outcomes were labelled as “hopeful, but insufficient” by various civil and Indigenous organisations for having no specific targets for curbing deforestation.
In late 2023, countries from the Amazon, the Congo Basin and south-east Asia agreed to protect their rainforests and boost nature finance during the Three Basins Summit in the Republic of the Congo. However, experts told Carbon Brief at the time that the meeting failed to reach a unified alliance and was, ultimately, “underwhelming”.
October marked the official end of COP15 with a meeting in Nairobi, which served to finish off some “outstanding business in Montreal” and advance the recommendations from the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) on implementation and review. Delegates also issued a draft recommendation on climate change and biodiversity.
Key negotiation issues
Over the past year, there have been a number of summits, finance pledges and intergovernmental talks relating to biodiversity.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the progress on the key biodiversity COP negotiation topics and related issues in the months since Montreal – from movement on the “30 by 30” goal to the focus on Indigenous rights.
Halting and reversing biodiversity loss
Back in Montreal, countries agreed that the overall mission of the GBF should be to “halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030”.
The GBF has been likened to the “Paris Agreement for nature”, with some comparing the 2030 goal of halting and reversing biodiversity loss to the aspirational 1.5C temperature limit.
After the GBF was agreed, Carbon Brief spoke to a range of biodiversity scientists who said that halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030 would be incredibly challenging.
A landmark report released in 2019 by the world’s biodiversity authority, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), found that one million animal and plant species now face extinction. This is more than at any other point in human history.
Across the world, populations of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish decreased by an average of 69% between 1970 and 2016, according to a 2022 WWF report on more than 30,000 animal populations. In tropical central and South America, the animal populations covered by the study fell by an average of 94% over this period.
Scientists also told Carbon Brief that achieving the mission would largely be decided by meeting the targets of the GBF that tackle the direct causes of biodiversity loss.
These include target 18, which addresses subsidies harmful to biodiversity; target 7, which addresses pollution; and targets 5 and 9, which address the “sustainable use” of biodiversity. (Progress on several targets is discussed in more detail below.)
One issue that negotiators have continued to work on since the GBF was agreed is developing a set of indicators for measuring biodiversity loss.
While many people associate “biodiversity” with iconic species and tropical rainforests, the term actually covers the whole spectrum of Earth’s biological diversity, ranging from the organisation of genes within organisms to the communities of animals and plants that make up ecosystems. This complexity makes biodiversity loss particularly difficult to measure.
At COP15, countries decided to set up a technical group to develop biodiversity loss indicators ahead of COP16, spearheaded by Colombia and the UK. Comprising 45 experts, the group has met several times virtually in 2023 and will meet for in-person discussions in Cambridge, England in March of this year.
30 by 30
One aim that grabbed the attention of politicians, media, activists – and even celebrities – at COP15 was the pledge to protect 30% of the world’s land and seas for nature by 2030, commonly referred to as “30 by 30”. It is contained within target 3 of the GBF.
The fight to get 30 by 30 into the GBF was spearheaded by a group of countries calling itself the High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People (HACN&P). It is led by Costa Rica and France, with the UK acting as a co-chair for the ocean component of the pledge.
Since COP15, the HACN&P set up a secretariat directed by former Costa Rican biodiversity negotiator Rita El Zaghloul.
During an interview at the COP28 climate summit in Dubai in December 2023, El Zaghloul told Carbon Brief that with the GBF agreed, the HACN&P has shifted its focus to ensuring the most vulnerable countries have the tools required to meet the target.
At COP28, she announced that the HACN&P had created a new “30 by 30 solutions toolkit” and a financial and technical “matchmaking” service. Explaining the purpose of these tools to Carbon Brief, she said:
“Because it was HACN&P that started the 30 by 30 movement, it is also our responsibility to ensure that countries have the sufficient support and tools to meet the target.
“We know that it is an ambitious target, because we have to move from approximately 17% on land and 8% on oceans [that is currently protected] to 30% on both. Many of the megadiverse countries are developing countries and small island developing states, so we need to provide them with the tools.”
Elsewhere at COP28, China surprised delegates by announcing that it was joining the HACN&P. The announcement came from COP15 president and China environment minister Huang Runqiu via videolink at a high-level session on 30 by 30.
El Zaghloul told Carbon Brief that the announcement came after more than two years of talks with China, who were initially reluctant to join the initiative while still maintaining the “neutral” role of COP15 president.
As of the end of COP28 in December 2023, 118 countries had joined the HACN&P. This compares to 114 in December 2022. (There are 196 countries, including the EU, that are party to the CBD. All of these countries have committed to 30 by 30 through the GBF.)
Finance
At COP15 in Montreal, the gavel went down adopting the GBF and its finance package amid controversy and objections from biodiverse developing countries.
The final finance target seeks to mobilise “at least $200bn per year” by 2030 from “all sources” – domestic, international, public and private. For comparison, the biodiversity finance gap for conservation is estimated at roughly $700bn per year for this decade.
Developed countries – along with others that “voluntarily assume” their obligations – are expected to “substantially and progressively increase” their international finance flows for nature “to at least $20bn per year by 2025 and to at least $30bn per year by 2030”, according to the GBF’s Target 19l.
Despite calls from many developing countries for a distinct fund housed under the COP, COP15 requested the Global Environment Facility (GEF) set up a special trust fund. This would be called the “Global Biodiversity Framework Fund” (GBF Fund) and be established “in 2023, and until 2030” to receive “financing from all sources”.
On June 29 last year, the GEF’s governing board approved plans to set up this “game-changing” new fund to finance the Framework’s implementation.
The GEF’s governing board approved plans to establish the fund on 29 June last year. A month later, at the GEF assembly in Vancouver, 186 countries ratified and officially launched the GBF Fund.
At the GEF assembly, COP15 hosts Canada contributed an initial capitalisation of C$200m ($147.3m), while the UK pledged £10m ($12.6m).
As much as 20% of the funds are intended for supporting Indigenous-led initiatives to protect and conserve biodiversity.
Indigenous groups – often sidelined from direct access to conservation funding – welcomed the dedicated allocation. Brazil’s Indigenous minister Sonia Guajajara pointed out that this “should not just be an aspirational criterion, but a concrete target that needs to be constantly updated” and called for “shared governance mechanisms that include recipient countries”.
Separately, at least 36% of the fund’s resources are to support small island developing states and least-developed countries.
At the assembly, Cuba and Honduras called for “simplified processes for obtaining” funding, the Earth News Bulletin reported. At the same time, the DRC, Namibia, Yemen and the Gambia “urged” more direct access to funds and minimising transaction costs.
At a side event on the sidelines of the UN general assembly in September, Germany pledged the final €40m ($43.3m) to put the fund into operation.
On Nature Day at COP28, Japan then pledged ¥650m ($43.8m). While this took the fund’s initial total capitalisation to about $247m, this falls far short of the “at least $20bn per year by 2025” target that developed countries were to raise. The US and EU, who supported and “welcomed” the fund, are yet to commit any new money.
The fund’s governing body will meet for the first time on 8 and 9 February this year in Washington DC to discuss its budget, business plan and how resources are allocated, with projects set to be funded by the end of 2024.
Projects backed by all eligible countries will have to go through consecutive selection rounds for funding based on criteria, including their potential to generate global environmental benefits, alignment with the GBF’s goals and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs), and their ability to raise resources from the private sector.
Not all the money raised will go to funding biodiversity projects directly: it will also have to cover staff costs, travel, consultants, monitoring and independent evaluation.
Additionally, if the fund’s current budget request is approved, it will have to pay the World Bank – the GEF’s host– an indirect charge of 11% on all direct costs for administrative support – a 300% increase from last year.
The UN Environment Programme’s State of Finance for Nature 2023 report, released at COP28, found that public finance still accounts for the majority of conservation spending in the GBF’s first year. At the same time, it found that contributions from biodiversity offsets and credits grew sharply in 2022 as countries including the UK, France and Australia rolled out new nature markets.
The report also noted that philanthropy – “driven by support for 30 by 30” – and private finance mobilised by debt instruments such as blue bonds and rhino bonds grew last year as well. But, it added, these small numbers paled in comparison with $7tn in nature-negative investments made the same year.
Implementation
Ensuring that the targets contained within the GBF are actually implemented by countries will be the major challenge in the coming years, experts tell Carbon Brief.
Details for how the agreement should be implemented – the so-called “teeth” of the deal – are contained within Section J of the GBF itself and a separate document called “mechanisms for planning, monitoring, reporting and review”. (It is worth noting that the GBF and its underlying documents are not legally binding.)
The agreed plan for how the GBF should be implemented by countries follows three key steps – sometimes referred to as “present, review and ratchet”. This closely mirrors the implementation schedule of the Paris Agreement.
Section J of the GBF specifies that countries should present national biodiversity strategies and action plans, or “NBSAPs”, that are “in alignment” with the GBF and its goals and targets. The underlying document adds that this should be done “by COP16”.
Since the end of COP15, France, the EU, Luxembourg, Hungary, Japan and Spain have submitted updated NBSAPs. The UK has indicated it will release its new NBSAP in May of this year.
In September 2023, an “accelerator partnership” to “fast-track and upscale” new NBSAPs was officially launched at New York Climate Week, after first being agreed at COP15. The initiative is headed by Colombia and Germany, with the support of various UN bodies.
As for the “review” step, countries have agreed to conduct a global analysis of whether NBSAPs align with the GBF at COP16 and hold a “global review” of progress at COP17 and COP19.
After this, countries “may take the outcome of the global reviews into account in future revisions and implementation of their” NBSAPs. This is the “ratchet” element of the implementation mechanism.
In October 2023, negotiators met in Nairobi to officially close COP15. The aim of this meeting was to tie up loose ends remaining from the landmark agreement of the GBF in Montreal in 2022.
The event brought together scientific and technical experts to give advice on what should be included in the global review earmarked for COP17 in 2026. Bernadette Fischler Hooper, the head of global advocacy at WWF International, told Carbon Brief:
“The technical experts and scientific experts discussed what should be in this report. So it was very focused on what that report should contain.”
Nature-based solutions
The use of nature to mitigate and adapt to climate change – known as nature-based solutions – featured a number of times in the GBF’s targets.
At COP28 in Dubai, nature-based solutions were also discussed at different stages. The global stocktake text – a key outcome of the summit that showed how countries can increase action to meet climate goals – “encourages” the implementation of nature-based solutions.
A report released in June by the International Institute for Sustainable Development recommended ways to ensure that nature-based solutions will boost biodiversity and ecosystems.
In a list of draft recommendations from the final round of intergovernmental talks on nature-based solutions, the co-chairs suggested ways to support their use.
These include setting up a database of policies related to nature-based solutions to enable learning between countries, analysing the technical tools available to support implementing such solutions and making a how-to guide for accessing finance for these projects.
At COP28, more than 150 companies and financial institutions said they would increase investments in nature-based solutions.
At COP16, nature-based solutions will likely feature in many national biodiversity action plans and will continue to be one of the key talking points, experts tell Carbon Brief.
For example, Spain intends to prioritise a number of different areas including nature-based solutions over the next few years to meet its climate and biodiversity targets, according to its revised NBSAP.
Invasive species
Invasive alien species are animals, plants or other organisms that have spread into places outside their natural habitats. These can negatively impact both nature and people, according to IPBES.
Target 6 of the GBF aims to reduce the establishment and introduction of invasive alien species by 50% by 2030.
Since the GBF was agreed at COP15, there have been advances in the knowledge of the distribution of invasive species across the world and the ways countries can handle biological invasions.
In September last year, IPBES published an assessment report on invasive alien species, which notes that humans have introduced 37,000 invasive alien species.
The report, based on more than 13,000 scientific studies, says that despite this, more than 80% of countries lack national legislation or regulations to address invasive species. However, it outlines three frameworks for governments to manage biological invasions, from introduction pathway management to species-based and site-based management. (For more, read Carbon Brief’s coverage of the IPBES report.)
According to reporting by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), the CBD’s SBSTTA Nairobi meeting in October emphasised the need to develop strategies to simultaneously address two main causes of biodiversity loss – climate change and invasive alien species – and to step up collaboration among environmental agreements to implement the GBF.
It also reported that the SBSTTA adopted eight resolutions, including one on invasive alien species. Among other things, such a resolution addresses how to identify and minimise cross-border e-commerce of live organisms or manage invasive alien species by preventing risks from climate change.
The secretariat of the CBD issued a document providing draft voluntary guidance and advice on matters regarding invasive alien species. These guidelines included the best methodologies for managing invasive alien species, such as cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness and multicriteria analysis.
The SBSTTA recommended the use of the IPBES report on invasive species for implementing the GBF, the CBD and NBSAPs. It also called on COP16 to acknowledge the importance of enhancing information availability and accessibility to strengthen the management of invasive species, according to the ENB.
The full IPBES assessment on invasive species could be approved at COP16, ENB reported.
Links between climate and biodiversity
Several experts tell Carbon Brief that there was a marked increase in the attention paid to biodiversity and nature at the UN climate summit, COP28, compared to previous editions.
An event hosted during the summit’s thematic “nature” day saw the hosts of COP28 and COP15 – the United Arab Emirates and China, respectively – announce a Joint Statement on Climate, Nature and People.
The statement included a pledge by its signatories to work towards “comprehensiveness and cohesion” between countries’ national climate policies (“nationally determined contributions” or “NDCs”) and their national plans for nature (“national biodiversity strategies and action plans” or “NBSAPs”). Dr David Cooper, CBD acting executive secretary, says the statement was “very welcome”. He tells Carbon Brief:
“Countries have to now, in the light of the Kunming-Montreal [Global] Biodiversity Framework, develop their national targets and include them in their national biodiversity strategies and action plans, and they are currently doing that.
“It’s clear that in light of the stocktake [at COP28] NDCs will have to be ramped up. So that’s a big opportunity to make sure that the role of nature, the role of biodiversity [and] ecosystems is fully used in that…The need to protect those sinks and so on is also an additional motivation for strengthening the ambition of the NDCs.”
Pepe Clarke, global oceans practice lead at WWF-International, tells Carbon Brief:
“We’re continuing to see closer integration of biodiversity considerations into global climate negotiations, which is a really positive and continuing trend.”
Indigenous rights
According to the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity (IIFB), Indigenous rights figure in seven of the GBF’s targets, including spatial planning, area-based conservation, sustainable use and participation and respect for the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities.
For example, Target 22 aims to ensure the participation of Indigenous peoples and local communities in decision-making and the respect of their rights over their lands and territories.
After the framework was agreed, the IIFB welcomed such recognition and said it would collaborate to implement the GBF and apply the “monitoring and reporting framework through community-based monitoring”.
In a meeting convened in November 2023, delegates reviewed the work programme for the section of the CBD that aims to respect and preserve Indigenous peoples’ knowledge and practices. They will continue these discussions at COP16.
The working group also looked at creating a permanent subsidiary body to offer advice to the COP and to enhance the participation of Indigenous peoples and local communities in other subsidiary bodies of the CBD.
In a comment piece, WWF’s head of policy research and development, Guido Broekhoven, said one of the goals of the GBF Fund (GBFF), created in August 2023, is elevating funding for conservation actions undertaken by Indigenous peoples.
The Global Environmental Fund, which administers the biodiversity fund, allocated 20% of funds from the GBFF to Indigenous peoples and local communities. The first instalment of the fund is expected to be delivered before COP16, Down to Earth reported.
Lucy Mulenkei, co-chair of the IIFB, said in a press release that “the creation of this fund and its commitment to supporting Indigenous Peoples and local communities is an important and clear recognition of the fundamental role they have had for generations [in] protecting biodiversity”.
However, Broekhoven noted in his comment piece that there needs to be more climate finance directly reaching communities protecting ecosystems, such as the Amazon and the Congo rainforest. He said that doing so “is critical to encouraging all countries to announce ambitious NBSAPs ahead of COP16 and to keeping the goal of halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030 in sight”.
Oceans
In the year since COP15, the world has moved forward on several marine-related treaties and policies, including the High Seas Treaty, an agreement on fishery subsidies at the World Trade Organization (see: harmful subsidies) and a global treaty on plastic pollution. In addition, debates around deep-sea mining have continued at both the national and international levels.
Officially finalised in June, the High Seas Treaty – a legally binding framework governing the use and conservation of international waters – has garnered more than 80 signatures since it opened for countries to sign at the UN general assembly in September. Dr Rachel Tiller, a chief scientist at Norway’s SINTEF Ocean, tells Carbon Brief:
“The path of getting a treaty up and standing and walking, is that first you have to sign it. And that doesn’t mean anything else other than that you intend not to in any way hinder its continued life…You’ve only said that ‘we have an intention of continuing this process and we intend to be part of it’.”
On 22 January, Palau became the first country to ratify the treaty. In total, 60 countries must do so before the treaty can come into effect. During this time, Clarke says, technical preparatory work can be done, but no formal work under the treaty body can be undertaken.
Tiller adds:
“What I worry, and what some others worry, about is now it’s going to be a race to do everything before they ratify – that everybody wants to do whatever they need to do before there’s some kind of legal agreement stopping them or hindering them in some way.”
While Norway recently approved seabed mining in its territorial waters in the Arctic Ocean, debates around such mining in international waters have continued at the International Seabed Authority. There is a “steadily growing number of countries that are coming off the fence” to support a moratorium, or a precautionary pause, on seabed mining, Clarke tells Carbon Brief.
If a pause took effect, Clarke says, “there would also need to be a significant body of work done on the scientific and technical side of things, to better understand the risks associated with seabed mining”. But it is unlikely that an agreement will be reached this year, he adds.
Overall, Clarke tells Carbon Brief:
“There has been quite significant forward progress in terms of the foundational architecture of agreements and government commitments needed to take forward key elements of the ocean policy agenda…[But] we’ve not seen the step change, particularly in protection, that we’re going to need to deliver the GBF in full by 2030.”
Digital sequence information
A new global mechanism and fund for sharing benefits from digital sequence information (DSI) was hailed by many as one of the big wins that clinched the deal at COP15. Digital sequence information refers to data derived from genetic resources, which is often sourced from biodiverse regions and communities who may not always benefit from its publication or use.
The COP decision on DSI established an ad hoc open-ended working group to finesse much of the crucial fine print that remains before COP16.
The group held its first meeting in Geneva in November 2023, where it identified five sets of core questions on how the fund is governed, who contributes to it, who benefits, what “non-monetary benefits” should look like and how the mechanism could work with existing national and other multilateral approaches to benefit-sharing.
According to the meeting report, countries agreed that the fund should contribute to achieving the GBF’s finance target and closing the $700bn biodiversity finance gap, with the COP deciding strategic funding priorities.
Developing and developed countries differed on several subjects, such as legally binding obligations on donors versus voluntary contributions and potential sources of funding, such as profit-sharing or a 1% retail levy on products derived from DSI. Another unresolved issue is how to distribute these benefits: by country allocation, on a project basis or something else.
Japan, Switzerland and the US – which is not party to the CBD – stressed “solely voluntary” contributions to the fund in their submissions, claiming this would be simple and easy to implement quickly.
Countries came together in favour of elements around capacity-building and the fund being used to meet biodiversity-related Sustainable Development Goals and the self-identified needs of Indigenous peoples and local communities..
Brazil, India, Argentina, Indonesia and the African Group maintained that non-monetary benefit sharing should go beyond just capacity building on how to use DSI and could include collaborative research.
According to Third World Network, “a very controversial question” that remains is whether funding allocations should be based, at least partially, on the geographical origins of genetic material.
In its closing plenary on 18 November, the working group adopted a final outcome on possible elements for the mechanism and fund.
But with much of the work still unfinished, they constituted an Informal Advisory Group to carry on intersessional work until the group’s second meeting in August 2024. That group convened online for the first time on 23 January to discuss data governance and DSI databases and is scheduled to meet five more times before August.
DSI developments under the CBD are being closely monitored for coherence with other treaty bodies and access-and-benefit sharing mechanisms, particularly the High Seas Treaty, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) and the World Health Organization’s pandemic preparedness framework.
Amid these ongoing negotiations, groups such as the DSI Scientific Network are calling for all current benefit-sharing mechanisms to be “harmonised” and saying that they should not “hinder” or “undermine” science.
Dr Siva Thambisetty, an intellectual property expert at the London School of Economics and an advisor to the G77+China bloc, tells Carbon Brief that the group’s viewpoint that “biology does not respect UN legal boundaries” is “catchy, but there is nothing natural about DSI use, circulation and storage – the consequences of which are closely connected to infrastructure, power and choice.”
Thambisetty adds that the GBF “must not sideline consensually-formed gains on benefit-sharing” under the High Seas Treaty but, instead, follow its lead.
Harmful subsidies
At COP15, countries agreed to identify – by 2025 – and then “eliminate, phase out or reform incentives, including subsidies” that are harmful for biodiversity.
The agreement also said that these incentives should be “substantially and progressively” reduced by at least $500bn each year by 2030, “starting with the most harmful incentives”.
Harmful subsidies were discussed at the COP28 climate summit in Dubai, particularly around fossil fuels.
The global stocktake text calls for the phasing out of “inefficient…subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible”. (For more on how countries plan to reduce biodiversity harmful subsidies, read Carbon Brief’s Q&A.)
The UN Development Programme recently published a report outlining a “step-by-step” guide to redirecting biodiversity harmful subsidies.
A World Bank report, published in June last year, said that explicit and implicit subsidies for fossil fuels, agriculture and fisheries now exceed $7tn each year. They are “harming people, the planet and economies”, the report said.
Early last year, the UK made moves away from harmful farming subsidies through its new funding scheme for farms in England, which is intended to replace the payments from the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. The UK’s funding scheme was updated with more funding and incentives in recent weeks.
Over the past few months, German farmers have been protesting against government plans to phase out and cut some agricultural subsidies and tax breaks.
In other subsidy developments, the UK and the Gambia were among the countries to recently accept the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on setting new rules to curb fishing-related subsidies.
The deal – agreed in 2022 – has now been accepted by 55 WTO members, which brings it halfway to the 110 needed for it to take effect.
It might “reach the necessary threshold over the next year or so” as subsidy negotiations continue, according to WWF’s Clarke.
These talks are ongoing and a draft text on curbing subsidies that add to overcapacity and overfishing will be discussed at a WTO ministerial conference in Abu Dhabi in February. Clarke tells Carbon Brief that the fishery negotiations are “complex”, adding:
“Colleagues who have now been engaging with this technical negotiation track have really expressed to me how concerned they are about the fact that this seems to be entering into a traditional trade negotiation, where each country is seeking to advance its own interests rather than deal with a common challenge.”
What do we know about the next UN biodiversity summit?
The next biodiversity summit, COP16, will take place in Colombia from 21 October to 1 November 2024. Six cities have offered to host, but the exact location has yet to be decided, according to the CBD.
Turkey withdrew as host last July after being hit by three earthquakes earlier in the year that killed more than 50,000 people and displaced millions.
It is understood that the CBD was in talks with a number of countries in Europe and South America in recent months until Colombia’s offer was announced at COP28 in December 2023.
The country plans to move away from fossil fuels under its current leftwing government, but still relies heavily on oil production revenue.
CBD acting executive secretary Cooper says it is “exciting” for the conference to take place in a “mega-diverse country” with “very strong Indigenous peoples’ organisations [and] a very strong scientific base”.
He adds that the Colombian environment minister, Susana Muhamed, is a “very inspiring leader” who could boost political will and “momentum in implementing the GBF”.
Muhamad has said that the slogan of COP16 will be “peace for nature”.
Other environment ministers from around the world will attend COP16, but presidents and prime ministers are generally not invited to the UN biodiversity summits. Cooper says that there are currently no plans to invite them to Colombia either. He tells Carbon Brief:
“It is important, though, that leaders are fully engaged. We will only achieve the goals and targets of the Kunming framework through a whole government approach.”
Cooper says he wants to see nations to “come with a strong commitment and strong actions already in place”. He notes:
“The first important function of COP16 is to put the spotlight on countries in terms of what has been achieved, what is being achieved, what hasn’t been achieved and needs to be achieved.”
Ahead of COP16, countries need to submit updated national biodiversity strategies and action plans that better align with the Kunming-Montreal deal (See: Implementation).
China, France, Japan, Hungary, the EU and others have already submitted their plans.
Other issues due to be finalised at COP16 include the monitoring framework for the GBF and a strategy for financial resource mobilisation. Talks on digital sequence information are also due to wrap up, and Cooper says that he wants to see “very clear progress” towards 2025 financial goals.
Another expected announcement is a global plan of action on the ties between health and biodiversity.
Over the course of 2024, meetings of different groups focused on indicators, risk assessment, benefit sharing and implementation will take place. Key SBSTTA and implementation subsidiary body meetings will happen in Nairobi in May.
In addition, 2024 is a major election year for dozens of countries around the world – including biodiverse superpowers India, Indonesia, Mexico and Brazil. The DRC also held a presidential vote late last year.
Cooper says that while nature is “less of a political football than climate change”, there is always a risk of “populist politicians or vested interests trying to drive a wedge” between sectors – especially agriculture and biodiversity conservation. He tells Carbon Brief:
“We have to make the case and really try and prevent these communities from being driven apart.”
Road to COP16
| 22-26 Jan | Conference on cooperation among the biodiversity-related conventions for implementation of the GBF | Bern |
| 5-9 Feb | Meeting of the GEF Council | Washington DC |
| 26-29 Feb | World Trade Organization ministerial meeting | Abu Dhabi |
| 26 Feb-1 Mar | UN Environment Assembly | Nairobi |
| 18-29 Mar | 29th session of the International Seabed Authority, Part I | Kingston |
| 10-12 Apr | UN Ocean Decade conference | Barcelona, Spain |
| 23-29 Apr | Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on plastic pollution | Ottawa |
| 13-18 May | CBD Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice | Nairobi |
| 21-29 May | CBD Subsidiary Body on Implementation | Nairobi |
| 17-21 Jun | Meeting of the GEF Council | Washington DC |
| 15 Jul-2 Aug | 29th session of the International Seabed Authority, Part II | Kingston |
| 12-16 Aug | Meeting of the open-ended working group on digital sequencing information | Montreal |
| 10-24 Sep | UN general assembly | New York |
| 16-18 Oct | CBD Subsidiary Body on Implementation | – |
| 21 Oct-1 Nov | CBD COP16 | Colombia |
The post Q&A: What progress has been made on protecting nature a year on from COP15? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What progress has been made on protecting nature a year on from COP15?
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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